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In den letzten Jahrzehnten hat sich in Lateinamerika ein neuer Kontext für die Durchsetzung von 
Menschenrechten herausgebildet. Die organisatorische Entwicklung des Interamerikanischen 
Menschenrechtsschutzsystems (IAS), die Verabschiedung neuer Verfassungen durch die nationalen 
Gesetzgeber und die Anwendung innovativer Verfassungsauslegungen durch die maßgeblichen 
Gerichte in der Region haben zur Entstehung eines kosmopolitischen lateinamerikanischen 
Konstitutionalismus geführt. In diesem neuen Kontext hat der Interamerikanische Gerichtshof für 
Menschenrechte (IACtHR) damit begonnen, die gerichtliche Überprüfung innerstaatlicher Gesetze zu 
praktizieren, d.h. er hat bei mehreren Gelegenheiten nationale Behörden angewiesen, innerstaatliche 
Gesetze wegen ihrer Unvereinbarkeit mit der Amerikanischen Menschenrechtskonvention (ACHR) für 
ungültig zu erklären. Angesichts der zunehmenden Konflikte zwischen nationalen und internationalen 
Menschenrechtsautoritäten zielt diese Studie darauf ab, den legitimsten und effektivsten Ansatz für die 
Praxis der interamerikanischen Konventionskontrolle zu finden. Ausgehend von der Debatte über die 
innerstaatliche richterliche Normenkontrolle werden zunächst die Gründe für die Praxis einer starken 
internationalen Normenkontrolle untersucht. Anschließend adressiert diese Studie Theorien, die 
versucht haben, die interamerikanische Konventionskontrolle zu schwächen. Diese Theorien haben sich 
häufig für die Übernahme des nationalen Ermessensspielraums auf der Grundlage der Rechtsprechung 
des Europäischen Gerichtshofes für Menschenrechte ausgesprochen. Schließlich plädiert die 
vorliegende Studie für eine kontextbasierte Theorie der interamerikanischen gerichtlichen Überprüfung 
und versucht, den nationalen Ermessensspielraum mit dem kosmopolitischen Konstitutionalismus 
Lateinamerikas in Einklang zu bringen. Die Theorie der gemischten Form der Konventionskontrolle 
befasst sich mit der Entwicklung der interamerikanischen Menschenrechtsgesetzgebung und 
Rechtsprechung. Ihr zufolge sollte das IACtHR in Fällen, in denen Mitgliedstaaten die durch die 
interamerikanischen Menschenrechtsgesetze geschützten bürgerlichen und politischen Rechte eklatant 
verletzen, eine starke Konventionskontrolle praktizieren. Dies ist auf die starke normative Dimension 
dieser Rechte innerhalb der interamerikanischen Menschenrechtsgesetzgebung zurückzuführen. 
Dagegen sollte das IACtHR dieser Theorie zufolge in Fällen, die sozioökonomische Rechte betreffen, 
eine schwache gerichtliche Überprüfung praktizieren, da diese erst spät in den interamerikanischen 
Menschenrechtsgesetzen und der Rechtsprechung auftauchen. Diese Studie beabsichtigt auch, die 
Nützlichkeit dieser Theorie für den kosmopolitischen Konstitutionalismus Lateinamerikas konkret 
aufzuzeigen, indem sie auf brasilianische Gesetze angewandt wird. Vor allem beansprucht diese Studie 
jedoch den Wert dieses rechtswissenschaftlichen Ansatzes für die Förderung der Entwicklung des 









In recent decades, a new human rights enforcement context has emerged in Latin America. The 
organizational evolution of the Inter-American System for Human Rights Protection (IAS), the adoption 
of new constitutions by national legislatures, and the adoption of innovative constitutional 
interpretations by the most authoritative courts in the region have led to the emergence of Latin 
American cosmopolitan constitutionalism. Within this new context, the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights (IACtHR) has started practicing the judicial review of domestic laws, i.e., on several occasions, 
it has ordered national authorities to invalidate domestic laws due to their incompatibility with the 
American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR). By reviewing domestic laws, the IACtHR has placed 
itself in the middle of a dialogue between legislatures and courts that was long seen as an exclusively 
domestic conversation within Latin American constitutionalism. This strong form of international 
jurisprudence has made the normative questions relating to judicial review much more complex to 
address. Given the increasing conflicts between domestic and inter-American human rights authorities, 
this study aims to find the most legitimate and effective approach to the practice of inter-American 
judicial review. In line with this, and drawing on the debate about domestic judicial review, it first 
assesses the reasons behind the practice of strong international judicial review. In order to offer a better 
form of inter-institutional interaction within the IAS, this study later addresses theories that have sought 
to weaken the practice of inter-American judicial review based on the principle of subsidiarity. These 
theories have often advocated for the adoption of the national margin of appreciation based on the 
European experience with this concept of deference to national authorities. Finally, this study advocates 
for a context-based theory of inter-American judicial review and tries to reconcile the national margin 
of appreciation with Latin American cosmopolitan constitutionalism. The theory of mixed-form inter-
American judicial review looks at the evolution of inter-American human rights legislation and 
jurisprudence. According to this theory, the IACtHR should practice strong inter-American judicial 
review in cases in which member states flagrantly violate the civil and political rights protected by inter-
American human rights law. This is due to the arguably strong normative dimension of these rights 
within inter-American human rights law. By contrast, according to this theory, the IACtHR should 
practice weak inter-American judicial review in cases involving socioeconomic rights due their late 
emergence within inter-American human rights law. This study also intends to prove the usefulness of 
mixed-form theory for Latin American cosmopolitan constitutionalism by applying it to Brazilian laws. 
Most importantly, it seeks to prove the value of this jurisprudential approach for promoting the evolution 

















Für Paul  
 iv 
 
Stand up against governments, against God. 
Stay irresponsible. 
Say only what we know & imagine. 
Absolutes are coercion. 
Change is absolute. 
Ordinary mind includes eternal perceptions. 
Observe what’s vivid. 
Notice what you notice. 
Catch yourself thinking. 
Vividness is self-selecting. 
If we don’t show anyone, we’re free to write anything. 
Remember the future. 
 





Come writers and critics, who prophesize with your pen 
And keep your eyes wide, the chance won’t come again 
And don’t speak too soon 
For the wheel’s still in spin 
And there’s no tellin' who that it’s namin' 
For the loser now will be later to win 
For the times they are a-changin' 
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i. The Inter-American Judicial Review of Domestic Laws  
 
If constitutional lawyers were asked to name one indispensable feature of constitutional 
democracies, many would probably pick the judicial review of legislation. The fact that courts 
invalidate legal texts is currently a part of everyday life in constitutional democracies.1 In 
textbooks on constitutional theory, judicial review now appears as a natural element of 
constitutional law.2 The historical descriptions of judicial review often claim its spontaneous 
and logical emergence within the institutional apparatus of modern democracies.3 Judicial 
review has successfully migrated to constitutional orders around the globe. This attests to the 
argument that it was an idea too good to be kept in its own original context.4 Over time, judicial 
review has ceased to be a spontaneous form of judicial self-empowerment and nowadays figures 
as an established legal practice, which is institutionalized within many legal systems.5 
  
As we all know, the practice of judicial review has far reaching consequences for the 
evolution of domestic constitutionalism. These consequences can be easily observed when we 
focus on a specific constitutional order under the authority of a powerful constitutional court. 
                                                 
1“The power of courts to review the constitutionality of legal norms enacted by democratic organs is one of the 
central features of constitutional or liberal democracies.” Carlos Santiago Nino, The Constitution of Deliberative 
Democracy, (New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 1996), 187. “[J]udicial empowerment through the 
constitutionalization of rights and the establishment of judicial review now appear to be the widely accepted 
conventional wisdom of contemporary constitutional thought.” Ran Hirschl, Towards Juristocracy. The Origins 
and Consequences of the New Constitutionalism, (Cambridge, London: Harvard University Press, 2004), 2. 
2This is particularly true in Germany. See: Christoph Möllers, “Scope and Legitimacy of Judicial Review in 
German Constitutional Law – the Court versus the Political Process,” in Debates in German Public Law, eds. 
Hermann Pünder, Christian Waldhoff, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2014), 3-26. 
3In a critical perspective see: Michel Troper, “The Logic of Justification of Judicial Review,” International Journal 
of Constitutional Law 1, (2003), 99-121.   
4It is common sense that judicial review emerged in the world of law when the U.S. Supreme Court decided 
Marbury v. Madison. There have been some scholars that contest the practical importance of this case for the 
contemporary notion of judicial review. On this issue see, for instance: Arguing Marbury v. Madison, ed. Mark 
Tushnet, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005). It is possible to follow the evolution of judicial review in its 
original context with Bruce Ackerman’s work, see: Bruce Ackerman, We the People 1-3, (Cambridge et al.: 
Harvard University Press, 1991-2014). Despite this debate, the most decisive issue is that the concept of judicial 
review has become institutionally disruptive within contemporary constitutional democracies. 
5Historically, Hans Kelsen was responsible for the institutionalization of judicial review with his work for the 1919 
Austrian constituent assembly. For Kelsen, this institutionalization was the most efficient mechanism to solve the 
inconsistencies of decisions on the validity of legislation that were issued by different courts within domestic law: 
“a centralization of the judicial review of legislation was highly desirable in the interest of the authority of the 
constitution.” Hans Kelsen, “Judicial Review of Legislation: A Comparative Study of the Austrian and the 
American Constitution,” The Journal of Politics 4, no. 2, (1942), 183-200, 186. The constitutionalization of judicial 
review around the globe proves that many political and judicial authorities have shared this interpretation of the 
relationship between judicial review and the authority of constitutional law.  
 2 
The Brazilian constitutional court, for instance, has turned the constitutional order into its own 
scrapbook. The court has the power to add or to strike down pieces of legislation as it pleases. 
Its decisions are nationally broadcast, and the judges often behave similarly to legislators, 
although, as unelected officials, they enjoy no democratic authority.6 This broad interpretation 
of judicial review has not only been practiced by the Brazilian constitutional court. Indeed, 
broad-scope judicial review is present in many constitutional orders, which explains why it has 
been intensely discussed by legal scholars from different constitutional backgrounds in the last 
decades.  
 
The amount of literature on judicial review attests to its importance but it also represents 
a challenge for legal scholars aiming to offer a different perspective on the legitimacy and 
effectiveness of judicial review. Despite all the challenges that these legal scholars may face, it 
is worth trying to rethink judicial review given that it has been changing in many legal systems 
due to the increasing authority of international courts within domestic law. Some international 
courts have started reviewing domestic laws, basing their decisions on international treaties. 
These international treaties bind the national legislatures responsible for enacting domestic laws 
and also domestic courts, which are empowered to conduct judicial reviews. This means that 
international judicial review has a transformative role with respect to constitutional lawmaking 
and interpretation, which affects especially domestic legislative and judicial authorities.  
 
International judicial review is a new feature for many constitutional democracies that 
are not members of more advanced international organizations like the European Union.7 The 
consequences of the practice of international judicial review have still not been properly 
debated in terms of their effects on many constitutional orders. This is especially true with 
regard to the Latin American constitutional orders under the authority of the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights (IACtHR). The increasing importance of international human rights 
adjudication in Latin America has been remarkable throughout the organizational evolution of 
                                                 
6The Brazilian constitutional court has decided that discrimination against LGBT people should be considered a 
crime based on the interpretation of legislation on racism. Judicial intervention in this case was arguably necessary 
due to the absence of specific legislation on discrimination based on sexual orientation within domestic law. The 
Brazilian legislature notified the court that several legislative projects were being discussed on the issue. The 
constitutional court has notwithstanding decided that it had authority over the matter due to the legislative inertia 
and delay in enacting specific legislation on this type of discrimination.  
7In Europe, the discussions of international judicial review started gaining more relevance due to jurisprudence of 
the European courts, i.e., the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). 
Outside European law there are some examples of debate on international judicial review. This debate, however, 
is usually led by European scholars. See, for instance, the Cambridge series of books: Studies on International 
Courts and Tribunals, eds. Geir Ulfstein, Andreas Føllesdal. 
 3 
the inter-American System for Human Rights Protection (IAS). Given that international human 
rights law has acquired a privileged position within some constitutional orders, the IACtHR has 
started deciding upon the validity of domestic pieces of legislation, and therefore it has come 
to play a role similar to that of a constitutional court in Latin America.  
 
The IACtHR has empowered itself by practicing inter-American judicial review of 
domestic laws. These laws have been invalidated mostly based on an extensive interpretation 
of a notable provision of the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR). According to 
Art. 2 ACHR, the IAS member states “undertake to adopt, in accordance with their 
constitutional processes” and the ACHR provisions, “such legislative or other measures as may 
be necessary to give effect” to the rights and freedoms recognized in the convention.8 Based 
mostly on Art. 2 ACHR, the IACtHR started invalidating domestic laws that, according to the 
interpretation of the majority of the IACtHR judges, are not in accordance with inter-American 
human rights law.  
 
The most prominent cases of inter-American judicial review involved the IACtHR’s 
invalidation of domestic amnesty statutes, which were adopted by national authorities as a 
condition for bringing an end to authoritarian regimes in Latin America. Since the 2000s, the 
IACtHR has started reviewing the adoption of these amnesty laws and has declared them 
incompatible with the ACHR. The court has understood that these laws often served as an 
obstacle to prosecuting human rights offenders. Due to this incompatibility, the IACtHR has on 
several occasions ordered judicial authorities to invalidate the amnesty statutes within domestic 
law. More recently, after decades of democratic rule in most Latin American countries, the 
IACtHR started extending inter-American review to cases involving socioeconomic rights. This 
illustrates the court’s concern with issues like material inequality and institutional failure in 
Latin America. Recent inter-American case law on socioeconomic rights point to the emergence 
of a specific form of inter-American judicial review of domestic legislation pertaining to these 
rights as well.  
 
The practice of international judicial review illustrates the IACtHR’s increasing 
authority over Latin American constitutional orders. Compared to other regional human rights 
courts, the IACtHR seems to be the most ambitious adjudicative body in terms of its desire to 
influence domestic law. This ambitious attitude is unusual for an international human rights 
                                                 
8ACHR, art. 2. There is no equivalent provision to this one in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).  
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court, which should limit its authority to the subsidiary protection of human rights and primarily 
defer to national authorities’ decisions, as some commentators have argued. This has caused 
debate among legal scholars about the consequences that inter-American judicial review may 
have for domestic constitutional law in Latin America. Has the IACtHR gone too far by 
practicing a form of international juristocracy9 or should domestic state authorities trust the 
IACtHR’s scrutiny of domestic legislation? Should legal scholars embrace or be cautious of the 
inter-American practice of judicial review? Has this court been consistent in its practice of 
international judicial review throughout its jurisprudence? What kind of legitimacy and 
effectiveness problems may the practice of inter-American judicial review bring about within 
the IAS? In light of these problems, is there a better approach that the IACtHR could adopt to 
international judicial review? This study will address these questions and, based on the 
contemporary phase of inter-American human rights law, seek to identify the best approach that 
the IACtHR could adopt to the review of domestic laws.  
 
Inter-American judicial review makes the normative questions that are inherent in the 
practice of judicial review even harder to address. It includes an international court in the inter-
institutional interaction that is implicit in the practice of judicial review within national law. 
This inter-institutional interaction has traditionally been perceived as a domestic issue by legal 
authorities and scholars. Now, it is not just the highest domestic courts and national legislatures 
who are claiming the authority to review or amend domestic laws. With regard to this particular 
evolution of inter-American human rights jurisprudence, this study argues that neither 
skepticism nor enthusiasm can suffice. If there is something that legal scholars have learned 
from debating judicial review within domestic law, it is that opposing parliamentary and 
judicial supremacy will not take them very far when seeking to address hard judicial review 
cases.10 Describing the relationship between national and international law based on the 
dualism of monism versus pluralism is also arguably of no use for this study. Indeed, these 
dualisms cannot take us very far when analyzing the legitimacy and effectiveness of inter-
American judicial review. Beyond these simplistic dualisms (legislative versus judicial 
                                                 
9As Mattias Kumm has explained to me, even before Ran Hirschl turned the term juristocracy famous in 
comparative constitutional law scholarship, Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde had coined the term “Jurisdiktionsstaat” 
with a strong normative sense. According to this normative sense of juristocracy, the powers of determined courts 
cannot be democratically legitimated. See, for instance: Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, “Grundrechte als 
Grundsatznormen: Zur Gegenwärtigen Lage der Grundrechtsdogmatilk,” Der Staat 29, no. 1, (1990), 1-31, 25. 
Kumm has noted that this study often uses juristocracy in a descriptive way, i.e., in order to describe how the 
IACtHR has extended its authority to reviewing domestic laws.  
10A summary of this debate can be found in: Mark Tushnet, “Judicial Review of Legislation,” in Oxford Handbook 
of Legal Studies, eds. Mark Tushnet, Peter Cane, (Oxford et al.: Oxford University Press, 2005), 165-182.   
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supremacy, monism versus dualism), this study tries to assess the normative questions of 
international judicial review based on two helpful concepts for understanding and guiding its 
inter-American practice: cosmopolitan constitutionalism and global constitutionalism. 
Cosmopolitan constitutionalism is related to the context of emergence of inter-American 
judicial review. Global constitutionalism refers to the evolution of constitutional law and legal 
scholarship in recent decades, i.e., it stands for how legal scholars may engage in the discussion 
of international judicial review in a way that enables them to provide the most suitable approach 
to its inter-American practice. 
 
Cosmopolitan constitutionalism helps us understand how the emergence of inter-
American judicial review was possible in Latin America. This has mostly involved elements of 
positive human rights law that strengthened the relationship between Latin American 
constitutional orders and the inter-American institutions for human rights protection. This study 
will explain how the evolution of Latin American constitutionalism has led to the emergence 
of top-down and bottom-up elements of cosmopolitan constitutionalism with regard to human 
rights protection. The convergence of these elements has strengthened the authority of human 
rights law within domestic constitutional orders, creating an environment for the IACtHR’s 
review of domestic laws. The practice of inter-American judicial review has introduced new 
elements in the relationship between the IACtHR and national authorities and made this 
relationship more complex. The issuing of conflicting decisions by different courts on the 
validity of domestic laws has become a common element within the IAS. For instance, if the 
IACtHR reviews a domestic law and this law has already had its validity confirmed by a 
domestic constitutional court, which decision should prevail? When addressing questions like 
this one, which relates to the legitimacy and effectiveness of inter-American judicial review, 
legal scholars may find it useful to pay attention to a new form of constitutional law and 
scholarship that has spread around the globe in most recent decades, i.e., global 
constitutionalism. 
 
Among the different definitions of global constitutionalism offered by legal scholars,11 
a particularly appealing one for this study defines global constitutionalism as a “jurisprudential 
                                                 
11See, for instance, all the editorials of the journal Global Constitutionalism: Human rights, Democracy, and The 
Rule of Law. See also: Anne Peters, “Global Constitutionalism,” in The Encyclopedia of Political Thought, ed. 
Michael T. Gibbons (Malden, MA: Wiley Blackwell, 2015), 1484-1487; Handbook on Global Constitutionalism, 
eds. Anthony Lang, Antje Wiener, (Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2017); Global 
Constitutionalism from European and East Asian Perspectives, eds. Takao Suami, Anne Peters, Dimitri 
Vanoverbeke, Mattias Kumm, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018). 
 6 
approach.”12 As Mattias Kumm has explained, global constitutionalism “provides a cognitive 
frame, or mindset, for understanding and engaging the world of law.”13 Despite the fact that 
conflicting theories could simultaneously figure under the thread of global constitutionalism, 
there seems to be a convergence of positive constitutional law and scholarship with regard to 
three indispensable elements, which, in turn, translate into indispensable fields of research: 
human rights, democracy, and the rule of law.14 In fact, global constitutionalism, as an 
outgrowth of modern constitutionalism, involves strong commitments to human rights, 
democracy, and the rule of law on the part of state authorities, and also on the part of scholars 
who engage the world of law.  
 
Cosmopolitan constitutionalism and global constitutionalism are essential concepts for 
this study when trying to address the hard questions that inter-American judicial review presents 
for Latin American constitutionalism. Within the Latin American cosmopolitan human rights 
context, this study argues that the IACtHR can become an ally of global constitutionalism in 
Latin America. The IACtHR can, by practicing inter-American judicial review, ensure that 
domestic constitutional orders remain strongly committed to human rights enforcement, which 
also has consequences for the other two pillars of global constitutionalism. However, the court 
itself is under the scrutiny of global constitutionalist scholars, which means that there is no 
scope for inter-American judicial activism, understood as the illegitimate and discretionary use 
of judicial power by the IACtHR. Based on this relationship between cosmopolitan and global 
constitutionalism, this study advocates for a normative theory of inter-American judicial 
review, i.e., mixed-form inter-American judicial review. This theory is intended to guarantee 
that domestic and inter-American authorities consistently abide by their commitments to human 
rights, democracy, and the rule of law within the cosmopolitan context for human rights 
enforcement in Latin America. This study also argues that this relationship between 
cosmopolitanism and global constitutionalism is essential for the further evolution of Latin 
American constitutionalism. Global constitutionalism lawmaking and scholarship is 
particularly useful for Latin American constitutions that are seeking to find a way out of the 
                                                 
12Mattias Kumm, “On the History and Theory of Global Constitutionalism,” in Global Constitutionalism from 
European and East Asian Perspectives, 168-199. 
13Ibid, 170. 
14Mattias Kumm has on several occasions referred to these three elements as the Trinitarian constitutionalist 
mantra, grammar or formula. See, for instance: Mattias Kumm, “Constituent Power, Cosmopolitan 
Constitutionalism, and Post-Positivist Law,” International Journal of Constitutional Law 14, no. 3, (2016), 697-
711, 710. 
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never-ending cycle of illiberalism brought about by the insular evolution of domestic 
constitutionalism in the region. 
 
 
ii. Methodology  
 
This study aims, first and foremost, to offer a context-specific theory of international 
human rights adjudication with regard to the practice of inter-American judicial review of 
domestic law. Context-orientation is probably the most decisive methodological element. Even 
if the study borrows concepts from foreign contexts and applies them to its descriptive and 
normative parts, it tries to discuss these concepts in light of the Latin American human rights 
enforcement context. The concept of cosmopolitan constitutionalism illustrates this approach 
well. 
 
This study is aware that cosmopolitan constitutionalism has been a useful concept to 
address forms of transnational political and economic integration around the globe, which 
emerged after the Second World War and have been strengthened in the West since the 1990s. 
Some of these transnational structures have been invested with refined mechanisms of 
governance and decision-making that are similar to the ones found within domestic 
constitutionalism. The gradual emergence of the European Union is the most illustrative 
example of how cosmopolitan law has slowly acquired constitutional features in the past 
decades. However, different contexts have given rise to different forms of cosmopolitan 
constitutionalism. As a consequence of this fact, cosmopolitan constitutionalism necessarily 
describes a different phenomenon in Latin American constitutionalism than when applied to 
European law. 
 
The regional political integration among Latin American democracies has not reached 
a level comparable to that of European law. Many Latin American countries still tend to adopt 
a very provincial approach to policy fields like the protection of the environment and the 
establishment of regional security policies. This provincial approach has prevented these policy 
fields from developing a more cosmopolitan perspective.15 Regarding environmental policy, 
for instance, the Brazilian government, which has authority over most of the Amazon rainforest, 
                                                 
15On how this is related to methodological problems within the relationship between international and domestic 
law, see: Ernst Ulrich Petersmann, Multilevel Constitutionalism for Multilevel Governance of Public Goods. 
Methodology Problems in International Law (Oxford, Portland: Hart Publishing, 2017).  
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has traditionally refused to share the protection against deforestation with international 
institutions and, most recently, has even refused to accept foreign funds, expertise and 
surveillance of the area.16 This refusal to share the task of protecting the area, which  cannot be 
done using domestic resources alone, is just one example of how insular constitutionalism 
hinders the development of multilevel governance structures in the region.  
 
Although many fields of research are not yet amenable to study under cosmopolitan 
frameworks, there is at least one field of research where the opposite is true: the protection of 
human rights and constitutional rights in Latin America. Since the late 1980s, different factors 
like the democratization of Latin American countries and the liberalization of their economies 
have increased the interaction between domestic and international authorities for the protection 
of human and constitutional rights in the region. Due to this new form of interaction between 
national and international human rights law, this study will focus on the contemporary form of 
human rights enforcement in Latin America as a special type of cosmopolitan constitutionalism. 
More specifically, this special type of cosmopolitan constitutionalism involves the study of the 
adjudication of human and constitutional rights within Latin American constitutionalism. As 
this study will explain, the cosmopolitanization of human rights protection has involved 
bottom-up and top-down elements.17 The most salient element in top-down cosmopolitan 
constitutionalism has been the emergence of strong inter-American judicial review, which is 
the main concern of this study. In order to provide the best theory for the practice of inter-
American judicial review, this study adopts descriptive and normative approaches. 
 
The descriptive parts mostly involve the analysis of domestic and international 
documents that attest to the emergence of Latin American cosmopolitan constitutionalism with 
regard to human rights protection. These parts aim to better understand the context in which 
inter-American judicial review has emerged. To describe this context, this study will try to trace 
the top-down and bottom-up elements that were responsible for the current intimate relationship 
                                                 
16The most illustrative example comes from the domestic management of the Amazon Fund. Countries like 
Norway and Germany, which were the biggest donors to this fund, stopped sponsoring the protection against 
deforestation due to its current non-transparent management. This was due to the fact that the current Bolsonaro’s 
administration terminated the previously successful managing committees on April 11, 2019 by issuing a decree.  
17Samantha Besson has called attention to the transnational character of human rights law, which involves top-
down and bottom-up relationships. For her, domestic and international human rights norms “are not only situated 
in a relationship of top-down transposition and/or enforcement of an international standard in domestic law, but 
also in a relationship of bottom-up international recognition and consolidation of the transnational or common law 
stemming from different domestic legal orders into an international standard.” Samantha Besson, “Human Rights 
as Transnational Constitutional Law,” in Handbook on Global Constitutionalism, eds. Anthony Lang, Antje 
Wiener, (Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2017), 234-247, 237.  This is especially 
true regarding the evolution of human rights law in Latin America.  
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between domestic and international law within the IAS. Most of these elements refer to the 
increasing authority of international human rights law within domestic law. From a bottom-up 
perspective, for instance, this increasing authority has been documented in the texts of the most 
recent Latin American constitutions. The descriptive parts also involve analyzing how concepts, 
many of them offered by legal scholars, have changed lawmaking and legal interpretation 
within Latin American constitutionalism. This could be called the descriptive-normative 
dimension of law, given that legal scholars have simultaneously described and tried to guide 
the work of legal and political authorities by offering new jurisprudential approaches. One 
example comes from the concept of transformative constitutionalism as applied to Latin 
American constitutional orders. This concept has incorporated the idea that socioeconomic 
rights should be judicially enforceable within domestic law, which has substantially changed 
the constitutional adjudication of these rights in countries like Brazil and Colombia.  
 
The normative parts have mostly involved arguing for the legitimacy and effectiveness 
of inter-American judicial review. Most importantly, it has involved the search for the best 
possible approach to inter-American judicial review, i.e., the most legitimate and effective 
approach. Although this study advocates for a context-specific theory of inter-American 
judicial review, it does not ignore the value of comparative scholarship. In line with this, the 
study compares inter-American with European human rights jurisprudence within its search for 
the best normative approach to inter-American judicial review. This comparative analysis is 
useful for Latin American lawyers due to the much more extensive experience with regional 
human rights enforcement in Europe. This study argues that this experience with regional 
human rights enforcement can be instructive for Latin American authorities and legal scholars. 
However, they do not necessarily need to import all jurisprudential elements of European 
human rights practices as an irrefutable truth and should always try to check if the elements of 
European human rights jurisprudence are compatible with the Latin American human rights 
enforcement context.  
 
Brazilian law has been chosen as the case for studying the concrete questions regarding 
inter-American judicial review. This study introduces the normative questions inherent in the 
practice of inter-American judicial review with specific references to the case of the IACtHR’s 
invalidation of the Brazilian amnesty law. Brazilian laws are also used as a practical test of the 
context-based theory of inter-American judicial review that this study aims to offer. There were 
two decisive reasons for picking Brazilian law as a case of study for inter-American judicial 
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review. First, this study has opted to focus on just one of the many Latin American 
constitutional orders under the authority of the IACtHR in order to describe the concrete 
consequences of inter-American judicial review for domestic constitutional law in Latin 
America. Second, my years of academic studies in Brazil have enabled me to approach 
Brazilian constitutional law with much more interest and familiarity.  
 
 
iii. Structure of the study  
 
Part I will describe the context for the emergence of inter-American judicial review. 
This context represents a form of cosmopolitan constitutionalism in Latin America. Latin 
American cosmopolitan constitutionalism has been brought about by the emergence of top-
down and bottom-up elements of positive human rights legislation and jurisprudence that 
transformed the relationship between domestic and international law with regard to the 
protection of human rights. Chapter I will describe these top-down and bottom-up elements in 
more general terms. The top-down elements refer to the organizational evolution of the IAS. 
From the bottom-up perspective, it is worth mentioning the adoption of new constitutional texts 
by national legislatures, and the adoption of innovative constitutional interpretations by courts 
that have strengthened the authority of international human rights law within domestic law. The 
convergence between these top-down and bottom-up elements has created a new context for 
human rights enforcement in Latin America, which has ultimately created the environment for 
the emergence of inter-American judicial review of domestic laws. 
 
Chapter II will describe in more concrete terms the problems that inter-American 
judicial review may pose for domestic constitutional law. In order to assess these problems, this 
chapter focuses on the emergence and evolution of Brazilian cosmopolitan constitutionalism. 
The 1988 constitution and the subsequent amendments made to it were the main triggers for 
Brazilian cosmopolitan constitutionalism. After describing the general features of the 1988 
cosmopolitan constitution, this chapter will focus on how cosmopolitan constitutionalism has 
worked in practice within Brazilian law. This mostly involves two basic attitudes that national 
authorities have adopted with regard to inter-American human rights jurisprudence: 
convergence or resistance. After analyzing some cases that reveal the transformative role of 
inter-American human rights jurisprudence towards domestic law, this chapter will address the 
resistance of the highest judicial authorities, i.e., the judges of the Brazilian constitutional court, 
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to enforcing inter-American human rights jurisprudence on amnesty laws. The IACtHR has 
twice invalidated the 1979 Brazilian amnesty law to date. Despite this fact, the Brazilian 
constitutional judges have refused to abide by inter-American jurisprudence and even 
reaffirmed the validity of the amnesty statute within the 1988 constitutional order, which 
represented a clear underenforcement of the ACHR and of the Brazilian cosmopolitan 
constitution. 
 
Part II focuses on the IACtHR practice of international judicial review. Chapter III will 
address the emergence and evolution of two specific forms of inter-American judicial review: 
conventionality control and the direct enforcement of socioeconomic rights. Conventionality 
control involves the IACtHR’s review of domestic legislation that violates civil and political 
rights, which are the only expressly mentioned rights in the text of the ACHR. The direct 
enforcement of socioeconomic rights is a more recent and emerging feature of inter-American 
human rights jurisprudence. It has still not led to a concrete case of domestic law review. 
Nevertheless, based on the evolution of inter-American case law on these rights, it is highly 
likely that the court will adopt this second specific form of inter-American judicial review. 
 
Chapter IV will address the normative grounds for the practice of international judicial 
review, which involve the discussion of its legitimacy and effectiveness. This analysis draws 
heavily on the debate about domestic judicial review based on one important similar feature 
between the domestic and the international variants, i.e., inter-institutional interaction. When 
addressing this inter-institutional interaction, this study draws on the distinction between strong 
and weak judicial review. Strong judicial review means that courts authoritatively amend 
domestic laws, while within weak judicial review courts may defer to legislatures the final say 
on the validity of legislation. This chapter will try to better understand the legitimacy and 
effectiveness issues inherent in the practice of strong judicial review. More specifically, it will 
analyze the reasons that legal scholars have offered for courts reviewing legislation. After 
addressing the most compelling arguments in favor of the practice of strong judicial review, 
this chapter will address the critiques of inter-American judicial review and focus on a common 
point of these critical approaches. As it will become clear, most of these critical approaches 
suggest that inter-American judicial review has not been in accordance with the principle of 
subsidiarity that the IACtHR is obliged to follow according to the ACHR. Invoking the 
principle of subsidiarity, legal scholars have suggested that the IACtHR should adopt weaker 
forms of international judicial review.   
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In Part III, this study aims to find the most appropriate approach to inter-American 
judicial review. Chapter V focuses on the compelling idea of weakening inter-American judicial 
review by borrowing the concept of the national margin of appreciation as it has been applied 
within European human rights jurisprudence. The margin of appreciation represents the 
deferential attitude that the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has adopted to the 
decisions made by national authorities with regard to human rights protection under the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). This chapter will compare European and 
inter-American human rights jurisprudence and analyze how European human rights 
jurisprudence can help legal scholars to rethink the practice of strong inter-American judicial 
review. Chapter V will argue for the necessity of a context-based theory of inter-American 
judicial review, which will be presented by the following Chapter VI.  
 
Mixed-form inter-American judicial review tries to reconcile the practice of strong 
judicial review with the introduction of weak review into inter-American human rights 
jurisprudence. This study argues that the strong form should be limited to the IACtHR’s review 
of domestic legislation pertaining to civil and political rights, while the weak form is more 
appropriate for cases involving socioeconomic rights. Part IV presents a practical test for the 
theory of mixed-form inter-American judicial review. Chapter VII will apply mixed-form inter-
American judicial review to two Brazilian laws that relate to the different categories of rights 
that are central for this theory: the Brazilian amnesty law, which relates to violations of civil 
and political rights, and Constitutional Amendment No. 95 (CA 95/2016), which brings about 
violations of socioeconomic rights within Brazilian law. This chapter will advocate for the 
strong judicial review of the Brazilian amnesty law and for the weak review of CA 95. In doing 
so, this chapter intends to illustrate the usefulness of mixed-form judicial review firstly for 
inter-American human rights jurisprudence and secondly for Latin American cosmopolitan 
constitutionalism as a whole. As the conclusion of this study will argue, the practice of mixed-
form inter-American judicial review can represent a step forward within the evolution of global 
constitutionalism in Latin America. Most importantly, mixed-form inter-American judicial 
review can become a powerful instrument against the insular evolution of domestic 





PART I. SETTING THE SCENE  
 
 
I. Latin American Cosmopolitan Constitutionalism  
 
1.1.  What is cosmopolitan constitutionalism? Blurring the lines between national 
and international law  
 
Different meanings have been attributed to the word cosmopolitanism. It emerged in 
ancient Greek philosophy with Diogenes’s answer to the question of his origins.18 It gained 
prominence in Western philosophy again with Immanuel Kant, who referred to 
cosmopolitanism in many pieces of philosophical writing. Kant’s essay on the perpetual peace 
is probably the most well-known document on the relationship between cosmopolitanism and 
law.19 In fact, Kant’s references to cosmopolitanism have given rise to many affirmative 
interpretations of cosmopolitanism. This can be observed in recent scholarship in different 
disciplines. 
  
In philosophy, neo-Kantian scholars like Seyla Benhabib have described the emergence 
of cosmopolitan norms based on the principle of universal hospitality.20 Kant’s essay has also 
inspired social science scholars like Ulrich Beck, who advocated for the end of “methodological 
nationalism” in the social sciences based on the concept of cosmopolitanism.21 In political 
theory, David Held has argued that cosmopolitanism is able to restructure the political 
                                                 
18“I am a citizen of the world,” answered he. Diogenes Laertius, “Diogenes,” in, Lives of The Eminent 
Philosophers, VI, 63; trans. Pamela Mensch, ed. James Miller, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), 269-
297, 288. 
19This is due to the fact that Kant proposed the integration of cosmopolitan law (ius cosmopoliticum) into the 
regulatory framework, which was basically composed by two types of norms at that time: national and international 
law. National law focused on citizens’ rights within their original political community, while international law 
focused on the regulation of inter-state relationships. In this context, Kant proposed cosmopolitan law as the right 
of guests in a particular political community. Moreover, ius cosmopoliticum was also used by Kant within his 
conception of the international community as a federation of nations. See: Immanuel Kant, Zum Ewigen Frieden. 
Ein Philosophischer Entwurf, (Königsberg, 1795). More recently, Jürgen Habermas sought to offer a fundamental 
conceptual revision of Kantian cosmopolitanism. See: Jürgen Habermas, “Kant’s Idea of the Perpetual Peace: At 
Two Hundred Years Historical Remove,” in The Inclusion of the Other. Studies in Political Theory, eds. Ciaran 
Cronin, Pablo De Greiff (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998), 165-201. For Habermas, “Kant’s idea of a cosmopolitan 
order must be reformulated if it is not to lose touch with a global situation that has changed fundamentally.” Ibid, 
178.  
20Seyla Benhabib, “The Philosophical Foundation of Cosmopolitan Norms,” in Another Cosmopolitanism, ed. 
Robert Post, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 13-44.  
21Ulrich Beck, Der Kosmopolitische Blick oder: Krieg ist Frieden (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2004). 
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organization of national, regional and global institutions.22 However, there have also been 
skeptical references to cosmopolitanism, in which scholars have interpreted this term in a very 
negative sense.23 Danilo Zolo, for instance, has related cosmopolitanism to traditional forms of 
global domination throughout history.24 Craig Calhoun has described the misleading 
conception of a world without borders that is shared by a cosmopolitan elite of frequent 
travelers.25 
 
When legal scholars started using this word for their jurisprudential approaches to 
lawmaking and legal interpretation, they had different positive and negative senses of 
cosmopolitanism at their disposal. Most references to cosmopolitanism were naturally made 
within international law scholarship, given that this field of law and legal research stands close 
to the issues usually associated with cosmopolitanism by the other social sciences.26 However, 
throughout the evolution of law and legal theory in the last decades, legal scholars stopped 
using cosmopolitanism for just describing international state relations. Some legal scholars 
started describing the relationship between national and international law with references to 
cosmopolitanism. This relationship is usually regulated by constitutional law, which gives us a 
sense of how these scholars have tried to grasp the new relationship between national and 
international law with innovative references to cosmopolitan constitutionalism. It is worth 
mentioning some of the studies that have adopted this approach. Two works were useful for the 
present study to describe the evolution of domestic and inter-American human rights law based 
on the concept of cosmopolitan constitutionalism: Alexander Somek’s theory of the 
                                                 
22David Held, Democracy and the Global Order. From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance, 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995).  
23In philosophy, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels have most prominently used this word in a very negative sense: 
“The bourgeoisie has through its exploitation of the world market given a cosmopolitan character to production 
and consumption in every country;” “[F]inancial swindling celebrated cosmopolitan orgies;” “The Second Empire 
had been the jubilee of cosmopolitan blackleggism.” All these quotes are from: Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, 
Manifesto of the Communist Party, trans. Samuel Moore, Friederich Engels, 1848, available at: 
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/download/pdf/Manifesto.pdf.  
24Danilo Zolo, Cosmopolis. Prospects for World Government, trans. David McKie (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
1997).  
25Craig Calhoun, “The Class Consciousness of Frequent Travelers: Towards a Critique of Actually Existing 
Cosmopolitanism,” South Atlantic Quarterly 101, no. 4, (2003), 869-897. Calhoun has even associated Brexit with 
a form of protest against cosmopolitanism, see: Craig Calhoun, “Brexit is a Munity Against the Cosmopolitan 
Elite,” New Perspectives Quarterly 33, no. 3, (2016), 50-58.  
26Martii Koskenniemi has claimed that “[t]he men who set up international law as a professional (instead of an 
academic) enterprise, distinct from diplomacy, history and national law, were not internationalists. They were 
cosmopolitans.” Martti Koskenniemi, “Legal Cosmopolitanism: Tom Franck’s Messianic World,” New York 
University Journal of International Law & Politics 35, (2003), 471-486, 473. Koskenniemi has reached the same 
Habermasian conclusion with regard to cosmopolitanism: “Today we know that something about the project of 
cosmopolitanism failed and that cosmopolitan lawyers have had to contend with what has seemed available: the 
diplomatic laws of sovereign equality.” Ibid, 475. 
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cosmopolitan constitution and Mattias Kumm’s legal cosmopolitanism as an integrated 
conception of public law. 
 
For Somek, “the emergence of the cosmopolitan constitution represents a momentous 
transformation of modern constitutionalism,” i.e., the cosmopolitan constitution “can be 
perceived as an outgrowth of modern constitutionalism.”27 He has claimed that the 
cosmopolitan constitution is the product of constitutionalism 3.0 as the third stage of modern 
constitutionalism. This third stage is characterized by the struggle between the task of collective 
self-governance within the national realm, which marked constitutionalism 1.0, and the rational 
and universal orientation of human rights, which was the most salient feature of 
constitutionalism 2.0. The cosmopolitan constitution is marked by ambivalence because it is a 
constitution between the local and the universal.28 Constitutionalism coped with this 
ambivalence by taking the “step from earning authority through practical reasons to earning it 
through mutual engagement.”29 For Somek, this explains the emergence of peer-review systems 
among liberal democracies in the 20th century. He has noted that the cosmopolitan constitution 
is a constitution constantly reviewed from the perspective of outsiders. For him, 
“[c]onstitutionalism 3.0 is about yielding, for the purpose of self-correction, to the judgement 
of one’s peers. Foreigners are given voice. The relevance of foreigner or foreignness to one’s 
own constitutional system is the defining characteristic of the cosmopolitan constitution.”30 
 
Somek has claimed that cosmopolitan constitutions possess some basic features like the 
recognition of human rights, the prohibition of discrimination based on nationality, and the 
virtual representation of foreigners in a specific political community.31 These features are easily 
identifiable within constitutions under European law. In fact, it would not be wrong to infer that 
Somek’s description of the cosmopolitan constitution lead, in practice, to a constitution similar 
to the ones found under European law.32 This European pedigree of Somek’s cosmopolitan 
                                                 
27Alexander Somek, “The Cosmopolitan Constitution,” in Transnational Law: Rethinking European Law and 
Legal Thinking, eds. M. Maduro, K. Tuori, S. Sankari, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 97-121, 
108-109. A complete version of Somek’s theory of the cosmopolitan constitution can be found in: Alexander 
Somek, The Cosmopolitan Constitution, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). 
28For Somek: “Human rights are universal while a particular people are the negation of universality necessary for 
their realization.” Alexander Somek, The Cosmopolitan Constitution, (book), 178.  
29Ibid. 
30Ibid, 183. 
31Ibid, 176-243.  
32One of his most recent pieces of writing on cosmopolitan constitutionalism is revealing of this European pedigree 
of the cosmopolitan constitution. See: Alexander Somek, “Die Nation und ihr Jenseits”, in Rechtsphilosophie zur 
Einführung, (Hamburg: Junius Verlag, 2018), 193-223. Somek usually starts writing about general legal concepts 
and ends up addressing European law. In all his years of research in the United States, he kept on writing about 
constitutionalism in Europe. Somek is, first and foremost, a European lawyer and, by diving deep into European 
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constitutionalism is related to his traditional critique of European law, which is present in most 
of his books.33 His approach to European law based on cosmopolitan constitutionalism was 
helpful for this study because it illustrates how it is possible for a lawyer to observe and criticize 
the relationship between national and international law within a specific legal context. 
 
Cosmopolitan constitutionalism draws on the evolution of positive law as well as on 
how authorities and legal scholars describe and interpret this new reality of norms. Latin 
America has also seen the emergence of a new context for lawmaking and legal interpretation 
in recent decades. This is especially true with regard to the norms relating to human rights 
protection in the region. However, Latin American cosmopolitan constitutionalism clearly 
differs from European cosmopolitan constitutionalism. In Europe, there has been a well-known 
discussion about legal pluralism and multilevel constitutionalism, which represent more refined 
interpretations of the relationship between national and international law that are only possible 
within the European context.34 This debate has drawn on the evolution of European law under 
the political agency of the European Union (EU) authorities and also on the consequent 
evolution of legal scholarship in this new and exciting context for lawmaking and legal 
interpretation. Mattias Kumm’s theory of cosmopolitan constitutionalism is intimately related 
to this evolution of the relationship between national and international law under European law. 
 
                                                 
law, he reaches more insightful perspectives on general legal theory. Regarding the European pedigree of the idea 
of the cosmopolitan constitution, he has written: “Reduction is essential. Writing is all about pruning and 
discarding preliminary drafts. Yes, the book has a regional focus, but this focus is surprisingly accidental. What 
matters, at the end of the day, are the ideas.” Alexander Somek, “Book Review. Blindness and Hindsight,” German 
Law Journal 19, no. 6, (2018), 1557-1566, 1558. 
33See: Alexander Somek, Individualism: An Essay of the Authority of the European Union, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008); Alexander Somek, Engineering Equality: An Essay on European Anti-Discrimination 
Law, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).  
34To give a few examples of this debate: Anne Peters, Elemente einer Theorie der Verfassung Europas, (Berlin: 
Duncker & Humblot, 2001); Martti Koskenniemi, “Constitutionalism as Mindset: Reflections on Kantian Themes 
About International Law and Globalization,” Theoretical Inquiries in Law 8, (2007), 9-26. Ingolf Pernice, “The 
Treaty of Lisbon: Multilevel Constitutionalism in Action,” Columbia Journal of European Law 15, (2009), 349-
407; The Constitutionalization of International Law, eds. Jan Klabbers, Anne Peters, Geir Ulfstein (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009); The Twilight of Constitutionalism, eds. Petra Dobner, Martin Loughlin, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2010); Nico Krisch, Beyond Constitutionalism: The Pluralist Structure of Postnational 
Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union and Beyond, eds. 
Matej Avbelj, Jan Komárek, (Oxford, Portland: Hart Publishing, 2012); Dieter Grimm, Die Zukunft der 
Verfassung  II, Auswirkungen von Europäisierung und Globalisierung, (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2012); 
Transnational Law: Rethinking European Law and Legal Thinking, eds. Miguel Maduro, Kaarlo Tuori, Suvi 
Sankari, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014); Research Handbook on Legal Pluralism and EU Law, 
ed. Gareth T. Davies, (Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2018); Matej Avbej, The 
European Union under Transnational Law: A Pluralist Appraisal, (Oxford, UK: Hart Publishing, 2018). 
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Kumm has described cosmopolitanism as an “integrated conception of public law.”35 
For him, the cosmopolitan turn in constitutionalism has led to a framework of norms in which 
the strict lines between national and international law, which have long dominated the field of 
research, have been blurred.36 In this new context, the main challenge for authorities and 
scholars is to try to offer globally legitimate grounds for the exercise of public power. He is 
strongly against a statist interpretation of the relationship between domestic and international 
law and has argued that both types of law have much more in common than some legal scholars 
and authorities want to admit.37 However, he is also against a simple monist conception of the 
relationship between domestic and international law and has argued for a refined conception of 
constitutional pluralism in which different legal systems can make claims to authority. 
  
Despite his refined model of constitutional pluralism, Kumm has argued that national 
and international law possess structural connections that can lead to a common conceptual 
framework for global public law. This common framework means that national and 
international law can be “mutually supportive and complementary.”38 For him, legal scholars 
and authorities should try to make sense of this new reality for norms and develop new 
normative approaches that can address this complex framework for justifying the exercise of 
power. They should stop searching for clear hierarchical structures between domestic and 
international law and accept the deeply pluralist structure of public law, offering normative 
interpretations that can fit into this context. It is based on this interpretation of the relationship 
between domestic and international law that he has proposed concepts like the “justice-relevant 
negative externalities”39 that domestic states may produce to each other and argued that only a 
cosmopolitan state is legitimate in the eyes of the international community when trying to solve 
issues like these.  
 
In conclusion, the value of approaches to cosmopolitanism coming from legal scholars 
lies not in their search for the definitive meaning of this word. Their value, at least for this 
                                                 
35Mattias Kumm, “The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism: An Integrated Conception of Public Law,” 
Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 20, no. 2, (2013), 605-628. 
36“National and international and international law form an integrative whole.” Ibid, 612.  
37Kumm has referred to the distinction between “Big C” constitutionalism with regard to the domestic realm, and 
“small c” constitutionalism regarding international law. For him, this distinction does not satisfy either side. On 
this point, see: Mattias Kumm, “The Best of Times and the Worst of Times. Between Constitutional Triumphalism 
and Nostalgia,” in The Twilight of Constitutionalism, eds. Petra Dobner, Martin Loughlin, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010) 201-219. 
38Kumm, The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism, 612. 
39“There can be no self-standing national constitutional legitimacy because the practice of constitutional self-
government within the framework of the sovereign state raises the problem of justice-relevant negative 
externalities.” Ibid. See his concept of justice-relevant externalities in: Ibid, 617-624. 
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study, lies in the capacity to both describe and criticize the relationship between national and 
international law within a specific legal system. The major challenge of the following 
descriptive parts is to explain how the new context for human rights enforcement in Latin 
America can be described as a type of cosmopolitan constitutionalism, which has enabled inter-
American judicial review of domestic law to emerge. This task involves questions like: How 
could lawyers describe Latin American constitutions as cosmopolitan constitutions? What 
consequences does this new narrative have for the relationship between national and inter-
American human rights law in Latin American countries? This study will address these 
questions in the following sections. 
 
 
1.2. Integration through human rights law in Latin America 
 
How could legal scholars refer to Latin American constitutionalism if Latin American 
countries are so different to each other? One plausible answer is the common past that these 
countries share. Colonization, African slavery, the massacre of indigenous people, 
revolutionary independence and the frequent rule of authoritarian regimes: All these factors 
took part in the history of most Latin American countries. When addressing this history, lawyers 
realize that the most integrative factor among these countries is the difficult evolution of liberal 
constitutionalism in the region since its beginnings.40 The evolution of Latin American 
constitutionalism has always been followed by inherent contradictions. For instance, many 
Latin American countries adopted their first constitutions in the 19th century but kept the 
institution of slavery within domestic law. The troubling past has had consequences for the 
evolution of constitutionalism to date. Latin American countries had to cope with this difficult 
past and this reveals a convergence in the evolution of constitutionalism at the domestic level.  
 
Despite this common history and its converging elements, the emergence of Latin 
American cosmopolitan constitutionalism is brought about by more recent top-down and 
bottom-up elements relating to human rights legislation and jurisprudence in the region.41 The 
                                                 
40See: Roberto Gargarella, Latin American Constitutionalism. 1810-2010, (Oxford et al.: Oxford University Press, 
2013). 
41This study has already referred to Samantha Besson’s concept of human rights as transnational constitutional 
law, which involves top-down and bottom-up relationships. Yoon Jin Shin has offered a practical example of these 
relationships. She has written about bottom-up cosmopolitan constitutionalism regarding South Korean law. See: 
Yoon Jin Shin, “Contextualized Cosmopolitanism: Human Rights Practice in South Korea,” Discussion Paper: 
Center for Global Constitutionalism, (Berlin: 2017). Later, she has addressed the same issue as bottom-up elements 
of global constitutionalism: Yoon Jin Shin, “Cosmopolitanising Rights Practice. The Case of South Korea,” in 
Global Constitutionalism from European and East Asian Perspectives, eds. Takao Suami et al. (Cambridge: 
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top-down elements involve the organizational evolution of the Inter-American System for 
Human Rights Protection (IAS), while the bottom-up elements involve the higher authority that 
human rights currently enjoy within domestic law in many Latin American countries. Both 
bottom-up and top-down elements have strengthened the integrative force of human rights law 
in Latin America, which is responsible for a more intimate relationship between domestic and 
international law within the IAS.42 It is important to stress that this study focuses on a type of 
regional integration that does not necessarily refer to a more ambitious ideal of regional political 
unity as the one present in Europe. In contrast to cosmopolitan constitutionalism in Europe, the 
Latin American version is limited to the evolution of human rights legislation and jurisprudence 
at the domestic and inter-American levels within the IAS.43  
 
Nobody can deny that the level of legal and political integration among Latin American 
democracies did not reach a comparable level to that of European law and that this is even 
something unimaginable in the near future. The ideal of regional political unity of Latin 
American countries was once enthusiastically defended by Simon Bolivar, who believed that 
only a stronger cooperation between these countries could lead to the end of colonial ambitions 
towards the region. This study does not share Bolivar’s ideals,44 i.e., it does not see law as an 
integrational tool that could be useful for regional political unity in Latin America. Latin 
American cosmopolitan constitutionalism is restricted to human rights protection and to the 
changing relationship between national and international law that has been brought about by 
human rights law within the IAS. Human rights legislation and jurisprudence are the most 
important, and for this study, the only triggers for the emergence of Latin American 
cosmopolitan constitutionalism.  
                                                 
Cambridge University Press, 2018), 1-26. Both authors are good examples of how legal scholars can describe 
cosmopolitan constitutionalism based on these bottom-up and top-down relationships between domestic and 
international authorities. 
42Flávia Piovesan, “Fuerza Integradora y Catalizadora del Sistema Interamericano de Protección de los Derechos 
Humanos: Desafios para la Formación de un Constitucionalismo Regional,” in La Justicia Constitucional y su 
Internacionalización. ¿Hacia un Ius Constitucionale Commune en América Latina?, Vol. II, eds. Armin von 
Bogdandy, Eduardo Ferrer Mac-Gregor, Mariela Morales Antoniazzi, (Ciudad del Mexico: Universidad Nacional 
Atónoma de México, 2010), 431-448. 
43This is the difference between integration through law in Europe and integration through human rights law in 
Latin America. The literature on integration through law in Europe is vast. On the evolution of this debate, see, 
for instance: The Transformation of Europe. Twenty-Five Years On, eds. Miguel Poiares Maduro, Marlene Wind, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017). 
44In fact, bolivarianism currently translates a very negative sense in the region since its last enthusiastic advocate 
was no one less than an authoritarian politician, namely Hugo Chaves. Chaves often claimed to be inspired by 
Bolivar’s ideals and called his government a Bolivarian revolution. On Bolivarian constitutionalism, see: Mark 
Tushnet, “The New ‘Bolivarian’ Constitutions: A Textual Analysis,” in Comparative Constitutional Law in Latin 
America, eds. Rosalind Dixon, Tom Ginsburg, (Cheltenham, UK, Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2017), 126-152. 
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It is true that integration through human rights law presupposes a certain level of 
regional political convergence, given that it relies on international institutions for human rights 
enforcement in Latin America. It was the political commitment of national authorities that gave 
rise to these international institutions. Political convergence is also present in the adoption of 
several inter-American treaties and conventions. Even though the debate of regional integration 
through human rights law should not ignore its inherent political side, Latin American political 
unity does not stand on the focus of this study. It is the regional integration through human 
rights law that offers the basis for the emergence of Latin American cosmopolitan 
constitutionalism. As mentioned, this type of regional integration refers most importantly to 
more recent development in human rights legislation and jurisprudence at the domestic and 
inter-American levels within the IAS, which will be addressed in the following. 
 
 
1.3.  Top-down and bottom-up cosmopolitan constitutionalism in Latin America 
 
Integration through human rights law in Latin America enables lawyers to describe the 
relationship between domestic and inter-American human rights law as a type of cosmopolitan 
constitutionalism. There are two different types of elements responsible for the emergence of 
Latin American cosmopolitan constitutionalism. First, there are elements at the regional level 
of human rights protection that have influenced the stronger relationship between domestic and 
inter-American human rights law. Second, there are elements at the domestic level of 
constitutional lawmaking that have strengthened the authority of human rights within domestic 
law. Both cannot be distinguished too sharply, since the regional level has influenced the 
domestic level and vice-versa.  Nevertheless, it is worth analyzing them separately in order to 
better describe the emergence of Latin American cosmopolitan constitutionalism. 
 
The regional elements of human rights enforcement relate to the organizational 
evolution of the IAS. This evolution has involved important political factors and, more recently, 
important jurisprudential factors pertaining to human rights protection in Latin America. It is 
possible to describe these elements as examples of top-down cosmopolitan constitutionalism in 
Latin America, since they first emerged at the inter-American level. These top-down elements 
of cosmopolitan constitutionalism include the institutional evolution of the Inter-American 
Commission of Human Rights (IACHR) and, most importantly for this study, of the Inter-
 21 
American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR). The top-down emergence of cosmopolitan 
constitutionalism was only possible due to its corresponding bottom-up evolution. This bottom-
up evolution involves the higher authority of human rights within domestic law, which has been 
established by national legislatures and the highest domestic courts. 
 
The following sections will describe the top-down and bottom-up emergence of Latin 
American cosmopolitan constitutionalism. First, the institutional evolution of the IAS will be 
described. Then, this chapter will describe the bottom-up elements of cosmopolitan 
constitutionalism by analyzing the adoption of new Latin American constitutions and how they 
have strengthened the authority of human rights law within domestic law. Finally, this chapter 
will also describe how domestic courts were responsible for the bottom-up evolution of 
cosmopolitan constitutionalism in Latin America since they have established a higher authority 




1.3.1. The top-down emergence of cosmopolitan constitutionalism  
 
The top-down emergence of Latin American cosmopolitan constitutionalism refers to 
the institutional evolution of the IAS. The work of the inter-American human rights commission 
(IACHR) is a fundamental element of top-down cosmopolitanism, but this study does not 
address it at length. There are some reasons for this approach. The most decisive reason for not 
fully addressing the work of the IACHR is that this would not be useful for the normative 
approach this study wishes to adopt toward inter-American judicial review of domestic law. In 
line with this, this study will focus on the IACtHR and address the most salient normative 
questions relating to the evolution of inter-American human rights jurisprudence. For this task, 
an analysis of the IACHR is of secondary importance. Nevertheless, the IACHR’s work will 
not be completely ignored. There are mentions of the IACHR reports on the human rights 
situation in specific Latin American countries and the IACHR is also included as a fundamental 
institution for human rights enforcement in Latin America in several parts of this study. Hence, 
the following section about the top-down cosmopolitan elements are focused on the institutional 








1.3.1.1.  The Inter-American Human Rights System (IAS) 
 
A brief description of the IAS is necessary in order to understand the institutional 
context of the contemporary regional integration through human rights law in Latin America. 
There is no scope within this study for an extensive historical description of the organizational 
evolution of the IAS, which was brought about by the political agency of the Organization of 
American States (OAS). However, some historical elements will be mentioned as long as they 
still relate to the contemporary form of human rights practices within the IAS.  
 
Bolivar’s ideal of a confederation of independent Latin American republics was doomed 
to fail,45 although other forms of regional integration came to prominence in the Americas in 
the end of the 19th century. Political integration gained more emphasis only in the post-war 
period of the 20th century. The 9th Conference of Bogotá was an important historical point, 
because it was responsible for the foundation of the OAS. The OAS has represented the 
accomplishment of a more mature level of institutional integration in the hemisphere. It was 
created by the Charter of Bogotá in 1948 as a regional agency within the United Nations and 
with similar purposes as an international organization at the regional level: to strengthen peace 
and security, and to promote economic, social, and cultural development in the Americas.46 
Another important document adopted in the Bogotá Conference was the American Declaration 
on the Rights and Duties of Man,47 which was the first document on human rights adopted by 
an interstate organization, prior even to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which 
came just months later.  
 
                                                 
45Bolivar’s ideal led to the First Congress of American States in Panama in 1826, where the Treaty of Perpetual 
Union, League and Confederation was adopted, which was an ambitious pact that established a military and mutual 
defense pact, including even a supranational parliamentary assembly. This treaty was ratified by only one state at 
that time, Gran Colombia itself. For a more detailed account of these initial forms of political integration in the 
Americas and how they eventually led to the adoption of the American Convention on Human Rights, see: A.H. 
Robertson, J. G. Merrils, “The American Convention on Human Rights,” in Human Rights in the World. An 
Introduction to the Study of the International Protection of Human Rights, 4th ed. (Manchester, New York: 
Manchester University Press, 1996), 197-237. 
46Art. 4 of the original text of the Charter of the OAS. The current OAS Charter was amended by the Protocol of 
Buenos Aires (1967), the Protocol of Cartagena das Indias (1985), the Protocol of Washington (1992), and finally 
by the Protocol of Managua (1993). 
47The American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man was adopted on May 1948. 
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The organizational evolution of the OAS has been followed by the adoption of several 
important protocols, conventions and treaties by its member states. The American Convention 
on Human Rights (ACHR) is the most important general human rights document adopted by 
the OAS member states. The ACHR, which is also known as the Pact of San José, was adopted 
in 1969 and it is the founding document of the IAS.48  It was mostly inspired by the American 
Declaration of 1948, the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) of 1950 and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966. The ratification of the ACHR is 
not mandatory to be granted membership within the OAS, which represents one important 
difference to the European system for human rights protection. It is also possible that OAS 
member states ratify the ACHR and refuse the authority of the IACtHR, which represents 
another important difference between the European system and the IAS.49  
 
The ACHR lists in its first part (Arts. 3 to 25 ACHR) a series of rights to be protected 
by the IAS member states.50 In its catalogue of rights, the ACHR focuses on individual civil 
and political rights such as the right to personal liberty, a fair trial, privacy, property, and 
freedom of conscience, religion, thought, expression, and association. The ACHR also prohibits 
discrimination, slavery and establishes children’s rights and the right to family life.51 The 
ACHR does not explicitly mention socioeconomic rights, but it establishes in its Art. 26 that 
member states must progressively achieve “the full realization of the rights implicit in the 
economic, social, educational, scientific and cultural standards” set forth in the Charter of the 
OAS.52 The original text of the ACHR has never been amended,53 but it has been supplemented 
                                                 
48The ACHR was signed on November 21, 1969, entering into force with the deposit of the eleventh necessary 
ratification in 1978. 
49Amaya Úbeda de Torres, when referring to the IAS, claimed that: “The main reason for the difference between 
this system and the European one, however, lies in the fact that the American States are not ready to make court 
control fully operational.” Amaya Úbeda de Torres, “The Optional Contentious Jurisdiction of the Court,” in The 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Case Law and Commentary, eds. Laurence Burgorgue-Larsen, Amaya 
Úbeda de Torres (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 4-23, 8. Despite not comparing the structure of these 
regional systems, some differences between them will be pointed out especially with regard to international human 
rights jurisprudence.  
50There are many useful commentaries on the ACHR. See, for instance: Convención Americana sobre Derechos 
Humanos. Comentario, eds. Christian Steiner, Mari-Christine Fuchs, 2nd ed. (Bogotá: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 
2019). 
51Cecilia Medina Quiroga has noted that the ACHR’s rights catalogue differs from other general human rights 
treaties due to its most recent date: “As the Convention is one of the most recent general treaties on human rights, 
the drafters were not only able to use the textual models of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) and the European Convention but were also able to examine the practice of the European system, which 
began functioning in 1953. In addition, the rights are drafted in such a way that from time to time they allow for 
the traditions and idiosyncrasies of the OAS Member States to be seen.” Cecilia Medina Quiroga, The American 
Convention on Human Rights. Crucial Rights and their Theory and Practice, 2nd ed. (Cambridge et al.: Intersentia, 
2016), 9.  
52ACHR, art. 26. 
53Sergio García Ramirez has mentioned the reluctance to change the original text of the ACHR: “There is resistance 
to ‘open up the Convention,’ which involves greater risks.” Sérgio Garcia Ramirez, foreword to The Inter-
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by two important Protocols: the Protocol of San Salvador,54 which focus on the protection of 
socioeconomic rights, and the Protocol to Abolish the Death Penalty in the Americas.55  
 
Although the ACHR represents the most important general human rights document, it 
is worth remembering that it is not the sole human rights document adopted by the IAS member 
states. Other specialized treaties and conventions take part on the contemporary inter-American 
corpus iuris, which includes, for instance, the Convention of Eradication of Violence against 
Women, the Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons, and the Convention on the 
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Persons with Disabilities.  
 
The second part of the ACHR is responsible for the structure of the IAS, which is 
composed of two main institutions: The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 
IACHR (Art. 32 ACHR), and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, IACtHR (Art. 33 
ACHR). The interaction between both organs is meant to monitor human rights enforcement in 
the Americas and hold states accountable in case of violations of the ACHR. This interaction 
between commission and court has changed throughout the organizational evolution of the IAS. 
The IACHR existed decades before the ACHR entered into force, created by a resolution of 
foreign ministers at a 1959 Conference held in Santiago. It later became a statutory organ of 
the OAS,56 and finally the most immediate authority for human rights protection within the 
IAS. This particular history of the IACHR caused some institutional problems regarding its 
competences due to its already existing powers and functions before the establishment of the 
IACtHR.57 This would later affect the beginning of the contentious jurisdiction of the IACtHR, 
since the commission had previously been responsible for analyzing individual petitions of 
human rights violations and did not easily start reporting cases to the later established court.58 
 
                                                 
American Court of Human Rights, eds. Burgorgue-Larsen, Úbeda de Torres, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2011). By “greater risks,” the former IACtHR Judge probably meant the existence of authoritarian governments 
in Latin America. 
54The Protocol of San Salvador was adopted in 1988 and entered into force in 1999. 
55The Protocol to the ACHR to Abolish the Death Penalty was adopted in 1990.  
56Due to the amendment of the Charter of Bogotá by the Protocol of Buenos Aires in 1967, the IACHR acquired 
a very broad mandate. Its principal function became “to promote the observance and protection of human rights 
and to serve as a consultative organ of the Organization in these matters.” Protocol of Buenos Aires, art.112.   
57For some time, the IACHR worked under a double mandate: the one resulting from the ACHR and the one 
resulting from earlier Conferences held in 1959, 1965 and 1967 that were decisive to its authority in the pre-history 
of the IAS. In the first 20 years, the IACHR work was basically restricted to its old mandate. 
58Thomas Buergenthal has addressed this initial institutional rivalry within the IAS. See: Thomas Buergenthal, 
“Remembering the Early Years of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights,” New York University Journal of 
International Law & Politics 37, no. 2, (2005), 259-280. 
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The IAS is a product of the regional political integration in the Americas, which was 
enabled mostly by the political agency of the OAS. Since its initial decade (1980s), the IAS has 
experienced a successful development with regard to its institutional authority. Different 
circumstances have been responsible for this successful history. As Thomas Buergenthal has 
pointed out, at the time of the adoption of the ACHR, less than a half of the first eleven ratifying 
countries were led by democratically elected governments.59 Buergenthal shares a common 
understanding that, with the wave of new democracies in Latin America since the late 1980s, it 
was possible for the IAS to gradually gain authority with the support of domestic democratic 
governments. However, this common narrative on the evolution of the IAS must be reviewed 
in some important points. It is true that, since the establishment of new democracies, Latin 
America has faced a renewed interest in human rights, which made the IACHR and the IACtHR 
become more influential institutions in the region. Yet, it is important to abandon the idealist 
narrative of Latin American governments as consistent human rights defenders and look for 
more plausible reasons for the IAS successful organizational evolution. The establishment of 
new Latin American democratic governments per se does not fully explain why the IAS has 
gained so much authority in the last decades. Even though democracies tend to strive for human 
rights enforcement, it is not self-evident that they will defer to the regional level of human rights 
protection, even after overcoming the rule of authoritarian governments at the domestic level. 
 
Regional systems for human rights protection can be viewed as a consequence of the 
growing peer accountability that has taken the stage in international relations with the mediation 
of international law.60 Human rights law was instrumental for this task of international relations 
and this fact calls for a more pragmatic interpretation of the evolution of the IAS. Paying 
attention to this increasing importance of peer accountability in international relations may offer 
a more adequate description of the organizational evolution of the IAS. Beth Simmons, for 
instance, has pointed out that peer accountability was not only restricted to human rights, but it 
could also be observed in other areas such as the control of armaments, trade policies and 
monetary relations in the 20th century.61 This century has seen the legalization of international 
                                                 
59Thomas Burgenthal, foreword to The Practice and Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, by 
Jo M. Pasqualucci, 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009). On this issue, see also: Cecilia Medina 
Quiroga, The Battle of Human Rights. Gross, Systematic Violations and the Inter-American System, (Dordrecht: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1988). 
60See: Alexander Somek, “Peer-review,” in The Cosmopolitan Constitution, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2014), 176-178. 
61Beth A. Simmons, “Why International Law? The Development of the International Human Rights Regime in the 
Twentieth Century,” in Mobilizing for Human Rights. International Law in Domestic Politics, (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009), 23-56. 
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human rights systems, which led to the establishment of the contemporary regional human 
rights systems: the European, the IAS and the African system. The evolution of these regional 
systems happened not only as a consequence of national authorities becoming eventually 
convinced that human rights enforcement should be a priority after the rule of authoritarian 
regimes. In fact, the post-dictatorship environment in Latin America did not avoid that 
democratic authorities accepted some decisions taken during past dictatorships.62  
 
Andrew Moravscki has also argued that domestic political costs were involved in the 
establishment of the regional systems for human rights protection.63 State authorities ratified 
international treaties for human rights protection as a way to ensure the establishment of a more 
willing environment for their international relations with other countries in the region. These 
more pragmatic descriptions from Simmons and Moravscki seem to match the institutional 
evolution of the IAS.64 It is worth remembering that representatives of important geopolitical 
powers in the region at the end of the 1970s, namely Argentina and Brazil, were at the start 
against the adoption of the ACHR, while other countries with a minor geopolitical influence 
like Costa Rica, Ecuador, Barbados, Haiti and Honduras were the first countries to ratify the 
human rights convention.65 The IAS would experience a substantial growth of its authority in 
the region only in the late 1990s, when the most populated Latin American countries accepted 
the jurisdiction of the IACtHR, i.e., Brazil and Mexico. These two democracies in the region 
accepted the jurisdiction of the IACtHR only in 1998. The full integration of most of the OAS 
member states into the IAS has since then contributed to the contemporary relevance of inter-
American institutions for Latin American constitutionalism. 
 
Regarding the procedures of inter-American human rights protection, only member 
states and the IACHR are able to submit cases to the IACtHR. All cases are first dealt with by 
the commission before they can be referred to the regional court (Art. 44 ACHR). The ACHR 
                                                 
62As this study will later explain, the continuing validity of amnesty laws in Latin America has attested to this fact. 
63Andrew Moravcski, “The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe,” 
International Organization 54, no. 2, (2000), 217-252. 
64Par Engstrom and Courtney Hillebrecht have rightly noted that the organizational evolution of the IAS has 
“shaped and been shaped by geopolitics,” i.e., it “has developed concurrently with other regional and international 
integration and institutionalisation efforts, as well as global shifts in human rights norms, practice and 
jurisprudence. The [IAS] has been one piece of an evolving human rights landscape, and while it has shaped what 
the landscape looks like, it, too, has been defined by these larger trends.” Par Engstrom, Courtney Hillebrecht, 
“Institutional Change and the Inter-American Human Rights System,” The International Journal of Human Rights 
22, no. 9, (2018), 1111-1122, 1112. 
65Cecilia Medina Quiroga has mentioned this episode in: Medina Quiroga, The Battle for Human Rights, 96. The 
American Convention was signed by 12 of the nineteen delegations present at the Conference in San José. First 
signatory states were: Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, 
Panama, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela. 
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does not allow individuals to directly claim the jurisdiction of the court.66 The IACHR receives 
petitions against states lodged by individuals, groups or NGOs. The commission first tries to 
reach a friendly settlement of the case and, if this is not possible, it starts its quasi-judicial 
activities, which consist of establishing the facts and determining the direct human rights 
violations and the appropriate remedies.67 The IACHR recommendations within its quasi-
judicial powers are not legally binding, but they have played an important role within inter-
American human rights enforcement. For the countries that have not accepted the jurisdiction 
of the IACtHR, the IACHR’s political review is the only stage within the IAS. Moreover, the 
IACHR may review petitions against countries that have not yet ratified the ACHR based on 
the American Declaration of 1948, which is legally binding to all OAS member states.  
 
As previously mentioned, the IACtHR was established with optional jurisdiction. The 
court has authority on advisory (Art. 65 ACHR) and contentious cases (Art. 61-63 ACHR). It 
may also issue provisional measures in case of serious human rights violations (Art. 64 ACHR). 
Until a considerable number of countries accepted its jurisdiction and the IACHR started to 
report cases to it, advisory case law represented most of the IACtHR activities within the IAS. 
A case is only reported to the IACtHR if the respondent state has accepted the regional 
jurisdiction of the IACtHR and if the IACHR concludes that the state has not complied with the 
issued recommendations.68 In its contentious proceedings, the IACtHR assesses the evidence 
submitted and rules on the alleged violations of the ACHR. With the growing importance of its 
contentious jurisdiction within the IAS, the IACtHR has strengthened its authority over the IAS 
member states. Throughout the evolution of the IAS, the IACtHR has acquired jurisdiction over 
20 of the 35 OAS member states.69 Inter-American human rights jurisprudence is also relevant 
for states that have not accepted its authority since it affects the work of the IACHR, which has 
authority over all OAS member states. The United States, Canada and most of the English-
speaking Caribbean countries have not accepted the IACtHR’s jurisdiction, which currently 
                                                 
66This has caused debate on the IACHR’s necessary scrutiny on reporting a case to the IACtHR. In the history of 
the IAS, Costa Rica has once tried to directly report the first contentious case to the IACtHR. In this first case, the 
IACtHR established that the commission’s analysis is an essential feature of the IAS and reaffirmed the IACHR 
as the most immediate authority for the regional protection of human rights within the IAS. See: IACtHR, (Order 
of the President) July 15, 1981, In the Matter of Viviana Gallardo.  
67The IACHR is also able to issue precautionary measures in case of serious and urgent situations with risk of 
irreparable harm. 
68As Thomas Antkowiak and Alejandra Gonza have pointed out, the IACHR “transforms from a quasi-judicial 
body that assesses matters of fact and law to a ‘procedural’ party before the Court;” Thomas Antkowiak, Alejandra 
Gonza, The American Convention on Human Rights. Essential Rights, (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2017), 10.  They have also claimed that the IACHR functions similar to the ministerio público of some domestic 
constitutional orders in Latin America; Ibid, 11.  
69They are: Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname and Uruguay. 
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makes the IACtHR an international human rights court for Latin American countries. 
Nowadays, despite several institutional difficulties,70 the IACtHR has increased its authority 
within the IAS by means of substantive human rights case law that encompasses contentious 
cases, advisory opinions and provisional measures.  
 
The IACtHR decides cases based on the ACHR and on the inter-American corpus iuris, 
which is composed by several human rights documents and, according to the IACtHR, also by 
inter-American human rights jurisprudence. International human rights legislation and 
jurisprudence have also been influential to inter-American human rights adjudication. The 
IACtHR has referred to documents from the universal system of human rights protection and 
also to traditional rules of interpretation of international law, which are present in instruments 
like the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1963. Among international documents, 
the IACtHR has also consistently referred to declaratory instruments relating to international 
human rights enforcement like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the American 
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man.71   
 
Another important distinguishing feature of the IAS lies in the wide variety of ordered 
reparations established by the IACtHR. According to Art. 63 (1) ACHR, if the IACtHR finds a 
violation of the ACHR, it can rule that this violation should “be remedied and that fair 
compensation [should] be paid to the injured party.”72 For Dinah Shelton, the ACHR gives the 
IACtHR “broad jurisdiction to decide on remedies,” given that “the plain language of Article 
63 indicates the Court’s power to order remedies other than compensation.”73 In fact, the court 
has interpreted Art. 63 ACHR in order to issue an extensive catalog of reparatory measures: 
restitution, rehabilitation, satisfaction, and guarantee of non-repetition, in conjunction with 
pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages.74 According to Art. 68 ACHR, respondent states 
                                                 
70See: Alexandra Huneeus, “The Institutional Limits of inter-American Constitutionalism,” in Comparative 
Constitutional Law in Latin America, eds. Rosalind Dixon, Tom Ginsburg, (Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA: 
Edward Elgar Publishing, 2017), 300-324.      
71The court has also addressed the importance of international treaties for inter-American human rights 
jurisprudence, see: IACtHR, (Advisory Opinion OC-1/82) September 24, 1982, "Other Treaties” Subject to the 
Consultative Jurisdiction of the Court (Art. 64 American Convention on Human Rights). 
72ACHR, art. 63 (1). 
73Dinah Shelton, Remedies in International Human Rights Law, 3rd. ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2015), 228. She has claimed that “The drafting history of the American Convention reveals no debate about 
conferring broad competence on the Court. The early drafts generally replicated the language of Article 50 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, but some states sought to strengthen this article.” Ibid. 
74Antkowiak and Gonza have claimed that the IACtHR “is the only international body with binding jurisdiction 
that has consistently ordered this full range of reparations. Especially noteworthy is the Tribunal’s focus upon 
exacting non-monetary remedies, in direct response to victim’s repeated petitions.” Antkowiak, Gonza, The 
American Convention on Human Rights, 19.  
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undertake to comply with the judgement of the IACtHR in any case to which they are parties. 
However, the IACtHR, as usual for most international courts, has no effective mechanisms to 
enforce its decisions. The IACtHR relies on the domestic compliance with its decisions in order 
to ensure the effectiveness of inter-American human rights jurisprudence. This affects 
especially the effectiveness of the practice of inter-American judicial review of domestic laws 
as we will see.75  
 
It is difficult for respondent states to fully comply with all the IACtHR ordered measures 
due to the extensive catalogue of reparations at its disposal. It is also no simple task to undertake 
an analysis of compliance rates within the IAS.76 Legal scholars have usually relied on the 
compliance with judgement orders  issued by the IACtHR and the decisions made by the highest 
domestic courts in order to present a more complete picture of compliance with inter-American 
jurisprudence.77 Although there is no sanction for non-compliance with a judgement, the ACHR 
establishes that, in an annual report to the General Assembly of the OAS, the IACtHR must 
indicate cases in which a state has not complied and make pertinent recommendations on the 
matter (Art. 65 ACHR). This provision is supposed to submit states to a kind of political 
embarrassment in order to ensure compliance with inter-American jurisprudence. This could 
also be described as a political function of the IACtHR, which is intended to align domestic 
human rights practices with inter-American human rights law. 
 
 
1.3.1.2. Inter-American judicial review as a top-down element of cosmopolitan 
constitutionalism 
 
Inter-American human rights jurisprudence has become the most salient element in the 
evolution of top-down cosmopolitan constitutionalism in Latin America. The emergence of 
                                                 
75Chapter IV will especially refer to the IACtHR dependence on the implementation of strong inter-American 
judicial review by national authorities in order to guarantee its effectiveness within domestic law. 
76The IACtHR recently published an overall analysis of its 40 years of jurisprudence that also brings interesting 
statistical information, see: IACtHR. 40 Years Protecting Rights, (Costa Rica: IACtHR, GIZ), available at: 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/sitios/libros/todos/docs/40anos_eng.pdf.    
77According to Jo M. Pasqualucci, there have been successful ordered compensations, but underenforced anti-
impunity orders: See: Pasqualucci, The Practice and Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 7-
8; On compliance with inter-American jurisprudence see: Damián González-Salzberg, “Complying (Partially) 
with the Compulsory Judgements of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in Law and Policy in Latin 
America, eds. Pedro Fortes et al. (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 39-56; Courtney Hillebrecht, Domestic 
Politics and International Human Rights Tribunals. The Problem of Compliance, (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2014); Courtney Hillebrecht “The Domestic Mechanisms of Compliance with International 
Human Rights Law: Cases Studies from the Inter-American Human Rights System,” Human Rights Quarterly 34, 
(2012), 959-985.  
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inter-American judicial review of domestic law has been simultaneously an element in and a 
product throughout this phenomenon. As Dinah Shelton has described, “the IACtHR has made 
broad use of its jurisdiction. (…) Unlike the usual practice of the European Court, the [IACtHR] 
has ordered a state to take specific action to remedy a breach of the Convention.”78 This 
explains how extensive interpretations of some ACHR provisions like Arts. 2 and 63 (1) ACHR 
have served as a legal basis for the practice of strong inter-American judicial review of domestic 
laws in Latin America. 
 
Two specific forms of strong inter-American judicial review can be described as salient 
elements in this top-down evolution of Latin American cosmopolitan constitutionalism: 
conventionality control and the direct enforcement of socioeconomic rights. The practice of 
conventionality control of domestic laws is related to the inter-American judicial enforcement 
of civil and political rights, which compose the majority of rights established by the ACHR. 
The direct enforcement of socioeconomic rights refers to the most recent IACtHR interpretation 
of the relation between the ACHR and other important inter-American human rights documents, 
more specifically the Protocol of San Salvador. Although this last form of inter-American 
judicial review has still not led to a concrete case of amendment of a domestic statute by the 
IACtHR, there is evidence that the IACtHR will start practicing the strong review of legislation 
on socioeconomic rights as Chapter III will explain. 
 
The emergence of inter-American judicial review illustrates how the IACtHR has 
strengthened its authority over domestic constitutional orders. This court has empowered itself 
with consequences for the relationship between national and international law within the IAS. 
The most salient consequence has been that compliance with inter-American judicial review 
has promoted convergence between domestic and inter-American human rights law. This 
convergence illustrates how inter-American judicial review has become an agent of the 
evolution of cosmopolitan constitutionalism. However, it is worth remembering that the 
emergence of inter-American judicial review was only possible due to the already existent 
elements of cosmopolitan constitutionalism within the IAS. Given that describing the specific 
forms of inter-American judicial review already involves the normative questions pertaining to 
their practice, this study will address these specific forms more closely under Chapter III, and 
then study the normative grounds for their practice in Chapter IV.  
 
                                                 
78Shelton, Remedies in International Human Rights Law, 229. 
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1.3.2. The bottom-up evolution of cosmopolitan constitutionalism 
 
The bottom-up evolution of cosmopolitan constitutionalism relates to the higher 
authority of human rights law within domestic legal systems in Latin America. In the first steps 
of the IAS, bottom-up cosmopolitan elements were restricted to the ratification of international 
human rights conventions by Latin American states. The ratification of the ACHR, for instance, 
was a prominent example of a bottom-up cosmopolitan element that strengthened the authority 
of inter-American human rights law within domestic law. More recently, though, there has been 
a stronger bottom-up evolution of Latin American cosmopolitan constitutionalism. In recent 
decades, domestic constitutional orders have changed their relationship with international law 
and, most importantly, with inter-American human rights law. The bottom-up elements of Latin 
American cosmopolitan constitutionalism refer mostly to these recent changes that have 
strengthened the relationship between domestic and inter-American human rights law. This has 
happened in a non-linear process and also in different ways in some Latin American countries.79  
 
There are two most important types of elements worth mentioning. First, there was a 
wave of new constitutional texts in Latin America, especially after the 1990s. The adoption of 
new constitutions or even the amendment or reform of constitutional texts are among the first 
type of bottom-up cosmopolitan elements brought about by national legislatures in the region. 
A second type of bottom-up cosmopolitanism refers to human rights interpretation by 
constitutional courts and the interaction between national and international courts when 
resolving cases that involve human rights law.   
 
 
1.3.2.1. Bottom-up cosmopolitanism and national legislatures 
 
The first type of bottom-up cosmopolitan elements emerged by the adoption of new 
constitutions that changed the relationship between domestic and international human rights 
law. Several Latin American constitutional orders have strengthened their commitment to 
human rights protection. For Rodrigo Uprimny, “the openness of the domestic legal system to 
international human rights law, particularly the special and privileged treatment of human rights 
                                                 
79On this issue, see: New Constitutionalism in Latin America. Promises and Practices, eds. Detlef Nolte, Almut 
Schilling-Vacaflor, (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing, 2012). 
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treaties” was a common feature of these recent  changes of Latin American constitutions.80 For 
Mariela Morales Antoniazzi and Pablo Saavedra Alessandri, these constitutional changes 
illustrate a trend of inter-americanization of domestic constitutional practices, i.e., the adoption 
of opening clauses, which yield constitutional authority to human rights treaties or establish 
that domestic rights must be interpreted according to international human rights law.81 Manuel 
Góngora-Mera has also pointed out that: “The general trend in Latin American constitutions 
during the past two decades has been the incorporation of human rights treaties into domestic 
law with ‘special status’.”82 This study will now address this new form of constitutionalism in 
Latin America, which has been brought about by the work of national legislatures. 
 
 
i) The adoption of new constitutions and their references to human rights law 
 
The most recent constitution of Colombia is a first example of the transformation of the 
relationship between domestic and international human rights law in Latin America. Art. 93 of 
the 1991 constitution establishes that “all international treaties and conventions ratified by the 
Congress shall prevail in the domestic order” and that domestic fundamental rights should be 
interpreted in light of ratified international treaties.83 Moreover, according to Art. 94, the rights 
established by the constitution and international treaties do not figure as a definitive catalogue 
of rights. They may be complemented by the rights inherent to the person, even if they are not 
explicitly mentioned in these documents.84 It is also worth mentioning Art. 164 of the 
Colombian constitution, according to which this constitution grants priority to the analysis of 
the ratification of international human rights treaties by the government.85   
 
According to the 1992 Constitution of Paraguay, constitutional law should enjoy higher 
authority than international treaties but these, in turn, enjoy a higher authority than ordinary 
                                                 
80Rodrigo Uprimny, “The Recent Transformation of Constitutional Law in Latin America: Trends and 
Challenges,” Texas Law Review 89, (2011), 1587-1609, 1592. 
81See: Mariela Morales Antoniazzi, Pablo Saavedra Alessandri, “Inter-Americanization. Its Legal Bases and 
Political Impact,” in Transformative Constitutionalism in Latin America, eds. Armin Von Bogdandy, Eduardo 
Ferrer Mac-Gregor, Mariela Morales Antoniazzi, Flávia Piovesan, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 255-
278. 
82Manuel Eduardo Góngora-Mera, “The Block of Constitutionality as the Doctrinal Pivot of an Ius Commune,” in 
Transformative Constitutionalism in Latin America, eds. Armin von Bogdandy et al., (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2017), 235-253, 238.  
83Constitution of Colombia, art. 93.  
84Ibid, art. 94.  
85Ibid, art. 164. 
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domestic law.86 This constitution also establishes that the state “admits a supranational legal 
order that guarantees the validity of human rights, peace, justice, cooperation and development 
in the political, economic, social and cultural spheres.”87 Still according to this constitution, 
international human rights treaties may be denounced only through the procedures applied to 
constitutional amendments.88 The 1999 Constitution of Venezuela establishes in its Art. 19 the 
obligation for domestic authorities to enforce human rights according to both the constitution 
and ratified international treaties.89 Moreover, its Art. 23 establishes the constitutional 
hierarchy of human rights: “Treaties, covenants and conventions relating to human rights (…) 
have constitutional hierarchy and prevail in the domestic order,” insofar as they contain more 
favorable norms than those established by domestic law.90 This article also establishes the 
“immediate and direct application” of these documents by domestic “courts and other 
organs.”91 
 
According to Art. 11 (3) of the 2008 Constitution of Ecuador, “all rights and guarantees 
laid down in the Constitution and international human rights instruments are directly and 
immediately applicable by and before any and all public servants, judicial or administrative.”92 
This constitution also establishes that the principles of “pro persona, least restrictive 
interpretation, direct applicability, and opening clause” must be applied to ratified international 
human rights treaties.93 Moreover, it establishes in its Art. 424 that “international human rights 
treaties ratified by the State that afford greater protection than the Constitution shall prevail 
over all legal provisions or public acts.”94 Finally, the 2009 Bolivian constitution establishes in 
its Art. 13 (4) that international human rights guarantees have primacy over ordinary domestic 
law and that the rights and duties laid down in the constitution are to be interpreted in 
accordance with international treaties.95 Moreover, Art. 14 (3) establishes that individuals and 
groups are ensured the free and effective exercise of the rights enshrined in the constitution, 
national laws and human rights treaties.96 Article 256 refers to the primacy of international 
human rights documents when they declare rights more favorable than those of the constitution 
                                                 
86Constitution of Paraguay, art. 137 
87Ibid, art. 145.  
88Ibid, art. 142. 
89Constitution of Venezuela, art. 19 
90Ibid, art. 23. 
91Ibid. 
92Constitution of Ecuador, art. 11 (3). 
93Ibid, art. 417. 
94Ibid, art. 424. 
95Constitution of Bolivia, art. 13 (4).  
96Ibid, art. 14 (3).  
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and that the rights recognized in the constitution must be interpreted in agreement with 
international human rights treaties.97 Although Art. 410 establishes the primacy of 
constitutional norms, it ranks international treaties above domestic law, granting international 
human rights treaties at least a supra-legal authority within domestic law.98   
 
 
ii) The higher authority of human rights due to constitutional reforms or 
amendments 
 
A new relationship between national and international human rights law has also been 
brought about by constitutional reforms or amendments carried out by legislatures in Latin 
America. A 1994 constitutional reform introduced Art. 75 (22) to the Argentinian constitution, 
according to which treaties and international agreements have primacy over domestic law.99 
This article mentions an extensive list of human rights treaties that “have constitutional 
hierarchy” but do not “derogate any article of the first part of this Constitution and should be 
understood as complementary to the rights and guarantees recognized by it.”100 Furthermore, 
this article establishes special procedures to pull out of human rights treaties and to ratify them 
in order that they acquire constitutional hierarchy within the Argentinean constitutional order.   
   
In Mexico, the constitution was amended in 2011 in order to make an explicit reference 
to human rights at the beginning of the constitutional text. The reform modified the title of 
Chapter 1 of the constitution (from “Of the individual guarantees” to “Of human rights and 
their guarantees”), as well as modifying several other constitutional articles that address human 
rights. In its Art. 1, the Mexican constitution now reads that “individuals shall be entitled to the 
human rights granted by this Constitution and the international treaties to which Mexico is 
party, as well as the guarantees for their protection.”101 
 
  
                                                 
97Ibid, art. 256.  
98Ibid, art. 410.  
99Constitution of Argentina, art. 75 (22). 
100Ibid. 
101Constitution of Mexico, art. 1. On the evolution of the protection of human rights in Mexico, see: José María 
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1.3.2.2. Bottom-up cosmopolitanism by means of constitutional interpretation 
 
The second important type of bottom-up cosmopolitan elements can be observed in 
human rights interpretation and in the interaction between national and international courts 
when resolving cases that involve human rights law. The difference to the first type of bottom-
up elements is that this second type does not necessarily involve the formal amendment of 
national constitutions by national legislatures. Legal authorities, more specifically courts, are 
the prominent actors of this second type of bottom-up evolution of Latin American 
cosmopolitan constitutionalism. 
 
There are at least two different important trends when it comes to this type of bottom-
up cosmopolitanism brought about by domestic courts. First, there is the interpretation held by 
the domestic highest courts of the hierarchy that human rights treaties should enjoy within 
domestic law. This has been a usual phenomenon within countries that do not clearly rank 
international human rights treaties in a specific position within national law or where recent 
constitutional amendments have changed the domestic authority of international treaties. A 
second important trend is the emergence of an inter-American framework for human rights 
enforcement, which can become an important reference point for rights adjudication within 
domestic law.  
 
 
i) The constitutionalization of international human rights treaties by domestic 
courts 
 
When the hierarchy of human rights treaties is not so clearly established by legislatures, 
it is up to judicial authorities to determine it. This has been the case in several Latin American 
countries, in which there is a lack of clear reference to the hierarchy of international human 
rights treaties within domestic law. This unclear reference led to what Manuel Góngora-Mera 
has described as the “judicial constitutionalization of human rights treaties.”102 For him, judicial 
constitutionalization describes a process through which an international human rights treaty 
acquires the normative rank of constitutional norms. There are basically two main consequences 
of this process. First, in cases of a norm conflict, the result may be that domestic statutes are 
                                                 
102Manuel Eduardo Góngora-Mera, Inter-American Judicial Constitutionalism. On the Constitutional Rank of 
Human Rights Treaties in Latin America Through National and Inter-American Adjudication, (San José, C.R.: 
Inter-American Institute of Human Rights, 2011), 84-120.  
 36 
declared unconstitutional based on their incompatibility with international human rights law. In 
turn, the rights established by international treaties might gain direct effects when they become 
constitutional rights by means of domestic remedies such as constitutional writs.103 
 
Góngora-Mera has underscored the importance of the doctrine of constitutional block 
and its consequences for constitutional adjudication in Latin America. This doctrine has been a 
prominent instrument for the constitutionalization of human rights treaties in some Latin 
American countries. According to it, courts may establish the constitutional authority of 
international human rights treaties based on the existence of a block of constitutional norms 
and principles, which encompasses domestic constitutional norms; and international human 
rights treaties, and declarations. For Góngora-Mera, “usually, the block of constitutionality 
encompasses the constitution stricto sensu, international declarations of human rights (…), and 
human rights treaties ratified by the state.”104 This constitutional block might be invoked in the 
constitutional review of domestic statutes as a parameter of constitutionality and in 
constitutional writs in cases of domestic violations of human rights.  
 
The constitutionalization of international human rights treaties can be observed, for 
instance, in Panama. The Supreme Court of Panama established the constitutionalization of 
some international human rights provisions through the constitutional block doctrine. The 
Supreme Court granted constitutional rank to Art. 8 ACHR in a 1990 decision.105 In several 
other decisions, it listed some international norms as figuring as standard for national 
constitutional review and progressively granted constitutional authority to international human 
rights documents. One example is a 1996 decision in which this supreme court included the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child into the constitutional block in Panama, arguing the 
absence of rights of children in the constitution. After the convention acquired constitutional 
authority, it was able to be enforced by writs of amparo within domestic law.106  
 
It is important to notice that, in some countries, the evolution of the judicial 
constitutionalization of international human rights treaties has been non-linear. This can be 
illustrated by the case of Peru. In its 1979 constitution, human rights treaties had the same rank 
                                                 
103Góngora-Mera, The Block of Constitutionality as the Doctrinal Pivot of an Ius Commune, 237. 
104Ibid, 238.  
105Góngora-Mera, Inter-American Judicial Constitutionalism, 86.  
106Ibid, 87. On the writ or action of amparo within Latin American constitutionalism, see: Allan-Randolph Brewer 
Carías, Constitutional Protection of Human Rights in Latin America: A Comparative Study of Amparo 
Proceedings, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
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of domestic constitutional norms, which represented a novelty in Latin America. According to 
Art. 101 of the old constitution, international treaties were a part of national law and in case of 
conflict between national and international norms, the later should prevail.107 Moreover, Art. 
105 established that human rights treaties could only be modified by means of constitutional 
amendments due to their constitutional rank within Peruvian law.108 Later, the 1993 
Constitution enacted under the authoritarian regime of Alberto Fujimori changed this 
constitutional rank of human rights treaties. The new 1993 text established a 
deconstitutionalization of human rights treaties, insofar as it established that international 
treaties were just “part of national law.”109  
 
As Góngora-Mera has explained, after the fall of Fujimori’s regime, Peru’s 
Constitutional Tribunal established the “reconstitutionalization of human rights treaties.”110  In 
a series of decisions, the newly independent court started to introduce important changes to the 
Peruvian constitutional order. Worth mentioning is the adoption of a Constitutional Procedural 
Code in 2004, according to which human rights treaties figure within the “block of 
constitutionality.”111 This new framework permitted this court to develop case law in favor of 
the application of human rights treaties within domestic law.112 Since then, even though human 
rights treaties enjoy only a simple legal rank, the Peruvian court was able to include them among 
norms of the block of constitutionality, which deserve protection according to the “indirect 
contravention of the Constitution.”113 That is, despite not having a formal constitutional rank, 
human rights treaties might enjoy a higher authority in concrete cases.  
 
A last example worth mentioning of how the process of constitutionalization of human 
rights treaties has been non-linear is the case of the Dominican Republic, where the Supreme 
Court of Justice introduced the writ of amparo into domestic law based on Arts. 8 and 25 (1) 
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art. 220 (4). Góngora-Mera has claimed that “[a]fter the self-coup (autogolpe) of President Alberto Fujimori, 
international human rights law and the inter-American system of human rights represented burdensome limits for 
the dictatorial actions of the government.” Góngora-Mera, Inter-American Judicial Constitutionalism, 116.  
110Góngora-Mera, Inter-American Judicial Constitutionalism, 119.  
111Peruvian Constitutional Procedural Code, art. V of the Preliminary Title. 
112Góngora-Mera, Inter-American Judicial Constitutionalism, 118. 
113Peruvian Constitutional Procedural Code, art. 75.  
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ACHR in a 1999 decision.114 For Góngora-Mera, this illustrated an increasing reception of 
human rights treaties at the domestic level.115 This reception was later reaffirmed in decisions 
that ruled for the necessity to harmonize domestic laws with inter-American human rights law. 
In a 2004 decision this harmonization was declared with regard to a new Criminal Procedure 
Code.116 The Dominican Supreme Court also established the binding character of inter-
American human rights jurisprudence within domestic law. However, more recent decisions 
denied the prevalence of international norms over domestic law, i.e., the Supreme Court 
reviewed its broad reception of inter-American human rights jurisprudence. For Góngora-Mera, 
“[t]he facts that gave rise to this change are framed in the intricate and highly politicized issue 
of the situation of Haitian immigrants in the Dominican Republic.”117 He has claimed that the 
Supreme Court started adopting a resistant attitude to enforce inter-American human rights law 
after an IACtHR decision on the protected right of Dominican-born children of Haitian ancestry 
to nationality and education in the country. This evolution illustrates that domestic 
constitutional courts have held different interpretations of the authority of international human 
rights law within domestic law, despite the general trend towards the constitutionalization of 
international human rights treaties in the region. 
 
 
ii) The inter-American framework for human rights enforcement  
 
The common framework for human rights adjudication within domestic law has been 
brought about by the evolutive character of inter-American human rights practices. Both inter-
American institutions are essential for this evolutive character of the inter-American framework 
for human rights enforcement. The states authorities might borrow quasi-jurisprudential 
(IACHR)118 and jurisprudential expertise (IACtHR)119 from the inter-American framework and 
adopt it as a meaningful reference point when deciding cases within domestic law. Particularly 
                                                 




118“[T]he Commission has built a large repertoire of mechanisms, including quasi-adjudication and mediation of 
friendly settlements; regular site visits to trouble spots throughout the region; and country reports.” Par Engstrom, 
Courtney Hillebrecht, “Institutional Change and the Inter-American Human Rights System,” The International 
Journal of Human Rights 22, no. 9, (2018), 1111-1122, 1115. 
119For an extensive analysis of inter-American case law on different provisions of the ACHR, see: Thomas 
Buergenthal, Dinah Shelton, Protecting Human Rights in the Americas: Case and Materials (Strasbourg: 
International Institute of Human Rights, 1993). An updated version of inter-American case law analysis can be 
found in: Laurence Burgorgue-Larsen, Amaya Úbeda de Torres, The Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Case 
Law and Commentary, trans. Rosalind Greenstein, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
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important to bottom-up cosmopolitanism is the common framework that inter-American 
jurisprudence has represented to rights adjudication within domestic law. Countries with similar 
human rights violations might rely on this shared human rights expertise in order to align 
domestic constitutional practices with better practices of human rights enforcement. Even if 
subsidiary to domestic human rights enforcement, the inter-American framework has become 
a valuable source of human rights expertise for national authorities. Together with other 
regional systems and the universal system for human rights protection, inter-American human 
rights law is currently an important reference point for domestic rights adjudication in Latin 
American countries. 
 
 The usefulness of this inter-American framework involves compliance with inter-
American jurisprudence on the part of national authorities. Just recently, the Grand Chamber 
of the Chilean Supreme Court demonstrated the value of the common framework for human 
rights adjudication in AD 1386-2014.120 This case involved the criminal convictions against 
indigenous leaders under Chile’s terrorist statute. In Norin Catrimán v. Chile,121 the IACtHR 
had ordered national authorities to nullify all the effects of these criminal judgements within 
domestic law. The Chilean Supreme Court decided to guarantee the effectiveness of this 
IACtHR judgement within domestic law.122 Most importantly, the Chilean court admitted the 
legitimacy of the practice of conventionality control, according to which national judicial 
authorities should review domestic legislation in case of conflict with inter-American human 
rights law.123 By doing so, national authorities, most importantly domestic courts, become 
auxiliary bodies of the IACtHR. For Jorge Contesse, this decision “deserves praise because it 
affirms a domestic court’s authority to declare itself an inter-American tribunal.”124 This 
interpretation of the complementary work between domestic courts and the IACtHR is 
illustrative of how the common framework for human rights enforcement might work in 
practice. 
 
                                                 
120Supreme Court of Chile, (Judgement) May 16, 2019, Case of AD 1386-2014. 
121IACtHR (Judgement), May 29, 2014, Case of Norín Catrimán et al. (Leaders, Members and Activist of the 
Mapuche Indigenous People) v. Chile. 
122Supreme Court of Chile, (Judgement) May 16, 2019, Case of AD 1386-2014, §5. 
123Ibid, §9. 
124Jorge Contesse, The Supreme Court of Chile as an inter-American Tribunal, International Journal of 
Constitutional Law Blog, May 31, 2019, http://www.iconnectblog.com/2019/05/thesupreme-court-of-chile-as-an-
inter-american-tribunal. For Contesse, “Chile’s highest court has not only enhanced its own authority, but also that 
of the Inter-American Court’s.” Ibid.  
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It is important to emphasize that inter-American framework for human rights 
enforcement does not only refer to questions of mandatory compliance with the decisions 
ordered by the inter-American institutions. Another important point here is the voluntary use 
of this regional framework for domestic rights enforcement. One example is the voluntary 
compliance on the part of Argentinian authorities with inter-American jurisprudence on 
amnesty laws. In Simón, Julio Héctor y otros,125 the Argentinian Supreme Court declared the 
invalidity of the Ley de Punto Final (Full Stop Law) and the Ley de Obediencia Devisa (Law 
of Due Obedience), which were enacted in the 1980s and had equivalent effects to amnesty 
laws in the country. The Argentinian Supreme Court established the invalidity of these laws 
based on the IACtHR invalidation of amnesty laws within Peruvian law. In Mazzeo Julio Lilo 
y otros,126 the Argentinian Supreme Court invalidated a 1989 decree by President Menem also 
based on inter-American jurisprudence. The cases of Simón and Mazzeo illustrate the voluntary 
domestic compliance with inter-American human rights jurisprudence and demonstrate how 
influential the inter-American framework can be for the domestic authorities when engaging in 
constitutional adjudication. In a nutshell, this inter-American framework has become 
meaningful given that inter-American institutions have addressed systematic and traditional 
human rights violations in the region and sought for appropriate remedies for their non-
repetition. National authorities should therefore not ignore this human rights expertise.  
 
 
1.4. Conclusion: Latin American cosmopolitan constitutionalism as the scene for the 
emergence of strong inter-American judicial review  
 
Although cosmopolitanism has a variety of meanings, cosmopolitan constitutionalism 
refers to the new relationship between national and international law that has emerged in 
different legal systems throughout the 20th century. In line with this, Latin American 
cosmopolitan constitutionalism can be a useful concept for describing the emergence of a new 
context for human rights enforcement in Latin America. Top-down and bottom-up elements 
have strengthened the authority of inter-American human rights law within domestic law and, 
ultimately, changed the relationship between domestic and international law within the IAS. In 
a nutshell, the top-down and bottom-up cosmopolitan elements have blurred the lines between 
                                                 
125Argentinian Supreme Court, (Judgement) June 14, 2005, Case of Simón Julio Hector y otros. 
126Argentinian Supreme Court, (Judgement) July 13, 2007, Case of Mazzeo Julio Lilo y otros. 
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domestic and international public law within the IAS. These elements have ultimately given 
rise to the inter-American practice of judicial review of domestic laws.   
 
The top-down cosmopolitan elements have included the organizational evolution of the 
IAS, with an emphasis on the increasing authority of the IACtHR. Although it is true that the 
establishment of new Latin American democracies has facilitated the organizational evolution 
of the IAS, this evolution is part of a larger trend of increasing peer-review in international 
relations throughout the 20th century. The initial steps within this evolution involved the 
adoption of the ACHR in 1969. However, the exponential increase in the IAS’s authority is 
much more recent. The ACHR entered into force in the late 1970s, but countries like Brazil and 
Mexico only fully integrated into the IAS in 1998, when they finally accepted the contentious 
jurisdiction of the IACtHR. Given that only Latin American countries have accepted this 
contentious jurisdiction to date, the IACtHR currently functions as a Latin American court of 
human rights. In fact, in the past two decades, the IACtHR gained in authority due to the new 
context for human rights enforcement that emerged in Latin America. During this short period, 
the court has not missed the chance to become an influential institution in domestic 
constitutional orders and, by practicing inter-American judicial review of domestic laws, it has 
consolidated its authority within Latin American constitutionalism.  
 
Bottom-up cosmopolitanism has involved the adoption of new constitutional texts by 
domestic legislatures, and the adoption of innovative constitutional interpretations by the 
highest domestic courts. One of the most salient features of recent Latin American constitutions 
is the privileged position that they conferred to human rights treaties within domestic law. 
National legislatures were not solely responsible for this bottom-up evolution of cosmopolitan 
constitutionalism. The most authoritative Latin American courts started adopting legal 
interpretations in favor of the stronger authority of international human rights law within 
domestic law. From the 1990s onwards, some courts started adopting the constitutional block 
doctrine, according to which international norms are included within the block of norms that 
are taken as a meaningful reference point for judicially reviewing domestic ordinary law. If 
domestic legislation is not in accordance with international provisions, domestic authorities can 
invoke the constitutional block and invalidate ordinary law based on this incompatibility. In 
conclusion, these most recent Latin American constitutions and innovative constitutional 




Latin American cosmopolitan constitutionalism brings about a new context for asking 
the normative questions that are inherently associated with the practice of judicial review.  In 
fact, these normative questions become even more difficult to address in this new context. 
National legislatures and the highest courts in Latin America are, according to the ACHR, 
obliged to comply with inter-American human rights jurisprudence. However, judicial review 
of legislation has traditionally been under the authority of domestic courts in Latin America. 
More specifically, constitutional courts have been the most prominent judicial reviewers of 
legislation within Latin American constitutionalism. With the emergence of inter-American 
judicial review, these Latin American courts may now have a rival. In fact, there has been some 
cases in which the IACtHR has contested the decision of some of the highest Latin American 
courts with regard to the validity of domestic norms. Conflicting decisions on the validity of 
norms have become a fundamental issue within Latin American cosmopolitan 
constitutionalism, which indicates the need for a normative theory of inter-American judicial 
review. 
 
As some scholars have noted, by practicing inter-American judicial review, the IACtHR 
has behaved like an international constitutional court for the Latin American countries under 
its authority.127 However, this Latin American constitutional court was not established by any 
international treaty or convention among the IAS member states. Most importantly, this 
constitutional authority of the IACtHR was definitely not established by the ACHR. The 
IACtHR has practiced something similar to what in the European context Dieter Grimm has 
described as a “clandestine transfer of powers,” which happened due to the European Court of 
Justice’s extensive interpretation of European treaties.128 Similar to Grimm’s analysis of 
European law, the IACtHR has clandestinely taken the authority of constitutional courts to 
review domestic legislation. In view of this, the normative questions referring to the legitimacy 
                                                 
127For instance, see: Ariel E. Dulitzky, “An Inter-American Constitutional Court? The Invention of the 
Conventionality Control by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights,” Texas International Law Journal 50, no. 
1, (2015), 46-93. 
128See: Dieter Grimm, The Constitution of European Democracy, trans. Justin Collins, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2017). Grimm referred to the ECJ’s decisions in Van Geend en Loos v. Netherlands (1963) and Costa v. 
ENEL (1964). In these judgements the ECJ established that community law had direct effects on and supremacy 
over domestic law, which Grimm has described as the constitutionalization of European treaties. For him, the 
most problematic issue is that this project of integration through law in Europe had “no critical bystanders,” given 
that the Council of Europe is “no counterweight to the ECJ.” Ibid, 9. In line with this, he argued that the ECJ’s 
decisions caused a legitimation gap within the European Union, given that the Council, the Parliament and the 
members states cannot review ECJ’s jurisprudence, and given that “[t]he ECJ, as a court, evades the question of 
democratically accountability entirely.” Ibid, 13. In the end, he argued, the ECJ had blinded itself against politics. 
On this issue, see also: Dieter Grimm, “The Democratic Costs of Constitutionalization – The European Case,” in 
Ibid, 81-104. 
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of inter-American judicial review are of high relevance for Latin American constitutional 
theory. Although several constitutions and courts have established new methods for enforcing 
inter-American human rights law within domestic law, inter-American judicial review has 
made the interaction between domestic and inter-American authorities much more complex. 
This can be more clearly illustrated with examples of the cosmopolitan relationship between 
national and inter-American human rights authorities. For the purpose of understanding this 
cosmopolitan relationship, it is better to focus on analyzing one of the Latin American 
constitutional orders and see how the practice of inter-American judicial review has affected 
the inter-institutional interaction between national and international authorities within the IAS. 
In the following chapter, this study will describe this cosmopolitan inter-institutional interaction 




II. The Brazilian Cosmopolitan Constitution 
 
 
2.1.  The bottom-up evolution of cosmopolitan constitutionalism in Brazil 
 
Despite the geographical location of their country, Brazilians do not share a strong sense 
of Latin American identity. Throughout the centuries, different colonial histories have set the 
Portuguese- and Spanish-colonized countries apart from each other in the region. Different 
cultures and languages, and the continental dimensions of the Brazilian territory, with its 
population concentrated along the coast, were important factors that contributed to Brazil’s 
exceptional status in Latin America. This Brazilian exception in the region offers a challenge 
when trying to situate Brazil within discussions about Latin America in any meaningful sense, 
given that the relations between the country and the region are not so self-evident.129 Due to the 
increasing relevance of human rights enforcement in the region, the first task of this chapter is 
describing Brazil’s integration through human rights law into Latin America.  
 
The previous chapter has described Latin American cosmopolitan constitutionalism in 
general terms. The present chapter has two main objectives: addressing with greater attention 
the cosmopolitan relationship between domestic and inter-American judicial authorities and 
introducing in more specific terms the normative issues inherent in the practice of strong inter-
American judicial review. First, it is worth describing more specifically what consequences this 
new Latin American context for human rights enforcement has for domestic constitutional 
practices. In order to fulfill this task, this chapter will analyze some Brazilian cases before the 
IACtHR and will flesh out the transformative role that these cases have played within domestic 
law. The key aspect of this descriptive approach is to demonstrate how this cosmopolitan 
relationship can enable different responses to traditional human violations in Brazil. As the last 
chapter has also emphasized, the inter-American framework for rights enforcement provided 
by inter-American jurisprudence can be useful for changing domestic practices of state 
authority. This study focuses on Brazil as an example of a Latin American constitutional 
democracy and asks how influential inter-American law has been in Brazilian legal practices. 
Related to this first question, it is worth addressing a second important point, i.e., how Brazilian 
case law has influenced inter-American human rights jurisprudence. These two questions guide 
this section of the study, which is focused on Brazilian legal cosmopolitanism. They are both 
                                                 
129Some universities have, for instance, a center for Latin American studies and another center for Brazilian studies. 
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related to the top-down and bottom-up evolution of cosmopolitan constitutionalism in Latin 
America. 
 
Regarding the second task of this chapter, i.e., introducing the problem of inter-
American judicial review with a concrete example, the final parts will address the IACtHR 
invalidation of the Brazilian amnesty law, which was established in two different cases 
throughout inter-American jurisprudence. This final section will address the resistance on the 
part of Brazilian judicial authorities, more specifically the Brazilian constitutional court judges, 
to adopting inter-American jurisprudence on amnesty laws as a decisive reference point when 
reviewing the validity of the Brazilian amnesty statute within the domestic system of judicial 
review. These Brazilian cases involving the contested validity of an amnesty statute represent 
the best example of how inter-American judicial review can lead to conflicts between national 
and inter-American authorities within the new context for human rights enforcement described 
as Latin American cosmopolitan constitutionalism in this study. 
 
Yet, before undertaking this analysis of cosmopolitan constitutional interaction between 
domestic and inter-American authorities, it is necessary to address what enables this 
cosmopolitan relationship. The most important trigger for the emergence of bottom-up 
cosmopolitan constitutionalism in Brazil was the adoption of the 1988 constitution.130 It was 
this constitution that has led the country to a gradual integration through human rights law into 
the Latin American human rights enforcement context. Brazilian legal cosmopolitanism has 
relied mostly on the evolution of human rights protection, democracy and the rule of law 
promoted by the recent normative framework of the 1988 constitution.  
 
 
2.2. The 1988 cosmopolitan constitution  
 
After the authoritarian rule of a military dictatorship (1964-1985), the 1988 constitution 
was described as the citizen constitution by one of the leading political figures of the 1987-1988 
constituent assembly, Deputy Ulysses Guimarães.131 After decades of indirect elections, which 
                                                 
130It is important to remember that integration through human rights law is an on-going process, which has 
involved different actors. Beyond legal authorities, previous Brazilian administrations and legislatures were 
responsible for yielding authority to the inter-American level of human rights protection. Civil society has also 
strengthened the Brazilian integration into the IAS through the work of NGOs and human rights defenders. 
131Ulysses Guimarães, Discourse on the Occasion of the Promulgation of the Constitution, available in Portuguese 
at: http://ref.scielo.org/yf7dtp. 
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resulted in non-democratic and authoritarian administrations, Brazil was finally able to find its 
way back to constitutional democracy. The first years of the new democracy were very turbulent 
with the death of Brazil’s first president arriving before he had even taken office and the 
impeachment of the third president for corruption scandals. Since the start, the new Brazilian 
constitutional order has had a difficult way. 
 
The length of the 1988 constitutional text is what first gets the reader’s attention.132 The 
Brazilian constitution has currently 250 articles, which extensively address several different 
topics from fundamental rights and the organization of state to very specific provisions on social 
security, education, culture, and sports. Despite a special procedure requiring a higher majority 
for constitutional amendments, the constitutional text was amended almost 100 times in its first 
30 years of existence.133 The preamble of the constitution establishes that the representatives of 
the Brazilian people convened the constitutional assembly in order “to institute a democratic 
state destined to ensure the exercise of social and individual rights, liberty, security, well-being, 
development, equality and justice” as the highest values of a society “founded on social 
harmony and committed, in the domestic and international orders, to the peaceful solution of 
disputes.”134 Moreover, Art. 3 establishes the fundamental objectives of the new constitutional 
order, i.e., i) to build a free, just and unified society, ii) to guarantee national development; iii) 
to eradicate poverty and substandard living conditions, and to reduce social and regional 
inequalities; and, finally, iv) to promote the well-being of all, without prejudice as to origin, 
race, sex, color, age, and any other forms of discrimination.135  
 
The 1988 constitution aligned Brazil with constitutional practices more recently 
associated with the label of global constitutionalism. As another example of a democratic 
constitution in Latin America that was adopted after a period of authoritarian rule, the Brazilian 
constitution imposes on state authorities some strong commitments to representative 
democracy, the rule of law, and human rights enforcement. These strong commitments are 
present throughout the whole constitutional text, but they are more emphatically stated in Art. 
60 (4), which establishes the unamendable character of the federalist form of government; 
direct, secret, universal and periodic elections; the separation of powers; and individual rights 
                                                 
132The best introduction to the Brazilian constitutional order for English speakers is arguably: Virgílio Afonso da 
Silva, The Constitution of Brazil. A Contextual Analysis, (Oxford et al.: Hart Publishing, 2019). 
133“The part of the Constitution that has been the most affected by constitutional amendments is that in which state 
intervention in the economy is regulated.” Ibid, 2. The 1988 constitution has been amended 99 times.  
134Brazilian constitution, preamble. 
135Ibid, art. 3. 
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and guarantees.136 This constitutional provision represents what legal scholars have described 
as the eternal constitutional clauses.137 They represent a core of constitutional identity, which 
shapes the basis of the constitutional order established in 1988. 
 
With regard to its commitments to democracy, the 1988 constitution represents a return 
of representative democracy after decades of indirect elections. In order to emphasize that 
Brazilians were finally citizens again with the right to have their voice heard in representative 
bodies, the constitution adopted the mandatory vote.138 The new constitution also established 
different forms of direct popular participation such as the plebiscite, the referendum and the 
possibility for the people to propose laws.139 The rule of law has been guaranteed through the 
separation of powers and the system of checks and balances, which encompasses the executive, 
the legislature and the judiciary. An important innovation in order to guarantee the rule of law 
in the country is the considerable increase in the authority of the Ministério Público, the 
Brazilian Public Ministry.140 The constitutional court, the Brazilian Supremo Tribunal Federal 
(STF), existed before the 1988 constitution, but it has also experienced a growth of its authority, 
especially after the adoption of new laws with regard to judicial review of legislation.141  
 
First, it is worth underscoring the important role that has been attributed to the Brazilian 
STF in most recent decades. As Conrado Hübner Mendes has pointed out, the court “has been 
portrayed as one of the responsible actors, if not the foremost, for the main achievements in 
                                                 
136Brazilian constitution, art. 60 (4).  
137Within German legal scholarship, legal scholars have referred to unamendable constitutional provisions as 
Ewigskeitsklauseln (eternal clauses). On the importance of these eternal clauses for constitutional law and how 
they have affected the practice of judicial review in different constitutional orders, see: Yaniv Roznai, 
Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017). 
138According to Art. 14 (1) of the Brazilian constitution, voting is compulsory for persons over 18 years old and 
optional for the illiterate, persons over 70 years old and those over 16 and under 18 years old. Mandatory vote has 
been a usual feature of Latin American constitutions. Carlos Santiago Nino even considered mandatory vote an 
essential feature of constitutional democracies, because he found it an effective solution to the problem of political 
apathy: “I have defended the preservation in Argentina of the present system of compulsory voting (…). It helps 
solve the collective-action problem, which otherwise may frustrate the interests of many participants and distort 
the tendency of the democratic process to create impartial solutions. Abstentionism may in fact cause deterioration 
of the democratic process, since it is harmful not only to the very people who decline to vote but to all citizens.” 
Carlos Santiago Nino, The Constitution of Deliberative Democracy, (New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 
1996), 155. 
139“Popular sovereignty shall be exercised by universal suffrage, and by direct and secret vote, with equal value 
for all, and, as provided by law, by: i) plebiscite, referendum, iii) popular initiative.” Brazilian constitution, art. 
14. 
140“The Public Ministry is a permanent institution, essential to the jurisdictional function of the State, with 
responsibility for defending the legal order, the democratic regime and indispensable social and individual 
interests.” Ibid, art. 127.  
141Ibid, arts. 101-103. 
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fundamental rights by Brazilian democracy since the beginning of the 2000s.”142 However, 
several institutional features have overly empowered the Brazilian constitutional court.  
 
As Oscar Vilhena Vieira has noted, the Brazilian STF is an example of a super 
constitutional court.143 This label is due to its substantial powers within the Brazilian justice 
system. The Brazilian STF is simultaneously: i) a constitutional court, ii) a specialized judicial 
court and iii) a court of last appeal. As a constitutional court, its authority relies mostly on the 
judicial review of laws and normative acts with binding effect for the federal and state levels; 
as a specialized court, its influence lies in its power to judge cases involving major state 
officials; as a court of last appeal, the STF has authority over millions of petitions within the 
Brazilian justice system. In order to cope with this heavy case load, the STF may issue, for 
instance, súmulas vinculantes (binding precedents) and it may establish the general effects of 
decisions in some special procedures, which contribute to its influence over legal practice more 
generally.144 The Brazilian STF has gained social prominence due to the high level of 
constitutional litigation in Brazil and also for having its sessions broadcast in its Justice 
Channel. Controversial rulings often hit the headlines of newspapers and are discussed in 
several TV shows. All these factors contribute to the phenomenon that has been described as 
the Brazilian supremocracy.145 This institutional context affects the interaction between the 
highest Brazilian court and the IACtHR, as it will become clear later in this chapter.  
 
Beyond the eternal clause on individual rights and guarantees, the 1988 constitution has 
gradually strengthened its commitments to human rights. Art. 5 of the original constitutional 
text lists an extensive catalogue of the fundamental rights of Brazilians and foreigners that 
reside in the country.146 Art. 5 (1) establishes the direct effects of fundamental rights and 
guarantees within Brazilian law.147 Moreover, Art. 5 (2) establishes that the rights and 
guarantees in the constitution do not exclude others derived from ratified international 
                                                 
142Conrado Hübner Mendes, “The Supreme Federal Tribunal of Brazil,” in Comparative Constitutional Reasoning, 
eds. András Jakab, Arthur Dyevre, Giulio Itzcovich, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Pres, 2017), 115-153, 
117.  
143See: Oscar Vilhena Vieira, “Descriptive Overview of the Brazilian Constitution and Supreme Court,” in 
Transformative Constitutionalism: Comparing the Apex Courts of Brazil, India and South Africa, eds. Oscar 
Vilhena, Upendra Baxi, Francis Viljoen, (Johannesburg: Pretoria University Law Press, 2013), 75-105. 
144Ibid, 102. See also the provision in: Brazilian constitution, art. 103-A. 
145Oscar Vilhena Vieira, “Supremocracia,” Revista Direito Getúlio Vargas 9, (2009), 441-464. It is worth 
mentioning that, more recently, the National Council of Justice was established as an organ to oversee the Brazilian 
judiciary: Brazilian constitution, art. 103-B. According to Art. 103-B (4), this council has the responsibility to 
control the administrative and financial functioning of the judiciary and the domestic judges’ performance. 
146Brazilian constitution, art. 5.  
147Ibid, art. 5 (1). 
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treaties.148 Flavia Piovesan has noted that “[t]he post-1988 period presents the broadest 
normative production of human rights law in all Brazilian legislative history,”149 and that “[t]he 
1988 Constitution celebrates the reinvention of the Brazilian normative legal framework in the 
field of human rights protection.”150 The ratification of the ACHR and the acceptance of the 
IACtHR contentious jurisdiction gave the Brazilian constitutional order a more cosmopolitan 
character. From the ratification of the ACHR until its full integration into the IAS, Brazil went 
through a gradual process of yielding authority to the inter-American level of human rights 
protection. Brazil ratified the ACHR on September 7, 1992, but it was not until 1998 that the 
country accepted the authority of the IACtHR, which completed its full integration into the IAS. 
Since then, the IACtHR has been able to rule on violations of the ACHR by Brazilian authorities 
and it has had the opportunity to rule over 9 Brazilian cases to date. Some of these cases will 
be analyzed in the following part of this chapter in order to illustrate the cosmopolitan 
relationship between the national and inter-American authorities.  
 
Given that the original text of the constitution had no clear provision about the hierarchy 
of international human rights treaties within Brazilian law, legal authorities and scholars have 
tried to address this issue and provide its most adequate interpretation. Some scholars argued 
that international human rights treaties already enjoyed constitutional rank based on Art. 5 (2) 
of the Brazilian constitution.151 Others disagreed and affirmed that, since there was no clear 
reference to this constitutional authority of international human rights law, these treaties 
enjoyed only a simple legal rank within Brazilian law.152 Constitutional Amendment No. 45 of 
2004 (CA 45) added Art. 5 (3) to the constitution, according to which international human rights 
treaties and conventions might acquire constitutional rank after been submitted to the same 
procedure established for constitutional amendments.153 The only convention approved by this 
                                                 
148Ibid, art. 5 (2).  
149Flávia Piovesan, “Fuerza Integradora y Catalizadora del Sistema Interamericano de Protección de los Derechos 
Humanos: Desafios para la Formación de un Constitucionalismo Regional,” in La Justicia Constitucional y su 
Internacionalización. ¿Hacia un Ius Constitucionale Commune en América Latina?, Vol. II, eds. Armin von 
Bogdandy et al., (Ciudad del Mexico: Universidad Nacional Atónoma de México, 2010), 431-448, 443. 
150Ibid. 
151Flávia Piovesan and Valério de Oliveira Mazzuoli have long advocated for this interpretation within Brazilian 
legal scholarship. See: Flávia Piovesan, Direitos Humanos e o Direito Constitucional Internacional 14th ed., (São 
Paulo: Saraiva, 2013); Valerio de Oliveira Mazzuoli, Controle Jurisdicional da Convencionalidade das Leis, 5th 
ed., (Rio de Janeiro: Forense, 2018). 
152See, for instance: Laerte José de Castro Sampaio, “Interpretação Constitucional Sobre Alienação Fiduciária e 
Prisão Civil,” in Os 10 Anos da Constituição Federal, ed. Alexandre de Moraes, (São Paulo, Atlas, 1999), 83-91; 
Maurício Adreiuolo Rodrigues, “Os Tratados Internacionais de Proteção dos Direitos Humanos e a Constituição,” 
in Teoria dos Direitos Fundamentais, (Rio de Janeiro: Renovar, 1999), 153-191. 
153“International treaties and conventions on human rights approved by both houses of the National Congress, in 
two different voting sessions, by the three-fifths votes of their respective members, shall be equivalent to 
Constitutional Amendments.” Brazilian constitution, art. 5 (3).   
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procedure to date has been the Inter-American Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities.154 The ACHR has not been submitted to this procedure, which means that the 
convention still does not enjoy constitutional rank within the Brazilian legal system. 
 
It is worth mentioning that CA 45 also added Art. 109 (5) to the Brazilian constitution, 
which establishes that, in cases of gross human rights violations, the Procurator-General of the 
Republic may request that the Superior Court of Justice refer a specific case to federal 
authorities.155 The purpose of this provision is to strengthen the investigation and provide faster 
remedies for serious human rights violations through the agency of federal authorities. The 
provision is based on the principle that the federal level is the one that is the most responsible 
for enforcing international human rights treaties within Brazilian law. Finally, it is also worth 
mentioning that CA 45 added Art. 5 (4) to the constitution, which establishes that Brazil accepts 
the authority of the International Criminal Court.156 
 
However, CA 45 has not settled the debate about the authority of international human 
rights law within Brazilian law. There was still controversy about the authority of international 
human rights treaties that did not pass through the special procedure established by the new 
Art. 5 (3) of the Brazilian constitution. As Gilmar Mendes has pointed out: “legal scholars and 
authorities have already advocated for the legal, supra-legal, constitutional or even supra-
constitutional authority of human rights treaties.”157 Finally, in the landmark decision within 
RE 466.343, the Brazilian constitutional court unanimously established that international 
human rights treaties that were not approved in accordance with the special procedure of Art. 
5 (3) of the Brazilian constitution enjoy a special type of authority within domestic law, which 
differs from the authority enjoyed by ordinary international treaties.158 For the Brazilian 
constitutional court, international human rights treaties enjoy a supra-legal but infra-
constitutional authority within Brazilian law. This refers especially to the authority of the 
ACHR within Brazilian law. Given this fact, it is worth analyzing RE 466.343 with greater 
attention.  
                                                 
154The Inter-American Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination Against Persons with 
Disabilities was adopted in 1999 and entered into force on September 14, 2001. 
155Brazilian constitution, art. 109 (5).  
156Ibid, art. 5 (4). 
157Gilmar Ferreira Mendes, “A Justiça Constitucional nos Contextos Supranacionais,” in Transnacionalidade do 
Direito, ed. Marcelo Neves, (São Paulo: Quartier Latin, 2011), 243-286, 258. 
158Brazilian STF, (Judgement) December 3, 2008, Case of RE 466.343/SP. For Flavia Piovesan, in this judgement 
the Brazilian STF changed its jurisprudence that since 1977 ranked international treaties at the same level of 
ordinary laws. See: Piovesan, Fuerza Integradora y Catalizadora del Sistema Interamericano de Protección de los 
Derechos Humanos, 444. 
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This case involved the controversy about the civil imprisonment for indebtedness in the 
case of an unfaithful trustee. This form of civil imprisonment is prohibited according to Art. 7 
(7) ACHR, which allows civil imprisonment only in the case of non-fulfilment of duties of 
support.159 In contrast, the Brazilian constitution allows it according to its Art. 5 (LXVII).160 
The Brazilian STF held different interpretations of this norm conflict between the ACHR and 
the Brazilian constitution throughout case law. Some initial decisions established that the 
constitutional provision should prevail, given that the ACHR enjoyed simple legal rank as an 
international treaty within Brazilian law.161 Finally, in RE 466.343/SP, the Brazilian STF ruled 
for the supra-legal but infra-constitutional authority of international human rights treaties and, 
most importantly here, of the ACHR within Brazilian law based on the fact that the convention 
is an international treaty that was not approved according to the procedure established by Art. 
5 (3) of the Brazilin constitution.162 Flávia Piovesan has claimed that according to current 
Brazilian constitutional court’s jurisprudence, there are 5 votes in favor of this supra-legal but 
infra-constitutional authority of international human rights treaties and 4 votes in favor of the 
constitutional authority of these treaties within Brazilian law.163 
 
It is beyond the scope of this study to fully address the domestic enforcement of the 
ACHR by the Brazilian constitutional court and how the Brazilian judges have interpreted the 
authority of inter-American human rights law within domestic law.164 It is worth remembering 
that the authority of inter-American human rights law does not only depend on legal 
enforcement but also on the overall influence over domestic lawmaking and administrative 
practices.165 Although this study will not engage in an analysis of the general enforcement of 
inter-American human rights law by the Brazilian political and legal authorities, it will illustrate 
                                                 
159“No one shall be detained for debt. This principle shall not limit the orders of a competent judicial authority 
issued for nonfulfillment of duties of support.” ACHR, art. 7 (7). 
160“There shall be no civil imprisonment for debt, except for a person who voluntarily and inexcusably defaults on 
a support obligation and for an unfaithful depository.” Brazilian constitution, art. 5 (LXVII).  
161Several of these decisions are mentioned by Gilmar Mendes. See: Mendes, A Justiça Constitucional nos 
Contextos Supranacionais, 260-275.   
162According to Judge Cezar Peluso: “the special character of these international human rights diplomas reserves 
them a specific place in the legal system, being below the Constitution, but above the domestic legislation.” 
Brazilian STF, (Vote Judge Cezar Peluso) December 3, 2008, Case of RE 466.343/SP.  
163Piovesan, Fuerza Integradora y Catalizadora del Sistema Interamericano de Protección de los Derechos 
Humanos, 444. 
164On this issue, see, for instance: Tom Gerald Daly, “Brazilian ‘Supremocracy’ and the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights: Unpicking an Unclear Relationship,” in Law and Policy in Latin America. Transforming Courts, 
Institutions and Rights, eds. Pedro Fortes, Larissa Boratti, Andrés Lleras, Tom Gerald Daly, (London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2017), 3-20. 
165See: The Inter-American Human Rights System. Impact Beyond Compliance, ed. Par Engstrom (London: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2019). 
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the cosmopolitan relationship between national authorities and the IACtHR in the following 
analysis of some Brazilian cases at the inter-American level. This is useful for the following 
discussion of the normative questions related to the practice of inter-American judicial review 
of domestic laws within Latin American cosmopolitan constitutionalism. 
 
 
2.3. Brazil before the IACtHR: cosmopolitan relationship between domestic and 
inter-American authorities 
  
For legal scholars seeking to address the normative questions related to inter-American 
judicial review, Brazilian cosmopolitan law might be the best case to study. This is due to the 
inconsistent attitude that national authorities have adopted with regard to the enforcement of 
inter-American human rights jurisprudence. In some cases, they have enforced the IACtHR 
decisions on domestic human rights violations, while in others they have simply ignored inter-
American jurisprudence. This inconsistent attitude explains the methodology of this part of the 
study. Vicki Jackson has distinguished three possible attitudes of domestic authorities towards 
international law: resistance, convergence and engagement.166 Based on his approach and on 
the inconsistent attitude of national authorities towards inter-American human rights law, the 
following section distinguishes two major case groups: i) cases that illustrate convergence and 
engagement with inter-American human rights jurisprudence and ii) cases that illustrate the 
resistance on the part of national authorities to adopt inter-American jurisprudence as a 
meaningful reference point for domestic practices of state authority. Some general points on 
these two different case groups are worth mentioning.  
  
Cosmopolitan convergence and engagement represent the intimate relationship between 
domestic constitutional practices and inter-American human rights enforcement. The cases 
analyzed within this case group illustrate how Latin American cosmopolitanism works in legal 
practice. The following analysis aims at demonstrating how inter-American human rights 
jurisprudence might address traditional issues of oppression and non-emancipatory practices 
that have followed Brazilian constitutionalism for a long time. Inter-American human rights 
jurisprudence offers a different context of adjudication for these traditional challenges, pointing 
at new horizons for Brazilian constitutionalism. Hence, inter-American human rights 
                                                 
166Vicki J. Jackson, Constitutional Engagement in a Transnational Era, (Oxford et al.: Oxford University Press, 
2010), 8. 
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adjudication may lead to transformative human rights practices within domestic 
constitutionalism. In fact, the interaction between Brazilian and inter-American authorities has 
consequences for both levels of rights enforcement. Brazilian cases have contributed to more 
creative and consistent regional human rights jurisprudence. The analysis of the following cases 
intends to demonstrate, first, how Brazilian constitutional practices have been affected by 
regional jurisprudence and, second, how Brazilian case law has contributed to the Inter-
American framework for human rights enforcement. In a nutshell, cosmopolitan convergence 
demonstrates how constitutionalism is not a project carried out solely by the agency of national 
authorities anymore. Domestic authorities may gain from a comparative regional framework 
for human rights enforcement, as long as they also contribute to its development.  
 
The resistant attitude is addressed in order to illustrate the normative questions related 
to inter-American judicial review of domestic laws. These normative questions are revealed 
primarily through the national authorities’ resistance to adopt inter-American human rights 
jurisprudence as a meaningful reference point for judicially reviewing domestic laws. The 
resistance to inter-American jurisprudence can be more clearly illustrated by two Brazilian 
cases before the IACtHR. These cases were related to the validity of the Brazilian amnesty law, 
which was declared incompatible with the ACHR by the IACtHR. Moreover, these cases are 
particularly relevant for the general authority of inter-American human rights jurisprudence. 
The resistance offered by Brazilians authorities in these cases represents, ultimately, a 
resistance to the authority of the IACtHR to practice inter-American judicial review. Similar to 
cosmopolitan convergence, resistance has consequences for both the domestic and the inter-
American levels as it will become clear in the final part of this chapter. 
 
  
2.3.1. Converging with inter-American human rights jurisprudence 
 
Why should national authorities align domestic constitutional practices with inter-
American human rights jurisprudence? The obvious answer to this question is: Because they 
are obliged to do it based on the ACHR. However, the analysis of the cosmopolitan relationship 
between national and inter-American human rights authorities reveals other answers to this 
compliance question. According to cosmopolitan constitutionalism, national authorities should 
comply with inter-American human rights jurisprudence because i) domestic violations serve 
as bottom-up inputs for the regional framework for human rights enforcement and ii) 
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throughout its evolution, this regional framework has become the best reference point for 
human rights enforcement in Latin America. Based on these two factors, cosmopolitan 
convergence and engagement represent, at least prima facie, a better option than resistance to 
inter-American human rights jurisprudence  
 
There is a number of Brazilian cases that illustrate the advantages of cosmopolitan 
convergence between national and inter-American human rights law. The following analysis of 
cosmopolitan convergence is limited to three Brazilian cases before the IACtHR. These three 
cases can demonstrate the transformative potential of the inter-institutional interaction between 
national and inter-American human rights authorities. This section will point out how this inter-
institutional interaction has led or can lead to the transformation of national and inter-American 
human rights law in each case.  
 
In Ximenes Lopes v. Brazil,167 the IACtHR addressed the cruel and degrading conditions 
under which Mr. Damião Ximenes Lopes was hospitalized in a psychiatric institution that 
operated within the Brazilian public health care system. Mr. Ximenes Lopes suffered serious 
physical and psychological attacks from the institution’s staff and died three days after his 
hospitalization. The IACtHR established violations of the rights to life and to humane treatment 
(Arts. 4 (1), 5 (1) and 5 (2) ACHR) based on the state’s duty to provide protection to individuals 
within the public health care system. It also established a violation of Arts. 8 (1) and 25 (1) 
ACHR due to the negligence of state authorities for not investigating the circumstances of Mr. 
Ximenes Lopes’ death. 
 
The IACtHR underscored the relevance of Ximenes Lopes as the first opportunity to rule 
on the violation of the human rights of a person with mental illness based on Arts. 4 and 5 
ACHR.168 This has represented an enrichment of the inter-American framework for human 
rights enforcement. In the decision, the IACtHR took the opportunity to address the rights of 
mentally ill people and the state’s duties regarding them.169 The IACtHR first acknowledged 
the inevitably vulnerable position of people with mental illness due to their particular 
psychological and emotional conditions: “increased vulnerability is due to the imbalance of 
power between patient and the medical staff,” and due “to the high degree of intimacy, which 
                                                 




is typical of the treatment of psychiatric illnesses.”170 Based on this vulnerable position, the 
IACtHR established that the staff should aim to ensure the patient’s welfare and respect his or 
her dignity.171 For the IACtHR, the duties of respect necessarily lead to a principled use of 
restraint techniques within psychiatric institutions, i.e., “any action which interferes with the 
ability of a patient to take decisions or which restricts his or her freedom of movement.”172 
Restraint should be used as a last resort and limited to the purpose of protecting the patient, 
medical staff or third parties when patient’s behavior pose a threat to their safety.  
 
Based on this IACtHR decision, local state authorities ordered the reopening of the 
investigations of Mr. Ximenes Lopez’s death, which eventually led to domestic criminal 
procedures against the director of the psychiatric institution where he was hospitalized. The 
case also led the state’s authorities to improve psychiatric institutions in the country and to 
promise to adopt better staff training in the treatment of mental illnesses.173 Even though the 
treatment in psychiatric institutions in Brazil still remains a serious issue that demands more 
effective public policies, the domestic adoption of the IACtHR decision should not be taken for 
granted. The decision has not only become a meaningful reference point for reopening the 
investigation of Mr. Ximenes’s case. It has also turned into an important reference for domestic 
institutions and activists seeking to combat violations of mentally ill people’s human rights in 
Brazil. After this IACtHR judgement, these domestic players have another strong argument to 
make when seeking to advocate against the cruel treatment that has become common practice 
in many psychiatric institutions in the country.  
 
In Favela Nova Brasilia v. Brazil,174 the IACtHR addressed the arbitrary use of police 
force in a favela located in the city of Rio de Janeiro. The IACtHR established the violations of 
the ACHR on the grounds that the police had not investigated the murder of 26 community 
residents and the sexual abuse of other three residents during two police operations in 1994 and 
1995. The case reveals the transformative potential of inter-American jurisprudence with regard 
to the arbitrary use of police force in the Brazilian favelas.  
                                                 
170Ibid, §129. 
171Ibid, §130. For the IACtHR, the respect for intimacy and autonomy should be regarded as a guiding principle 
of the treatment of people with mental illnesses. 
172Ibid, §§133-136. 
173See: Cassia Maria Rosato, Ludmila Cerqueira Correia, “Caso Damião Ximenes Lopes. Cambios y Desafios 
Después de la Primera Condena de Brasil por Parte de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos,” SUR 8, 
no. 15, (2011), 93-115.  See also: Isaac de Paz González, The Social Rights Jurisprudence in the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights, Shadow and Light in International Human Rights, (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 
2018), 123-145. 
174IACtHR, (Judgement) February 16, 2017, Case of Favela Nova Brasília v. Brazil.  
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The IACHR addressed the practice of registering the deaths during the police operations 
under resistance to authority reports (autos de resistência in Portuguese). By filling these 
reports, civil police usually justified the extreme use of force as self-defense, despite that the 
autopsies of the victims attested to the fact that they were fatally shot.175 These reports were 
issued before even initiating investigations and hindered due diligence in the cases. The 
investigations basically consisted of assembling a victims’ profile with his or her criminal 
records and often came to an end with the presumption that the victims had potentially been 
criminal. Moreover, they often began with the presumption that policy officers were acting in 
compliance with the law and that the killings were the necessary results of resistance to police 
authority during the raids. For some domestic and international authorities, these reports served 
to legitimate extrajudicial and summary executions.176 
 
The IACtHR concluded that the reports served to transfer the responsibility for the 
executions from the police force to the victims.177 Based on that, the IACtHR ordered that “the 
concept of ‘opposition’ or ‘resistance’ to police action must be abolished.”178 Beyond a mere 
change of the reports’ name, the court ordered that domestic authorities should ensure 
consistency in the reports on personal injury and murder due to the police action. The IACtHR 
decision in Favela Nova Brasilia led to the reopening of investigations of the specific police 
operations involved in the case. According to the domestic authorities directly involved, the 
reopening of the investigations is a clear step to ensure the effectiveness of inter-American 
human rights jurisprudence within national law.179 This IACtHR decision may now serve as 
additional support for domestic NGOs and several other human rights defenders and institutions 
that oppose the arbitrary use of police force in underprivileged urban areas around the country. 
The resistance to authority reports best illustrate this arbitrary use of force and many domestic 
players have opposed them as a mean to explain the deaths caused by police operations in 
Brazil. After the international decision in Favela Nova Brasilia, national authorities are now 
internationally obliged to stop this illegitimate use of police force. 
 
                                                 
175Ibid, §105. 
176The Special Rapporteur of the United Nations on Extrajudicial, Summary and Arbitrary Executions claimed that 
these reports “have frequently badly disguised extrajudicial executions” by the police force in Brazil. Ibid, §108. 
177Ibid, §193. 
178Ibid, §335. 
179See: “MP Reabre Investigações de Chacinas Ocorridas nos anos 90 em Favela do Rio,” O Estado de S. Paulo, 
July 10, 2018, https://brasil.estadao.com.br/noticias/rio-de-janeiro,mp-reabre-investigacoes-de-chacinas-
ocorridas-nos-anos-90-em-favela-do-rio,70002396637.  
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In Hacienda Brasil Verde v. Brazil,180 the IACtHR ruled on the alleged conditions of 
enslavement in a farm located in the state of Para, in the north of Brazil. The IACtHR 
established a violation of Art. 6 ACHR (“Freedom from Slavery”) based on the lack of due 
diligence on the part of state authorities. For the IACtHR, the local state authorities were 
supposed to prevent or to put an end to the contemporary form of slavery found in the case once 
they were aware of the cruel and degrading working and living conditions in the Brazil Verde 
farm, which included: i) the lack of proper payment, housing, food and hygiene, ii) work under 
threats and armed surveillance, and iii) arbitrary salary deductions for essential expenses like 
food or medicine, which frequently led to debts that could not possibly be paid by the workers.  
 
Hacienda Brasil Verde has also enriched the regional framework for human rights 
enforcement based on the bottom-up case inputs. For Isaac de Paz González, the case became 
a landmark one because it was the first decision on contemporary forms of slavery, forced labor 
and exploitation perpetrated by private individuals within inter-American jurisprudence, and 
because it addressed historically structural discrimination based on poverty.181 In terms of how 
these concepts were applied in Hacienda Brasil Verde, the IACtHR established a strict concept 
of the contemporary form of slavery in light of international documents and comparative human 
rights jurisprudence. For the IACtHR, this contemporary form of slavery can be determined 
based on, among other factors:182 i) the restriction or control of individual autonomy ii) to the 
benefit of the perpetrator; iii) the absence of consent or free will on the part of the victim due 
to threats or other forms of coercion, fraud or false promises, and iv) the use of physical or 
psychological violence. The IACtHR included the working and living conditions of the Brazil 
Verde farm as falling under the concept of contemporary slavery and considered them a clear 
violation of the ACHR and several other national and international documents. 
 
In addition to establishing violations based on slavery, the IACtHR established a 
violation of Art. 6 (1) ACHR based on the “historical structural discrimination” of the farm 
workers due to their economic position. This is due to the fact that other organizations had 
previously denounced the practice of slavery in the farm. Later, some workers were even able 
to escape from the farm and tried to report on their working conditions, but the local police 
authorities refused to hear the case due to the carnival holiday.183 Based on these facts, the 
                                                 
180IACtHR, (Judgment) October 20, 2016, Case of Hacienda Brasil Verde Workers v. Brazil.  
181Issac de Paz González, The Social Rights Jurisprudence in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 172. 
182IACtHR, Hacienda Brasil Verde Workers v. Brazil, §272. 
183Ibid, §327.  
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IACHR found that local authorities had discriminated against the workers due to their 
unprivileged social condition. For the commission, local authorities aligned themselves with 
the farmers, since they saw each other as belonging to the same social class. The evidence of 
this discrimination was the lack of criminal cases against the local farmers and also the 
conciliatory approach adopted by local judicial authorities within cases relating only to farm 
workers’ labor rights.184  
 
The IACtHR regarded poverty as one of the possible reasons for structural 
discrimination, which is prohibited according to Art. 24 ACHR (“Right to Equal Protection”). 
The court addressed “the indissoluble link” between Arts. 24 and Art 1 (1) ACHR and 
established that poverty could be understood as a factor in discrimination.185 The IACtHR 
concluded the existence of structural discrimination against the farm workers as a “part of the 
population that shared characteristics related to its conditions of exclusion, poverty and lack of 
education.”186 Based on that, it ruled that the state was responsible for violations of Arts. 6 (1) 
and 1 (1) ACHR due to the “historical systemic discrimination based on the economic position” 
of the farm workers.187 Judges Eduardo Ferrer Mac-Gregor and Elizabeth Odio Benito 
underscored the concept of historical structural discrimination based on poverty as an 
innovative feature of inter-American human rights jurisprudence in their concurrent opinion on 
the case.188  
 
Hacienda Brasil Verde relates to the battle against contemporary forms of slavery in 
Brazil. As the IACtHR also acknowledged, Brazil kept the institution of slavery for more than 
three centuries. This long practice of slavery still has consequences for contemporary Brazilian 
society, since many workers, especially those with black skin, are still discriminated against by 
means of lower wages and poor working conditions. Prominent Brazilian authorities have 
addressed the challenges of bringing slavery to a definitive end and also acknowledged the 
remaining forms of slavery in the country.189 The IACtHR decision in Hacienda Brasil Verde 




187Ibid, 4th operative paragraph. 
188For them: “The IACHR recognized in the Judgment, for the first time, that the discriminatory facts of the present 
case were derived from the economic position -because of their situation of poverty- of the 85 victims who were 
inside the Hacienda Brasil Verde.” IACtHR, (Separate Opinion Judge Eduardo Ferrer Mac-Gregor and Judge 
Elizabeth Odio Benito), Hacienda Brasil Verde Workers v. Brazil, §46.  
189The former president of Brazil, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, admitted that the enforcement of the abolition of 
slavery law (Lei Áurea) from 1888 is still a challenge in some parts of the country; IACtHR, Hacienda Brasil 
Verde, §116, note 83.    
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goes in the same direction as the emancipatory work of several domestic institutions and 
activists. This decision strengthens the efforts to fight against contemporary forms of slavery 
within domestic law. Moreover, the concept of historical structural discrimination based on 
poverty may now serve as a useful reference point for Brazilian authorities and civil society. 
This innovative element of inter-American human rights jurisprudence may now be adopted by 
domestic litigants in cases involving discrimination based on their economic position within 
Brazilian law.  
 
 
2.3.2. Resisting inter-American human rights jurisprudence 
 
Resistance to inter-American human rights law does not simply involve non-compliance 
with inter-American human rights jurisprudence. Non-compliance is something ordinary within 
regional rights systems for human rights protection and it also frequently happens within the 
IAS. One of the most decisive factors for this is the vast array of ordered measures that is usually 
established by the IACtHR. Due to the many different ordered reparatory measures, full 
compliance with the IACtHR decisions might even be considered an exception within the IAS. 
Resistance to inter-American jurisprudence involves non-compliance with the IACtHR 
decisions, but it also involves national authorities undermining the authority of inter-American 
human rights law. Domestic authorities can be described as adopting a resistant attitude as long 
as they establish substantial obstacles to the enforcement of inter-American human rights law 
within national law. This has happened in at least two cases involving the inter-American 
judicial review of the Brazilian amnesty law: Gomes Lund v. Brazil190 and Herzog v. Brazil.191 
In both cases, the IACtHR invalidated the Brazilian amnesty law, given that this domestic 
statute has represented an obstacle for the prosecution and punishment of serious human rights 
violations committed by the military regime (1964-1985). 
 
Gomes Lund, also known as Guerrilha do Araguaia, involved the arbitrary detention, 
torture, enforced disappearance and extrajudicial executions of political opponents of the 
Brazilian military government. In order to intimidate the opposition, the Brazilian army sent 
more than 3000 soldiers between 1972 and 1975 to the region of the Brazilian river Araguaia, 
where the guerrilheiros were thought to be forming an armed opposition to the regime. Initially, 
                                                 
190IACtHR, (Judgement) November 24, 2010, Case of Gomes Lund et al. (“Guerrilha do Araguaia”) v. Brazil. 
191IACtHR, (Judgement) March 15, 2018, Case of Herzog et al. v. Brazil. 
 60 
the incursions of the army were only meant to observe the development of the guerrilha but, 
eventually, the soldiers were ordered to exterminate the members of the armed oppositional 
group. After more than 40 years, about 60 group members are still missing. Due to the 
unwillingness of Brazilian authorities to investigate the facts based on the enforcement of the 
Brazilian amnesty law, a petition was filled to the IACHR, which eventually led to the case 
before the IACtHR. 
 
More recently, another case was reported to the IACtHR due to the domestic 
enforcement of the amnesty statute. In Herzog, the IACtHR was asked to rule on the murder by 
state officials of the journalist Vladimir Herzog, which occurred in one of the military facilities 
used for interrogation of suspected leaders of the opposition. Herzog was asked to answer some 
questions and, in the following day, voluntarily presented himself to the military facility. After 
hours of interrogation and torture, Herzog was found dead, hanging with a belt around his neck 
in the interrogation room. The official version given by the military state was that Herzog had 
committed suicide.192 His murder caused a national commotion, followed by several days of 
strikes led by journalists’ unions, students and university professors. Thousands were present 
at his funeral and at a mass celebrated in his memory. The journalist’s arbitrary execution was 
an important historical point for the civil opposition to the military dictatorship. Due to the 
national resonance of the case, the military government conducted an official investigation to 
clarify the circumstances of Herzog’s death. Nevertheless, the official declaration, which was 
based on fake forensics, claimed that Herzog had committed suicide.193 
 
As mentioned, a solution to the human rights violations in Gomes Lund and Herzog was 
not possible within domestic law. The criminal investigation of the cases was dismissed several 
times, even after the Brazilian democratization led by the 1988 constitution. The main reason 
for all dismissals was the enforcement of the amnesty law (Law No. 6683/1979), which has not 
allowed the prosecution of human rights violations committed during 1961 and 1979.194 In the 
                                                 
192In order to set a suicide scene, military officials also faked a suicidal letter.  
193This official version got so discredited that Herzog was not even buried among people who committed suicide 
in the Jewish cemetery. See: IACtHR, Herzog v. Brazil, §151.  
194The Law No. 6683/1979 established: 
 
“1. Amnesty is granted to all whom, in the period between September 2, 1961, and August 15, 1979, committed 
political crimes or derived crimes to these, electoral crimes, to those who had their political rights suspended, and 
to direct or indirect public servants of the administration, of foundations that belong to the public power, to the 
public servants of the legislative and judicial powers, to the military, leaders, and union representatives, who were 
punished based on institutional and complementary acts. 
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merits section of Gomes Lund, the IACtHR established the incompatibility between the amnesty 
law and the ACHR. For the IACtHR, “amnesty provisions, the statute of limitation provisions, 
and the establishment of exclusions of responsibility that are intended to prevent the 
investigation and punishment of those responsible for serious violations to human rights such 
as torture, summary, extrajudicial, or arbitrary executions, and enforced disappearance are not 
admissible, all of which are prohibited for contravening irrevocable rights recognized by 
International Human Rights Law.”195 The IACtHR found that “the provisions of the Brazilian 
Amnesty Law that prevent the investigation and punishment of serious human rights violations 
are not compatible with the American Convention” and, therefore, these provisions “lack legal 
effect.”196 In Herzog, the IACtHR also established the invalidity of the Brazilian amnesty law 
based on the non-existence of an armed conflict at that time in the country, which could in 
principle bring legitimacy to the use of an amnesty law if the aim were to bring this internal 
conflict to an end.197  
 
The IACtHR also emphasized that the enforcement of the Brazilian amnesty law went 
against inter-American human jurisprudence on the matter and it represented, therefore, a clear 
underenforcement of the ACHR by Brazilian authorities. In the judgement of both Brazilian 
cases, the IACtHR followed its precedent decision in Barrios Altos v. Peru, which represented 
the first opportunity to rule on the incompatibility between domestic amnesty laws and the 
ACHR. It is worth mentioning that, since Barrios Altos, the IACtHR has established an anti-
impunity approach to amnesty laws in several cases involving countries like Chile, Uruguay 
and El Salvador. Moreover, inter-American amnesty case law has also been responsible for the 
emergence of conventionality control.198  
 
In Gomes Lund, the IACtHR established the duty of conventionality control regarding 
the review of the amnesty statute within domestic law. For the IACtHR, national judicial 
authorities are internationally obliged to exercise the ex officio review of the amnesty statue: 
                                                 
§ 1. For the purposes of this Article, derived crimes are those crimes of any nature related to political crimes or 
carried out with political motivation. 
 
§ 2.- Those excluded from the benefit of this amnesty are persons who were convicted of the crimes of terrorism, 
assault, kidnapping, and personal attacks.” 
 
This English translation can be found in: IACtHR, Gomes Lund v. Brazil, §134.  
195IACtHR, Gomes Lund v. Brazil, §171. 
196IACtHR, Gomes Lund v. Brazil, 3rd operative paragraph. 
197IACtHR, Herzog v. Brazil, §209. 
198The following chapter will explain in greater detail how conventionality control functions as a specific form of 
strong inter-American judicial review of domestic laws.  
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“The Judicial Power (…) is internationally obligated to exercise the ‘control of conventionality’ 
ex officio between the domestic norms and the American Convention.”199 Moreover, the 
domestic judicial authorities should “take into account not only the treaty, but also the 
interpretation that the Inter-American Court, as the final interpreter of the American 
Convention, has given it.”200 In Herzog, the IACtHR claimed that the domestic judicial 
authorities’ duty to review the amnesty law existed since 1992, when the country ratified the 
ACHR and, in view of that, they “should have performed an ex officio control of 
conventionality between domestic rules and the American Convention.”201 
 
Although the IACtHR established in both cases conventionality control as an obligation 
for domestic judicial authorities, the practice of conventionality control is particularly 
problematic in the case of the Brazilian amnesty law due to the judgement by the Brazilian STF 
in the Arguição de Descumprimento de Preceito Fundamental (Claim of Non-compliance with 
a Fundamental Precept - ADPF) No. 153.202 This claim of non-compliance with a fundamental 
precept (ADPF) is an action of the Brazilian system of abstract judicial review of legislation 
and it was used by domestic institutions in order to contest the constitutionality of the Brazilian 
amnesty law within the current constitutional order established by the 1988 constitution. Within 
ADPF No. 153, the Brazilian STF established, in a seven to two vote, the conformity of the 
1979 amnesty law to the 1988 Brazilian constitution. This decision of the national highest court 
has erga omnes effects for which only few remedies can apply. Hence, it represents a major 
obstacle imposed by the Brazilian constitutional court to the effectiveness of inter-American 
jurisprudence on amnesty statues within Brazilian law. This domestic decision has figured as 
the most prominent act of resistance on the part of these Brazilian judicial authorities to adopt 
inter-American human rights jurisprudence as a meaningful reference point for constitutional 
rights adjudication.203 
 
                                                 
199IACtHR, Gomes Lund v. Brazil, §176.  
200Ibid.  
201IACtHR, Herzog v. Brazil, § 292.  
202Brazilian STF, (Judgement) April 29, 2010, Claim of Non-Compliance with a Fundamental Precept (ADPF) 
No. 153.  
203Virgilio Afonso da Silva has recently commented on the contemporary validity of the Brazilian amnesty law: 
“The fact that this highly controversial type of amnesty – self-amnesty – has been almost unanimously accepted 
as valid even after the end of the authoritarian regime is one of the most intriguing peculiarities of the transition 
to democracy in Brazil. (…) [O]nly 30 years after its enactment the Amnesty Law was challenged before the STF, 
which, however, in a very controversial decision, upheld its constitutionality.” Virgilio Afonso da Silva, The 
Constitution of Brazil. A Contextual Analysis, (Oxford et al: Hart Publishing, 2019), 21-22.  
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The arguments presented by the STF judges who voted for the constitutionality of the 
1979 amnesty law may be summarized in three main points: i) the amnesty law represented, in 
its historical context, a national pact that has enabled Brazil’s transition from a military 
dictatorship to a constitutional democracy; ii) by means of Constitutional Amendment No. 
26/1985 (CA 26),204 there was a reaffirmation of the validity of the 1979 amnesty law in the 
contemporary constitutional order established by the 1988 constitution; and that iii) the 
Brazilian legislature would be the competent authority to review the 1979 amnesty law and not 
the Brazilian constitutional court.  
 
The core argument for the current validity of the 1979 amnesty law was that the 
historical context inevitably led to it. In fact, this interpretation of the Brazilian transition to 
democracy was present in all votes of the Brazilian STF judges in favor of the amnesty statute’s 
validity. For the Justice Rapporteur of ADPF No. 153, the amnesty law represented a “political 
decision in a moment of conciliatory transition in 1979,” given that “all were absolved, and 
some absolved themselves.”205 This political agreement carried out by the Brazilian legislative 
could not be changed by the constitutional court, since the congress would be the only 
appropriate authority to do so. Finishing his vote, the Justice Rapporteur ruled that: “The 
Amnesty Law of 1979 does not belong to the past constitutional order. It was reaffirmed in the 
new constitutional order and constituted a new fundamental norm, and as such its conformity 
to the Constitution of 1988 is unquestionable.”206 The Justice Rapporteur’s vote demonstrates 
a “general mindset of the transition to democracy” that was widely shared by other members of 
the Brazilian STF in the decision of ADPF No. 153.207  
 
Chief Justice Cesar Peluso claimed: “Each people come to terms with the past according 
to their culture, feelings, character and history; Brazil has opted for a conciliatory path.”208 
Justice Carmen Lúcia claimed that “Amnesty was a necessary and indispensable step in the 
path of Brazilian democracy.”209 Justice Ellen Gracie added: “Amnesty is the overcoming of 
                                                 
204This constitutional amendment established the following constituent assembly (1987-1988), which was 
responsible for the adoption of the 1988 constitution. 
205Brazilian STF, (Vote of the Justice Rapporteur), ADPF No. 153.  
206Ibid.  
207Juliano Zaiden Benvindo, “Memory and Forgetfulness in the Brazilian Dictatorship: Can New Revelations Help 
Brazil Expiate its Sins?,” Int’l J. Const. L. Blog, July 5, 2018, available at: 
http://www.iconnectblog.com/2018/07/memory-and-forgetfulness-in-the-brazilian-dictatorship-can-new-
revelations-help-brazil-expiate-its-sins/. 
208Brazilian STF, (Vote of the Chief Justice Cezar Peluso), ADPF No. 153.  
209Brazilian STF, (Vote of Justice Carmen Lucia), ADPF No. 153. 
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the past, which looks forward to reconciliation in society.”210 It is beyond the scope of this 
study to extensively discuss questions of transitional justice with regard to the debate about the 
Brazilian amnesty law.211 There is no need for a historical review of the Brazilian amnesty law 
to demonstrate that the Brazilian cases of Gomes Lund and Herzog illustrate best the resistance 
that national authorities may adopt to enforcing inter-American human rights jurisprudence 
within domestic law. Most importantly, these cases illustrate the resistance that a constitutional 




2.4.  Conclusion: A constitutional court’s resistance to strong inter-American judicial 
review  
 
The 1988 Brazilian constitution was the initial trigger for the emergence of bottom-up 
cosmopolitan constitutionalism within Brazilian law. After the 1964-1985 authoritarian regime 
in the country, the 1988 constitution imposed some strong commitments on national authorities 
involving democracy, human rights enforcement, and the rule of law. The 1988 constitution is 
aligned with other constitutions around the globe that also established these same strong 
commitments to the three pillars of global constitutionalism within domestic law. Regarding 
human rights enforcement, the constitution strengthened the authority of international human 
rights law within Brazilian law. Within this cosmopolitanization of Brazilian constitutional law 
with respect to human rights protection, it was worth emphasizing that the country ratified the 
ACHR in 1992 and accepted the contentious jurisdiction of the IACtHR in 1998. A subsequent 
amendment to the constitution (CA 45/2004) established a procedure to grant constitutional 
rank to international human rights treaties. The current Brazilian constitutional order is an 
illustrative example of a Latin American cosmopolitan constitutional order, i.e., a constitutional 
order that is fully integrated into the new Latin American human rights enforcement context. 
  
                                                 
210Brazilian STF, (Vote of Justice Ellen Gracie), ADPF No. 153. 
211This would necessarily involve the comparative analysis of the relationship between amnesty laws and the 
concept of transitional justice. On this issue, see: Amnesty in the Age of Human Rights Accountability. Comparative 
and International Perspectives, eds. Francesca Lessa, Leigh A. Payne, (New York et al: Cambridge University 
Press, 2012); Louise Mallinder, Amnesty, Human Rights and Political Transitions. Bridging the Peace and Justice 
Divide, (Oxford, Portland: Hart Publishing, 2008). Focusing on the Latin American context, see: Transitional 
Justice. Handbook for Latin America, ed. Félix Ratégui, (Brasilia: Brazilian Amnesty Commission, Ministry of 
Justice, 2011). 
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In the past decades, national authorities have been under the scrutiny of the inter-
American institutions, i.e., the IACHR and the IACtHR. The interaction between national and 
inter-American authorities has been transformative of domestic practices of state authority. This 
chapter has described this transformative role of inter-American jurisprudence with reference 
to cases involving traditional domestic human rights violations like the abuse of people with 
mental illness in public psychiatric institutions, the arbitrary use of police force in 
underprivileged urban areas and the contemporary forms of enslavement in rural areas. 
Focusing on Brazilian case law before the IACtHR, there are evident advantages of 
cosmopolitan convergence with inter-American jurisprudence. Brazilian authorities have much 
to gain if they consistently refer to the inter-American framework for human rights enforcement 
when trying to find solutions for the traditional human rights violations within domestic law. 
This is due to the fact that, over time, the IACtHR has created valuable jurisprudence by 
addressing the traditional violations of human rights in different Latin American countries. This 
chapter has also emphasized that Brazilian case law enriched this inter-American framework, 
offering the IACtHR the opportunity to issue landmark decisions on fundamental issues relating 
to the enforcement of the ACHR. Brazilian case law has enriched inter-American human rights 
jurisprudence, which may be later adopted by other Latin American authorities and civil society 
when dealing with similar cases of domestic human rights violations. 
  
However, the evolution of cosmopolitan constitutionalism in Brazil has not only gone 
in one direction. It has also included the resistance on the part of the Brazilian constitutional 
court to the inter-American judicial review of the Brazilian amnesty law. It is worth mentioning 
that the judgment in ADPF No. 153 was issued even before the IACtHR issued its decision in 
Gomes Lund. The Brazilian constitutional court did not even wait for the IACtHR interpretation 
of the matter before establishing the constitutionality of the amnesty statute within domestic 
law. The IACtHR, in turn, did not accept the arguments of transitional justice offered by the 
judges of the Brazilian constitutional court. For the IACtHR, “the decision of the Federal 
Supreme Court confirmed the validity of the interpretation of the Amnesty Law without 
considering the international obligations” of the country, “particularly those established in 
Articles 8 and 25 of the American Convention, in relation with Articles 1(1) and 2 of the 
same.”212 
 
                                                 
212IACtHR, Gomes Lund v. Brazil, §§176-177. 
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Within the IAS, there have been two conflicting decisions issued by prominent courts 
with regard to the validity of the Brazilian amnesty law. This leads to the question of which 
decision should prevail. In fact, this conflict between the IACtHR and the Brazilian 
constitutional court gives rise to other important questions relating to inter-American judicial 
review. For instance: How are national authorities supposed to enforce conventionality control 
at the domestic level? Does inter-American judicial review even bind domestic judicial 
authorities within the IAS in the way the IACtHR has claimed it does? Are domestic authorities 
allowed to adopt a critical approach to the practice of strong inter-American judicial review? 
Does this critical approach necessarily represent resistance to inter-American human rights 
jurisprudence? These questions reveal that there are substantial obstacles to the consistent 
practice of inter-American judicial review, at least when seen from a bottom-up perspective. 
Despite the adoption of cosmopolitan constitutions, there is still not a consistent normative 
guide for domestic judicial authorities seeking to implement inter-American judicial review 
within the IAS. The resistance on the part of Brazilian authorities attests to the necessity for a 
consistent practice of inter-American judicial review that does not leave any scope for national 
authorities to oppose it. However, before addressing this ideal normative model of inter-
American judicial review, it is necessary to study in greater detail the specific forms of strong 
inter-American judicial review that have been adopted to date. In line with this, this study will 
address these specific forms in the following chapter.  
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PART II. THE COURT IN ACTION  
 
 
III. Inter-American Human Rights Jurisprudence: From Transitional to  
 Transformative Justice 
 
The IACtHR has adopted two specific forms of international judicial review of domestic 
laws throughout inter-American human rights jurisprudence: conventionality control and the 
direct enforcement of socioeconomic rights. This chapter will first describe the emergence of 
these two forms and, in the following chapter, the normative grounds for their practice will be 
discussed. It is important to point out that these two forms of inter-American judicial review 
can describe the evolution of human rights enforcement in Latin America as a whole. 
Conventionality control emerged from the necessity to enforce civil and political rights in cases 
of systematic human rights violations practiced by authoritarian regimes in the past. These gross 
violations marked the first important phase of inter-American jurisprudence, which was mostly 
concerned with questions of transitional justice. The direct enforcement of socioeconomic 
rights represents a more recent phase of inter-American jurisprudence, which is focused on 
questions of material inequality and institutional failure in the region. Due to the more recent 
character of this inter-American judicial practice, its specific features are still emerging. This 
chapter argues that, based on the evolution of inter-American case law on socioeconomic rights, 
there is sufficient evidence that the IACtHR will start reviewing domestic legislation on these 
rights as part of practicing their direct enforcement. 
 
 
3.1. Conventionality control: enforcing civil and political rights in Latin America 
 
3.1.1. The genesis of conventionality control  
 
It is important to understand the circumstances under which conventionality control 
emerged. This specific form of strong inter-American judicial review of domestic laws is 
directly related to questions of transitional justice. The transitional justice phase of inter-
American jurisprudence was characterized by, among other things, the judicial review of 
domestic amnesty laws that were adopted by some Latin American governments as a condition 
for domestic democratization. Hence, amnesty case law illustrates the initial phase of inter-
American human jurisprudence, which was focused on the prosecution of systematic human 
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rights violations committed by dictatorships. Amnesty case law reveals that conventionality 
control was, at least at the start, a jurisdictional reaction to the systematic underenforcement of 
civil and political rights at the domestic level. In this context, amnesty laws were the trigger for 
the emergence of conventionality control. It is true that the practice of conventionality control 
was also refined in cases that were not related to amnesty laws, but amnesty case law was the 
genesis of conventionality control as a specific form of strong inter-American judicial 
review.213  
 
The IACtHR Judge Sergio García Ramirez initially mentioned the idea behind 
conventionality control in several separate opinions. First, Judge García Ramirez just referred 
to conventionality control in the context of the general international responsibility of states 
under the IACtHR jurisdiction.214 Later, he added one first remarkable feature to the concept 
by distinguishing it from domestic constitutional review.215 He emphasized the differences 
between conventionality control and domestic constitutional review in subsequent 
judgements.216 Despite these previous mentions of conventionality control by Judge García 
Ramirez, it was within amnesty case law that the doctrine had its first explicit mention, more 
specifically in the decision of Almonacid Arellano v. Chile.217 This judgement is the most 
important document on conventionality control and its most discussed paragraph reads:  
 
“The Court is aware that domestic judges and courts are bound to 
respect the rule of law, and therefore, they are bound to apply the 
provisions in force within the legal system. But when a State has ratified 
an international treaty such as the American Convention, its judges, as 
part of the State, are also bound by such Convention. This forces them 
to see that all the effects of the provisions embodied in the Convention 
are not adversely affected by the enforcement of laws which are 
contrary to its purpose and that have not had any legal effects since their 
                                                 
213Chapter VII will analyze inter-American jurisprudence on amnesty statutes as an argument for the judicial 
review of the Brazilian amnesty law. In the present section, the mentions to cases involving amnesty statutes will 
be made based on their relevance for the emergence and evolution of the specific features of conventionality 
control.   
214IACtHR (Separate Opinion Judge Sérgio Garcia Ramirez) November 25, 2003, Case of Myrna Mack Chang v. 
Guatemala, §27. Although it does not translate “conventionality control” in English, the expression that Judge 
Garcia Ramirez used in Spanish was control de convencionalidad.  
215IACtHR (Separate Opinion Judge Sérgio Garcia Ramirez) July 7, 2004, Case of Tibi v. Ecuador. 
216IACtHR (Separate Opinion Judge Sérgio Garcia Ramirez), February 1, 2006, Case of López Alvarez v. 
Honduras, §30; IACtHR (Separate Opinion Judge Sérgio Garcia Ramirez) September 26, 2006, Case of Vargas 
Areco v. Paraguay, §6. 
217IACtHR, (Judgement) September 26, 2006, Case of Almonacid Arellano et al. v. Chile. 
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inception. In other words, the Judiciary must exercise a sort of 
"conventionality control" between the domestic legal provisions which 
are applied to specific cases and the American Convention on Human 
Rights. To perform this task, the Judiciary has to take into account not 
only the treaty, but also the interpretation thereof made by the Inter-
American Court, which is the ultimate interpreter of the American 
Convention.”218 (emphasis added) 
 
According to this first explicit mention of conventionality control by the IACtHR, 
domestic judges are responsible for resolving conflicts between domestic laws and the ACHR. 
In fact, based on Almonacid, the domestic judges, as national control holders, should review 
domestic legislation that, according to the IACtHR, violates inter-American human rights law. 
The IACtHR explicitly mentioned that domestic judicial authorities should take inter-American 
human rights legislation and jurisprudence as a meaningful reference point when engaging in 
domestic rights enforcement. Based on this first description of conventionality control, the 
IACtHR implies that national authorities should privilege international human rights law over 
domestic law in case of conflicts between these different realms of regulation. For Laurence 
Burgorgue-Larsen, Almonacid has represented a transition to the stage of consolidation of the 
practice of conventionality control within inter-American human rights jurisprudence.219 From 
then on, its specific features have been refined by several IACtHR decisions, concurrent 
opinions of IACtHR judges and also by the frequent intersections with the scholarly debate 
about strong inter-American judicial review of domestic laws.  
 
 
3.1.2. The specific features of conventionality control 
 
The practice of conventionality control has strengthened the regional authority of the 
IACtHR. It is necessary to understand how conventionality control has acquired its 
contemporary form throughout inter-American jurisprudence and how it has been responsible 
for debates about the increasing authority of the IACtHR within the IAS. This section will 
describe the evolution of conventionality control’s specific features. This involves the analysis 
                                                 
218Ibid, §124.  
219Laurence Burgorgue-Larsen, “Chronicle of a Fashionable Theory in Latin America. Decoding the Doctrinal 
Discourse on Conventionality Control,” in The Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Theory and Practice, 
Present and Future, eds. Yves Haeck, Oswaldo Ruiz-Chiriboga, Clara Burbano-Herrera, (Cambridge et al.: 
Intersentia, 2015), 647-676, 652.  
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of some IACtHR decisions and also of concurrent opinions issued by some IACtHR judges.220 
This section will focus on the most important cases and individual concurring opinions that 
have contributed to conventionality control’s contemporary form.  
 
Almonacid was responsible for establishing what conventionality control is in principle, 
but it did not say much on how national authorities were supposed to practice it. After 
Almonacid, the IACtHR quickly noticed potential problems with the domestic enforcement of 
its innovative but broad concept. One of the initial challenges was the fact that the different 
constitutional orders within the IAS have different judicial review systems, which usually differ 
between diffuse and concentrate systems.221 It was then just months after Almonacid that the 
IACtHR first added new features to conventionality control in Dismissed Congressional 
Employees v. Peru.222 These new features related more to procedural questions, i.e., that 
conventionality control should be exercised ex officio and within the competences of the 
immediate judicial authority of a case in accordance with domestic law.223 
 
After the IACtHR refined these procedural aspects of conventionality control, it started 
strengthening its legal basis with references to the ACHR. In Heliodoro Portugal v. Panama,224 
the IACtHR first explicitly based conventionality control on the principle of effectiveness (effet 
utile) as stated in Art. 2 ACHR (“Domestic Legal Effects”). As this study has already 
mentioned, Art. 2 ACHR establishes that the IAS member states “undertake to adopt, in 
accordance with their constitutional processes and the provisions” of the ACHR, “such 
                                                 
220On the importance of individual concurring opinions within inter-American human rights jurisprudence, see: 
Ranieri L. Resende, “Deliberation and Decision-Making Process in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: 
Do Individual Opinions Matter?,” Northwestern Journal of Human Rights 17, no. 1, (2019), 26-50. 
221There are also mixed forms of judicial review systems, such as the Brazilian system. On this issue, see: Virgílio 
Afonso da Silva, “Beyond Europe and the United States: The Wide World of Judicial Review,” in Comparative 
Judicial Review, eds. Erin F- Delaney, Rosalind Dixon, (Cheltenham et al.: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2018), 318-
336. It is worth mentioning Mark Tushnet’s opinion that these structural features of judicial review have lost 
relevance over time: “The differences between specialized and generalist constitutional courts, and abstract and 
concrete review, are no longer matters of central scholarly concern. As judicial review spread, experience showed 
that structural features, including the appointment process, are less important than was initially thought.” Mark 
Tushnet, “Judicial Review of Legislation,” in Oxford Handbook of Legal Studies, eds. Mark Tushnet, Peter Cane, 
(Oxford et al.: Oxford University Press, 2005), 165-182, 167.   
222IACtHR, (Judgement) November 24, 2006, Case of Dismissed Congressional Employees v. Peru. 
223“When a State has ratified an international treaty such as the American Convention, the judges are also subject 
to it; this obliges them to ensure that the effet utile of the Convention is not reduced or annulled by the application 
of laws contrary to its provisions, object and purpose. In other words, the organs of the Judiciary should exercise 
not only a control of constitutionality, but also of “conventionality” ex officio between domestic norms and the 
American Convention; evidently in the context of their respective spheres of competence and the corresponding 
procedural regulations. This function should not be limited exclusively to the statements or actions of the plaintiffs 
in each specific case, although neither does it imply that this control must always be exercised, without considering 
other procedural and substantive criteria regarding the admissibility and legitimacy of these types of action.” Ibid, 
§128.  
224IACtHR, (Judgement) August 12, 2008, Case of Heliodoro Portugal v. Panama. 
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legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect” to the rights protected by the 
convention.225 For the IACtHR, Art. 2 ACHR requires two different types of measures: “the 
repeal of laws and practices of any kind that entail a violation of the guarantees established in 
the Convention” and “the enactment of laws and the development of practices conductive of 
respect for those guarantees.”226 There are therefore positive and negative duties associated 
with the principle of effectiveness as applicable to the relationship between inter-American 
human rights law and domestic law. Based on that, the IACtHR ruled that national judicial 
authorities should guarantee the effectiveness of inter-American human rights law so that it is 
not overruled by the enforcement of contrary domestic law. For the court, “the defense of or 
respect for human rights, arising from international commitments concerning the work of the 
Judiciary, must be achieved through the so-called ‘conventionality control’.”227 
 
It is worth mentioning that not only Art. 2 ACHR has been offered as a normative basis 
for the practice of conventionality control. Some IACtHR judges have also based the practice 
of conventionality control on Article 1 (1) ACHR, which refers to the general obligation to 
respect human rights. Judge Eduardo Ferrer Mac-Gregor also based conventionality control on 
Art. 25 ACHR, which refers to the right of judicial protection.228 Art. 29 ACHR (“Restrictions 
Regarding Interpretation”), which is usually referred as the pro homine, or pro persona 
principle, has also been mentioned in the discussion of the legitimacy of conventionality 
control. For some authorities and scholars, domestic law can often represent an illegitimate 
restriction of the rights protected by the ACHR. Domestic judicial authorities are therefore 
responsible for reviewing domestic laws in cases of conflict with inter-American human rights 
law.  
 
Beyond these ACHR provisions, Arts. 26 and 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties have also been mentioned as offering a legal basis to the practice of conventionality 
control.229 Art. 26 of the Vienna Convention refers to the well-known pacta sunt servanda 
clause, according to which “every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be 
performed by them in good faith.”230 Directly related to the practice of conventionality control, 
                                                 
225ACHR, art. 2. 
226IACtHR, Heliodoro Portugal v. Panama, §180. 
227Ibid. 
228See: Eduardo Ferrer Mac-Gregor, “Conventionality Control. The New Doctrine of the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights,” American Journal of International Law Unbound 109, (2015), 93-99.    
229The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) was signed on May 23,1969 and entered into force on 
27 January 1980. 
230VCLT, art. 26. 
 72 
Art. 27 of the Vienna Convention establishes that a member of any treaty system “may not 
invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.”231 
Despite the fact that legal authorities and scholars have invoked provisions from several 
international documents in order to justify the practice of conventionality control, Art. 2 ACHR 
still represents the core of the normative grounds for its practice. It is by invoking Art. 2 ACHR 
that the IACtHR have made conventionality control a specific form of strong inter-American 
judicial review of domestic laws. 
 
Regarding the national authorities that are empowered to practice conventionality 
control, Laurence Burgorgue-Larsen has rightly noted that the IACtHR expanded the catalogue 
of conventionality control’s owners in a series of decisions.232 The IACtHR initially referred 
only to judicial authorities as being competent to practice conventionality control.233 Then, in 
Cabrera Garcia and Montiel Flores v. Mexico,234 the IACtHR established that conventionality 
control could be practiced by “judges and organs related to the administration of justice” (my 
emphasis).235 After that, prosecutors were explicitly mentioned among potential authorities for 
the practice of conventionality control236 until, eventually, in Gelman v. Uruguay, the IACtHR 
extended conventionality control to “any public authority” within the IAS.237  
 
Despite the fact that the court has adopted a broad catalogue of conventionality control’s 
owners, domestic judicial authorities still remain the most prominent agents of conventionality 
control for this study. This is due to the fact that judicial authorities are the ones that are 
competent to practice judicial review of legislation and, by doing so, guarantee the effectiveness 
of inter-American judicial review within national law. When the IACtHR orders that national 
authorities should amend domestic laws, this order is specially oriented to domestic judges, 
who can practice the judicial review of legislation that was considered inconsistent by the 
IACtHR. Indeed, although national legislatures are the most important public authorities to 
amending domestic legislation, in Almonacid v. Chile, the IACtHR explicitly mentioned 
domestic judicial authorities as the ones responsible for the practice of conventionality control.  
 
                                                 
231Ibid, art. 27. 
232Burgorgue-Larsen, Chronicle of a Fashionable Theory in Latin America, 654. 
233As, for instance, in Almonacid, See: IACtHR, Almonacid Arellano v. Chile, §124.  
234IACtHR, (Judgement) November 26, 2010, Case of Cabrera García and Montiel Flores v. Mexico. 
235Ibid, §225. 
236IACtHR, (Judgement) November 20, 2012, Case of Gudiel Álvarez et al. ("Diario Militar") v. Guatemala, § 
330.   
237IACtHR, (Judgement) February 24, 2011, Case of Gelman v. Uruguay, §239.  
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Also relevant within the specific features of conventionality control is the difference 
between diffuse and concentrate control, which was addressed by Judge Eduardo Ferrer Mac-
Gregor in his concurrent opinion on Cabrera Garcia and Montiel Flores.238 For him, the 
distinction is grounded in regimes of domestic judicial review. He claimed that concentrate 
conventionality control has been exercised by the IACtHR since the beginning of its contentious 
jurisdiction within the IAS. By contrast, the IACtHR has introduced the novelty of diffuse 
conventionality control, according to which the domestic judge is converted “into an Inter-
American judge, into the first and true guardian of the American Convention, of its Additional 
Protocols (and possibly of other international instruments) and of the jurisprudence of the Inter-
American Court.”239 He admitted that this practice of diffuse control may vary according to 
domestic laws on judicial review. In view of this, he claimed that “the intensity of ‘diffuse 
conventionality control’ will diminish in those systems that do not permit “diffuse 
constitutionality control’ and, therefore, not all judges have the authority to not apply a law to 
a specific case.”240 
 
Regarding the pieces of national law that could trigger the practice of conventionality 
control, the IACtHR has emphasized that any domestic document can be subjected to review. 
Based on that, the control involves the ex officio review of judicial and administrative acts, 
legislation and even domestic constitutional provisions if they present any incompatibility with 
the block of conventionality. In Gelman v. Uruguay, the IACtHR ruled that even democratic 
processes may be subjected to review according to conventionality control.241 In order to 
practice conventionality control, inter-American and domestic authorities should take, 
according to Judge Eduardo Ferrer Mac-Gregor, the “block of conventionality” into account.242 
For him, inter-American human rights law represents a parameter for the practice of 
conventionality control of domestic legislation and comprises the ACHR and other 
international documents within the Inter-American corpus iuris.243 The IACtHR has on several 
occasions referred to the block of conventionality control. In Gudiel Álvarez et al. v. 
                                                 
238IACtHR, (Concurring Opinion Judge Ad Hoc Eduardo Ferrer Mac-Gregor) November 26, 2010, Case of 
Cabrera García and Montiel Flores v. Mexico. 
239Ibid, §24. 
240Ibid, §37. 
241IACtHR, (Judgement) Gelman v. Uruguay, §239. 
242IACtHR, (Concurring Opinion Judge Ad Hoc Eduardo Ferrer Mac-Gregor) November 26, 2010, Case of 
Cabrera García and Montiel Flores v. Mexico, §44. 
243As Chapter I has already mentioned, the current Inter-American corpus iuris encompasses the ACHR, 
supplemented by its two protocols, other inter-American human rights documents and international treaties and, 
most importantly, inter-American human rights jurisprudence. 
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Guatemala,244 for instance, the IACtHR ruled that national authorities should, when practicing 
conventionality control, take into account not only the ACHR but also other inter-American 
documents that were ratified by the state and inter-American human rights jurisprudence.245  
 
Judge Ferrer Mac-Gregor also admitted that, based on the (non-)ratification of 
international and, more specifically, inter-American documents, there can be several types of 
conventionality control within the IAS. If an IAS member state did not ratify a specific 
document, the domestic and inter-American authorities cannot include it into the specific block 
of conventionality involved in the case. However, Judge Ferrer Mac-Gregor noted that, with 
the evolution of the IAS, the block of conventionality at the regional level often coincides with 
the block of constitutionality at the domestic level, given that several international instruments 
have constitutional authority within many Latin American legal systems.246  
  
It is worth mentioning what Burgorgue-Larsen has described as the raison d’etre of 
conventionality control,247 i.e., the teleological grounding for its practice. For Judge Ferrer 
Mac-Gregor, the main objectives of conventionality control are to prevent the enforcement of 
incompatible national laws, create an integrated system of human rights protection and facilitate 
judicial dialogue within the IAS.248 Most importantly, he has claimed that conventionality 
control is an essential mechanism to lead human rights enforcement within the IAS towards an 
“authentic Ius Constitutionale Commune Americanum.”249 However, there are also less 
altruistic objectives associated with the practice of conventionality control. Conventionality 
control has arguably emerged due to the IACtHR fear of non-effective and non-authoritative 
jurisprudence. The logic behind stating direct effects and primacy to the IACtHR decisions is 
that conventionality control could bolster the effectiveness of inter-American human rights 
jurisprudence. In fact, the implementation of conventionality control led to an exponential 
increase in the authority of the IACtHR in its relationship with domestic authorities (more 
specifically with domestic judicial authorities). Hence, improving the effectiveness of inter-
                                                 
244 IACtHR, (Judgement) November 20, 2012, Case of Gudiel Álvarez et al. ("Diario Militar") v. Guatemala. 
245Ibid, §330.  
246IACtHR (Concurring Opinion Judge Ad Hoc Eduardo Ferrer Mac-Gregor), Case of Cabrera García and 
Montiel Flores v. Mexico, §26. 
247Burgorgue-Larsen, Chronicle of a Fashionable Theory in Latin America, 656-658. She referred to the concurring 
opinions of Judge Sergio García Ramírez as decisive for understanding the objectives of conventionality control. 
However, Judge Eduardo Ferrer Mac-Gregor has played a protagonist role as an advocate for the practice of 
conventionality control. In line with this, this study will refer to his interpretation of conventionality control’s 
objectives.  
248Eduardo Ferrer Mac-Gregor, “Conventionality Control. The New Doctrine of the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights,” American Journal of International Law Unbound 109, (2015), 93-99, 98-99. 
249Ibid, 99.  
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American human rights jurisprudence is arguably the main objective behind the inter-American 
practice of conventionality control.  
 
Finally, it is also worth mentioning that, since its initial forms, conventionality control 
has revealed an intense intersection between inter-American jurisprudence and scholarly 
debate. This intersection tells much about the evolution of conventionality control to the 
contemporary phase of a specific form of strong inter-American judicial review of domestic 
laws. To give an example of this intersection, besides his past position within the IACtHR, 
Judge Sergio García Ramírez is also a prominent Mexican constitutional scholar, who has 
written much on the theoretical grounds of conventionality control. This dual position is also 
shared by current IACtHR judges, especially by Judge Eduardo Ferrer Mac-Gregor, another 
prominent Mexican constitutional lawyer that currently presides over the IACtHR and has 
discussed conventionality control in several academic articles. This mixture of legal authority 
and scholar led Laurence Burgorgue-Larsen describe these prominent figures as “actor-
researchers,” given that they are simultaneously thinkers and agents of the practice of 
conventionality control within the IAS.250 
 
 
3.2. The direct enforcement of socioeconomic rights  
 
Inter-American jurisprudence on socioeconomic rights has evolved from an indirect 
protection of these rights to the establishment of an autonomous and direct form of international 
judicial enforcement. This evolution has happened based on innovative legal interpretations of 
the relationship between different inter-American human rights documents, but especially 
between the ACHR and the Protocol of San Salvador, which is the most specific inter-American 
document on socioeconomic rights. The judicially enforceable character of socioeconomic 
rights represents a new phase of inter-American human rights jurisprudence, i.e., the 
transformative justice phase. Transformative justice has material inequality and institutional 
failure as its main concerns.251 The following sections will first describe the initial phase of an 
indirect protection of socioeconomic rights through civil and political rights. Then, this chapter 
                                                 
250Laurence Burgorgue-Larsen, Chronicle of a Fashionable Theory in Latin America, 666.  
251On this isse, see: Armin von Bogdandy, “The Transformative Mandate of the Inter-American System. Legality 
and Legitimacy of an Extraordinary Jurisgenerative Process,” Max Planck Institute Research Paper Series, no. 16, 
(2019), available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3463059. See also the contributions in: 
Transformative Constitutionalism in Latin America, eds. Armin von Bogdandy et al., (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2017).  
 76 
will describe the emergence of the direct judicial enforcement of socioeconomic rights within 
inter-American human rights jurisprudence and explain why it represents an emerging specific 
form of strong inter-American judicial review of domestic laws.  
 
 
3.2.1. The indirect protection of socioeconomic rights through civil and political rights  
 
There are political and legal reasons for the few inter-American cases addressing 
socioeconomic rights.252 The most important political reason was the rule of authoritarian 
regimes, which directed the IACtHR’s focus towards the protection of civil and political rights 
in Latin America. This later changed in the history of the IAS, when domestic democratic 
regimes enabled the court to address other rights not immediately related to the human rights 
violations committed by authoritarian regimes.253 With regard to the legal reasons, the ACHR 
represented a first obstacle to the evolution of an autonomous inter-American case law on 
socioeconomic rights. As previously mentioned in this study, the ACHR contains just one 
article on these rights, i.e., Art. 26 ACHR (“Progressive Development”). In addition to this 
provision, the ACHR mentions socioeconomic rights in its preamble, where it establishes that 
“the ideal of free men enjoying freedom from fear and want can be achieved only if conditions 
are created whereby everyone may enjoy his economic, social and cultural rights, as well as his 
civil and political rights.”254 
 
 As Chapter I has explained, the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on 
Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, or “Protocol of San 
Salvador,” is an inter-American treaty that more specifically addresses socioeconomic rights.255 
The rights catalogue of the Protocol of San Salvador (PSS) enumerates the right to work and to 
the just, equitable and satisfactory conditions of work; trade unions rights, social security rights; 
right to health and a healthy environment; right to food, education, benefits of culture, formation 
                                                 
252This category of rights also encompasses environmental rights. I have opted to address these rights simply as 
“socioeconomic rights.” The most essential character of these rights is that they are not primarily related to civil 
rights and political liberties, which represent a more traditional category of human rights. While legal scholars 
usually address civil rights as “first-generation rights,” socioeconomic rights are often addressed as “second-
generation rights” and environmental rights, in turn, as “third-generation rights.” I have not adopted this typology 
based on the different eras of their emergence in this study. 
253Claudio Grossman has distinguished 3 important phases of inter-American human rights jurisprudence: 
dictatorship, transition to democracy and the last phase of struggle against inequality and poverty. Claudio 
Grossman, “The Inter-American System and Its Evolution,” Inter-American & European Human Rights Journal 
2, no. 1-2, (2009), 49-65. 
254ACHR, preamble.   
255The Protocol of San Salvador (PSS) was adopted on November 17, 1988 and entered into force in 1999. 
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and protection of families; the rights of children, and the protection of the elderly and disabled. 
This protocol also establishes the progressive enforcement obligation with regard to 
socioeconomic rights in its Art. 1.256 Moreover, it establishes the obligation to enact domestic 
legislation in order to guarantee the effectiveness of inter-American legislation on 
socioeconomic rights,257  and it regulates the scope of the domestic restrictions and limitations 
of socioeconomic rights.258 Finally, it is worth mentioning that the PSS establishes that states 
must periodically submit reports to the OAS Secretary General, which are later forwarded to 
the Inter-American Council for Integral Development and to the IACHR. According to its Art. 
19 (6), the IACHR and the IACtHR have authority to rule on petitions that allege violations of 
trade union rights (Art. 8 (a) PSS) and the right to education (Art. 13 PSS).259  
 
Despite the adoption of the PSS within inter-American human rights legislation, 
socioeconomic rights are still not directly mentioned by the ACHR and this indirect relation 
has had consequences for legal practice. Throughout most of inter-American human rights 
jurisprudence, there was no autonomous or direct enforcement of socioeconomic rights, which 
were always enforced within cases involving the civil and political rights expressly mentioned 
in the convention. Protecting socioeconomic rights through civil and political rights was the 
indirect way that the IACtHR found to respond to their violations at the domestic level. Thomas 
Antkowiak has mentioned examples of this indirect protection.260 One example comes from the 
interpretation of Art. 4 ACHR (“Right to Life”). Case law involving Art. 4 ACHR led the 
IACtHR to establish the concept of a dignified life (vida digna in Spanish), which involves 
remedies relating to socioeconomic rights as well. In the case of incarcerated persons, for 
instance, the IACtHR established that they may enjoy the right to a dignified life to be ensured 
by opportunities of physical exercises, recreation and education; as well as medical, dental and 
psychological care.261 Another example mentioned by Antkowiak in his studies of inter-
American jurisprudence is case law involving the right to property (Art. 21 ACHR). Within 
regional case law involving the rights of indigenous people to their traditional lands, the right 
                                                 
256PSS, art. 1. 
257Ibid, art. 2. 
258Ibid, art. 5. 
259“Any instance in which the rights established in paragraph a) of Article 8 and in Article 13 are violated by action 
directly attributable to a State Party to this Protocol may give rise, through participation of the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights and, when applicable, of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, to application 
of the system of individual petitions governed by Article 44 through 51 and 61 through 69 of the American 
Convention on Human Rights.” Ibid, art. 19 (6). 
260See: Thomas Antkowiak, “Social, Economic, and Cultural Rights. The Inter-American Court at a Crossroads,” 
in The Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Theory and Practice, Present and Future, eds. Yves Haeck, 
Oswaldo Ruiz-Chiriboga, Clara Burbano-Herrera (Cambridge: Intersentia, 2015), 259-276. 
261Ibid, 270-272. 
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to property has also indirectly involved a wide range of socioeconomic rights granted to 
indigenous communities.262  
 
These different case groups illustrate how the indirect relation between the ACHR and 
socioeconomic rights has necessarily linked them to civil and political rights at the regional 
level. For Antkowiak, this necessary link may have undermined the significance of 
socioeconomic rights within inter-American human rights law.263 This initial necessary relation 
hindered the evolution of specific regional case law on socioeconomic rights. This is also 
related to the fact that neither the IACHR nor representatives of the victims argued violations 
of Art. 26 ACHR for a considerable time. With the evolution of inter-American case law on 
socioeconomic rights, the IACtHR has gradually adopted the direct enforcement of these rights, 
as the following section will explain.  
 
 
3.2.2. The emergence of the direct enforcement of socioeconomic rights  
 
Similar to conventionality control, the IACtHR decisions and the individual concurrent 
opinions of some IACtHR judges have played a significant role throughout the evolution of 
inter-American jurisprudence on socioeconomic rights. The IACtHR judges have on several 
occasions disagreed about some important points referring to the direct judicial enforcement of 
socioeconomic rights and this can be illustrated especially by their individual concurrent 
opinions. This section will focus on the most important cases for the emergence and evolution 
of the direct judicial enforcement of socioeconomic rights. The following cases illustrate the 
initial dismissal of petitions based on Art. 26 ACHR to the currently established autonomous 
and direct enforcement of this ACHR provision by the IACtHR. 
 
The first landmark case towards the direct enforcement of socioeconomic rights was 
Five Pensioners v. Peru.264 This case concerned the review of pensions cuts within Peruvian 
law and it was the first case in which the IACHR directly alleged a violation of Art. 26 ACHR 
before the IACtHR. In its decision, the IACtHR recognized “both an individual and a collective 
dimension” of socioeconomic rights and claimed a right of all members of the population to 
                                                 
262Ibid, 272-273. 
263Antkowiak has claimed that “[i]f economic, social and cultural rights are only important because they enable or 
support civil and political rights, this implies that they are subordinate and inferior to civil and political rights;” 
Ibid, 275. 
264IACtHR, (Judgement) February 28, 2003, Case of “Five Pensioners” v. Peru. 
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social security and to a pension.265 Nevertheless, the IACtHR did not establish a violation of 
Art. 26 ACHR, arguing that the limited group of petitioners could not represent the conditions 
experienced by the entire population in Peru.266 This interpretation was criticized by authorities 
and scholars in some specific points.267 In his concurrent opinion on this decision, Judge Sergio 
Garcia Ramirez emphasized that the decision could be reviewed in the future. For him, it was 
necessary to review the hierarchy of socioeconomic rights within inter-American 
jurisprudence.268 
 
Years later, Acevedo Buendía v. Peru269  represented another landmark case towards the 
direct judicial enforcement of socioeconomic rights by the IACtHR. In this case, the IACtHR 
established that the progressive development obligation (Art. 26 ACHR) with regard to 
socioeconomic rights is judicially enforceable. The IACtHR considered itself “fully competent 
to analyze the violations of all rights enshrined in the American Convention.”270 Based on that, 
the IACtHR established that the duty under Art. 26 ACHR is subject to the general obligations 
of Arts. 1 (1) and 2 ACHR, similar to the enforcement of civil and political rights within inter-
American jurisprudence.271 The IACtHR also referred to the duty over regressive measures 
relating to socioeconomic rights as stated by the UN Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights. The IACtHR acknowledged that “there is a duty- though conditioned - of not 
adopting retrogressive steps”272 (emphasis added). Based on that, regressive measures 
                                                 
265Ibid, §147. 
266“Economic, social and cultural rights have both an individual and a collective dimension. This Court considers 
that their progressive development (…) should be measured in function of the growing coverage of economic, 
social and cultural rights in general, and of the right to social security and to a pension in particular, of the entire 
population, bearing in mind the imperatives of social equity, and not in function of the circumstances of a very 
limited group of pensioners, who do not necessarily represent the prevailing situation.” Ibid. 
267The IACtHR decision in Five Pensioners was criticized by some legal scholars who have traditionally advocated 
for the judicially enforceable character of socioeconomic rights at the inter-American level. See: Tara J. Melish, 
“The Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Beyond Progressivity,” in Social Rights Jurisprudence: Emerging 
Trends in Comparative and International Law, ed. Malcolm Langford (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2008), 372-408. See also: Christian Courtis, “Luces y Sombras. La Exigibilidad de los Derechos Económicos, 
Sociales y Culturales en la Sentencia de los Cinco Pensionistas de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos,” 
in El Mundo Prometido. Escritos sobre Derechos Sociales y Derechos Humanos, (México, DF: Fontamara, 2009), 
203-230. 
268IACtHR, (Concurring Opinion Judge Sergio García Ramírez) February 28, 2003, Case of “Five Pensioners” v. 
Peru.  
269IACtHR, (Judgment) July 1, 2009, Case of Acevedo Buendía et al. (“Discharged and Retired Employees of the 
Comptroller”) v. Peru.  
270Ibid, §97.  
271The IACtHR ruled that: “it is pertinent to note that even though Article 26 is embodied in chapter III of the 
Convention, entitled ‘Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,’ it is also positioned in Part I of said instrument,  
entitled ‘State Obligations and Rights Protected’ and, therefore, is subject to the general obligations contained in 
Articles 1(1) and 2 mentioned in chapter I (entitled ‘General Obligations’), as well as Articles 3 to 25 mentioned 
in chapter II (entitled ‘Civil and Political Rights’).” Ibid, §100. 
272Ibid, §103 
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regarding socioeconomic rights could be subjected to IACtHR review: “the regression is 
actionable when economic, social and cultural rights are involved.”273  
 
Although this interpretation for the judicially enforceable character of Art. 26 ACHR 
was adopted unanimously, Acevedo Buendía revealed the dissent regarding the direct 
enforcement of socioeconomic rights among the IACtHR judges. Judge García Ramírez 
emphasized in a concurring opinion that the case represented the affirmation of the enforceable 
character of Art. 26 ACHR before the IACtHR.274 By contrast, Judge Ad Hoc Victor Oscar 
García warned that the new interpretation of Art. 26 ACHR and the duty over regressive 
measures actually did not have a direct relation to the case and that it could “lead to 
interpretations of an important impact on the Inter-American system of human rights; which 
calls for a more detailed and thorough treatment.”275 Similar to Five Pensioners, in Acevedo 
Buendía the IACtHR did not establish a violation of Art. 26 ACHR with regard to the pensions 
cuts directly involved in the case. Although some legal scholars, such as Thomas Antkowiak, 
have pointed out the contradictory and inadequate treatment of Art. 26 ACHR in this case,276 
Acevedo Buendía does illustrate the IACtHR progressive jurisprudence on socioeconomic 
rights. Laurence Burgorgue-Larsen has precisely called attention to the “audacity of the court” 
to establish the judicially enforceable character of socioeconomic rights.277 This audacious 
attitude was due to the fact that the IACtHR started to expand its authority through a more 
expansive interpretation of Art. 26 ACHR. The following development of inter-American case 
law on socioeconomic rights confirmed Burgorgue-Larsen’s analysis.  
 
Right after Acevedo Buendía, it is worth mentioning the concurrent opinion of Judge 
Margarette May Macaulay on Furlan v. Argentina,278 which involved the rights to health and 
social security within domestic law. Her concurring opinion was very relevant to the normative 
conception of the direct judicial enforcement of socioeconomic rights by the IACtHR. Judge 
Macaulay claimed that, with regard to socioeconomic rights, the IACtHR’s focus should not be 
                                                 
273Ibid. 
274IACtHR, (Concurrent Opinion Judge Sergio García Ramírez) July 1, 2009, Case of Acevedo Buendía et al. v. 
Peru. 
275IACtHR, (Concurrent Opinion Judge Ad Hoc Víctor Oscar Shiyin García Toma) July 1, 2009, Case of Acevedo 
Buendía et al. v. Peru. 
276Antkowiak, Social, Economic and Cultural rights. The Inter-American Court at a Crossroads, 266-270.  
277Laurence Burgorgue-Larsen, “La Política Jurisprudencial de la Corte Interamericana en Materia de Derechos 
Económicos y Sociales: de la Prudencia a la Audacia,” in Interamericanización del Derecho a la Salud. 
Perspectivas a la Luz del Caso Poblete de la Corte IDH, eds. Mariela Moralez Antoniazzi, Laura Clérico 
(Querétaro: Instituto de Estudios Constitucionales, 2019) 53-109. 
278IACtHR, (Concurring Opinion Judge Margarette May Macaulay) August 31, 2012, Case of Furlan and Family 
v. Argentina. 
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the progressive development or regression of said rights, but “the duty to guarantee them.”279 
In line with this, she argued that it was “useful to use the sources which allow for the 
interpretation of the content of the obligation to guarantee the right to health and the right to 
social security” involved in Furlan. She proposed to extend the interpretation of Art. 26 ACHR 
based on the pro persona principle of Art. 29 (b) ACHR. She also advocated for a systematic 
interpretation of the ACHR and the PSS. For her, this systematic interpretation could enable 
these inter-American documents to better fulfill their purpose of guaranteeing socioeconomic 
rights enforcement within the IAS. Based on a systematic interpretation of both treaties, the 
IACtHR could be able to “update the normative sense” of Art. 26 ACHR.280  
 
Just one year after Furlan, the direct enforcement of socioeconomic rights would receive 
a considerable support through the election of Eduardo Ferrer Mac-Gregor Poissot as an 
IACtHR judge.281 Since his election, Judge Ferrer Mac-Gregor has acted as an advocate for the 
direct enforcement of socioeconomic rights. His opposition to the previous majoritarian 
understanding of the indirect relation between the ACHR and socioeconomic rights was present 
in his first concurrent opinion on Suárez Peralta v. Ecuador.282 This case indirectly involved 
Art. 4 PSS (“Right to Health”). For Judge Ferrer Mac-Gregor, the case offered the opportunity 
to rule on the right to health in a direct and autonomous form.283 He argued that a direct judicial 
enforcement of socioeconomic rights could lead “towards the full normative effectiveness of 
Article 26” ACHR and grant “transparency and real protection to economic, social and cultural 
rights.”284 For him, the direct judicial enforcement had a legal basis in the ACHR.285 He 
described the relation between Art. 26 ACHR and Art. 19 (6) PSS as an “apparent 
contradiction.”286 This apparent contradiction required an interpretative exercise in order to 
                                                 
279Ibid, §6. 
280Ibid, §9.  
281Oscar Parra Vera has called attention to the “protagonist role of Judge Eduardo Ferrer Mac-Gregor” for reaching 
the majoritarian understanding in favor of the direct enforcement of socioeconomic rights within the IACtHR. See: 
Oscar Parra Vera, “La Justiciabilidad de los Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales en el Sistema 
Interamericano a la luz del Artículo 26 de la Convención Americana. El Sentido y la Promesa del Caso Lagos del 
Campos,” in Inclusión, Ius Commune y Justiciabilidad de los DESCA en la Jurisprudencia Interamericana. El 
Caso Lagos del Campo y los Nuevos Desafíos, eds. Eduardo Ferrer Mac-Gregor, Mariela Morales Antoniazzi, 
Rogelio Flores Pantoja, (Querétaro, Mexico: Instituto de Estudios Constitucionales, 2018), 181-234, 182. 
282IACtHR (Concurrent Opinion Judge Eduardo Ferrer Mac-Gregor) May 21, 2013, Case of Suárez Peralta v. 
Ecuador.  
283Ibid, §3. 
284“[T]he protection of economic, social and cultural rights by indirect means and in connection with other civil 
and political rights (...) does not provide full efficiency and effectiveness of these rights.” Ibid, §11. For him, this 
necessary link distorted the essence of socioeconomic rights and went against a “clear trend towards the 
recognition and normative effectiveness of all rights in accordance with the evident progress made at the national 
level and in international human rights law.” Ibid.  
285Ibid, §33.  
286Ibid, §§36-56. 
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bring these two treaties into accord. Following Judge Macaulay’s opinion on Furlan, he claimed 
that an update of the normative sense of Art. 26 ACHR was possible and necessary. For him, 
the direct enforcement of socioeconomic rights was “not only an interpretative possibility, but 
also a duty towards social justice,” which was able “to lead towards the full, real, direct, and 
transparent realization of all rights, whether civil, political, economic, social, and cultural, 
without a hierarchy or categorization that undermines their realization.”287 
 
Judge Ferrer Mac-Gregor’s audacious interpretation of the relationship between Art. 26 
ACHR and the rights protected by the PSS was contested by other IACtHR judges. Judge 
Alberto Pérez Pérez claimed that “the references to the right to health in the judgement do not 
mean that competence is being assumed in relation to that particular right, or to economic, 
social and cultural rights in general.”288 He also pointed out that the IACtHR could not ignore 
the provision of Art. 19 (6) PSS. For him, this provision was meant to restrict the competence 
of the IACtHR to cases involving the right to education and the rights of labor unions. This 
debate has followed inter-American case law on socioeconomic rights since then. In Huapaya 
v. Peru,289 Judge Pérez Pérez again voted against the direct enforcement of the right to work 
(Art. 6 PSS). For him, the right to work was not “included among those recognized by the 
American Convention on Human Rights, but among those recognized by the Protocol of San 
Salvador,” which is under the special protection established by Art. 19 (6) of said protocol.290 
Moreover, he argued that the direct enforcement lacks any legal basis within inter-American 
human rights law.291 Judge Ferrer Mac-Gregor, however, reaffirmed his position in a concurrent 
opinion issued together with Judge Alberto Caldas.292  
 
                                                 
287Ibid, §108. It is worth following the thread of his argument. First, he pointed out that no provision of the Protocol 
of San Salvador limits the interpretation of Arts. 1 and 2 ACHR (Ibid, §42). Second, based on Art. 29 (b) ACHR, 
a restrictive interpretation of rights is not possible due to the pro homine or pro persona principle (Ibid, §44). 
Eventually, Judge Ferrer Mac-Gregor expanded the scope of Art. 26 ACHR. For him: “economic, social and 
cultural rights provided for in other laws, including the constitutions of States parties, as well as rights provided 
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288IACtHR, (Concurrent Opinion Judge Alberto Perez Perez) May 21, 2013, Case of Suárez Peralta v. Ecuador.    
289IACtHR, (Judgement) June 24, 2015, Case of Canales Huapaya et al. v. Peru. 
290IACtHR, (Concurrent Opinion Judge Alberto Pérez Pérez) June 24, 2015, Case of Canales Huapaya et al. v. 
Peru. 
291“Article 26 of the American Convention does not provide for the specific recognition of economic, social and 
cultural rights or their inclusion in the protection regime established by the Convention.” Ibid, §22. 
292Although this concurrent opinion did not present any new interpretative element if compared to the concurrent 
opinion issued on Suárez Peralta, its importance was due to the fact that Judge Ferrer Mac-Gregor got an ally 
towards the majority rule on the autonomous and direct enforcement of socioeconomic rights at the regional level.   
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In Gonzáles Lluy v. Ecuador,293 the IACtHR established for the first time a violation of 
an article from the PSS. The case involved the right to education (Art. 13 PSS) of an HIV 
positive child, who was expelled from a kindergarten because of her health condition. Despite 
this landmark established violation, the direct enforcement of the right to health (Art. 4 PSS) 
was contested by Judge Pérez Pérez (with the same arguments from his concurring opinion on 
Huapaya regarding the right to work) and by Judge Humberto Antonio Sierra Porto. Judge 
Sierra Porto first contested the effectiveness of the direct enforcement of socioeconomic rights. 
He also contested the legitimacy of direct enforcement, given that Art. 26 ACHR does not 
establish any list of rights to be protected under the convention. For him, the interpretation in 
favor of the direct enforcement represented “a fairly extensive task of interpretation.”294 He 
acknowledged that the IAS could have adopted a less problematic legislative technique than 
the current “complex system of referrals” between the ACHR and different protocols.295 
However, he emphasized that the direct enforcement of socioeconomic rights relied on a very 
controversial interpretation of the relationship between these inter-American documents. 
Hence, he advocated for a “literal interpretation” of the ACHR and the PSS, which, for him, 
led to the limited competence of the IACtHR to rule on cases involving socioeconomic rights. 
Finally, Judge Sierra Porto also showed his concerns on a possible delegitimization of the 
IACtHR towards the IAS member states, which could damage the progress in human rights 
protection made throughout history.296 
 
The majoritarian understanding for the direct enforcement of socioeconomic rights was 
eventually reached in the decision of Lagos del Campo v. Peru.297 This case involved the right 
to employment stability of Mr. Alfredo Lagos de Campo, who acted as the president of the 
electoral committee of a state industrial community and was dismissed due to declarations given 
in an interview for the local press. The IACtHR established, for the first time within inter-
American jurisprudence, a violation of the right to work (Art. 6 PSS) based on an extensive 
interpretation of Art. 26 ACHR in relation with Article 1 (1) ACHR.298 In Lagos del Campo, 
                                                 
293IACtHR, (Judgement) September 1, 2015, Case of Gonzales Lluy et al. v. Ecuador. 
294IACtHR, (Concurring Opinion Judge Humberto Sierra Porto) September 1, 2015, Case of Gonzales Lluy et al. 
v. Ecuador, §7. 
295Ibid, §9. 
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297IACtHR, (Judgement) August 31, 2017, Case of Lagos del Campo v. Peru.  
298“The State is responsible for the violation of the right to employment stability, recognized in Article 26 of the 
American Convention, in relation to Articles 1.1, 13, 8 and 16 thereof, to the detriment of Mr. Lagos del Campo, 
in the terms of paragraphs 133 to 154 and 166 of this judgment.” Ibid, 5th resolutive paragraph. 
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the paragraph that more clearly illustrates the emergence of the direct enforcement of 
socioeconomic rights reads: 
 
“It should be noted that the Court has previously established its 
jurisdiction to hear and resolve disputes relating to Article 26 of the 
American Convention (…) in respect of which Article 1(1) confers 
general obligations of respect and guarantee on States (supra para. 142). 
The Court has also established important jurisprudential developments 
in this area, in light of various conventional articles. In view of these 
precedents, this Judgment develops and specifies a specific violation of 
Article 26 of the American Convention on Human Rights, provided for 
in Chapter III, entitled Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of this 
treaty.”299 (emphasis added) 
 
After Lagos del Campos, the IACtHR established a violation of Art. 26 ACHR in three 
other cases involving the right to work:  Dismissed Employees of Petroperú v. Peru,300 San 
Miguel Sosa v. Venezuela,301 and Muelle Flores v. Peru.302 These decisions referred to the 
precedent judgement in Lagos del Campo. These references represent a clear effort to 
consolidate the direct enforcement of socioeconomic rights within inter-American human rights 
jurisprudence. Based on Laurence Burgorgue-Larsen’s analysis of the evolution of 
conventionality control, we can affirm that Lagos del Campo represents a passage to the stage 
of consolidation of the direct enforcement of socioeconomic rights as a specific form of strong 
inter-American judicial review.303 To date, the IACtHR has established, beyond the direct 
enforcement of the right to work, the direct enforcement of the right to health (Art. 10 PSS). 
This happened more specifically in two cases: Poblete Vilches v. Chile304 and Cuscul v. 
Guatemala.305 
 
                                                 
299Ibid, §154. 
300IACtHR, (Judgement) November 23, 2017, Case of Dismissed Employees of Petroperú et al. v. Peru.  
301IACtHR, (Judgement) February 8, 2018, Case of San Miguel Sosa et al. v. Venezuela.  
302IACtHR, (Judgement) March 6, 2019, Case of Muelle Flores v. Peru. 
303Based on Burgorgue-Larsen studies of inter-American jurisprudence, we can affirm that Lagos del Campo 
represented the revelation of the direct enforcement of socioeconomic rights within inter-American jurisprudence. 
This case stands for the emergence of the direct enforcement of socioeconomic rights similar to how Almonacid 
stands for the emergence of conventionality control. 
304IACtHR, (Judgement) March 8, 2018, Case of Poblete Vilches et al. v. Chile. 
305IACtHR, (Judgement) August 23, 2018, Case of Cuscul Pivaral et al. v. Guatemala.  
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In Poblete Vilches, the IACtHR found a violation of the right to health due to the state 
responsibility for the inadequate conditions of hospitalization of Mr. Vinicio Antonio Poblete 
Vilches. He was twice hospitalized in a public hospital and died due to the negligence of 
medical staff. The IACtHR established the direct enforcement of Art. 10 PSS based on a 
“systematic, teleologic and evolutive interpretation” of inter-American human rights 
documents, according to which socioeconomic rights were incorporated into the catalogue of 
rights protected by the ACHR.306 Moreover, the court distinguished between two types of 
obligations in relation to the right to health: obligations of immediate effect and progressive 
obligations.307 In line with this, the IACtHR ruled that the facts in Poblete Vilches involved 
only immediate obligations regarding the right to health.308 However, in Cuscul Pivaral v. 
Guatemala, the IACtHR established for the first time a violation of the progressive obligation 
relating to the right to health. This case involved the right to health of people living with HIV. 
According to the IACHR, there was a total lack of state medical care for a group of HIV positive 
people living in poverty. The commission claimed that this omission had a serious impact on 
their right to health, life and personal integrity.309 Based on its evolutive jurisprudence on Art. 
26 ACHR,310 the IACtHR established that state authorities violated the progressive 
development obligation: “The inaction on the part of the state (…) constituted a breach of its 
obligations regarding the progressive protection of the right to health, in violation of Article 26 
of the American Convention.”311  
 
It is true that in none of the cases mentioned above has the IACtHR ordered state 
authorities to amend national laws based on inter-American human rights law on 
socioeconomic rights. However, this seems to be just a matter of time within the evolution of 
the particular features of the direct enforcement of socioeconomic rights. It is worth 
remembering that, in contrast to conventionality control, which represents a solid specific form 
of strong international judicial review, the specific features of the direct enforcement of 
socioeconomic rights are still emerging within inter-American human rights jurisprudence. 
Until now, Art. 26 ACHR and the provisions of the PSS have been enforced by the IACtHR in 
relation with Art. 1 (1) ACHR. The inter-American judicial review of domestic law would 
                                                 
306IACtHR, Poblete Vilches v. Chile, §103.  
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involve that the IACtHR invoke Art. 2 ACHR within case law on socioeconomic rights. There 
is enough evidence that the IACtHR will adopt this approach, as this study will now explain.    
 
First, Art. 2 PSS repeats the provision of Art. 2 ACHR with regard to the obligation to 
adopt domestic legislation in accordance with inter-American human rights law. According to 
it, “[i]f the exercise of the rights set forth in this Protocol is not already guaranteed by legislative 
or other provisions,” the IAS member states “undertake to adopt, in accordance with their 
constitutional processes and the provisions of this Protocol, such legislative or other measures 
as may be necessary for making those rights a reality.”312 This provision arguably gives a legal 
basis for the inter-American judicial review of domestic laws on socioeconomic rights. In fact, 
given that the IACtHR started to interpret the relationship between the ACHR and the PSS in 
an evolutive, teleologic and systematic way as it claimed, for instance, in Poblete Vilches, the 
court is not far from practicing the review of domestic legislation within the direct enforcement 
of socioeconomic rights.  
 
Second, the IACtHR at least once addressed the relationship between the direct 
enforcement of socioeconomic rights and Art. 2 ACHR. In its Advisory Opinion OC-23/17 
(“The Environment and Human Rights”),313  the IACtHR established that, according to Art. 2 
ACHR, the IAS member states have a duty to adopt domestic legislation to guarantee the 
effectiveness of the rights provided by the ACHR. For the IACtHR, this state obligation to bring 
domestic legislation into accordance with the ACHR “is not limited to the constitutional or 
legislative text,” but should extend to “all legal provisions with a regulatory nature and translate 
into effective practical application”.314 In line with this, the court established that the states 
should regulate the protection of the environment having in mind this duty to adopt proper 
legislation in order to avoid significant damage to the environment.315 Moreover, the IACtHR 
established the essential elements of domestic regulation referring to environmental impact 
studies, which, according to the court, should include, among other things, specific procedural 
rules and the duties that authorities and decision-makers should follow when analyzing projects 
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with a significant  environmental impact.316 Here, for instance, lies the scope for the court to 
review domestic laws that do not abide by these criteria.  
 
Finally, some IACtHR judges have also already addressed the relationship between the 
direct enforcement of socioeconomic rights and Art. 2 ACHR. Judge Eduardo Ferrer Mac-
Gregor, for instance, has claimed that “the next challenge for the Inter-American Court is to 
develop a full model of the conventionality control doctrine” based on socioeconomic rights as 
a means “to improve the compliance of human rights law in domestic frameworks with a new 
conception of social justice.”317 What does he mean by that? It seems that he intends to relate 
the judicial enforcement of socioeconomic rights to the practice of conventionality control by 
the IACtHR. This could involve the practice of inter-American judicial review of domestic laws 
on socioeconomic rights. Judge Ferrer Mac-Gregor intends to strengthen the direct enforcement 
of socioeconomic rights by adding to its features the practice of inter-American judicial review 
of domestic law. Given that he has been a very influential judge in the development of inter-
American human rights jurisprudence, this interpretation is also an important factor to the 
emergence of this second specific form of strong inter-American judicial review. 
 
 
3.3. Conclusion: The specific forms of strong inter-American judicial review  
 
This chapter has described the two specific forms of strong inter-American judicial 
review of domestic laws: conventionality control and the direct enforcement of socioeconomic 
rights. In order to understand better these specific forms, this chapter found it necessary to 
describe both their emergence and the evolution of their specific features throughout inter-
American jurisprudence. Conventionality control emerged in response to the underenforcement 
of civil and political rights following the democratization of some previously authoritarian 
Latin American countries. These authoritarian regimes adopted amnesty laws as a condition for 
democratization and as a means to avoid punishment by the democratic governments that 
followed them. The conventionality control of these laws represented the core of the first major 
phase of inter-American jurisprudence, i.e., the transitional justice phase. Although 
                                                 
316Ibid, §150. 
317Eduardo Ferrer Mac-Gregor, foreword to The Social Rights Jurisprudence in the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights. Shadow and Light in International Human Rights, Isaac de Paz González, (Cheltenham, UK; 
Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2018). 
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conventionality control has emerged within inter-American jurisprudence on amnesty laws, the 
IACtHR has also refined its specific features in cases that did not involve amnesty statutes.  
 
Throughout several cases, the IACtHR refined the procedural aspects of conventionality 
control, which contributed to its practical enforcement within domestic law.  Although the court 
eventually extended conventionality control to every national authority within the IAS, the 
domestic judicial authorities are the most prominent agents of conventionality control due to 
their competence to review legislation with general effect within some Latin American 
constitutional orders. Some IACtHR decisions and concurrent opinions of IACtHR judges have 
addressed other important procedural elements of conventionality control, like the type of 
domestic laws that could give rise to conventionality control and the type of inter-American 
documents that could serve as a reference point for its practice. In view of these specific 
features, conventionality control can be described as the domestic judicial authorities’ 
international obligation to review national law that is not in accordance with inter-American 
human rights law. Should they face an inconsistent statute or provision, domestic judicial 
authorities should refrain from enforcing it or should even opt to invalidate it based on inter-
American human rights law. By doing so, state authorities would not only be complying with 
the ACHR, but also serving as auxiliary bodies to the IACtHR. This auxiliary work is essential 
for the effectiveness of conventionality control due to the fact that the IACtHR cannot amend 
domestic laws per se according to the ACHR. Hence, the court has ordered national judicial 
authorities to do so based on their obligation to comply with inter-American human rights law 
and, most importantly, with inter-American jurisprudence.318  
 
Beyond conventionality control, the direct enforcement of socioeconomic rights 
represents another specific form of inter-American judicial review that is still emerging within 
inter-American human rights jurisprudence. The IACtHR has gradually extended its authority 
towards the adjudication of socioeconomic rights. These rights are not directly mentioned by 
the ACHR and, due to this absence of direct reference, the IACtHR initially enforced them 
within cases that involved violations of civil and political rights. However, the commission 
recently started referring cases that argued violations of Art. 26 ACHR and, throughout the 
evolution of inter-American case law on socioeconomic rights, the IACtHR eventually 
established the direct enforcement of these rights. The IACtHR first recognized an individual 
                                                 
318The following chapter will address the disputed existence of strong international judicial review due to this 
effectiveness issue. 
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and collective dimension of socioeconomic rights. Then, it established that the progressive 
development obligation under Art. 26 ACHR is subject to the general obligations of Arts. 1 (1) 
and 2 ACHR, which meant that this obligation had a judicially enforceable character. Finally, 
the IACtHR established a direct violation of the right to work (Art. 6 PSS) for the first time. 
Since then, the IACtHR has tried to consolidate the direct enforcement of socioeconomic rights 
by establishing other direct violations of socioeconomic rights. Beyond the right to work, the 
court has established a direct violation of the right to health (Art. 10 PSS) within socioeconomic 
rights case law.  
 
The IACtHR has still not ordered national authorities to amend domestic legislation on 
socioeconomic rights. This is due to the late emergence of the direct enforcement of 
socioeconomic rights when compared to conventionality control. However, there is evidence 
that the court will adopt this second specific form of strong inter-American judicial review. 
Three points illustrate this argument more clearly. First, the practice of strong inter-American 
judicial review involves the enforcement of Art. 2 ACHR. The PSS has a similar provision in 
its Art. 1 (“Obligation to Adopt Domestic Measures”). Based on the new interpretation of the 
relationship between these two inter-American documents, the IACtHR already has a legal 
basis for the practice of the second specific form of strong inter-American judicial review. 
Second, the court specifically referred to the relationship between domestic law on 
socioeconomic rights and Art. 2 ACHR in the Advisory Opinion OC-23/17 (“Human Rights 
and the Environment”). In this advisory opinion, the court established essential elements that 
should be included in the domestic laws that regulate projects with a significant environmental 
impact. Herein lies the scope for the court to review domestic laws that do not include these 
essential features. Finally, it was worth mentioning the opinion of an influential IACtHR judge 
about the necessity of developing a stronger relationship between conventionality control and 
the direct enforcement of socioeconomic rights. This opinion arguably advocates for adopting 
strong inter-American judicial review within the direct enforcement of socioeconomic rights.  
 
In Chapter I, inter-American judicial review has been described as a fundamental 
element in the top-down evolution of Latin American cosmopolitan constitutionalism. Strong 
review is simultaneously the product and an agent of this evolution. In light of the study of 
inter-American jurisprudence, we can better understand why this new feature of Latin American 
cosmopolitan constitutionalism has caused much controversy among legal authorities and 
scholars. The evolution of conventionality control and the direct enforcement of socioeconomic 
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rights illustrates how the IACtHR has practiced a transfer of powers from the domestic courts 
to the inter-American level. The practice of strong inter-American judicial review of legislation 
has served as the main mechanism for this transfer of constitutional powers. However, as we 
have seen in Chapter II, domestic courts are likely to oppose this evolution of inter-American 
human rights jurisprudence. Cases like Gomes Lund and Herzog reveal that constitutional 
courts may want to keep their constitutional authority over domestic legislation, as they have 
traditionally done within Latin American constitutionalism. Latin American constitutional 
courts, despite being obliged to comply with inter-American jurisprudence, may resist the 
practice of strong inter-American judicial review of domestic laws. 
 
As it has become clear within the previous chapters, cosmopolitan convergence is not 
only the result of the top-down emergence of human rights legislation and jurisprudence in 
Latin America. Bottom-up elements have also been of fundamental importance for Latin 
American cosmopolitan constitutionalism. Resistance to cosmopolitan convergence ultimately 
reveals the lack of a strong normative sense with regard to the practice of inter-American 
judicial review on the part of national authorities, more specifically constitutional courts. 
However, advocates for the practice of strong inter-American judicial review often ignore its 
controversial character within Latin American constitutionalism. One such example is a 
practical guide to the practice of conventionality control that was edited by the Inter-American 
Institute of Human Rights.319  
 
According to this practical guide, the practice of conventionality control is a logical 
consequence of a legal education based on topics such as the relationship between domestic 
and international human rights law, the structure of the IAS and the member states’ 
responsibilities under the ACHR.320 However, it is difficult to deny the fact that the practice of 
strong inter-American judicial review is still a relatively recent feature within Latin American 
constitutionalism. Its development by the IACtHR, its adoption by domestic authorities, and 
the scholarly debate are still not settled. It is also difficult to deny that even a basic education 
on the legal subjects mentioned by the practical guide would inevitably lead to serious 
discussions about the legitimacy and effectiveness of inter-American judicial review within the 
current phase of inter-American human rights law. The practice of strong inter-American 
                                                 
319Instituto Inter-Americano de Derechos Humanos (IIDH), Manual Auto-Formativo para la Aplicación del 
Control de Convencionalidad Dirigido a Operadores de Justicia, (San José da Costa Rica: IIDH, 2015).  
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conventionality control more naturally.” Ibid, 69.  
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judicial review is not self-evident, and some scholars should stop pretending that it is. The 
previous chapters have illustrated the demand for a normative theory of inter-American judicial 
review that is compatible with the evolution of Latin American constitutionalism. The initial 
step towards this normative theory is studying the legitimacy and effectiveness of international 
judicial review in more general terms. After assessing the normative grounds for the practice 
of international judicial review, it is necessary to look for the most legitimate and effective 
approach that the IACtHR can adopt when practicing inter-American judicial review of 
domestic laws. These tasks will guide the following chapters of this study.   
 92 
IV. The Normative Grounds for the Practice of Strong International Judicial Review 
 
 
4.1. The controversial existence of strong international judicial review  
  
The previous chapter has described the emergence of two specific forms of inter-
American judicial review of domestic laws. The most appropriate description of these specific 
forms involves the distinction between strong and weak judicial review. Legal scholars have 
distinguished between strong and weak forms of judicial review within domestic law. Strong 
judicial review refers to the final say that courts have on the validity of legislation. Within weak 
judicial review, courts may defer to the political review of legislation carried out by legislative 
or administrative instances. Within international law, strong international judicial review also 
relates to the judicial interpretation of domestic legislation, although it may possibly involve 
the review of judicial decisions and executive acts within the multilevel system of human rights 
protection. This study focuses on the practice of inter-American judicial review of domestic 
legislation. In view of this, the adjective strong generally refers to the final say that the IACtHR 
may have on the review of legislation without considering the position of national authorities, 
most importantly domestic legislatures and constitutional courts.321 The courts’ final say may 
range from just a more concrete interpretation of domestic law to even striking down domestic 
statutes. This possibility of invalidating domestic statutes is the most problematic feature of the 
practice of strong inter-American judicial review as this chapter will explain. 
 
As Başak Çali has pointed out, “the use of the term ‘judicial review’ in the context of 
the judicial powers of international courts” is something “more contemporary” and “its 
emergence can be linked to the rise of the regional human rights courts of Europe, the Americas 
and Africa.”322 In contrast to domestic judicial review, international judicial review seems to 
                                                 
321Jeremy Waldron has found this distinction between strong and weak judicial review useful for debating the 
legitimacy of this institution: “In a system of strong judicial review, courts have the authority to decline to apply 
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envisage). Moreover, courts in this system have the authority to establish as a matter of law that a given statute or 
legislative provision will not be applied, so that as a result of stare decisis and issue preclusion a law that they have 
refused to apply becomes in effect a dead letter. A form of even stronger judicial review would empower the courts 
to actually strike a piece of legislation out of the statute-book altogether.” Jeremy Waldron, “The Core of the Case 
Against Judicial Review,” Yale Law Journal 115, (2006), 1346-1406, 1354. Mark Tushnet has defined strong-
form judicial review as “a system in which judicial interpretations of the Constitution are final and unrevisable by 
ordinary legislative majorities.” Mark Tushnet, Weak Courts, Strong Rights. Judicial Review and Social Welfare 
Rights in Comparative Constitutional Law, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), 33.  
322Başak Çali, “International Judicial Review,” in Handbook on Global Constitutionalism, eds. Anthony F. Lang, 
Antje Wiener, (Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2017) 291-303, 291. 
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necessarily adopt the form of weak review. Çali has also addressed this issue when she claimed 
that “international judicial review does not raise the same intensity of problems that are 
highlighted in the context of strong domestic judicial review” and that “in all its manifestations, 
international judicial review is a weak form of judicial review seen from the perspective of 
domestic constitutional orders.”323   
 
There are some major obstacles to describing the practice of strong inter-American 
judicial review that relate to the institutional position of regional human rights courts, as Çali 
has noted. These obstacles seem to make lawyers reluctant to incorporate insights from a rich 
debate on judicial review at the domestic level to the discussion of its inter-American practice. 
Overcoming them is necessary in order to bring new horizons to the debate on the legitimacy 
and effectiveness of the practice of inter-American judicial review. One well-known argument 
against the existence of strong international judicial review is the one that points to the fact that 
the IACtHR relies on the domestic level for compliance with its decisions. How could this 
international court have the final say on the review of domestic legislation if the enforcement 
of its decisions relies on the agency of domestic authorities? Due to its institutional standing, 
inter-American judicial review seems to necessarily represent a weak form of judicial review. 
   
Another common argument against the existence of strong international judicial review 
in general is that jurisprudence is not recognized as an immediate source of international law.324 
This argument is based, for instance, on a disputed interpretation of Art. 38 (d) of the statute of 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ), according to which the ICJ uses “judicial decisions and 
the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means 
for the determination of rules of law” (my emphasis).325 Based on the subsidiary character of 
jurisprudence, the IACtHR could not rely on its own jurisprudence to justify the practice of 
strong international judicial review of domestic laws. By doing so, the IACtHR assumes that 
inter-American jurisprudence is a primary source of international law. For some scholars, this 
assumption is wrong based on the nature of international law and, more specifically, of 
international human rights law.326  
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324On this issue, see: David Kennedy, “The Sources of International Law,” in International Legal Structures, 
(Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1987), 11-107. See also: The Oxford Handbook on The Sources of International Law, eds. 
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Órganos Interamericanos de Proteción de Derechos Humanos para los Tribunales Judiciales Nacionales,” in 
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However, based on the evolution of international human rights adjudication, legal 
scholars should arguably change their perception that international jurisprudence involves only 
weak forms of judicial review. As Başak Çali and Anne Koch have suggested, there are 
currently three different forms of international judicial review: weak, intermediate and 
strong.327 For these authors, the level of strength of judicial review depends on some factors. If 
an international human rights adjudicative body just establishes a rights violation but does not 
establish the appropriate remedies or monitors the reparation of this violation, we can say that 
it is practicing weak international judicial review. If this court establishes a rights violation 
along with its consequent potential remedies and forms of prevention, it is practicing 
intermediate international judicial review. Finally, if this court establishes a violation and the 
potential remedies to this violation, and monitors compliance with the judgement, it can be said 
to be practicing strong international judicial review. These categories are useful to describe the 
evolution of international adjudication, but the strength of inter-American judicial review also 
relates to the effectiveness of inter-American jurisprudence within domestic law. 
 
It is difficult to ignore the influence of inter-American human rights jurisprudence in 
domestic law throughout recent decades in Latin America. Paying attention to this influence 
leads us to conclude that, if the IACtHR does not have a final say on domestic pieces of 
legislation within the IAS, it has at least a very persuasive voice on this matter. Its influence 
has been exercised over all domestic branches, which contributes to the argument that strong-
form review has emerged within the evolution of inter-American human rights jurisprudence. 
This can be illustrated by Radilla Pacheco v. Mexico328 and the domestic responses to this case 
in Mexico.329 This case involved a victim of enforced disappearance caused by military 
personnel. The IACtHR established that the military courts had no authority over the case and 
that it had to be reported to ordinary courts. Moreover, the IACtHR established the duty to 
practice conventionality control in order to ensure the enforcement of the decision. The 
Mexican authorities basically ignored the IACtHR judgement and, after Radillha Pacheco, the 
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country was found in violation with the ACHR in 3 more cases within just 2 years.330 
Eventually, the Mexican Supreme Court decided to study the case with greater attention and it 
eventually became very influential in Mexican constitutional law.  
 
 The case was responsible for the adoption of several important domestic measures. 
First, the IACtHR decision in Radilla Pacheco was one of the determining factors of the 2011 
constitutional reform that granted human rights a constitutional rank within Mexican law. As 
this study has already pointed out, this reform modified the title of Chapter 1 of the constitution 
(from “Of the individual guarantees” to “Of human rights and their guarantees”), as well as 
modifying several constitutional articles. The case was also responsible for introducing 
conventionality control to the Mexican authorities. The Mexican state established a training 
program for all justice operators and reported to the IACHR that, until September 2015, 62.440 
people were trained in, among other issues, the practice of conventionality control.331 
Eventually, the Mexican Supreme Court established the binding character of inter-American 
jurisprudence, even in cases in which Mexico is not a party. Finally, the case was also important 
for the measures adopted by the Mexican executive power, since in 2014 the government 
withdrew of its reservations to three treaties adopted in the framework of the OAS.332  
 
This Mexican case strengthens the argument that, based on the evolution of Latin 
American cosmopolitan constitutionalism, the institutional condition of the IACtHR should not 
prevent the analysis of strong-form inter-American judicial review. As Çali has also noted, “of 
the three human rights systems,” the IACtHR “has adopted the broadest and the strictest 
conception of international judicial review.”333 It is also worth mentioning that Çali and Koch 
have claimed that the IACtHR “constitutes an institution that comes closest to an international 
version of strong judicial review,” given that this court “spells out the measures states have to 
implement in order to remedy a given violation in an exceptionally detailed manner, thereby 
leaving no room for any further deliberation as to what the appropriate form of implementation 
might be.”334 In line with this, strong judicial review has become common practice within inter-
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American jurisprudence and it currently stands as the most prominent element in the top-down 
evolution of Latin American cosmopolitan constitutionalism. Despite its arguably advantages 
for human rights enforcement, legal scholars should address the legitimacy and effectiveness 
of strong inter-American judicial review with greater attention.  
 
 
4.2. Inter-institutional interaction as a common feature of domestic and international 
judicial review 
 
The discussion about the legitimacy and effectiveness of international judicial review 
raises similar questions to those raised in the discussion of its practice within domestic law. 
This section first addresses inter-institutional interaction as a common feature of domestic and 
international judicial review. This common feature underscores the importance of the debate 
on the practice of judicial review within domestic law for the discussion of international judicial 
review. This chapter will then address in greater detail the reasons for and against the practice 
of domestic judicial review and how these reasons can also be useful for assessing the 
legitimacy of strong international judicial review.  
 
Although it is said that the national and international levels of adjudication have more 
differences than similarities, it is worth paying attention to one remarkable common feature 
they have in terms of judicial review. Similar to domestic judicial review, international judicial 
review necessarily has a multi-institutional character. Within domestic law, judicial review 
necessarily involves inter-institutional interaction between courts and legislatures.335 When 
courts invalidate laws or order their amendment within domestic law, legislatures should 
respond to these judicial decisions and adopt new legislation on the specific issues that were 
judicially reviewed. Judicial review is an essential feature of deliberative democracies, given 
that it promotes this inter-institutional interaction on legislative matters. As is clear from 
previous sections of this study, when the IACtHR orders that national authorities should review 
domestic laws, it lacks the power to enforce this decision. The IACtHR necessarily relies on 
the national authorities, i.e., domestic courts and legislatures, in order to guarantee the 
effectiveness of the practice of inter-American judicial review. Without these national 
authorities, inter-American judicial review is merely wishful thinking.336 This makes inter-
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institutional interaction a necessary feature of international judicial review. Due to this common 
multi-institutional character of domestic and international judicial review, studies of inter-
institutional dialogue referring to domestic judicial review can also be useful for analyzing the 
practice of international judicial review.  
 
Throughout the evolution of inter-American human rights jurisprudence, the inter-
institutional interaction between the IACtHR and national authorities has become as complex 
as it is within domestic constitutional orders. While the domestic practice of strong judicial 
review might raise questions of the legitimacy of courts striking down majority-based statutes, 
at the international level, it is not surprising that some commentators have raised arguments 
against inter-American judicial review. Inter-American judicial review of domestic law has 
brought about a new relationship between the IACtHR and the highest domestic courts and 
national legislatures. This new inter-institutional relationship is the main focus of the following 
parts of this study. This study argues that, if legal scholars pay greater attention to inter-
institutional interaction, they might be able to find the most appropriate approach to this new 
relationship between the IACtHR and national authorities. In fact, trying to find the best 
normative model of inter-American judicial review necessarily means trying to find the most 
appropriate relationship between the IACtHR and the highest national authorities. 
 
Yet, it is worth mentioning some particular issues regarding the legitimacy and 
effectiveness of strong international judicial review. It is especially due to the institutional 
position of international courts that such particular issues have emerged. Addressing the 
legitimacy of international adjudication, Armin Von Bogdandy and Ingo Venzke have 
addressed what they called “a widespread sense of unease about the legitimacy of international 
courts.”337 They have described “specific legitimation problems of international adjudication” 
due to different factors like institutional asymmetries and the fragmentation of international 
law.338 Institutional asymmetries refer to the fact that international treaties usually provide a 
legal basis for international adjudication.339 In contrast to domestic statutes, international 
treaties are not so readily amended within legislative processes. This means that the 
“democratic potential of parliamentary legitimation can develop less with an international treaty 
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than with domestic law.”340 Moreover, the processes of negotiating, amending and ratifying 
international treaties are usually slow because they depend on qualified majorities or special 
procedures within international and, in turn, domestic legislatures. Von Bogdandy and Venzke 
have concluded that “[t]he democratic premise that judicial law-making can be politically 
corrected with democratic majorities is therefore hardly respected with international 
adjudication.”341 Moreover, the intense fragmentation of international law does not contribute 
to a higher democratic pedigree of international adjudication.342 For them, this fragmentation 
may hinder “democratic generality” and become “a problem for the democratic legitimation of 
international court’s public authority.”343 
 
There are also important issues regarding the effectiveness of international judicial 
review. The effectiveness of judicial decisions is a much more salient issue in international 
contexts of adjudication than it is within domestic constitutional orders. Although national 
authorities underenforce judicial decisions in an everyday basis and this fact might even sound 
banal to professional lawyers, with regard to strong international judicial review, 
nonenforcement or underenforcement might represent a much more salient threat to the overall 
effectiveness of a specific international legal system. This effectiveness question may also be 
intimately related to the legitimacy questions associated with international adjudication. 
National state authorities may try to oppose decisions by international judicial authorities by 
means of nonenforcement. From a bottom-up perspective, nonenforcement or 
underenforcement of international decisions may even be perceived as a legitimate form of 
opposition to strong international judicial review. The fact that strong review does not leave 
scope for critical positions to international judicial decisions is indeed a delicate issue. Should 
domestic state authorities blindly abide by international decisions or should they seek another 
form of interaction with international judicial authorities by means of nonenforcement of 
jurisprudence? 
 
 Even if some form of critical approach to strong inter-American judicial review might 
be desirable, it is hard to deny that massive underenforcement would lead to the overall 
                                                 
340Ibid, 123. 
341Ibid, 125.  
342On this issue, see also: Martti Koskenniemi, “International Legislation Today: Limits and Possibilities,” 
Wisconsin International Law Journal 23, (2005), 61-92. Martti Koskenniemi, “Fragmentation of International 
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ineffectiveness of inter-American human rights jurisprudence. This is particularly problematic 
in the case of the IACtHR, given that this court has heavily relied on the practice of strong 
review of domestic laws. A salient argument against strong international judicial review is that 
it can lead to backlash against international courts. If the IACtHR does not adopt a principled 
practice of strong review, national authorities may start to massively underenforce the court’s 
decisions. This could cause considerable harm to the further evolution of inter-American human 
rights jurisprudence. However, inter-American judicial authorities are not supposed to tolerate 
the domestic violations of human rights, since this attitude would harm the integrity of a system 
that was created to protect people from these same violations. The practice of strong inter-
American judicial review must therefore strike a balance between the legitimacy and 
effectiveness issues. Trying to strike this balance involves the discussion of the normative 
grounds for the practice of inter-American judicial review. Due to the notable common feature 
between the national and international contexts of adjudication, namely inter-institutional 
interaction, legal scholars may gain a better perspective on international judicial review if they 
pay close attention to the rich discussion of inter-institutional interaction within domestic law.  
 
 
4.3. The legitimacy and effectiveness of judicial review within domestic law  
 
Judicial review has been responsible for courts acquiring a more relevant position within 
domestic constitutional democracies. There has been contestation to this evolution of 
constitutional democracies within legal scholarship. Ran Hirschl, for instance, has addressed 
this phenomenon as a problem of “juristocracy.”344 In fact, many prominent legal scholars have 
emphasized that constitutional rights enforcement should not be restricted to what 
constitutional courts say the constitution is. One well-known example within legal scholarship 
is “popular constitutionalism,” which is a theory of constitutional rights enforcement that does 
not privilege judicial supremacy and, in the words of one of its most prominent proponents, 
even intends to take the constitution away from the courts.345 The fact is that strong judicial 
review is necessarily related to questions of the legitimacy of this legal practice, because it 
                                                 
344Ran Hirschl, Towards Juristocracy. The Origins and Consequences of the New Constitutionalism, (Cambridge: 
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arguably involves the review of democratically enacted laws practiced by non-democratically 
elected adjudicative bodies. Strong review triggers a discussion of the counter-majoritarian 
difficulty that courts face when they review majority-based legislation, as Alexander Bickel has 
prominently pointed out.346 This counter-majoritarian difficulty represents a general argument 
against the practice of judicial review within domestic law.  
 
Several legal scholars have referred to the counter-majoritarian difficulty in many 
different ways. One prominent example is Jeremy Waldron’s article The Core of the Case 
Against Judicial Review.347 Waldron aimed to offer arguments against judicial review in its 
general features, i.e., not relying on a specific context or history of this legal practice.348 For 
him, yielding to ordinary majority-based decision-making is the best way to resolve rights-
based disagreements among citizens in democracies that fulfill some minimal requirements.349 
His claim is based on two main factors: i) strong judicial review does not “provide a way for a 
society to focus clearly on the real issues at stake when citizens disagree about rights,” but 
“distracts them with side-issues about precedent, texts and interpretation;”350 and ii) strong 
review’s political illegitimacy relies on the fact that this legal practice privileges “majority 
voting among a small number of unelected and unaccountable judges” at the same time that “it 
disenfranchises ordinary citizens and brushes aside cherished principles of representation and 
political equality in the final resolution of issues about rights.”351 
 
Another example of a critical approach to judicial review is offered by Richard 
Bellamy’s concept of political constitutionalism.352 Bellamy has advocated for limits on the 
practice of judicial review within liberal democracies. For him, “ambitious schemes of judicial 
review” that ignore the complexity involved in rights’ interpretation and enforcement “risk 
making judicial decisions appear arbitrary, thereby threatening the legitimacy of the 
constitution.”353 Despite all the disadvantages pointed out by Waldron and Bellamy, many 
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scholars have advocated for the advantages brought about by the practice of judicial review of 
legislation within constitutional democracies. It is interesting to address what could justify the 
practice of judicial review within domestic law according to these scholars and how these 
arguments might be influential in the debate on international judicial review. As we will see, 
some scholars have advocated that judicial review is not necessarily an anti-democratic 
institution. Some of these scholars have even described judicial review as an essential feature 
of constitutional democracies.  
 
Hans Kelsen was a traditional defender of the practice of judicial review of 
legislation.354 He claimed that “[i]nsofar as it makes sure that statutes come into existence in 
conformity with the constitution (…) constitutional adjudication serves the function of an 
effective protection of the minority against assaults on the part of the majority.”355 In another 
passage, Kelsen associated the judicial review of legislative procedures to a systemic design of 
institutional control that is decisive for the fate of modern democracies. For him, “democracy 
without control is impossible in the long run.”356 Based on this fact, minorities should be able 
to appeal to constitutional courts, either directly or indirectly, for the review of legislation that 
exposes them to the “arbitrariness of the majority.”357  
 
More recently, Mattias Kumm has described the importance of judicial review as a 
feature of constitutional democracies as comparable to that of the liberal right to vote.358 For 
him, “judicial review is not only compatible with liberal democracy;” it also “institutionalizes 
a right to justification that should be regarded as basic an institutional commitment of liberal-
democratic constitutionalism as electoral accountability based on an equal right to vote.”359 
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Likewise, Alon Harel and Adam Shinar have argued that judicial review is the institutional 
embodiment of the right to a hearing.360 For them, this right to a hearing is essential for the 
protection of individual rights in every legal system given that “it grants individuals an 
opportunity to challenge decisions that impinge (or may have impinged) upon their rights, to 
engage in reasoned deliberation concerning these decisions, and to benefit from a 
reconsideration of these decisions in light of this deliberation.”361 Although Harel and Shinar 
have affirmed that non-judicial institutions, e.g., the legislature, can enforce the right to a 
hearing, courts are arguably specially designed to fulfill this task within constitutional 
democracies. In line with this, they have argued that any institution that aims to give effect to 
the right to a hearing should operate in a judicial manner, i.e., it should resemble a court.362 
 
Other legal scholars have argued that judicial review can play an important role in 
constitutional democracy; however, these scholars have granted less weight to the importance 
of judicial review as an institution of liberal constitutionalism. Ronald Dworkin, for instance, 
addressed judicial review based on the forms of democracy currently existing in some countries. 
For him, the practice of judicial review necessarily leads to the concept of a constitutional court 
as a “forum of principle,” according to which it “should make decisions of principle rather than 
policy.”363 In light of contemporary democratic systems, he claimed that “judicial review 
insures that the most fundamental issues of political morality will finally be set out and debated 
as issues of principle and not political power alone, a transformation that cannot succeed, in 
any case not fully, within the legislature itself.”364 Nevertheless, it is important to emphasize 
that, for Dworkin, judicial review is not an indispensable feature of democracies. In his last 
book, he claimed that “judicial review is one possible (though I emphasize, only one possible) 
strategy for improving a government’s legitimacy”365 and that if “representative government is 
indeed necessary (…) [t]hat is not true of judicial review.”366 
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So now we have some different interpretations of the legitimacy and effectiveness of 
judicial review within domestic law. Some scholars warn us of the illegitimacy and risks 
inherent in the practice of judicial review of legislation, while others describe it as an 
indispensable feature of constitutional democracies or at least one possible way to strengthen 
the government’s legitimacy. How could these different interpretations be useful for the 
discussion about the legitimacy and effectiveness of international judicial review? This section 
has argued that the reasons related to the necessity and suitability of domestic judicial review 
might enable lawyers to better assess the normative grounds for the practice of international 
judicial review within the IAS. In fact, inter-American judicial review of domestic laws has 
become an indispensable feature for Latin American democracies throughout the evolution of 
Latin American cosmopolitan constitutionalism, as the previous chapters have explained. As 
this study will explain in Chapter VI, the inter-American institutions have traditionally faced a 
difficult context for human rights enforcement in Latin America. Illiberal and authoritarian 
practices still persist in some Latin American countries and this justifies the demand for some 
form of control body of domestic legislative practices, given that authoritarianism is more often 
than not institutionalized via legislation. Inter-American judicial review of domestic laws could 
guarantee the close control of the consistent evolution of domestic legislation according to inter-
American human rights law. In line with this, strong inter-American judicial review could 
represent an important factor against domestic authoritarian practices that flagrantly violate the 
civil and political rights protected under inter-American human rights law. It is mostly based 
on this persistence of domestic authoritarian practices in Latin America that, for this study, the 
interpretations in favor of judicial review are more useful for establishing a principled practice 
of strong inter-American judicial review. Due to the necessity of control of authoritarian 
legislative practices in Latin American countries, this study will try to strengthen the arguments 
for the legitimacy of strong judicial review in the following. 
 
The first step is to address how courts can serve as a control body within deliberative 
democracies without necessarily becoming anti-democratic institutions. Some scholars have 
claimed that courts can strengthen the legitimacy of democratically enacted legislation through 
the practice of judicial review by guaranteeing the participatory rights of citizens. Here it is 
worth mentioning how Jürgen Habermas has addressed this issue. For him, “only the procedural 
conditions for the democratic genesis of legal statutes secures the legitimacy of enacted law.”367 
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In view of this, a constitutional court plays an important role: to guarantee that citizens enjoy 
private and public autonomy.368 For Habermas, the separation of powers based on the classical 
liberal paradigm is no longer appropriate in light of the current form of fundamental rights.369 
He has emphasized that private autonomy is currently endangered both by the state and by 
economic and social factors. This is because these factors affect how citizens can exercise their 
communicative and participatory rights in democracies. For Habermas, the constitutional court 
should devote particular attention to “the contents of disputed norms primarily in connection 
with the communicative presuppositions and procedural conditions of the legislative 
process.”370 For him, “such a procedural understanding of the constitution places the problem 
of legitimating constitutional review in the context of a theory of democracy” (emphasis in 
original).371 This changes the usual interpretation of judicial review as a necessarily anti-
democratic legal practice within deliberative democracies. 
 
Habermas has mentioned John Hart Ely’s theory as an appropriate description of the 
relationship between judicial review and communicative and participatory rights.372 Ely’s 
theory of judicial review grants prominence to participatory rights, given that, according to it, 
discriminatory laws violate the principle of equal treatment not only with regard to the 
principle’s content. These discriminatory laws “result from a political process whose 
democratic procedural conditions have been violated” (emphasis in original).373 Based on this 
fact, the legitimacy of judicial review relates to “the conditions for the democratic genesis of 
laws.”374 For Habermas, Ely has given “the liberal mistrust of tyrannical majorities a surprising 
procedural twist.”375 Although Habermas has criticized Ely’s theory in some important 
respects, he has approved of this procedural twist. Based on the value of judicial review for 
guaranteeing the conditions of deliberative democracy, Habermas has concluded that “we 
cannot carry on the discussion of the supreme court's activism or self-restraint in abstracto.”376 
Given that judicial review is essential for the promotion of citizen’s private and public 
autonomy (and also of their relationship) within the system of rights, “a rather bold 
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constitutional adjudication is even required in cases that concern the implementation of 
democratic procedure and the deliberative form of political opinion- and will-formation.”377 
 
In a nutshell, Habermas and Ely help us understand that the practice of judicial review 
is not necessarily anti-democratic and can, under certain conditions, even strengthen the 
legitimacy of the exercise of public authority, which also includes the enactment of legislation. 
Yet, it is worth addressing a final question relating to the legitimacy and effectiveness of strong 
judicial review: How can judicial review strengthen the legitimacy of exercising public 
authority without necessarily becoming a form of tyrannical judicial power? The answer to this 
question brings us to the concept of the right to justification, which this study will explain in 
the following. 
 
The right to justification with regard to the exercise of public authority has been widely 
discussed in different fields of research. References to the right to justification have become an 
essential feature of liberal political theories since John Rawls described his concept of public 
reason and how legitimate law depends on it.378 For Rawls, reasonable pluralism is a basic 
feature of constitutional democracies, which makes all comprehensive doctrines of truth in 
politics impossible. Rawl’s political liberalism has replaced these comprehensive doctrines 
with an idea of the “politically reasonable.”379 For Rawls, fundamental political questions 
should be decided by reasons that might be shared by all citizens as free and equals.380 This is 
directly related to the legitimacy of the practice of judicial review.381 
 
Rawls affirmed that “in a constitutional regime with judicial review, public reason is the 
reason of its supreme court.”382 This court, as the higher judicial interpreter, should adopt public 
reason when engaging in legal interpretation, given that public reason gives legitimacy to law. 
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Rawls imagined the situation in which a strong majority of the electorate seizes power and starts 
to pass legislation against public reason. This majority can eventually “make the constitution 
conform to its political will” and, in this way, greatly affect higher law.383 In this context, Rawls 
argued that the supreme court should be able to “by applying public reason (…) prevent that 
law from being eroded by the legislation of transient majorities, or more likely, by organized 
and well-situated narrow interests skilled at getting their way.”384 He refused to describe the 
practice of judicial review of legislation in this situation as anti-democratic. For him, the 
practice of judicial review was “indeed antimajoritarian with respect to ordinary law” but it was 
not antimajoritarian with respect to higher law because it accords “with the constitution itself 
and with its amendments and politically mandated interpretations.”385  
 
Based on Rawl’s theory we can conclude that public reason is a legitimizing factor for 
the review of legislation within domestic law.386 However, how does the idea of public reason 
relate to human rights adjudication? How could human rights give rise to this contestation of 
the exercise of state authority by means of public reason? Rainer Forst has addressed this issue 
and explained that behind all claims based on human rights lies the basic right to justification.387 
He has opposed the description of a relative character of human rights as a category of rights 
typical of Western societies. For him, the demand for human rights is something that comes 
from within the structure of society and that simultaneously aims to influence this structure. He 
has explained that the claim for human rights emerges “where people ask for reasons, for 
justification for certain rules, laws and institutions, and where the reasons they receive are no 
longer sufficient.”388 In line with this, Forst has described the right to justification as “an 
unconditional claim to be respected as someone to whom one owes reasons for actions, rules 
or structures to which he or she is subject.”389 The right to justification relates to human rights 
as “the most general and basic claim of every human being, which others, people or states, 
cannot reject.”390  
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Forst gives us a sound philosophical grounding for how the right to justification lies 
behind every claim based on human rights. In fact, within legal scholarship, the right to 
justification has been generally related to the justification of state interference with individual’s 
basic or fundamental rights. There is a wide range of approaches to this issue, but the most 
discussed one comes from the relationship between judicial review and the proportionality test 
as applied to fundamental rights adjudication.391 Robert Alexy’s well-known formula of 
fundamental rights adjudication is arguably the most prominent approach to proportionality-
based judicial review.392 Alexy has argued that “the enactment of constitutional rights binding 
all states powers entails the opening of the legal system to the system of morality, an opening 
which is both rational and can be mastered by rational means” (my emphasis).393 This relation 
between adjudication and rationality is what drove him to look for a rational means of 
constitutional rights adjudication.394 His approach is intimately related to principles theory, 
according to which he distinguished between rules as definitive commands and principles as 
norms that demand that something be realized “to the greatest extent possible given the legal 
and factual possibilities.”395 Based on this optimization requirement, Alexy has argued that 
balancing is the most appropriate form of interpretation and enforcement of conflictual 
principles.396 This leads to a necessary relation between principles and the proportionality test. 
For him, judicial authorities should review whether, in case of conflictual principles, state 
interference with individual rights is in accordance with the subprinciples of suitability, 
necessity, and proportionality in the narrower sense. Only if state interference succeeds at these 
three different stages can it be considered valid. 
 
Alexy’s approach has, in turn, given rise to several theories of constitutional rights 
interpretation. Despite the prominence of his approach, it is worth noting that his is not the only 
paradigm of constitutional rights adjudication adopted by courts around the globe with regard 
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to proportionality test.397 As Jacob Bomhoff has noted, the practice of balancing means 
different things in different contexts.398 However, the successful migration of the 
proportionality test and of balancing to several constitutional orders around the globe does tell 
us much about the structure of human rights and its relationship with the right to justification.399 
This has been well explained by Mattias Kumm’s approach to the right to justification and its 
consequences for human rights judicial enforcement.400 Kumm has argued that “judges do not 
interpret rights: they assess justifications.”401 For him, the success of the proportionality test as 
a form of legal interpretation did not happen by chance: “The apparent ‘casual override’ that is 
reflected in the ubiquitous use of the proportionality test is connected to the distinctive 
contestatory and justificatory function of rights.”402 He has described the proportionality test as 
“a test of public reason,” which is intimately related to the structure of human rights as rights 
that “simultaneously stand above politics and are at the heart of the political process.”403  
 
State authorities are challenged to concretize and specify human rights, and Kumm has 
explained that “once we specify a right in the context of an ordinary political process, we no 
longer call the concrete specification a human right, but a statutory or administrative right.”404  
However, he has argued that human rights could not serve “as the normative foundation of the 
whole of law and politics”405 and that “any version of the total rights conception must be 
wrong.”406 For him, any theory of human rights should acknowledge the existence of reasonable 
disagreement among free and equals and the possible variances in human rights adjudication. 
This insight adds an important feature to the relationship between human rights and the right to 
justification: the reasonable exercise of judicial authority. In this context, the task of courts that 
adjudicate human rights is to police the boundaries of the reasonable, “focusing merely on 
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reasonableness understood as the justifiability in terms of public reason.”407 They should not 
“tell public authorities what justice and good policy requires” but review measures that “impose 
burdens on some people, when no sufficiently plausible defense in terms of public reason can 
be mounted for doing so.”408   
 
Kumm’s approach tries to address the inflationary use of human rights parlance within 
legal interpretation, which has had consequences for the structure and exercise of public 
authority in general. The right to justification gives courts legitimacy to practice judicial review 
but it has been difficult to adopt a reasonable practice of judicial authority within constitutional 
democracies due to the inflationary use of human rights. This is due to the fact that human 
rights inflation can lead to an exponential increase in the authority of courts. Given that courts 
should be responsible for assessing whether state interference with individual rights is justified, 
they have become exponentially empowered.409 The paradox of this omnipresence of judicial 
authority is that this omnipresence is not reasonable under the concept of liberal deliberative 
democracy, according to which courts are only one of the many important instances of 
lawmaking and legal interpretation. The total conception of human rights leads, paradoxically, 
to a very illiberal conception of government marked by judicial activism. 
 
Herein lies the importance of the relation between the right to justification and the 
legitimacy and effectiveness of judicial review of legislation as practiced within constitutional 
and human rights adjudication. The various approaches to judicial review and the right to 
justification addressed above can illustrate how the practice of judicial review can be legitimate 
within deliberative democracies. Judicial review can even become a valuable means of 
strengthening the legitimacy of the exercise of public authority. However, trying to limit the 
inflationary use of human rights language and, in turn, the exercise of judicial authority are also 
important features of the jurisprudential approaches to judicial review above described. Legal 
authorities should be aware of the risks of the inflationary use of judicial review based on 
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extensive human rights interpretation. This applies especially to the practice of international 
judicial review of domestic law by the IACtHR. Despite the fact that this court may legitimately 
function as a control body of domestic laws adopted by Latin American national authorities, 
the IACtHR should also be aware that the inflationary interpretation of human rights represents 
an unreasonable exercise of international judicial authority. Due to this fact, the IACtHR should 
seek to limit the practice of strong inter-American judicial review in a reasonable way. As this 
study will later explain, this reasonable way involves the evolution of inter-American human 
rights legislation and jurisprudence. 
 
In conclusion, several theories help us understand that the practice of judicial review 
does not necessarily go against the concept of deliberative democracy and can even strengthen 
the legitimacy of exercising public authority. Theories that link judicial review to participatory 
rights illustrate this character of judicial review in our contemporary systems of fundamental 
rights especially well. However, any theory of judicial review should also address the necessity 
for a reasonable exercise of judicial authority. It is a fact that constitutional courts have 
experienced an increase in their authority due to fundamental rights adjudication. Trying to find 
reasonable terms for the exercise of judicial authority is a fundamental feature of concepts like 
the right to justification. Until now this chapter has addressed the traditional debate on domestic 
judicial review among prominent legal philosophers and pointed to how this debate can also be 
useful for discussing the new inter-institutional interaction brought about by the practice of 
inter-American judicial review. The following section will briefly address a new variant of the 
practice of judicial review that has emerged in some Latin American countries. This new variant 
involves the review of legislation on socioeconomic rights at the domestic level. The concept 
of transformative constitutionalism has been an important element in this particular evolution 
of domestic constitutional jurisprudence, which later also had consequences for the inter-
American level of human rights enforcement.  
 
 
4.4. Latin American transformative constitutionalism and socioeconomic rights 
judicial enforcement 
 
Transformative constitutionalism came to prominence within constitutional scholarship 
based on the South African experience with this concept. In South Africa, the concept was 
introduced by Karl Klare, who claimed that the legal authorities had the potential to promote 
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social change and argued for a new methodology of legal interpretation under the rule of the 
new South African constitution.410 Klare compared the transformative methodology under the 
new constitutional order to the formalist methodology previously applied under the apartheid 
regime in South Africa. After his seminal work was published, the concept arguably became 
the most widely discussed topic for South African constitutionalism. As it happens to every 
prominent concept, transformative constitutionalism has undergone some shifts and even South 
African scholars have admitted that there is “no single stable understanding of transformative 
constitutionalism.”411 Despite this difficulty of finding a core concept, transformative 
constitutionalism has reached other constitutional orders such as Brazil, India and Colombia.412  
 
In Latin America, the concept has recently received more attention from legal authorities 
and scholars for several reasons. The first obvious reason is that Latin American countries share 
similar conditions of poverty, inequality and institutional failure with other societies within the 
Global South.413 Latin American authorities and scholars have looked at transformative 
constitutionalism as an interesting normative concept for addressing the challenging conditions 
the region presents for constitutional rights enforcement. Poverty, inequality and corruption 
have reached acute levels in Latin America and transformative constitutionalism has gained a 
reputation as a theory of legal interpretation that does not ignore this difficult context for rights 
enforcement but tries to integrate it within jurisprudential approaches. 
 
There are some other general features responsible for this successful migration of 
transformative constitutionalism. Since its emergence, transformative constitutionalism in 
Latin America has been opposed to mere transitional constitutionalism, which is the type of 
constitutional theory concerned mostly with civil and political rights enforcement. These rights 
were usually disrespected by authoritarian regimes in Latin America’s recent past and therefore 
they deserved greater attention on the part of legal authorities and scholars after the 
democratization of Latin American countries. By contrast, transformative constitutionalism 
focuses primarily on socioeconomic development. In fact, as Oscar Viena Vilheira and Dimitri 
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Dimoulis have noted, the word “development” appears several times in the text of Latin 
American transformative constitutions: 35 times in the 1988 Brazilian constitution, 52 times in 
the 1991 Colombian constitution, 73 times in the 2008 Ecuadorian constitution, and 75 times 
in the 2009 Bolivian constitution.414 In a nutshell, transformative constitutionalism aims at 
achieving a form of substantial equality under the rule of law, which makes the concept very 
appealing for constitutional lawmaking and interpretation in Latin American countries.415  
 
It is true that, as Roberto Gargarella has pointed out, transformative constitutionalism 
has long been present in Latin American constitutional orders.416 For him, transformative 
constitutionalism does not represent a new form of Latin American constitutionalism, because 
it is possible to trace the emergence of social constitutionalism back to the 20th century. Based 
on the history of Latin American constitutionalism, he has affirmed that “what is presented as 
new turns out to be, in general, all too ‘old’.”417 The beginning of social constitutionalism was 
related to the adoption of new constitutional texts that included a broad catalog of 
socioeconomic rights like the 1917 Mexican constitution, the 1937 Brazilian constitution, the 
1938 Bolivian constitution and the 1945 Ecuadorian constitution.418 However, the novelty of 
Latin American transformative constitutionalism does not lie in legislation, but in the legal 
enforcement of transformative constitutions. A prominent feature of Latin American 
transformative constitutionalism has been the strong judicial enforcement of socioeconomic 
rights.419 This judicial enforcement can include strong remedies in case of violation of these 
rights and also the practice of strong judicial review of legislation on socioeconomic rights, 
given that the minimum and maximum amounts of public spending on education, health and 
social security, for instance, are usually defined by domestic laws. It is the judicial enforcement 
of socioeconomic rights that is truly innovative in the contemporary form of Latin American 
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constitutionalism.420 The evolution of domestic constitutional adjudication in countries like 
Brazil and Colombia can illustrate this new prominent feature of transformative 
constitutionalism in the region.  
 
The Colombian constitutional court has established two main principles relating to the 
enjoyment of socioeconomic rights: the vital minimum principle and the principle of the social 
state of law.421 This constitutional court established the vital minimum principle based on 
general principles (e.g., human dignity) and on the socioeconomic rights catalog of the 
Colombian constitution, which encompasses, for instance, the right to health, social security, 
and housing. Based on the vital minimum principle, individuals “have a right to receive at least 
the minimum level of subsistence and  enjoyment of rights needed to survive under dignified 
conditions.”422 This principle settled the controversy about the judicially enforceable character 
of socioeconomic rights and turned these rights into individually enforceable ones by means of 
the tutela writs within Colombian law.423 The principle of a social state of law, in turn, was 
established based on Art. 1 of the Colombian constitution and also became highly influential in 
constitutional adjudication.424 According to it, the state should provide the conditions necessary 
for a dignified life to the people and resolve the inequalities in society. This principle led to the 
increasing authority of the Colombian constitutional court to demand that the state undertake 
actions to alleviate poverty and ensure substantive equality in the country.  
 
The Brazilian STF has also consistently enforced socioeconomic rights. According to 
Oscar Vilhena, the Brazilian constitutional court “issued significant decisions obliging states 
and municipalities to spend constitutional mandatory financial resources on education and also 
obliging these entities to provide places for children in the school system.”425 According to 
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Octavio Motta Ferraz, ordinary courts have followed the example of the constitutional court 
and adopted an individually enforceable rights approach with regard to the right to health.426 
Based on this approach, ordinary courts have not deferred to the other political branches and 
have rarely hesitated to issue strong remedies in case of violation of socioeconomic rights, 
regardless of questions like the scarcity of fiscal resources.427   
 
Transformative constitutionalism has led to a high level of litigation of socioeconomic 
rights in some Latin American countries. The impact of the established individually enforceable 
character of the right to health in Colombia and in Brazil illustrates this particularly well. 
According to Cepeda Espinosa and Landau, the number of tutela writs requesting protection 
for the right to health quadrupled in Colombia between 1999 and 2005.428 In Brazil, Octavio 
Motta Ferraz has described that, since the mid-1990s, “an avalanche of lawsuits followed” 
lower courts’ decisions to establish the state’s obligation to provide HIV-infected individuals 
with the newest (and often the most expensive) drugs available.429 Later, the lawsuits went 
beyond HIV-AIDS treatment and started to encompass claimants’ rights to all sorts of surgical 
procedures and drugs for various diseases like diabetes, Alzheimer’s and multiple sclerosis.430 
 
The strong judicial enforcement of socioeconomic rights has become the most salient 
feature of contemporary Latin American transformative constitutionalism. It first emerged 
within domestic constitutional adjudication in some Latin American countries and, later, it has 
also emerged within inter-American human rights jurisprudence. The direct enforcement of 
socioeconomic rights as a specific form of strong inter-American judicial review can be seen 
as the most recent element in the evolution of Latin American transformative constitutionalism. 
Nowadays transformative constitutionalism can involve the empowerment of domestic courts 
and, most importantly for this study, the empowerment of the IACtHR.  Until now this chapter 
has addressed how the empowerment of national courts by means of practicing judicial review 
can be democratically legitimized. This chapter has explained how judicial review can even 
strengthen the democratic pedigree of domestic democracies. This means that judicial review 
can be reconciled with the concept of deliberative constitutionalism, which means that several 
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institutions are responsible for amending and interpreting the constitution. Moreover, this 
chapter has addressed the problem of judicial activism by introducing concepts like the right to 
justification, according to which courts should reasonably review the validity of democratically 
enacted legislation when adjudicating human and constitutional rights. 
 
However, there is still a remaining point regarding the value of international judicial 
review for deliberative constitutionalism: why should international courts be allowed to have a 
say within the inter-institutional interaction brought about by judicial review? What could 
justify adding an international human rights court to this traditionally domestic constitutional 
practice? This question relates to explanations of why constitutional lawyers have turned to 
global constitutionalism, which this study will outline in the following.   
 
 
4.5.  The turn to global constitutionalism: the argument for multilevel inter-
institutional interaction 
  
As Chapter III has explained, conventionality control and the direct enforcement of 
socioeconomic rights have become essential elements in inter-American human rights 
jurisprudence. This study has already underscored their relevance as elements in the top-down 
evolution of Latin American cosmopolitan constitutionalism. Conventionality control was the 
first specific form of strong inter-American judicial review. The IACtHR has expressly 
addressed domestic courts as prominent actors of conventionality control, which renders 
domestic judicial authorities an extension of the IACtHR judges. The direct judicial 
enforcement of socioeconomic rights represents another specific form of strong inter-American 
judicial review. The judicially enforceable character of socioeconomic rights at the inter-
American level has been consistent with domestic constitutional practices that advocate that 
courts should have a say within the debate on the enforcement of these rights. As the previous 
section has explained, Latin American transformative constitutionalism has been a decisive 
element in this evolution of inter-American human rights jurisprudence. Transformative 
constitutionalism has led courts to take a more active role in the enforcement of socioeconomic 
rights, which can involve the practice of domestic judicial review of legislation pertaining to 
these rights. In line with this, the IACtHR seems to be following the same path as domestic 
courts with regard to socioeconomic rights adjudication.  
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 Conventionality control and the direct enforcement of socioeconomic rights are 
jurisprudential elements that have strengthened the authority of the IACtHR. What could justify 
this stronger authority? What could justify this IACtHR’s new place among domestic 
institutions, which were previously the only ones responsible for interpreting and amending 
domestic constitutional norms? In a general sense, the justification of this IACtHR’s stronger 
authority relates to what Alon Harel has described as the rise of global constitutionalism within 
constitutional law scholarship.431 He has noted that some constitutional lawyers have taken a 
recent turn to global constitutionalism due to their skepticism about the capacity of domestic 
norms to guarantee the legitimate exercise of public authority in the global order. This skeptical 
attitude towards domestic constitutionalism has led some scholars to propose strengthening the 
role of international institutions. For Harel, this turn is justified based on the fact that individuals 
are freer in a global order because their rights are drafted and protected at the domestic and 
international levels. This is not related to the fact that their rights may be better protected by 
international institutions than by national institutions: it relates to the fact that “the protection 
of their rights does not depend upon the good will of national courts or other institutions in 
charge of interpreting the constitution.”432 For Harel, the turn to global constitutionalism 
“protects us from the prospects of living at the mercy of the drafters and interpreters of national 
constitutions.”433  
 
Harel’s argument has a particular relevance for Latin American countries, whose 
governments have time and again failed to protect their citizens’ rights. The persistence of 
authoritarian governments in the region is evidence of this constant failure particularly with 
regard to the protection of civil and political rights. Nevertheless, Harel’s justification for the 
turn to global constitutionalism refers to an obligation that can be generally applied to all states 
within the international community. Ronald Dworkin referred to this obligation when he 
proposed a new philosophy for international law.434  
 
Dworkin argued that there is a general obligation for each state, as a coercive system, 
to improve its political legitimacy. From this general obligation at the domestic level, there 
follows an obligation to improve the overall international system: “If a state can help to 
facilitate an international order in a way that would improve the legitimacy of its own coercive 
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government, then it has a political obligation to do what it can in that direction.”435 He  claimed 
that, in light of the contemporary form of the international order, there is “a duty to pursue 
available means to mitigate the failures and risks of the sovereign-state system.”436 He defined 
this duty as “the most general structural principle and interpretative background of international 
law.”437 
 
Following Harel and Dworkin, the turn to global constitutionalism is necessary in order 
to strengthen the type of international order that can reciprocally improve the political 
legitimacy of states as coercive governments. National constitutions do no suffice to provide 
this type of system and this fact justifies the necessity of protecting rights also at the 
international level. One of the consequences of the turn to global constitutionalism is the 
obligation imposed on domestic authorities to interact with their international peers in order to 
fulfill the general structural principle. This involves the national authorities’ obligation to 
interact with institutions like international human rights courts. The mandatory character of this 
interaction should not be taken for granted given that this interaction may strengthen the 
authority of international human rights courts over time. Although the turn to global 
constitutionalism establishes the necessity of multilevel inter-institutional interaction, it does 
not say much about how this inter-institutional interaction should work. How should 
interpreters from different levels deal with possible conflicts between national and international 
norms without assuming opposing positions, i.e., the positions of cosmopolitan internationalists 
against insular constitutionalists?  
 
Eyal Benvenisti and Alon Harel have, for instance, proposed a discordant parity model 
of interaction between national and international institutions.438 For them, there has to be “an 
equal status of international law and constitutional law,” given that “international norms and 
constitutional norms compete with each other and seek to dominate the normative sphere.”439 
The most useful feature of their discordant parity model is to acknowledge the duty of “each 
norm-interpreter, be it either an international law or a domestic law interpreter” to “give due 
account to the interpretation disputed by its national and international peers.”440 Their 
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440Ibid, 57.  
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discordant parity model, however, should arguably be rethought in some points that involve the 
justification of strong international judicial review as a legitimate form of inter-institutional 
interaction between inter-American and national authorities within the IAS.  
 
From a normative perspective, it is insufficient to state that “conflict is a permanent and 
desirable feature of the legal world.”441 Lawyers should seek the right answers, or at least the 
best possible answers, to these types of conflicts. In fact, this is exactly why courts exist. The 
purpose of international and national courts is not merely to observe the legal world without 
deciding which interpretation is the right answer. In this context, conflict has to be resolved. 
Given this structural feature of the legal world, multilevel inter-institutional interaction has to 
be able to settle some interpretative conflicts between national and international norms. Over 
time, this inter-institutional interaction is able to strengthen the normative dimension of rights, 
which will have an impact on decisions in future cases. The adoption of more specific 
legislation within national and international law, and the existence of jurisprudential precedents 
on both levels are among the main legal sources that can serve as meaningful reference points 
for settling interpretative disputes.  
 
 In line with this, the outcomes of the multilevel inter-institutional interaction have the 
potential to legitimize the practice of strong international judicial review. This represents an 
empowerment of international courts, but the source of this stronger authority is also based on 
bottom-up elements in this multilevel relationship. This has been the case of Latin American 
cosmopolitan constitutionalism, whose evolution has led to the strengthening of the authority 
of the IACtHR over Latin American constitutional norms interpreters. The defining question is 
in which cases the practice of strong inter-American judicial review is the most appropriate 
solution for the normative dispute between national and international norms. This question 
involves the evolution of domestic and inter-American legislation and jurisprudence pertaining 
to the dispute in a specific case. For some disputes, it is arguably unreasonable that national 
authorities should be allowed to disregard settled interpretations that are based on pieces of 
legislation and legal precedents. Due to the fact that national and inter-American authorities 
have settled some interpretative issues, the practice of strong inter-American judicial review is, 
in principle, legitimate. However, national authorities should be allowed to have more 
discretion when interpreting some human and constitutional rights due to the lack of a stronger 
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normative dimension of the interpretative disputes involved in a case. This justifies the practice 
of weak international judicial review, according to which a greater margin of appreciation is 
given to national norm-interpreters. 
  
 The last paragraph has begun to outline the mixed-form theory of inter-American 
judicial review, which is the main concern of Chapter VI in this study. This theory addresses 
the problem with the fact that the IACtHR has heavily relied on the practice of strong 
international judicial review throughout inter-American human rights jurisprudence. There are 
several critiques of this jurisprudential approach, which the following section of this chapter 
will address.  
 
 
4.6.  Contesting international juristocracy in Latin America 
 
There are different interpretations of the emergence of strong international judicial 
review within inter-American human rights jurisprudence. According to the defenders of the 
Ius Constitutionale Commune in Latin America (hereinafter ICCAL), the practice of strong 
inter-American judicial review could contribute to a better interaction between domestic and 
international authorities within the IAS, which, in turn, would lead to the emergence of an ius 
constitutionale commune (a type of constitutional common law) in Latin America. In line with 
this, the defenders of ICCAL have underscored the positive aspects of the practice of 
conventionality control and the direct enforcement of socioeconomic rights. This enthusiasm 
about the practice of strong inter-American judicial review can be observed in the opinions of 
some prominent scholars and authorities. One of these enthusiastic lawyers is Judge Eduardo 
Ferrer Mac-Gregor. In one of his most relevant individual concurring opinions, the Mexican 
judge claimed that the IAS was moving towards a more integrated system of human rights 
protection by means of the practice of conventionality control. For him, conventionality control 
“is progressively forging an authentic Ius Constitutionale Commune Americanum as a 
substantial and indissoluble nucleus to preserve and guarantee the human dignity of the 
inhabitants of the region.”442 He argued that conventionality control is one of the most 
important elements in the construction of ius constitutionale commune in Latin America, given 
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that it promotes more judicial dialogue within the IAS.443 Some defenders of the ICCAL have 
also claimed that law and legal scholarship can make a difference in the social agenda in Latin 
America.444 In line with this, transformative constitutionalism scholarship represents the efforts 
on the part of many actors that “want to change the political and social realities of Latin America 
in order to create the general framework for the full realization of democracy, the rule of law, 
and human rights.”445 Despite these arguments in favor of the practice of the specific forms of 
strong inter-American judicial review, there are opposing views on their practice within the 
IAS.  
 
Jorge Contesse, for instance, has offered a very critical interpretation of the legitimacy 
and effectiveness of conventionality control.446 He has argued that conventionality control lacks 
solid legal reasoning based on the ACHR and also reveals a problematic understanding of the 
IACtHR as a constitutional tribunal for Latin America.447 Moreover, conventionality control 
could prompt a backlash within the IAS. For Contesse, conventionality control has been an 
illegitimate intervention of the IACtHR into Latin American countries’ domestic affairs.448 For 
him, the establishment of conventionality control reveals a reluctance of the IACtHR to adopt 
mechanisms of subsidiarity in human rights adjudication. He has also questioned the necessity 
and effectiveness of conventionality control. Based on the enforcement of the IACtHR 
decisions on amnesty laws by national authorities of Argentina and Peru, for instance, the 
IACtHR did not need to introduce conventionality control into inter-American human rights 
jurisprudence. He has also claimed that conventionality control could harm the authority of the 
IACtHR in the region. Ultimately, this top-down approach could be more susceptible to a 
backlash against the international court’s legal authority.449  
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incorporation is fundamentally a municipal, not an international, decision.” Ibid, 1178. 
 449“The court needs the states’ support; it can derive its legitimacy and exercise its authority only in so far as the 
states, as primary members of the international community, confer this legitimacy and authority upon it. 
Particularly in the context of more established democracies, the Inter-Ameircan Court faces significant, direct 
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The inter-American practice of strong judicial review was also described as one example 
of the IACtHR “antidemocratic and illiberal tendencies.”450 For Ezequiel Malarino, the 
IACtHR has practiced international judicial activism, which has gradually converted the ACHR 
into a different text than the one the IAS member states initially signed. For him, the IACtHR 
“rewrote the ACHR in terms of both individual rights and issues concerning the court’s 
competence and functions”451 by, for instance, creating new rules, broadening its competence 
to rule on facts that occurred prior to the ratification of the ACHR and extending the effects of 
decisions well beyond the immediate cases. For Malarino, the practice of conventionality 
control just confirms these antidemocratic and illiberal features of inter-American human rights 
jurisprudence.452 
 
Roberto Gargarella was also critical of the IACtHR decision to strike down the 
Uruguayan amnesty law in Gelman v. Uruguay. As this study will later explain, this decision 
involved the most salient democratic challenge to the judicial review of an amnesty statute, 
because the Uruguayan amnesty law had been twice confirmed in referenda. For Gargarella, 
after these demonstrations of popular support, the Uruguayan amnesty law was “democratically 
legitimate to a significant degree” (emphasis on the original).453 He has referred to a “problem 
of democratic pedigree” of the IACtHR decision, namely the fact that the IACtHR “in fewer 
than ten lines, and basically without offering any argument (...) overruled a decision of the 
Uruguayan Congress that had been ratified by the popular opinion of more than 50% of the 
population expressed through clean and direct means.”454 
 
There have also been critical references to the practice of transformative 
constitutionalism at the domestic and inter-American levels. Regarding the domestic level, 
Helena Alviar Garcia has claimed that socioeconomic rights litigation has not evolved as some 
                                                 
challenges from member states. The best response to these challenges is not combative, top-down stance, but 
collaboration founded in bottom-up legitimacy.” Ibid, 1184. 
450Ezequiel Malarino, “Judicial Activism, Punitivism and Supranationalisation: Illiberal and Antidemocratic 
Tendencies of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights,” International Criminal Law Review 12, (2012), 665-
695. 
451Ibid, 666. 
452He has claimed that conventionality control practice illustrates the “punitivism” within inter-American human 
rights jurisprudence. Ibid, 681. 
453“The legitimacy of the norm in question is notably reinforced, however, by having been twice approved by 
popular votes, which are understood to be the highest expression of popular sovereignty.” Roberto Gargarella, 
“The Constitutionalization of International Law in Latin America. Democracy and Rights in Gelman v. Uruguay,” 
American Journal of International Law Unbound 109, (2015), 115-119, 117. 
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have hoped it would and, most importantly, that it did not “succeed in challenging the basic 
market structures and economic conditions that lead to the unequal distribution of social 
resources”455 in most Latin American countries. Referring to the high level of socioeconomic 
rights litigation in Colombia, she has argued that “at the end of the day the overall power 
structure and unequal distribution remain largely intact.”456 Michaela Hailbronner has called 
attention to the risks and challenges inherent in rights adjudication according to transformative 
constitutionalism in countries of the Global South.457 For her, “if ‘doing good’ is courts’ main 
source of authority,” there are the risks of arbitrariness, inconsistency and unfairness of judicial 
decisions. Moreover, “founding judicial authority on good outcomes”458 leads to direct 
competition between judges and politicians, whereby courts may involve themselves in risky 
political gambles in order to gain or maintain their judicial authority over public policies.  
 
Regarding the inter-American level of human rights enforcement, the critical references 
to transformative constitutionalism were also present in the debate among IACtHR judges about 
the judicially enforceable character of socioeconomic rights. In his concurring opinion to Lagos 
del Campo, Judge Humberto Sierra Porto mentioned the strong position of some judges within 
the IACtHR regarding the direct enforcement of Art. 26 ACHR.459 He then demonstrated his 
opposition to transformative constitutionalism, claiming that “no transformative law can be 
made contrary to existing law.”460 He also claimed that decisions like Lagos del Campo 
“propose a vision, a project of integration and transformation guided solely by the organs of the 
IAS,” and that this moves the IACtHR away from its main function, “which is to administer 
justice, guaranteeing the protection of human rights under the strict observance of its 
competence.”461 
 
Based on the discussion presented above, there are different interpretations of the 
advantages and disadvantages of the practice of strong inter-American judicial review of 
domestic laws. Some scholars have argued that strong judicial review could contribute to more 
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integration through human rights law and even lead to the emergence of a Latin American ius 
constitutionale commune. This stronger integration could improve human rights enforcement 
and also be to the benefit of the other major fields of global constitutionalism in Latin America, 
i.e., democracy and the rule of law. Other scholars have claimed that the specific forms of 
judicial review are illegitimate and ineffective within inter-American human rights 
jurisprudence. Conventionality control, for instance, is said to be an illegitimate intrusion of the 
IACtHR into the constitutional powers of national authorities. The direct enforcement of 
socioeconomic rights is claimed to be an illegitimate interpretation of inter-American 
documents referring to the protection of these rights at the regional level. 
 
Due to the increasing critique of the practice of strong inter-American judicial review, 
some legal scholars have tried to offer a better approach to its legitimacy and effectiveness 
issues. One common feature of these approaches is their references to the subsidiary principle 
as it is applicable to international human rights enforcement. The principle of subsidiarity has 
been offered as a compelling argument for the IACtHR to adopt weaker forms of international 
judicial review. The concluding section of this chapter will address how legal authorities and 
scholars have referred to a higher level of subsidiarity as a compelling argument for weakening 
the practice of inter-American judicial review and how this discussion leads us to the concept 
of the national margin of appreciation within European human rights jurisprudence. 
 
 
4.7.  Interim conclusion: Strong inter-American judicial review and the principle of 
subsidiarity 
 
The subsidiary character of the IAS to national systems is established by Art. 46 ACHR. 
More specifically, Art. 46 (a) ACHR establishes that the admission of a petition by the IACHR 
depends on the fact that “the remedies under domestic law have been pursued and exhausted in 
accordance with generally recognized principles of international law.”462 (my emphasis). In line 
with this ACHR provision, the question arises of what the exhaustion of domestic remedies 
exactly means. Art. 46 ACHR has been traditionally invoked by respondent states to contest 
the admissibility of petitions and requests.463 Laurence Burgorgue-Larsen has explained that 
                                                 
462ACHR, art. 46 (a). 
463Laurence Burgorgue-Larsen, “Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies,” in The Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights. Case Law and Commentary, eds. Laurence Burgorgue-Larsen, Amaya Úbeda de Torres (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), 129-145, 132. 
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the IAS’s institutions “have interpreted the requirement of exhaustion of domestic remedies in 
a way that is flexible and favorable to the victims.”464 The IACtHR has reviewed whether the 
domestic measures were adequate and effective remedies for the human rights violations in a 
specific case.  
 
In fact, legal scholars have more than once expressly mentioned the subsidiary character 
of inter-American human rights protection as an argument for the adoption of weaker forms of 
inter-American judicial review. Paolo Carozza, for instance, has emphasized that subsidiarity 
is a structural principle of international human rights law.465 Other legal scholars have lamented 
the lack of attention to the subsidiary principle by the IACtHR. Gerald Neumann, for instance, 
has claimed that the IACtHR has insufficiently considered the consent of the IAS member states 
in its evolutive jurisprudence.466 Jorge Contesse has also claimed that the IACtHR could adopt 
a different approach towards Latin American states, which currently include a greater number 
of established democracies than in the region’s authoritarian past.467 These approaches share a 
common sense that a greater attention to the principle of subsidiarity could resolve the 
legitimacy and effectiveness issues inherent in the practice of strong inter-American judicial 
review, given that this principle could lead to the adoption of weaker forms of international 
judicial review by the IACtHR.  
 
Yet, a salient question related to these scholars’ proposals is: Has the practice of strong 
inter-American judicial review violated the principle of subsidiarity regarding international 
human rights protection? According to the most emphatic defenders of strong inter-American 
judicial review, it has not. The relation between the subsidiarity principle and conventionality 
control has been addressed, for instance, by Judge Eduardo Ferrer Mac-Gregor in his concurrent 
opinion on Cabrera Garcia and Montiel Flores v. Mexico.468 For him, conventionality control 
has not made the IACtHR into a court of appeal or a “court of 4th instance” within the IAS.469 
He argued that the subsidiary character of conventionality control relies on the primary 
                                                 
464She has added: “This is totally understandable on a continent where democracies are young and still fragile, 
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authority of the IAS member states to offer solutions for human rights violations; only after this 
exhaustion of domestic remedies may the same violations be reported to the inter-American 
institutions. 
 
The relationship between conventionality control and the subsidiarity principle has also 
been addressed by the IACtHR within at least two judgements. In Santo Domingo Massacre v. 
Colombia,470 the court emphasized the subsidiary and complementary character of inter-
American human rights jurisprudence to national legal systems. For the IACtHR, it is only 
possible to hold states accountable under the ACHR after national authorities “had the 
opportunity to declare the violation and to repair the damage caused by its own means.”471 The 
IACtHR claimed that the principle of subsidiarity (or complementarity) “crosscuts” the IAS in 
a way that the system of protection established by the ACHR does not replace the work of 
national authorities but complements it.472 Moreover, the IACtHR affirmed that the state 
represents “the main guarantor of the human rights of the individual, so that, if an act that 
violates the said rights occurs, it is the state itself that has the obligation to decide the matter at 
the domestic level (...) before having to respond before international instances.”473 The IACtHR 
further established that conventionality control is in accordance with the complementary nature 
of inter-American human rights enforcement given that it represents “a dynamic and 
complementary control of the conventional obligations of States to respect and guarantee 
human rights” within the IAS.474 The IACtHR claimed that domestic authorities are “primarily 
obligated” to practice conventionality control, while the inter-American authorities are only 
“complementarily” obligated to do so. For the court, this form of decision-making and 
protection of human rights ensure that the national and international levels can be both shaped 
and adapted to each other.475 Since Santo Domingo Massacre, the IACtHR has reiterated this 
position in other cases like Andrade Salmón v. Bolivia.476  
 
In his individual concurrent opinion on the order of monitory compliance in Gelman v. 
Uruguay,477 Judge Ferrer Mac-Gregor argued that lawyers could distinguish between primary 
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and secondary conventionality control based on the subsidiarity principle. For him, primary 
conventionality control is exercised by national authorities and, if they fail at this task, 
secondary control may be exercised by the IACHR and, ultimately, by the IACtHR. Moreover, 
he distinguished between the res judicata and the res interpretata authority of the IACtHR 
decisions. 478 He defined the erga omnes effects of inter-American jurisprudence within the IAS 
as relating to their res interpretata authority. This res interpretata authority refers to the duty 
of domestic authorities within the IAS to enforce the interpretation of inter-American human 
rights law held by the IACtHR as general elements of the regional corpus iuris. For Judge Ferrer 
Mac-Gregor, this authority is relative based on Art. 29 ACHR, which establishes that the ACHR 
provisions deserve privilege only if they are the most favorable for the individual (pro homine 
or pro persona principle). By contrast, the res judicata authority refers to the absolute inter 
partes authority of a decision laid down by the IACtHR towards an IAS member state. This res 
judicata authority is normatively binding only on the respondent state in a specific case. 
 
Despite these arguments offered by the IACtHR and by legal scholars, the violation of 
the principle of subsidiarity has become one of the most salient counter-arguments to the 
practice of strong inter-American judicial review. Due to the relevance of this argument, one 
pertinent question is whether the IACtHR could adopt a weaker form of international judicial 
review based on the subsidiary character of inter-American human rights protection. Does any 
form of weak international judicial review have the capacity to introduce a higher level of 
subsidiarity to inter-American human rights jurisprudence? The answer to this question relates 
to which concrete form weak inter-American judicial review should adopt within the IAS. Pablo 
González-Dominguez has offered one important contribution to this debate when he tried to 
reconstruct the practice of conventionality control in light of the subsidiarity principle.479  
 
González-Dominguez claimed that the existence of conventionality control is legitimate 
based on the circumstances of its emergence, i.e., Latin America’s historical struggle against 
the practice of gross human rights violations. Despite being legitimate, he argued that the 
IACtHR should change the practice of conventionality control by paying greater attention to 
the principle of subsidiarity. For him, the principle of subsidiarity can be used as a basis for 
distinguishing between conventionality control as an international obligation, namely the 
guarantee of non-repetition of human rights violations, and as a principle, which allows more 
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flexibility to national authorities to enforce inter-American human rights jurisprudence.480 He 
based this distinction on an interpretation of Art. 2 ACHR, according to which a high but not 
absolute degree of freedom should be granted to states to decide how to enforce inter-American 
human rights law within domestic law.481 
 
As an international obligation, conventionality control represents a guarantee of non-
repetition of gross human rights violations. For him, strong inter-American review is legitimate 
“when states systematically fail to comply with practices that are manifestly anti-conventional, 
and where the [IACtHR] finds that States are incapable or unwilling to modify laws and 
practices that are the causes of human rights violations.”482 In contrast, conventionality control 
could also figure as a general doctrine of compliance with inter-American human rights law. In 
this sense, González-Dominguez argued that it should be taken as a principle.483 He further 
explained that, as a principle, there are different degrees of the practice of conventionality 
control in different states. These different degrees are based on i) the competences of domestic 
authorities, ii) the constitutional hierarchy of the inter-American corpus iuris within domestic 
law and iii) the open character of international human rights law, which allows different forms 
of specification of these rights.484  
 
González-Dominguez’s approach is interesting with respect to how the IACtHR could 
weaken the practice of inter-American judicial review based on the principle of subsidiarity. 
Similar to the theory of mixed-form inter-American judicial review that this study will propose, 
his theory of conventionality control also encompasses the same idea of mixing strong judicial 
review (conventionality control as an international obligation) with a weaker form 
(conventionality control as a principle). However, the most problematic issues in his theory is 
arguably that he does not pay great attention to current challenges to human rights enforcement 
in Latin America. In light of these current challenges, the practice of strong inter-American 
judicial review could be limited to address flagrant violations of civil and political rights within 
the IAS, while weak inter-American review could be limited to cases involving socioeconomic 
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rights. Yet, before describing this theory, it is worth addressing in the following chapter the 
most prominently proposed way of adding subsidiary into inter-American human rights 
jurisprudence, i.e., the concept of the national margin of appreciation within ECtHR 
jurisprudence. As the next chapter will argue, the comparison between inter-American and 
European human rights jurisprudence can strengthen the argument for the necessity of a 
context-based theory of international judicial review in Latin America. 
  
 129 
PART III. THE LEGAL SCHOLAR IN ACTION  
 
 
V. Borrowing the European Margin of Appreciation? 
 
Some legal scholars have proposed affording national authorities a greater margin of 
appreciation as a viable approach to international human rights adjudication within the IAS. 
The concept of the national margin of appreciation is well-known within European human 
rights jurisprudence. References to the usefulness of the margin of appreciation in Latin 
America have come to prominence due to the IACtHR’s increasing authority and, especially, 
since the introduction of strong inter-American judicial review (more specifically, 
conventionality control) into inter-American jurisprudence. Due to this growing relevance, this 
chapter will now address the concept of the margin of appreciation and its arguable usefulness 
for the IACtHR. First, this chapter will mention some of these references to the usefulness of 
the margin of appreciation for inter-American human rights jurisprudence. It will then analyze 
the absence of the margin of appreciation from inter-American jurisprudence by comparing 
some IACtHR decisions with the ones made by the ECtHR in cases that involved similar facts. 
Then, the chapter will address the scholarly debate on the margin of appreciation in order to 
find patterns of its practice within extensive European case law involving this concept. Finally, 
the present chapter will explain how the concept of the national margin of appreciation can be 
reconciled with the task of developing a context-based theory of inter-American judicial review 
in Latin America. 
 
 
5.1. The margin of appreciation as an alternative form of inter-American judicial 
review? 
 
In their general and more specific features, the ECtHR practice of granting national 
authorities a wider margin of appreciation is opposed to the inter-American practice of 
conventionality control. While the margin of appreciation privilege deference to state 
authorities within the multilevel system of human rights protection, the practice of 
conventionality control emphasizes the binding character of inter-American human rights 
legislation and jurisprudence. Generally, the IACtHR has been reluctant to grant a higher level 
of scrutiny to domestic state authorities within the IAS. The first reason for this reluctance 
seems to be the historical development of the IAS, which was followed by major challenges to 
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the proper enforcement of civil rights and political liberties brought about by authoritarian 
domestic governments in the region. Related to this first reason, the IACtHR has also been 
concerned with the effectiveness of its interpretations of inter-American human rights law. It 
seems that the IACtHR does not entirely trust domestic authorities regarding human rights 
protection due to traditional skepticism and a concern with the effectiveness of its decisions, 
given the fact that the court does not have its own enforcement mechanisms.485  
 
Despite Latin America’s troubled past and its consequences for the particular 
development of inter-American human rights jurisprudence, some scholars have argued that the 
IACtHR should now embrace the concept of the margin of appreciation in its relationship with 
national authorities. Andreas Føllesdal, for instance, has claimed that the margin of appreciation 
is “also compatible with the IAS,” whereby the IACtHR must “adjudicate states with fragile 
democratic and rule of law traditions – skeptics notwithstanding” (my emphasis).486 For him, 
the margin of appreciation could ensure that the IACtHR judges become more deferential to 
the domestic level when seeking to resolve human rights violations. Dominic McGoldrick has 
also claimed that the IACtHR should afford member states a margin of appreciation based on 
the fact that many Latin American countries are now broadly democratic.487 For him, 
“democratic and political legitimacy should push the IACtHR towards respecting the decisions 
of, and the balances struck by, national legislatures, executives and courts, in the same way that 
the ECtHR does.”488 
 
Not only legal scholars have underscored the usefulness of the margin of appreciation 
for the IACtHR. Some IACtHR judges have also referred to it when seeking to resolve cases 
and even regretted the absence of domestic discretion within IACtHR case law. In some cases, 
these IACtHR judges have even contested this absence. Although this contestation has been 
more present in the literature and it has been of marginal importance in the IACtHR decisions 
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to date, it seems worth addressing how some judges referred to the national margin of 
appreciation as a possible way to remedy human rights violations within the IAS. It is worth 
focusing on references to national authorities’ discretion within cases that involved the practice 
of strong inter-American judicial review, i.e., conventionality control and the direct 
enforcement of socioeconomic rights. In view of this, at least two examples are worth 
mentioning.  
 
The first example is the individual dissenting opinion of Judge Alberto Pérez Pérez on 
Atala Riffo.489 For him, the evolving interpretation of the ACHR as a living instrument should 
be based on “the understanding that, in order to make progress (…), it is necessary to reach a 
consensus, or common ground or a convergence of standards among the States Party.”490 He 
claimed that this regional consensus existed with regard to discrimination based on sexual 
orientation in the case but argued that “the same cannot be said with respect to the evolution of 
the notion of the family and its status as the foundation or basic and natural element of 
society.”491 In that sense, the IACtHR did not need to establish a violation of Art. 17 (1) ACHR 
(“Right to family”), because this was “one of the areas in which it is most essential to allow a 
national margin of appreciation” to the state authorities (my emphasis).492  
 
The second example of an individual opinion that contested the lack of inter-American 
practice of the margin of appreciation comes from the dissenting opinion of Judge Eduardo Vio 
Grossi in Lagos del Campo.493 As this study has already mentioned, this case involved the 
practice of strong judicial review by means of the direct enforcement of the right to work (Art. 
6 PSS, Art. 26 ACHR). For Judge Vio Grossi, the majoritarian decision in Lagos del Campo 
was wrong because it ignored the fact that “within the scope of national law,” there is a realm 
of exclusive state authority “also called the margin of appreciation, which shows that not 
everything is regulated by international law.”494 He also argued that according to the ACHR, 
this realm of exclusive state authority apply to the enforcement of socioeconomic rights.  
 
Is it appropriate to advocate for the practice of the national margin of appreciation in 
order to introduce a counterweight to the practice of strong inter-American judicial review? 
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Could the margin of appreciation be used in order to weaken the international judicial activism 
of the IACtHR? This chapter will try to answer these questions about the usefulness of the 
concept of the domestic margin of appreciation first by comparing both inter-American and 
European human rights jurisprudence and second by analyzing the scholarly debate about the 
ECtHR’s jurisprudential approach to this concept. 
 
As mentioned, an overall analysis of inter-American jurisprudence shows that the 
IACtHR has not adopted the margin of appreciation as a general principle of deference to 
national authorities.495 Gonzalo Candia has guessed that the reason behind this overall rejection 
is the “desire of many activists and scholars to transform the IACtHR into the new constitutional 
court of the Americas, with absolute powers to make uniform the interpretation and application 
of the Inter-American convention throughout the continent.”496 For him, “this necessarily 
prevents any significant use of the margin of appreciation doctrine” in Latin America.497 
Despite his guess about the second intentions of some activists and scholars, it is necessary to 
undertake a more accurate analysis of the cases in which the IACtHR could have granted state 
authorities a wider margin of appreciation of the immediate human rights violations. Some 
cases might help us understand why the IACtHR has opted for strong inter-American judicial 
review and not for deference to domestic state authorities. Notwithstanding this relevance of 
comparative scholarship, scholars should be careful when comparing inter-American and 
European human rights jurisprudence. 
 
A particular case group that it is often addressed as illustrative of the overall rejection 
of the margin of appreciation by the IACtHR is amnesty case law. However, a comparison 
between both regional systems based on amnesty case law is not appropriate. The amnesty cases 
usually involved gross human rights violations, such as extrajudicial executions, enforced 
disappearances, and torture. These violations of the ACHR allow, in fact, no margin of 
appreciation for national authorities. Once it was established that the state authorities were 
responsible for cases of torture or enforced disappearance, there was no scope for discussions 
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on whether there should be any domestic margin of appreciation of the matter. Amnesty cases 
relating to gross human rights violations are, therefore, not best suited for a fair comparison 
between jurisprudence of both regional human rights courts.  
 
Three different case groups will serve for the comparison between inter-American and  
European human rights jurisprudence with regard to the practice of deference to the domestic 
level: i) cases of state interference with the right to freedom of expression based on the concept 
of public morality, ii) cases involving the right to reproductive techniques like fertilization in 
vitro and its inherent morally-charged issues like the embryo’s right to life, and, finally, iii) 
cases involving discrimination based on sexual orientation. These cases groups enable us legal 
scholars to fairly compare the Latin American with the European context with regard to 
deference to the domestic level. This comparison can be useful for legal scholars that seek 
alternatives to the practice of strong inter-American judicial review. The fair comparison 
between both regional systems can offer new horizons for the discussion of conventionality 
control and the direct enforcement of socioeconomic rights within the IAS. 
 
 
5.2.  International human rights jurisprudence and deference to national authorities 
 
5.2.1. Comparing inter-American and European human rights jurisprudence: case 
studies 
 
The following comparative analysis is certainly not exhaustive of extensive European 
case law relating to the different case groups mentioned below. Other studies have compared 
inter-American with ECtHR jurisprudence in greater detail and with regard to different issues 
like the differences in the institutional structure of the courts and the overall evolution of 
regional human rights jurisprudence.498 The following sections will mention at least one 
specific inter-American case relating to each case group and will compare it to other similar 
European cases. Even if limited to a few cases, the following comparative analysis is able to 
illustrate how the ECtHR deferred to national authorities in cases in which the IACtHR opted 
for practicing strong inter-American judicial review.  
 
                                                 
498See, for instance: Symposium: Comparing Regional Human Rights Regimes, International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 16, no. 1, (2018), 128-253. 
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i) State interference with the right to freedom of expression based on offenses to 
public morality  
 
A particular piece of regional case law that illustrates the differences regarding the forms 
of international judicial review between the ECtHR and the IACtHR involves the concept of 
public morality. While in Europe, public morality has influenced the ECtHR and prompted it 
to give state authorities a higher discretion based on the argument that they probably know 
better about the moral sensibilities of their own communities, in Latin America the IACtHR 
has constrained the action of national state authorities based on its own interpretation of similar 
offenses to public morality. The Last temptation of Christ v. Chile499 is an illustrative case of 
the non-adoption of the margin of appreciation by the IACtHR based on offenses to public 
morality. This case concerned the rights to freedom of conscience and religion (Art. 12 ACHR) 
and to freedom of thought and expression (Art. 13 ACHR) regarding a judicial prohibition of 
the exhibition of a Martin Scorsese’s film that depicted Jesus Christ in a struggle against various 
forms of temptations, such as fear, depression and lust. The film was first submitted to previous 
domestic censorship established by Art. 19 (12) of the Chilean constitution, which authorized 
it. Later, the Second Court of Santiago reviewed this administrative decision and prohibited the 
film. This decision was confirmed by the Chilean Supreme Court.500  
 
Although the IACtHR did not establish a violation of Art. 12 ACHR, it established a 
violation of Art. 13, together with Arts. 1 (1) and 2 ACHR. For the IACtHR, the existence of 
film censorship in the Chilean constitution was not in accordance with the ACHR. The court 
considered that the ban on exhibiting the film constituted prior censorship in violation of Art. 
13 ACHR, which only allowed prior censorship in cases of public entertainment in order to 
regulate film exhibition based on the protection of children and adolescents.501 For the IACtHR, 
“by maintaining cinematographic censorship in the Chilean legal system,” the state authorities 
were “failing to comply with the obligation to adapt its domestic law to the Convention in order 
                                                 
499IACtHR, (Judgement) February 5, 2001, Case of “The Last Temptation of Christ” (Olmedo-Bustos et al.) v. 
Chile. 
500The Chilean Court ruled that: “In the film, the image of Christ is deformed and diminished, to the utmost. In 
this way, the problem is posed of whether it is possible, in the name of freedom of expression, to destroy the 
sincere beliefs of a great many people. (…) No one doubts that the greatness of a nation can be measured by the 
attention it gives to the values that allowed it to exist and grow. If these are neglected [or] abused, as the image of 
Christ is deformed and abused, the nation is endangered, because the values on which it is based are disregarded.” 
See: Ibid, §78.   
501Ibid, §§70-71.  
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to make effective the rights embodied in it.”502 In line with this, the IACtHR ordered that 
domestic authorities should amend the constitution in order to eliminate this form of prior 
censorship of films.503 Due to this ordered measure, this judgement represents an example of 
strong inter-American judicial review of domestic law despite the fact that this case was decided 
even before the establishment of conventionality control within inter-American jurisprudence. 
The Chilean national congress complied with the IACtHR decision and amended the Chilean 
constitution. The national legislature established the right to freedom of artistic creation and 
eliminated censorship, which was substituted by a classification system. This classification 
system was designed to guide adults with regard to the contents of film productions and protect 
children and adolescents based on international treaties on the matter.504 
 
The Last Temptation of Christ illustrates the IACtHR reluctance to admit that national 
authorities are in a better position to decide when a particular work of art offends the religious 
sentiments prevailing in a community. It is, in fact, a diametrical opposite decision to the one 
held in Handsyde v. United Kingdom,505 whereby the ECtHR decided that national authorities 
are better able to rule over restrictions of the freedom of expression based on offenses to public 
morality. Handsyde has become the leading case for the concept of the national margin of 
appreciation in Europe.506 It involved the notion of obscenity under Art. 10 ECHR regarding a 
schoolbook that were considered obscene by national authorities.507 In this case, the state 
authorities confiscated the book alleging offenses to public morality, which justified the state 
interference with the right to freedom of expression according to the Art 10 (2) ECHR. This 
provision establishes that the exercise of the freedom of expression may be subject to 
“formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties (…) prescribed by law and (…) necessary in a 
democratic society” based on “the protection of health or morals.”508. In Handyside, the ECtHR 
held that the confiscation of the book was prescribed by domestic law and had “an aim that is 
legitimate” under Art. 10 (2) ECHR, “namely the protection of morals in a democratic 
                                                 
502Ibid, §88. 
503Ibid, 4th operative paragraph.  
504Scorsese’s film was ultimately reclassified by the new classification council and included in the category over 
18 years of age. See: IACtHR (Compliance with Judgement) November 28, 2003, §§19-20. 
505ECtHR, (Judgement) December 7, 1976, Case of Handyside v. The United Kingdom.  
506Handyside v. UK is comparable to what Almonacid v. Chile represents for the concept of conventionality control 
in Latin America. 
507The book contained “chapters on the following subjects: Education, Learning, Teachers, Pupils and The System. 
The chapter on Pupils contained a twenty-six page section concerning ‘Sex’ which included the following sub-
sections: Masturbation, Orgasm, Intercourse and petting, Contraceptives, Wet dreams, Menstruation, Child-
molesters or ‘dirty old men’, Pornography, Impotence, Homosexuality, Normal and abnormal, Find out more, 
Venereal diseases, Abortion, Legal and illegal abortion, Remember, Methods of abortion, Addresses for help and 
advice on sexual matters.” Ibid, §20.  
508ECHR, art. 10 (2). 
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society.”509 Moreover, due to the lack of a European moral consensus, national authorities 
should enjoy a margin of appreciation to evaluate if any interference with the right to freedom 
of expression is necessary due to offenses to public morality.510 
 
The ECtHR has adopted Handsyde as a reference point for the decision of several other 
cases involving similar offenses of public morality within domestic law. The same deferential 
attitude to the national authorities was adopted, for instance, regarding the state authorities’ 
confiscation of paintings that were considered obscene in Müller and Others v. Switzerland.511 
In this case, the ECtHR did not establish a violation of Art. 10 ECHR, which was alleged with 
regard to the confiscation of three paintings and the fine imposed on the applicants. The 
confiscation and fine were established because the paintings, which depicted fellatio, sodomy 
and sex with animals, had been shown in a public exhibition. The ECtHR considered the Swiss 
courts’ decision reasonable, namely that painting depicting different manners of sexual 
relations, particularly with animals, could offend the ordinary sensibility of individuals in the 
community.512 For the ECtHR, the state had a wide margin of appreciation to assess if there 
was a pressing social need to seize the paintings and fine the applicants.513 
 
In Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria,514 the ECtHR was asked to rule on the seizure of 
a satirical film involving the Christian religion by the Austrian public prosecutor, who alleged 
                                                 
509ECtHR, Handyside v. UK, § 45. 
510According to the ECtHR: “...it is not possible to find in the domestic law of the various Contracting States a 
uniform European conception of morals. The view taken by their respective laws of the requirements of morals 
varies from time to time and from place to place, especially in our era which is characterized by a rapid and far-
reaching evolution of opinions on the subject. By reason of their direct and continuous contact with the vital forces 
of their countries, State authorities are in principle in a better position than the international judge to give an 
opinion on the exact content of these requirements as well as on the ‘necessity’ of a ‘restriction’ or ‘penalty’ 
intended to meet them. (...) Consequently, Article 10 para. 2 (art. 10-2) leaves to the Contracting States a margin 
of appreciation. This margin is given both to the domestic legislator ("prescribed by law") and to the bodies, 
judicial amongst others, that are called upon to interpret and apply the laws in force.” Ibid, §48. 
511ECtHR, (Judgement) May 24, 1988, Case of Müller and Others v. Switzerland.   
512“In the instant case, it must be emphasized that - as the Swiss courts found both at the cantonal level at first 
instance and on appeal and at the federal level - the paintings in question depict in a crude manner sexual relations, 
particularly between men and animals. (…) The Court recognizes, as did the Swiss courts, that conceptions of 
sexual morality have changed in recent years. Nevertheless, having inspected the original paintings, the Court does 
not find unreasonable the view taken by the Swiss courts that those paintings, with their emphasis on sexuality in 
some of its crudest forms, were ‘liable grossly to offend the sense of sexual propriety of persons of ordinary 
sensitivity’ (see paragraph 18 above). In the circumstances, having regard to the margin of appreciation left to 
them under Article 10 §2 (art. 10-2), the Swiss courts were entitled to consider it ‘necessary’ for the protection of 
morals to impose a fine on the applicants for publishing obscene material.” Ibid, §36. 
513“[H]aving regard to their margin of appreciation, the Swiss courts were entitled to hold that confiscation of the 
paintings in issue was ‘necessary’ for the protection of morals.” Ibid, §43. 
514ECtHR, (Judgement) September 20, 1994, Case of Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria.  
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a violation of Section 188 of the Austrian Penal Code.515 The ECtHR pointed out that the 
provisions of the Austrian Penal Code were intended to prevent citizens from having their 
religious beliefs publicly insulted.516 For the ECtHR, the seizure of the film did not represent a 
violation of the right to freedom of expression due to the lack of a regional European consensus 
on the significance of religion in society, which entitled Austrian authorities a broad margin of 
appreciation in evaluating the necessity of imposing restrictions to avoid any offense of 
religious beliefs.517 In line with this, the ECtHR accepted the argument of a pressing social need 
to preserve religious peace, given that the film was to be screened in a city where Roman 
Catholicism is the majority religion. Based on that, it interpreted the seizure of the film as an 
act to ensure religious peace and prevent people from feeling attacked based on their religious 
beliefs. 518  
 
Likewise, in Wingrove v. United Kingdom,519 the ECtHR did not establish a violation 
of Art. 10 ECHR due to the refusal of the British Board of Film Classification to certify a film 
produced by the applicant. For the British authority, the film violated the criminal law of 
blasphemy and could give rise to outrage at the unacceptable treatment of the sacred subject of 
Christ by depicting his crucified body as a participant in the erotic desires of St. Teresa. Here, 
again, the ECtHR found no violation of Art. 10 ECHR based on the legality and necessity of 
the interference with the right to freedom of expression according to state authorities’ 
interpretation of the matter.520 
 
It is worth mentioning that the ECtHR has not unconditionally deferred to states 
authorities’ interpretation of the restriction to freedom of expression. Cases like Giniewski v. 
France521 and Unifaun Theatre Productions v. Malta522 demonstrate that the ECtHR might 
                                                 
515According to an informational bulletin distributed by the institute, in the film “[t]rivial imagery and absurdities 
of the Christian creed are targeted in a caricatural mode and the relationship between religious beliefs and worldly 
mechanisms of oppression is investigated." Ibid, §10. The public prosecutor established criminal proceedings 
against the institute at the request of a Roman-Catholic diocese: Ibid, §11. 
516Ibid, §48. 
517“As in the case of ‘morals’ it is not possible to discern throughout Europe a uniform conception of the 
significance of religion in society (...) For that reason it is not possible to arrive at a comprehensive definition of 
what constitutes a permissible interference with the exercise of the right to freedom of expression where such 
expression is directed against the religious feelings of others. A certain margin of appreciation is therefore to be 
left to the national authorities in assessing the existence and extent of the necessity of such interference.” Ibid, 
§50.  
518Ibid, §§51-57. 
519ECtHR, (Judgement) November 25, 1996, Case of Wingrove v. The United Kingdom.  
520A similar interpretation can be found in: ECtHR, (Judgement) July 10, 2003, Case of Murphy v. Ireland.  
521ECtHR, (Judgement) January 31, 2006, Case of Giniewski v. France. 
522ECtHR, (Judgement) May 15, 2018, Case of Unifaun Theatre Productions Limited and Others v. Malta.  
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adopt a strict review of state interference if it considers that the limitation of freedom of 
expression was not “prescribed by law”, nor had it a “legitimate aim” or was it “necessary in a 
democratic society,” according to Art. 10 (2) ECHR. However, the ECtHR has consistently 
deferred to national authorities when enforcing Art. 10 (2) ECHR. In its 2018 decision in E.S 
v. Austria,523 the ECtHR deferred to national authorities’ interference with the right to freedom 
of expression of an Austrian woman who held seminars about the Islam. In these seminars she, 
among other things, accused Muhammed of pedophilia and was criminally prosecuted and 
convicted according to Austrian law. In a unanimous judgement, the ECtHR found no violation 
of Art. 10 ECHR, because “the absence of a uniform European conception of the requirements 
of the protection of the rights of others in relation to attacks on their religious convictions 
broadens the Contracting States’ margin of appreciation when regulating freedom of expression 
in relation to matters liable to offend personal convictions within the sphere of morals or 
religion.”524 For the ECtHR, “the domestic authorities had a wide margin of appreciation in the 
instant case, as they were in a better position to evaluate which statements were likely to disturb 
the religious peace in their country.”525 
 
In conclusion, the IACtHR has not relied on the argument that national authorities are 
in a better position to know about the moral sensibilities of their communities as a reason to 
grant these authorities a wide margin of appreciation on the interference with the right to 
freedom of expression. The IACtHR has also not adopted the interpretation that, due to a lack 
of regional consensus regarding issues of public morality, state authorities should enjoy a wide 
margin of appreciation of these issues. In contrast to its European counterpart, the IACtHR did 
not establish, for instance, any violation of the right to freedom of religion in a case pertaining 
to a film that could offend the majority’s religion in a particular community. Otherwise, in The 
Last Temptation of Christ, the IACtHR established that state interference with the exhibition of 
a film characterized a violation of Art. 13 ACHR and ordered the amendment of national law 
in order to bring it into accordance with inter-American human rights law. 
 
                                                 
523ECtHR, (Judgement) October 25, 2018, Case of E.S v. Austria. 
524“In examining whether restrictions on the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention can be considered 
‘necessary in a democratic society’, the Court has frequently held that the Contracting States enjoy a certain margin 
of appreciation (…) The absence of a uniform European conception of the requirements of the protection of the 
rights of others in relation to attacks on their religious convictions broadens the Contracting States’ margin of 
appreciation when regulating freedom of expression in relation to matters liable to offend personal convictions 
within the sphere of morals or religion (…) Not only do they enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in that respect, 
they also have the positive obligation under Article 9 of the Convention of ensuring the peaceful co-existence of 
all religions and those not belonging to a religious group by ensuring mutual tolerance.” Ibid, §44. 
525Ibid, §50.  
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ii) The right to medically-assisted reproductive techniques  
 
The IACtHR non-deferential attitude can also be illustrated by cases involving other 
types of controversial moral issues. One of these cases was Artavia Murillo v. Costa Rica,526 
which involved the discussion of the prohibition of in vitro fertilization by national authorities 
based on the purported right to life of the embryo. The position that the IACtHR held in this 
case differs from decisions of the ECtHR in similar cases. The most salient difference is that 
the IACtHR has not drawn on the notion of a regional consensus in order to establish violations 
of the ACHR, even if an issue is controversial and could be interpreted in a different way by 
national authorities. In Artavia Murillo, the IACtHR ruled on the alleged human rights 
violations resulting from the presumed general prohibition of the practice of in vitro 
fertilization, which had been in effect in Costa Rica since 2000 due to a decision of the 
Constitutional Chamber of the Costa Rican Supreme Court of Justice. The IACHR argued that 
this absolute prohibition constituted arbitrary interference in the right to private life and the 
applicant’s right to family. Moreover, it alleged that the prohibition violated the right to equality 
due to its disproportionate impact on women, inasmuch as the state had denied them access to 
a treatment that would have enabled them to overcome a genetic disadvantage with regard to 
the possibility of having biological children.527  
 
The IACtHR acknowledged that Costa Rica was the only country that expressly 
prohibited in vitro fertilization in the region.528 This reproductive technique was declared 
unconstitutional due to the judicial review of an executive decree that had previously regulated 
the reproductive technique in the country. One of the core arguments in favor of the 
unconstitutionality was that the technique would violate the right to life of the fertilized 
embryos. The Costa Rican court referred in its decision to the absolute protection of the 
embryo’s right to life. For this national court, the right to life “must be protected for those who 
are born and also for the unborn” and, based on the current stage of the reproductive technique, 
in vitro fertilization “entails the conscious damage to human life.”529 In order to overrule this 
domestic decision, the IACtHR established its own position to the question of the embryo’s 
                                                 
526IACtHR, (Judgement) November 28, 2012, Case of Artavia Murillo et al. (In Vitro Fertilization) v. Costa Rica. 
527Ibid, §2.  
528“Based on the expert opinions presented by the parties at the public hearing, it was established that Costa Rica 
is the only country in the region that prohibits and, therefore, does not practice IVF [in vitro fertilization].” Ibid, 
§254. 
529Ibid, §256.  
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right to life.530 Based on this interpretation, the IACtHR found no violation of the ACHR in the 
case and ordered that domestic authorities had to undertake the appropriate measures to ensure 
that “the prohibition of the practice of in vitro fertilization is annulled as rapidly as possible so 
that those who wish to use this assisted reproduction technique may do so without encountering 
any impediments.”531 Hence, the IACtHR ordered that in vitro fertilization should be made 
available within Costa Rica’s infertility treatments and programs, with the supervision of 
qualified professionals and institutions.532 
 
This decision reveals the authoritative approach of the IACtHR, which disregarded 
national authorities’ position that embryos could have a right to life. Beyond the Costa Rican 
court’s decision, the IACtHR also acknowledged the draft of a bill that was meant to regulate 
in vitro fertilization in the country. According to this draft, national authorities were supposed 
to protect human rights from the moment of fertilization, and in vitro fertilization could only 
be practiced if all eggs fertilized during treatment cycle were transferred to the woman who 
produced them. The bill, which was not approved, intended to absolutely prohibit the reduction 
or destruction of embryos based on the protection of their right to life.533 Furthermore, the 
IACtHR did not make any reference to the lack of an established regional consensus with regard 
to the issue of the embryo’s right to life. Several points in Artavia Murillo differ from decisions 
held by the ECtHR in similar cases. The following cases are illustrative of how the ECtHR has 
relied on concept of the national margin of appreciation to solve similar issues addressed within 
Artavia Murillo.  
 
In Vo v. France,534 the applicant alleged that her therapeutic abortion, which was caused 
by the chirurgical rupture of her amniotic sack, should be considered manslaughter based on 
her unborn child’s right to life (Art. 2 ECHR).535 The ECtHR considered that, due to a lack of 
                                                 
530“The Court has used different methods of interpretation that have led to similar results according to which the 
embryo cannot be understood to be a person for the purposes of Article 4 (1) of the American Convention. In 
addition, after analyzing the available scientific data, the Court has concluded that ‘conception’ in the sense of 
Article 4 (1) occurs at the moment when the embryo becomes implanted in the uterus, which explains why, before 
this event, Article 4 of the Convention would not be applicable. Moreover, it can be concluded from the words ‘in 
general’ that the protection of the right to life under this provision is not absolute, but rather gradual and 
incremental according to its development, since it is not an absolute and unconditional obligation, but entails the 
understanding that exceptions to the general rule are admissible.” Ibid, §264. 
531Ibid, §336. 
532Ibid, §334-338.   
533Ibid, §84. 
534ECtHR, (Judgement) July 8, 2004, Case of Vo v. France. 
535This was the result of an unfortunate misunderstanding. Another patient with a similar family name was at the 
same time at the hospital and was due to have a contraceptive coil removed. The doctor consulted her medical file 
and, noting that she could not understand and speak French very well, pierced the amniotic sac of the applicant 
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European consensus on the question of the right to life of the fetus, Art. 2 ECHR could not be 
applied to the case based on the existence of domestic legislation and state authorities’ 
interpretation that went contrary to the applicant’s claim.536 The court further considered that it 
was “neither desirable, nor even possible as matters stand, to answer in the abstract the question 
whether the unborn child is a person” in terms of Art. 2 ECHR.537 Based on that, the ECtHR 
found no violation of this ECHR provision.538 
 
In Evans v. United Kingdom,539 the ECtHR was asked to rule on the applicant’s claim 
of a violation of Arts. 2, 8 and 14 ECHR due to the fact that domestic law permitted her former 
partner to withdraw his consent to the storage and use by her of embryos created jointly by 
them. According to the applicant, the provisions of domestic law that required the embryos to 
be destroyed violated the right to life under the ECHR and her right to have a child genetically 
related to her. In this case, again, in two specific points the ECtHR decision differed from the 
IACtHR judgement in Artavia Murillo. First, the ECtHR established that the specification of 
when the right to life began came within the state’s margin of appreciation of this matter, which, 
in the case, led to the decision that the embryos did not have a right to life.540 Second, the 
ECtHR dismissed the alleged violations of Arts. 8 and 14 ECHR given the lack of a European 
consensus on the matter.541 
 
In S.H and others v. Austria,542 the ECtHR ruled on the Austrian general prohibition of 
the use of sperm for in vitro fertilization and ova donation, which was contested by two Austrian 
couples wishing to conceive a child through this assisted reproductive technique.543 The ECtHR 
acknowledged that, although there was a clear trend across Europe in favor of in vitro 
                                                 
without realizing that this was a case of mistaken identity. This procedure eventually caused the termination of the 
applicant’s pregnancy. Ibid, §§9-12. Based on these facts, “[t|he applicant complained of the authorities’ refusal 
to classify the taking of her unborn child’s life as unintentional homicide. She argued that the absence of criminal 
legislation to prevent and punish such an act breached Article 2 of the Convention.” Ibid, §46. 
536Ibid, §§80-85; “the issue of when the right to life begins comes within the margin of appreciation which the 
Court generally considers that States should enjoy in this sphere.” Ibid, §82. “At European level, the Court 
observes that there is no consensus on the nature and status of the embryo and/or foetus.” Ibid, §84. 
537Ibid, §85. 
538Ibid, §95. 
539ECtHR, (Judgement) April 10, 2007, Case of Evans v. the United Kingdom. 
540“[I]n the absence of any European consensus on the scientific and legal definition of the beginning of life, the 
issue of when the right to life begins comes within the margin of appreciation which the Court generally considers 
that States should enjoy in this sphere. Under English law, as was made clear by the domestic courts in the present 
applicant’s case, an embryo does not have independent rights or interests and cannot claim – or have claimed on 
its behalf – a right to life under Article 2. There had not, accordingly, been a violation of that provision.” Ibid, §54. 
541Ibid, §§92, 96. 
542ECtHR, (Judgement) November 3, 2011, Case of S.H. and Others v. Austria.  
543The applicants alleged that this prohibition within domestic law violated Art. 8 ECHR (Right to Private and 
Family Life). Ibid, §49. 
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fertilization, the emerging European consensus was still developing and was not based on 
settled legal principles.544 The ECtHR also recognized that Austrian legislators seriously 
discussed the consequences of allowing sperm and ova donation. For the ECtHR, the national 
legislature carefully approached a controversial issue that raises complex ethical questions. 
Moreover, the alleged violation of Art. 8 ECHR was dismissed based on the fact that Austrian 
authorities did not prohibit individuals from going abroad when seeking infertility treatments 
that were unavailable in the country.545  
 
Just to mention a last case, in Parrillo v. Italy,546 the ECtHR ruled on the alleged 
violations of the ECHR due to the ban under Italian law of the applicant’s donation of her own 
in vitro fertilized embryos for scientific research. The ECtHR ruled that the right to donate 
embryos to scientific research was not “one of the core rights attracting the protection of Art. 8 
ECHR,”547 and that, consequently, the state should be afforded a wide margin of appreciation 
of this matter.548 Moreover, Italian authorities should be granted a wide margin of appreciation 
due to the lack of a European consensus on the matter.549 The court further pointed out that the 
drafting process of the Italian statute involved an intense discussion of the matter and that the 
national legislature had taken into account the state’s interest in protecting both the embryo’s 
and the individual’s right to self-determination.550 In line with this, the ECtHR concluded that 
the ban was in accordance with the ECHR, dismissing the alleged violation of Art. 8. ECHR.551 
 
                                                 
544“The Court would conclude that there is now a clear trend in the legislation of the Contracting States towards 
allowing gamete donation for the purpose of in vitro fertilization, which reflects an emerging European consensus. 
That emerging consensus is not, however, based on settled and long-standing principles established in the law of 
the member States but rather reflects a stage of development within a particularly dynamic field of law and does 
not decisively narrow the margin of appreciation of the State.” Ibid, §96. 
545“The fact that the Austrian legislature, when enacting the Artificial Procreation Act which enshrined the decision 
not to allow the donation of sperm or ova for in vitro fertilization, did not at the same time prohibit sperm donation 
for in vivo fertilization – a technique which had been tolerated for a considerable period beforehand and had 
become accepted by society – is a matter that is of significance in the balancing of the respective interests and 
cannot be considered solely in the context of the efficient policing of the prohibitions. It shows rather the careful 
and cautious approach adopted by the Austrian legislature in seeking to reconcile social realities with its approach 
of principle in this field. In this connection, the Court also observes that there is no prohibition under Austrian law 
on going abroad to seek treatment of infertility that uses artificial procreation techniques not allowed in Austria 
and that in the event of a successful treatment the Civil Code contains clear rules on paternity and maternity that 
respect the wishes of the parents.” Ibid, §114. 




550“The Court therefore observes that, during the drafting process of the Law in question the legislature had already 
taken account of the different interests at stake, particularly the State’s interest in protecting the embryo and that 
of the persons concerned in exercising their right to individual self-determination in the form of donating their 
embryos to research.” Ibid, §188. 
551Ibid, §198. 
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In conclusion, the IACtHR has not relied on regional consensus in order to establish 
violations of the ACHR, even if a specific case involved controversial issues like the question 
of the embryo’s right to life. The IACtHR has not shown the same level of consideration of 
national authorities’ position on morally-controversial matters as the ECtHR has done. The 
IACtHR opted to enforce its own position and has expected that national authorities comply 
with its interpretations based on their obligation to abide by inter-American human rights 
jurisprudence according to the ACHR. If the IACtHR acknowledges any controversial issue 
that lacks consensus among inter-American states, it will likely take a proactive attitude and fill 
it with its own interpretations, which are based on the evolutive character of inter-American 
human rights jurisprudence.  
 
 
iii) Discrimination based on gender and sexual orientation 
 
Another interesting piece of case law that enables a comparison between both regional 
courts’ jurisprudence is related to discrimination based on sexual orientation. Generally, the 
IACtHR and the ECtHR have established violations of their correspondent human rights 
conventions based on this type of discrimination. The difference lies in the fact that the ECtHR 
has allowed national authorities a higher margin of manouevre in some cases due to the lack of 
a European consensus on specific issues within European case law. In the opposite direction, 
the IACtHR established a violation of the ACHR in the first case involving this type of 
discrimination. Most importantly, the IACtHR related the enforcement of inter-American 
human rights law against discrimination based on sexual orientation to the practice of 
conventionality control, which gives rise to the practice of strong inter-American judicial 
review. 
 
In Atala Riffo v. Chile,552 the IACtHR ruled on Chile’s international responsibility for 
discriminatory treatment and arbitrary interference in the private and family life of Ms. Atala 
Riffo who, due to her sexual orientation, lost custody of her three daughters. Ms. Atala married 
her husband, but years later they decided to end their marriage, after which she started to share 
the same house with her same-sex partner, 3 daughters and her eldest son. The children’s father 
filled a custody suit, which argued, among other things, that Ms. Atala was putting the physical 
and emotional development of the girls at risk and that she was not able to take care of them 
                                                 
552IACtHR, (Judgement) February 24, 2012, Case of Atala Riffo and Daughters v. Chile.  
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based on her “new sexual lifestyle.”553 A juvenile court granted provisional custody of the girls 
to the father. This decision was later confirmed by the Chilean Supreme Court, which granted 
permanent custody to the father. According to the Chilean Supreme Court, Ms. Atala put her 
own interests before those of her daughters when she decided to live with a same-sex partner, 
which also caused confusion on the part of the girls about her mother’s sexuality; the confusion 
was also due to the absence of a male figure at home, which could harm the children’s 
development. This judgement also established that the girls were in a situation of risk due to 
their vulnerable position in a unique family environment, which significantly differed from that 
of their school companions and acquaintances in the neighborhood; this fact could expose the 
children to ostracism and discrimination, affecting their personal development.554 
 
Atala Riffo was the first case in which the IACtHR established sexual orientation and 
gender identity as categories protected by the ACHR.555 In its decision, the IACtHR contested 
the argument offered by the respondent state of the lack of a regional consensus on 
discrimination based on sexual orientation. When addressing this argument, the IACtHR 
affirmed the evolutive character of inter-American jurisprudence regarding the rights of 
discriminated minorities. For the IACtHR, “the alleged lack of consensus in some countries 
regarding full respect for the rights of sexual minorities cannot be considered a valid argument 
to deny or restrict their human rights or to perpetuate and reproduce the historical and structural 
discrimination that these minorities have suffered.”556 Based on that, the IACtHR established 
that the Chilean courts failed to comply with the requirement of a “strict scrutiny test” and that 
“speculation, assumptions, stereotypes or generalized considerations regarding parent’s 
personal characteristics or cultural preferences regarding family’s traditional concepts are not 
admissible.”557 
 
The IACtHR acknowledged that it may be true that “certain societies can be intolerant 
based on race, gender, nationality or sexual orientation,” but states cannot use this fact as a 
“justification to perpetuate discriminatory treatments.”558 The court emphasized that regional 
human rights jurisprudence must have a transformative purpose and promote structural changes 
                                                 
553Moreover, in the custody lawsuit, he argued that treating same-sex partners as normal could distort the meaning 
of a human couple, man and woman, and therefore, it could alter the “natural meaning of the family.” See: Ibid, 
§31. 
554Ibid, §§56,57.  
555Ibid, §91. 
556Ibid, §92.  
557Ibid, §109. 
558Ibid, §119.  
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that are able to dismantle stereotypes and practices that perpetuate discrimination against LGBT 
people.559 Moreover, the IACtHR considered that the children’s best interest cannot be used to 
justify discrimination against parents based on their sexuality.560 In line with this, the IACtHR 
ruled that sexuality is an essential component of a person’s identity and that it is not reasonable 
to require that someone puts his or her life and family project on hold because of it.561  
  
After Atalla Riffo, the IACtHR established violations of the ACHR due to 
discrimination based on sexual orientation in 2 other cases.562 In Duque v. Colombia,563 the 
IACtHR found that Colombia had violated the ACHR for not providing equal access to public 
benefits to a gay man after the death of his partner. His right to a pension was refused within 
national law due to the fact that domestic laws had not recognized same-sex couples as eligible 
for this benefit in the past. However, when the IACtHR issued its decision, domestic laws on 
this matter had already been amended; these domestic laws guaranteed the right to the disputed 
benefit. Based on this fact, the IACtHR did not find any violation of Art. 2 ACHR.564 In Flor 
Fleire v. Ecuador,565 the IACtHR established the notion of “discrimination by perception” 
when ruling on the case of a heterosexual man, who had been the victim of discrimination on 
the grounds of perceived homosexuality. Due to this incorrect perception, he had been 
dismissed by the Ecuadorian armed forces. The IACtHR established that “discrimination may 
be based on actual or perceived sexual orientation.”566 For the IACtHR, discrimination by 
perception “has the effect or purpose of preventing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or 
exercise of the human rights and fundamental freedoms of the person who is the subject of such 
discrimination, irrespective of whether or not that person identifies himself or herself with a 
particular category.”567 Given this fact, discrimination by perception may constitute a violation 
of ACHR provisions like Art. 24 ACHR (“Right to Equal Protection before the Law”). 
 
Within inter-American case law on discrimination based on sexual orientation, it is also 
worth mentioning the Advisory Opinion on Gender Identity, Equality and Non-Discrimination 
                                                 
559Based on that, the IACtHR established the duty of national authorities to strongly enforce the regional decision 
through the practice of conventionality control. See: Ibid, §282. 
560Ibid, §§109-110. 
561Ibid, §§138-139.  
562See: Jorge Contesse, “Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity in Inter-American Human Rights Law,” North 
Carolina Journal of International Law 44, (2019), 353-385. 
563IACtHR, (Judgement) February 26, 2016, Case of Duque v. Colombia. 
564Ibid, §139. 




of Same-Sex Couples (AO OC-24/17) requested by Costa Rica.568 In this advisory opinion, the 
IACtHR established that, despite the fact that no explicit definition of discrimination exists in 
the ACHR, sexual orientation, gender identity and gender expression are categories protected 
by Art. 1 (1) ACHR. According to the court, the words any other social condition from Art. 1 
(1) ACHR leave “the categories open to the incorporation of other grounds for discriminations 
that were not explicitly indicated” in the text of ACHR.569 Furthermore, the IACtHR 
emphasized its interpretation that a lack of regional consensus cannot be considered as a valid 
argument in order to deny or restrict human rights or to reproduce and perpetuate historical and 
structural discrimination that certain groups and persons have suffered.570 Based on that, the 
IACtHR established that the ACHR protects the change of name and the rectification of public 
records and identity documents in order to conform them to a person’s gender identity.571 
Moreover, it established that family ties that may derive from a relationship between persons 
of the same sex deserve protection and that some institutions, like marriage, should be extended 
to same-sex couples.572 
 
European case law on discrimination based on sexual orientation is very extensive and 
involved many different issues that range from the past prohibition under criminal law of 
homosexual relations between adults until more contemporary matters like same-sex partners’ 
right to parenthood and transsexuals’ right to legal recognition of gender reassignment.573 It is 
necessary to consider the different political contexts and the different time of the decisions 
when trying to establish any comparison between Latin America and Europe on the matters 
related to discrimination based on sexual orientation. As Frans Viljoen has pointed out, the 
Council of Europe has taken a leading role in countering this type of discrimination in 
Europe.574 This has also influenced the ECtHR, which has “established itself as the most 
                                                 
568IACtHR, (Advisory Opinion) November 24, 2017, Gender Identity, and Equality, and Non-Discrimination with 
Regard to Same-Sex Couples. State Obligations in Relation to Change of Name, Gender Identity, and Rights 
Deriving from a Relationship Between Same-Sex Couples (Interpretation and Scope of Articles 1 (1), 3, 7, 11 (2), 
13. 17, 18, and 24, in Relation to Article 1, of the American Convention on Human Rights, “AO OC-24/17.”   
569Ibid, §70. 
570Ibid, §§83, 219. 
571Ibid, §§85-116.  
572Ibid, §§199, 218. 
573On this historical evolution, see: Paul Johnson, Homosexuality and the European Court of Human Rights 
(Abingdon et al: Routledge, 2013); Frédéric Edel, Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights Relating to 
Discrimination on Grounds of Sexual Orientation or Gender Identity, (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 2015); 
Damian Gonzalez-Salzberg, Sexuality and Transsexuality under the European Convention on Human Rights. A 
Queer Reading of Human Rights Law, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2019).  
574Frans Viljoen, “Minority Sexual Orientation as a Challenge to the Harmonised Interpretation of International 
Human Rights Law,” in Towards Convergence in International Human Rights Law. Approaches of Regional and 
International Systems, eds. Carla M. Buckley, Alice Donald, Philip Leach, (Leiden, Boston: Brill Nijhoff, 2017), 
156-192.  
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progressive body adjudicating such cases.”575 For Viljoen, the IACtHR was able to follow 
ECtHR’s jurisprudence “because the political context within which it functions has, by the time 
it delivered its first judgement, to a great extent aligned itself with the situation prevailing in 
Europe.”576 This general convergence between the IACtHR and the ECtHR is illustrated by the 
references that the IACtHR has made to European decisions. In Atala Riffo, the IACtHR 
mentioned, for instance, the ECtHR’s decision in Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v. Portugal,577 
whereby the ECtHR established that to withdraw a father’s shared custody based on his sexual 
orientation constituted a violation of his right to have a family life (Art. 8 ECHR).578 This was 
the first case in which the ECtHR included sexual orientation as one of the possible reasons for 
discrimination, which is prohibited according to Art. 14 ECHR.579  
 
This general convergence between the IACtHR and ECtHR must not hinder the analysis 
of the evolution of European jurisprudence on matters related to discrimination based on sexual 
orientation. This analysis is revealing of the ECtHR’s practice of the margin of appreciation 
and it clarifies under which circumstance the ECtHR defers to national authorities’ positions. 
At least two important case groups are worth mentioning: i) case law of single homosexuals’ 
right to adoption and ii) case law related to transsexuals’ rights to legal recognition of gender 
reassignment. The evolution of European human rights jurisprudence in these different case 
groups shows how flexible the practice of the margin of appreciation has been within the 
European context. Initially the ECtHR granted states a wide margin of appreciation of these 
matters, but later it decided to restrict that margin based on the evolution of human rights law 
in Europe.  
 
There was a turning point within European jurisprudence concerning the LGBT 
people’s right to individual adoption. Regarding this issue, the ECtHR ruled in Fretté v. 
France580 that it was in accordance with the ECHR the fact that French authorities restricted 
adoption to single heterosexuals and excluded single homosexuals. For the ECtHR, states 
                                                 
575Ibid,188. 
576Ibid.  
577ECtHR, (Judgement) December 21, 1999, Case of Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v. Portugal.  
578Ibid, §36. 
579“The Court is accordingly forced to conclude that there was a difference of treatment between the applicant and 
M.’s mother which was based on the applicant’s sexual orientation, a concept which is undoubtedly covered by 
Article 14 of the Convention. The Court reiterates in that connection that the list set out in that provision is 
illustrative and not exhaustive, as is shown by the words ‘any ground such as’.” Ibid, §28. 
580ECtHR, (Judgement) February 26, 2002, Case of Fretté v. France.  
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retained a broad margin of appreciation of this matter.581 Later in 2008, the ECtHR decided to 
restrict this margin of appreciation in the judgment of E.B. v. France,582 according to which the 
different treatment was discriminatory and that single homosexuals should have the same right 
to adoption as single heterosexuals within French law.583 This decision now constitutes the 
current standard of European human rights jurisprudence on this matter. 
 
It is interesting to mention that the ECtHR still relies on the concept of the margin of 
appreciation when deciding cases related to LGBT adoption. The issue of second-parent 
adoption by same-sex couples is illustrative of this fact. In Gas and Dubois v. France,584 the 
ECtHR addressed the French prohibition on second-parent adoption by same-sex couples. In 
this case, two women in a civil partnership had a child through assisted reproduction but only 
the biological mother was recognized as a parent. The ECtHR found no violation of Arts. 8 and 
14 ECHR due to the fact that the applicants were not married, which led to the impossibility of 
shared parenthood according to French law.585 As Gonzalez-Salzberg has noted, for the ECtHR, 
“the fact that different-sex couples would be able to share parental responsibility by getting 
married, a possibility that was prohibited to the applicants, had no relevance” (my emphasis).586  
In fact, the ECtHR has held that there is no obligation on state authorities to grant same-sex 
couples’ access to marriage.587 Later, in X and others v. Austria,588 the ECtHR addressed again 
                                                 
581“It is indisputable that there is no common ground on the question. Although most of the Contracting States do 
not expressly prohibit homosexuals from adopting where single persons may adopt, it is not possible to find in the 
legal and social orders of the Contracting States uniform principles on these social issues on which opinions within 
a democratic society may reasonably differ widely. The Court considers it quite natural that the national authorities, 
whose duty it is in a democratic society also to consider, within the limits of their jurisdiction, the interests of 
society as a whole, should enjoy a wide margin of appreciation when they are asked to make rulings on such 
matters. (…) Since the delicate issues raised in the case, therefore, touch on areas where there is little common 
ground amongst the member States of the Council of Europe and, generally speaking, the law appears to be in a 
transitional stage, a wide margin of appreciation must be left to the authorities of each State.” Ibid, §41. 
582ECtHR, (Judgement) January 22, 2008, Case of E.B. v. France.  
583“The present case does not concern adoption by a couple or by the same-sex partner of a biological parent, but 
solely adoption by a single person. Whilst Article 8 of the Convention is silent as to this question, the Court notes 
that French legislation expressly grants single persons the right to apply for authorisation to adopt and establishes 
a procedure to that end. Accordingly, the Court considers that the facts of this case undoubtedly fall within the 
ambit of Article 8 of the Convention. Consequently, the State, which has gone beyond its obligations under Article 
8 in creating such a right – a possibility open to it under Article 53 of the Convention – cannot, in the application 
of that right, take discriminatory measures within the meaning of Article 14”. Ibid, §49. The ECtHR ruled that 
“French law allows single persons to adopt a child (see paragraph 49 above), thereby opening up the possibility of 
adoption by a single homosexual, which is not disputed. Against the background of the domestic legal provisions, 
it considers that the reasons put forward by the Government cannot be regarded as particularly convincing and 
weighty such as to justify refusing to grant the applicant authorisation.” Ibid, §94. 
584ECtHR, (Judgement) March 15, 2012, Case of Gas and Dubois v. France.  
585“[F]or the purposes of second-parent adoption, the applicants’ legal situation cannot be said to be comparable 
to that of a married couple.” Ibid, §68.  
586Damian A. Gonzalez-Salzberg, Sexuality and Transsexuality under the European Convention on Human Rights. 
A Queer Reading of Human Rights Law, (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2019), 151.  
587ECtHR, (Judgement) June 24, 2010, Case of Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, §§49-64. 
588ECtHR (Judgement) February 19, 2013, Case of X and Others v. Austria. 
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the issue of LGBT second-parenthood. In this case, the ECtHR ruled that “differences based on 
sexual orientation require particularly serious reasons by way of justification or, as is sometimes 
said, particularly convincing and weighty reasons.”589 The court acknowledged that Austrian 
law allows second-parent adoption for both married and unmarried heterosexual couples.590 
Due to this fact, the ECtHR held that the prohibition of same-sex couples’ second-parent 
adoption was discriminatory.591 
 
There was another turning point within the case law related to transsexuals’ right to 
legal recognition of gender reassignment. In Rees v. United Kingdom,592 the ECtHR decided 
that there was no positive obligation on the national government to alter the existent system for 
birth registration to establish any form of legal recognition of gender reassignment. For the 
ECtHR, this question fell within the state’s margin of appreciation of the matter.593 Only 16 
years later, the ECtHR reviewed this interpretation within Christine Goodwin v. The United 
Kingdom,594 and established that the “unsatisfactory situation in which post‑operative 
transsexuals live in an intermediate zone as not quite one gender or the other is no longer 
sustainable.”595 Based on that, the ECtHR established that “the respondent Government can no 
longer claim that the matter falls within their margin of appreciation.”596 Consequently, the 
ECtHR established a positive obligation based on Arts. 8 and 12 ECHR, according to which 
some form of legal recognition to gender reassignment had to be established.597 
                                                 
589Ibid, §99. 
590“[T]he Court finds that there was a difference in treatment between the applicants and an unmarried different-
sex couple in which one partner sought to adopt the other partner’s child. That difference was inseparably linked 
to the fact that the first and third applicants formed a same-sex couple, and was thus based on their sexual 
orientation.” Ibid, §130. 
591Ibid, §153. The ECtHR considered that “the Austrian legislation appears to lack coherence. Adoption by one 
person, including one homosexual, is possible. If he or she has a registered partner, the latter has to consent (…) 
The legislature therefore accepts that a child may grow up in a family based on a same-sex couple, thus accepting 
that this is not detrimental to the child. Nevertheless, Austrian law insists that a child should not have two mothers 
or two fathers.” Ibid, §144. 
592ECtHR, (Judgement) October 17, 1986, Case of Rees v. The United Kingdom.  
593“Several States have, through legislation or by means of legal interpretation or by administrative practice, given 
transsexuals the option of changing their personal status to fit their newly-gained identity. They have, however, 
made this option subject to conditions of varying strictness and retained a number of express reservations (for 
example, as to previously incurred obligations). In other States, such an option does not - or does not yet - exist. 
It would therefore be true to say that there is at present little common ground between the Contracting States in 
this area and that, generally speaking, the law appears to be in a transitional stage. Accordingly, this is an area in 
which the Contracting Parties enjoy a wide margin of appreciation.” Ibid, §37. 
594ECtHR, (Judgement) July 11, 2002, Case of Christine Goodwin v. The United Kingdom.  
595Ibid, §90. 
596Ibid, §93. 
597“The Court has found that the situation, as it has evolved, no longer falls within the United Kingdom's margin 
of appreciation. It will be for the United Kingdom Government in due course to implement such measures as it 
considers appropriate to fulfil its obligations to secure the applicant's, and other transsexuals', right to respect for 
private life and right to marry in compliance with this judgment.” Ibid, §120. 
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In conclusion, despite the general convergence between the IACtHR and the ECtHR on 
cases relating to discrimination based on sexual orientation, European human rights 
jurisprudence still differs on issues like the weight granted to regional consensus on the 
protection against this type of discrimination. Even considering the different political contexts 
and the different times in which the decisions were made, the ECtHR has traditionally shown a 
higher level of reliance on the existence or on the lack of regional consensus, while the IACtHR 
has strongly enforced its own interpretations of regional human rights law, filling the gaps of 
regional jurisprudence whenever it found it appropriate. Previous case law was also illustrative 
of how the ECtHR practice of the margin of appreciation has followed the evolution of human 
rights enforcement in Europe. This has enabled turning points within European human rights 
jurisprudence. Some issues that were treated with light scrutiny by the ECtHR before, now no 
longer lead to the ECtHR’s deferential attitude to national authorities’ interpretation of them. 
The following part will now describe how legal scholars have tried to find patterns throughout 
the ECtHR jurisprudence on the margin of appreciation, which can be useful to analyze its 
potential value for international human rights adjudication in Latin America.  
 
 
5.2.2. Observing the patterns of ECtHR jurisprudence on the margin of appreciation 
 
The margin of appreciation is a concept of judicial deference to state authorities’ policies 
and interpretations with regard to human rights enforcement. More specifically, it represents a 
form of judicial self-restraint developed by the ECtHR on certain issues related to the protection 
of human rights under the ECHR. Handsyde v. United Kingdom598 is the landmark case that 
illustrates this ECtHR’s deferential attitude to state authorities. It is true that the ECtHR also 
emphasized in this case that Article 10 ECHR “does not give the Contracting States an 
unlimited power of appreciation” and that “the domestic margin of appreciation thus goes hand 
in hand with a European supervision.”599 However, the margin of appreciation represents the 
most prominent specific form of weak international judicial review adopted by an international 
human rights adjudicative body. The concept has achieved a high level of acceptance in Europe, 
which can be illustrated by the adoption of Protocol 15 to the ECHR. This protocol, which has 
not yet come into force, includes references to the concept of the margin of appreciation within 
                                                 
598ECtHR, (Judgement) December 7, 1976, Case of Handsyde v. The United Kingdom.  
599Ibid, §49.  
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the preamble of the ECHR.600 As is also clear in this chapter, this European concept differs 
from specific forms of strong international judicial review developed by the IACtHR, i.e., 
conventionality control and the direct enforcement of socioeconomic rights.   
 
Regarding European human rights jurisprudence, there are several reasons for and 
against this deferential attitude on the part of the ECtHR. It is worth mentioning the arguments 
raised within the discussion of the legitimacy and effectiveness of the margin of appreciation. 
Regarding the reasons for its practice,601 some scholars have argued that the principle of 
subsidiarity is the first reason to support the practice of the margin of appreciation within 
ECtHR jurisprudence.602 Another reason in favor of the margin of appreciation is that domestic 
authorities are in a better position to remedy human rights violations, given that they have a 
better knowledge of the human rights violations in a specific case.603 The third legitimating 
reason for the practice of the margin of appreciation involves the reasonable disagreement about 
rights, which could justify the adoption of different interpretations of human rights law by 
domestic courts. Due to this reasonable pluralism within the European system, the ECtHR 
should defer to the national authorities’ decisions.604 The final reason refers to restraining the 
ECtHR’s judicial activism,605 which is also related to the reasons for deferring to domestic 
democratic self-governance.606  
 
In contrast, some legal scholars have claimed that the practice of the margin of 
appreciation is illegitimate and ineffective with regard to the protection of human rights in 
Europe. For George Letsas, the concept as practiced by the ECtHR goes against the universal 
character of human rights and against a principled way of treating Europeans as free and equal 
individuals.607 He has argued that, time and again, the margin of appreciation has represented 
                                                 
600According to Article 1 of the Protocol 15, the new text of the final part of the preamble of the European 
convention will read: “Affirming that the High Contracting Parties, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, 
have the primary responsibility to secure the rights and freedoms defined in this Convention and the Protocols 
thereto, and that in doing so they enjoy a margin of appreciation, subject to the supervisory jurisdiction of the 
European Court of Human Rights established by this Convention.” Protocol 15 ECHR, art. 1.   
601Andreas Føllesdal has recently summarized the reasons for and against the practice of the margin of appreciation 
in Europe. See: Andreas Føllesdal, “Appreciating the Margin of Appreciation,” in Human Rights: Moral or 
Political?, ed. Adam Etinson, (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), 269-294.  
602Ibid, 275. 
603Regarding this issue, the ECtHR established in Handsyde v. UK that, due to epistemic factors, national 
authorities are in a better position to address the limitations of the human rights established by the ECHR based 
on offenses to public morality. 
604Føllesdal, “Appreciating the Margin of Appreciation,”, 277. 
605Ibid, 279. 
606Ibid, 280. 
607“The use of the doctrine is altogether unjustified,” George Letsas, A Theory of Interpretation of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 81. 
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the enforcement of “moralistic preferences of majorities.”608 For him, the ECtHR has taken “the 
moralistic preferences of the majority as being synonymous with public morals.”609 This would 
make the margin of appreciation illegitimate. Moreover, deference to the national level could 
harm the regional system’s goal of promoting the protection of human rights. Similar to Letsas, 
other scholars have questioned whether deference based on the lack of a regional consensus 
could also lead to vagueness and legal uncertainty for human rights enforcement in Europe.610  
 
Although it is beyond the scope of this study to describe the historical evolution of this 
concept within the European human rights enforcement context, it is worth addressing patterns 
in the practice of the margin of appreciation that have emerged throughout ECtHR case law. 
These patterns of jurisprudence have been described by some studies of the margin of 
appreciation. One particularly interesting point for the present study is the difference between 
a wide and a strict margin of appreciation, and their dynamic enforcement throughout European 
human rights jurisprudence. It is particularly interesting to observe how issues that initially 
enjoyed a wide margin of appreciation are now dealt with strict scrutiny by the ECtHR. This 
fact could be observed in the previous section of this chapter, especially with regard to case law 
involving discrimination based on gender and sexual orientation. Some scholarly works 
discussed below clarify how this flexibility of the margin of appreciation is related to the 
evolution of human rights enforcement in Europe. The difference between a wide and a strict 
margin of appreciation has been addressed in different ways by legal scholars.  
 
Howard C. Yourow has noted that “national discretion analysis has varying uses in the 
interpretation of different groups of Convention articles”611 and that there has been “an 
elasticity in the application of the margin of appreciation” by the ECtHR.612 For him, the margin 
of appreciation has been a “very flexible instrument in the hands of shifting majorities”613 or 
even “a multifunctional tool in the hands of Strasbourg authorities.”614 He has also claimed that 
patterns have emerged throughout ECtHR jurisprudence on the margin of appreciation with 
                                                 
608Ibid, 120. 
609Ibid, 121. 
610These issues have been mentioned by Andreas Føllesdal as common critiques of the practice of the margin of 
appreciation in Europe, see: Føllesdal, Appreciating the Margin of Appreciation, 283-289. 
611Howard Charles Yourow, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Dynamics of European Human Rights 
Jurisprudence, (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1996), 186. 
612Ibid, 192. 
613Ibid, 193. 
614Ibid, 194.  
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regard to different ECHR articles.615 He has distinguished between the ECtHR enforcement of 
“due process articles” (Arts. 5 and 6 ECHR) and of “personal freedoms articles” (Arts. 8 to 11 
ECHR).616 For him, the ECtHR practiced intensive jurisprudence on procedural due process 
cases throughout its initial three decades, and these cases also reflected an “already existing 
impressive consensus in the law and practice of States Parties.”617 However, the personal 
freedoms articles were, for him, characterized by “open-ended wordings which do not give rise 
to easily distinguished autonomous Convention criteria for judgement,” and “have stimulated 
national discretion analysis.”618  
 
Yutaka Arai-Takahashi has distinguished between policy grounds that justified allowing 
a wide margin of appreciation to European states and policy grounds that supported  more active 
judicial interference on the part of the ECtHR.619 For him, morally charged issues like obscenity 
and blasphemy, and other issues like national security, electoral systems, medical expertise, 
and socioeconomic policies have led the ECtHR to adopt regional judicial self-restraint.620 On 
the other hand, cases involving discrimination on grounds of race, gender, or nationality have 
been subjected to a more stringent scrutiny of merits, which left little scope for a state’s margin 
of appreciation on these matters.621 For Arai-Takahashi, “in those areas, the Strasbourg organs 
are willing to engage in a meticulous examination of the merits,” whereby “[a] State is required 
to adduce weighty evidence for the necessity of an interfering measure.”622  
 
According to these studies, the difference between the practice of a wide and a strict 
national margin of appreciation within the European context is based on the nature of the rights 
involved in a particular case. This is a common interpretation among legal scholars, who have 
noted that the ECtHR has allowed a national margin of appreciation if a case involves certain 
articles of the ECHR “that include limitation clauses (Arts. 8-11 ECHR), unequal treatment or 
non-discrimination (Art. 14 ECHR) and the right to a fair trial (Art. 6 ECHR).”623 In contrast, 
                                                 
615“The national margin of discretion standard expands or contracts to condone or condemn national action 
depending, on a case-by-case basis, upon the facts; upon the nature and quality of, necessity for, and 
proportionality of the rights restriction(s) imposed by the state; and upon the text, context, and precedential value 




619Yutaka Arai-Takahashi, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine and the Principle of Proportionality in the 




623Føllesdal, Appreciating the Margin of Appreciation, 272. 
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“the ECHR has rarely allowed a [margin of appreciation] with regard to non-derogable rights: 
Arts. 2 (right to life), 3 (prohibition against torture), and 4 (1) [ECHR] (prohibition of slavery 
and forced labor).”624 Although this distinction based on the nature of rights seems a good 
interpretation of the ECtHR practices of the national margin of appreciation, there are opposing 
views of this interpretation within legal scholarship. Andrew Legg, for instance, has refused to 
grant high importance to the nature of specific rights or types of cases when analyzing 
jurisprudence on the margin of appreciation.625 For him, “external” or “institutional” factors, 
i.e., those not immediately related to the nature of rights and types of cases, have also played 
an important role for the practice of inter-institutional deference. He has described the nature 
of the rights and type of cases as first-order reasons, while the institutional factors represent 
second-order reasons for the practice of the margin of appreciation.  
 
Regarding these second-order reasons, international authorities tend to yield the final 
say to the domestic level based on two different types of reasons, namely: i) reasons relating to 
the democratic legitimacy of state practices and the level of common practice among the 
member states of an international system; and ii) epistemic limitations and expertise as 
influential factors in decision-making.626 Within the first category of reasons, international 
tribunals tend to yield authority based on the democratic legitimacy of respondent states and 
the level of common practice among state members.627 Within the second category of reasons, 
international courts may rely on institutional confidence to reach a decision for cases in which 
expertise plays a significant role. International courts may seek recourse to the domestic level 
when they feel national authorities are in a better position due to their greater knowledge and 
skills on the matter.628 In a nutshell, for Legg, deference relies especially on second-order 
reasons, most importantly “democratic legitimacy, the common practice of states, and 
expertise.”629 
 
                                                 
624Ibid. 
625“[T]he margin of appreciation operates, structurally at least, in the same way irrespective of the type of right or 
the nature of the case.” Andrew Legg, The Margin of Appreciation in International Human Rights Law. Deference 
and Proportionality, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 3; “It is often said by commentators and judges 
alike that the nature of right or the type of case is a factor that affects the width of the margin of appreciation or 
the amount of deference to be accorded to the state. Similarly, it is often said that there are different proportionality 
tests for different rights or types of case. There is some truth in these propositions, but they are not entirely 
accurate.” Ibid, 200.  
626Ibid, 24-26.  




George Letsas has also not relied on the nature of rights to describe European 
jurisprudence on the margin of appreciation. He has distinguished between a substantive and a 
structural concept of the margin of appreciation.630 The substantive concept refers to the 
discretion domestic authorities have within human rights adjudication.631 If the concept of the 
margin of appreciation is understood as describing national authorities’ discretion, the ECtHR 
may establish that a specific state authority has or has not acted within its margin of appreciation 
of the matter.632 The structural concept does not immediately refer to the discretion of national 
authorities, but to “the limits or intensity of the review of the ECtHR in view of its status as an 
international tribunal.”633 If it is understood as a structural concept, the margin of appreciation 
stands for the institutional interaction between the ECtHR and the member states within the 
European system for human rights protection. Most importantly, the structural concept of the 
margin of appreciation limits the authority of the ECtHR within its relationship with national 
authorities.634 
 
 Most studies on the national margin of appreciation have affirmed the dynamic character 
of the practice of international judicial deference to domestic authorities in Europe. Some 
ECtHR judges have addressed this dynamic character of international judicial review in Europe. 
ECtHR Judge Dean Spielmann, for instance, has identified some factors that are responsible 
for this dynamic practice. These factors have included the ECHR provision invoked, the context 
of the ECtHR’s decision, and the existence of general consensus among contracting states.635 
The dynamic character of ECtHR jurisprudence on the national margin of appreciation has also 
been a consequence of the political side of human rights protection in Europe. Judge Robert 
Spano has claimed that, due to the evolutive character of European human rights legislation, 
                                                 
630George Letsas, “Two Concepts of the Margin of Appreciation,” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 26, no. 4, 
(2006), 705-732.  
631For Letsas, the substantive concept addresses “the relationship between individual freedoms and collective 
goals.” Ibid, 706. 
632“The substantive concept of the doctrine refers to all the cases where, despite the fact that there was 
‘interference’ with a freedom protected by the ECHR, the interference did not amount to a violation of a right. As 
such, it presupposes or is linked to a theory, which tells us whether and when interference with fundamental 
freedoms is impermissible.” Ibid, 710.  
633Ibid, 706.  
634“On the structural concept, the margin of appreciation imposes limits on the powers of judicial review of the 
European Court, by virtue of the fact that it is an international court. It is the idea that the Court’s power to review 
decisions taken by domestic authorities should be more limited than the powers of a national constitutional court 
or other national bodies that monitor or review compliance with an entrenched bill of rights.” Ibid, 720-721. For 
Letsas, the ECtHR has not distinguished between these two different concepts, which has caused much confusion 
when authorities and scholars refer to the margin of appreciation as practiced within European human rights 
jurisprudence. 
635Dean Spielmann, “Allowing the Right Margin: the European Court of Human Rights and the National Margin 
of Appreciation Doctrine: Waiver or Subsidiarity of European Review?,” Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal 
Studies 14, (2012), 381-418, 394. 
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the Strasbourg system was entering in the “age of subsidiarity.”636 His argument was a direct 
response to critiques of European human rights jurisprudence in the last decade.637 For Judge 
Spano, the political debate among member states against strong international judicial review in 
Europe has not only led to the adoption of declarations like the Interlaken (2010) and Brighton 
(2012) declarations;638 it has also “created an important incentive for the Court in recent years 
to develop a more robust and coherent concept of subsidiarity.”639 In line with this, he has 
argued that the ECtHR has been rethinking the appropriate level of deference to national 
authorities “so as to implement a more robust and coherent concept of subsidiarity” in 
accordance with new European human rights legislation like Protocol 15 to the ECHR.640 
 
This dynamic practice of judicial deference has arguably occurred due to the more 
extensive European experience with issues that are inherent in the multilevel inter-institutional 
interaction regarding human rights protection.641 This is especially true when we compare the 
European system with the IAS. In Europe, legal authorities and scholars have been rethinking 
the terms of engagement between domestic and international authorities much longer than their 
Latin American peers. In fact, it is only recently that Latin American domestic and international 
authorities have started to address the most problematic issues deriving from multilevel inter-
institutional interaction. Due to this longer European experience, it is unsurprising that 
European legal authorities and scholars were the first to propose alternatives that could improve 
the engagement between national and international human rights authorities. Some of these 
alternatives have involved concepts of deference to national authorities that arguably conform 
with the ECtHR’s reasonable interpretations of the ECHR. Most importantly, as the previous 
case studies section has demonstrated, international judicial deference to national authorities 
can change based on the evolution of human rights law over time. As one of the most prominent 
outcomes of the multilevel inter-institutional interaction for human rights protection in Europe, 
the concept of the national margin of appreciation can arguably also improve the interaction 
                                                 
636Robert Spano, “Universality or Diversity of Human Rights? Strasbourg in the Age of Subsidiarity,” Human 
Rights Law Review 14, (2014), 487-502. For him, this age of subsidiarity is “manifested by the Court’s 
engagement with empowering the Member States to truly ‘bring rights home’.” Ibid, 491. 
637Judge Spano’s article was a response to: Lord Hoffmann, “The Universality of Human Rights,” Judicial Studies 
Board Annual Lecture, March 19, 2009, available at: https://www.judiciary.uk/announcements/speech-by-lord-
hoffmann-the-universality-of-human-rights/. 
638The Interlaken Declaration involved the adoption of an action plan to reform the European system up to 2019. 
The Brighton Declaration has led to the adoption of Protocol 15 that includes mentions to the subsidiary principle 
and the margin of appreciation into the preamble of the ECHR.  
639Ibid, 491. He has added: “The Court has demonstrated its willingness to defer to the reasoned and thoughtful 
assessment by national authorities of their Convention obligations.” Ibid. 
640Ibid, 498.  
641See, for instance: Alice Donald, Philip Leach, Parliaments and the European Court of Human Rights, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2016). 
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between inter-American and domestic authorities. The last sections of this chapter will address 
how this European experience can be useful for the practice of inter-American judicial review 
within international human rights adjudication.  
 
 
5.2.3. Interim conclusion: affording national authorities the right margin of appreciation  
 
The previous sections of this chapter have addressed how the margin of appreciation 
has been practiced by the ECtHR and how legal scholars have interpreted this practice. These 
sections have also enabled us to observe the differences between European and inter-American 
human rights jurisprudence regarding the strength of judicial review in theory (scholarship) and 
in practice (case studies). In comparison to the IACtHR’s practices of strong judicial review, 
the ECtHR has generally adopted weaker forms of judicial review within international human 
rights jurisprudence. As Basak Çali has explained, these differences in the strength of judicial 
review have related more specifically to variations in the intrusiveness of the established 
remedies against violations of the international human rights conventions.642 While the IACtHR 
has been known for its highly intrusive jurisprudence,643 the ECtHR has opted to adopt “a less 
intrusive and more deferential approach to human rights remedies.”644  
 
For Çali, the provisions of European and inter-American human rights conventions 
(legal design explanation) and the different history of the two international systems of human 
rights protection (case-history explanation) are not enough to explain this variation in the 
intrusiveness of remedies. Accordingly, Çali has proposed the legal culture explanation, which 
is arguably the most appropriate theory in this context. According to the legal culture 
explanation, “shared ideas amongst the members of the courts and commissions”645 are the 
most essential elements when seeking to understand the different international approaches to 
remedies against violations of the conventions. Legal culture is essential for the differences in 
the intrusiveness of remedies because it serves as the basis for international courts to create new 
remedies beyond the text of the international human rights conventions.  
 
                                                 
642Basak Çali, “Explaining Variation in the Intrusiveness of Regional Human Rights Remedies in Domestic 
Orders,” International Journal of Constitutional Law 16, no. 1, (2018), 214-234. 




Based on the legal culture explanation, Çali has noted that the ECtHR “has long seen its 
role as balancing the effective protection of rights while recognizing its subsidiary role in the 
protection of human rights,”646 which has led the court to develop doctrines of deference to the 
national authorities, like the margin of appreciation. Moreover, the political agency of the 
Committee of Ministers has also been a decisive element in the nonintrusive approach adopted 
by the ECtHR within the European system. In contrast, the IACtHR has adopted a more 
intrusive approach to remedies in Latin America “due to an institutional culture that supports 
an all-encompassing intrusive role.”647 This institutional culture has been created by the 
domestic institutional failures but also by the weak agency of the General Assembly of the 
OAS. Due to this institutional vacuum at both domestic and inter-American levels, the IACtHR 
has assigned itself a transformative mandate,648 which is directly related to the practice of strong 
inter-American judicial review.  
 
Different legal cultures have manifested in differences in the strength of international 
judicial review in Europe and in Latin America. In Europe, the principle of subsidiarity has 
played an important role in several treaties that constitute the structure of contemporary 
European law.649 The margin of appreciation is just one of the different expressions of this 
European legal culture that privileges the subsidiary principle.650 There is no corresponding 
Latin American legal culture given that there is no scope for stronger international interventions 
into the countries’ domestic affairs in the region. As Chapter I has underscored, European law 
is much more cosmopolitan than Latin American constitutional law. While subsidiarity has 
become an essential principle for the allocation of powers between the regional and the 
domestic level in Europe, in Latin America there is not scope for discussing the subsidiary 
principle outside the framework of inter-American human rights protection. This restricted 
scope of the subsidiary principle in Latin America has arguably affected the legal culture of 
human rights enforcement, given the domestic and international authorities’ lack of experience 
with inter-institutional deference.  
 
                                                 
646Ibid.  
647Ibid, 232. 
648Armin von Bogdandy, “The Transformative Mandate of the Inter-American System. Legality and Legitimacy 
of an Extraordinary Jurisgenerative Process,” Max Planck Institute Research Paper Series, no. 16, (2019), available 
at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3463059. 
649See, for instance: Katarzyna Granat, The Principle of Subsidiarity and its Enforcement in the EU Legal Order: 
The Role of National Parliaments in the Early Warning System, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2018).  
650On this relationship between the margin of appreciation and the principle of subsidiarity see, for instance: 
Alastair Mowbray, “Subsidiarity and the European Convention on Human Rights,” Human Rights Law Review 
15, (2015), 313-341.   
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Despite these different legal cultures in Europe and in Latin America, it is worth 
mentioning that both systems of human rights protection are dynamic and have the potential to 
adopt convergent approaches over time, i.e., the IACtHR can adopt weaker forms of 
international judicial review, while the ECtHR can adopt more intrusive remedies. Although 
the IACtHR has strengthened its transformative role in the past years and refused to adopt 
weaker forms of international judicial review, the ECtHR has already increased the strength of 
remedies in some cases.651 As examples of this increasing intrusiveness, Çali has mentioned 
the introduction of the pilot-judgement procedure into the European system and the new 
application of Art. 46 ECHR in some cases.652 
 
The pilot-judgement procedure has been introduced into European human rights 
jurisprudence as a means of tracing repetitive cases and solving them more efficiently.653 These 
cases usually have the same underlying cause within domestic law. For this reason, the ECtHR 
may establish a pilot judgment in order to cope with its increasing workload. The remedies 
established in a pilot judgement extend to all similar cases. These remedies have often included 
general measures to be adopted at the domestic level to resolve the systemic problem that has 
given rise to the repetitive cases. More often than not, these general measures involve amending 
domestic legislation. These general measures are also related to new interpretations of Art. 46 
ECHR, in which the ECtHR has ordered domestic authorities to amend domestic legislation in 
order to prevent future human rights violations. Some recent examples of this increasing 
intrusiveness of international remedies in Europe are worth mentioning. 
 
In Hutten-Czapska v. Poland,654 the ECtHR ordered national authorities to amend 
domestic housing legislation on the grounds that it had imposed several restrictions on 
landlord’s rights, like setting an extremely low ceiling on rent levels, which made it impossible 
for landlords to even afford their maintenance costs. In Manole and Others v. Moldova,655 the 
                                                 
651It is beyond the scope of this study to fully address the usefulness of strong international judicial review for the 
European context. However, as Miles Jackson has noted, the ECtHR will likely have to address the compatibility 
between domestic amnesty laws and the ECHR in the future. See: Miles Jackson, “Amnesties in Strasbourg,” 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 38, no. 3, (2018), 451-474.   
652Çali, Explaining Variation in the Intrusiveness, 223. 
653On the pilot-judgement procedure, see: ECtHR Press Unit, Factsheet – Pilot Judgements, January, 2019, 
available at: https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_Pilot_judgments_ENG.pdf; Dominik Haider, The Pilot-
Judgement Procedure of the European Court of Human Rights, (Leiden, Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
2013); Responding to Systemic Human Rights Violations. An Analysis of “Pilot Judgements” of the European 
Court of Human Rights and their Impact at National Level, eds. Philip Leach, Helen Hardman, Svetlana 
Stephenson, Brad K. Blitz, (Antwerp et al: Intersentia, 2010).  
654ECtHR, (Judgement) June 19, 2006, Case of Hutten-Czapska v. Poland. 
655ECtHR (Judgement), September 17, 2009, Manole and Others v. Moldova.  
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ECHR ordered national authorities to take general measures, which included legislative reform, 
to ensure that domestic regulations on public service broadcasting organizations no longer give 
rise to violations of Art. 10 ECHR. In Ürper and Others v. Turkey,656 the ECtHR ordered 
national authorities to amend a domestic piece of legislation that had given rise to violations of 
the journalists’ conventional rights according to Art. 10 ECHR.  
 
In Oleksandr Volkov v. Ukraine,657 the ECtHR ordered the Ukrainian authorities to 
reform the system of judicial discipline. In Ališić and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina et 
al,658 the ECtHR ordered Slovenian and Serbian authorities to amend domestic law to enable 
the applicants to recover their old foreign-currency savings. In Centre for Legal Resources on 
behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu v. Romania,659 the ECtHR ordered the respondent state to adopt 
general measures to ensure the establishment of an appropriate legal framework that could 
guarantee the independent legal representation of mentally disabled individuals. Finally, in 
Tagayeva and Others v. Russia,660 the ECtHR ordered national authorities to adopt an 
appropriate domestic legal framework for use of lethal force during security operations. 
 
Similar to what the IACtHR has done when it practices conventionality control, the 
ECtHR has ordered national authorities to amend domestic legislation, which illustrates the 
increasing intrusiveness of international remedies in Europe. However, as Çali has pointed out, 
this intrusiveness has mostly been negotiated with respondent states. Regarding the pilot-
judgement procedure, the ECtHR “first informally consults with the respondent states in order 
to see whether there is appetite for a pilot judgement in the receiving state.”661 Moreover, 
according to Art. 46 (2) ECHR, the Committee of Ministers, and not the ECtHR itself, is 
responsible for monitoring compliance with human rights jurisprudence.662 As we have seen in 
Chapter IV, issuing monitoring compliance orders in order to guarantee the effectiveness of 
decisions is one of the elements of strong inter-American judicial review. These factors attest 
to the fact that the IACtHR still represents the best example of strong international human rights 
jurisprudence around the globe. Nevertheless, the increasing intrusiveness of international 
                                                 
656ECtHR (Judgement), October 20, 2009, Case of Ürper and Others v. Turkey. 
657ECtHR (Judgement), January 9, 2013, Case of Oleksandr Volkov v. Ukraine. 
658ECtHR, (Judgement) July 16, 2014, Ališić and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia 
and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.  
659ECtHR (Judgement) July 17, 2014, Case of Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu v. 
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660ECtHR (Judgement) April 13, 2017, Case of Tagayeva and Others v. Russia. 
661Çali, Explaining Variation in the Intrusiveness, 224.  
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remedies in Europe illustrates that international human rights courts may be converging 
regarding the adoption of mixed-form international judicial review. 
 
It is worth emphasizing that this type of mixed-form international judicial review in 
Europe has been adopted due to the challenges that European human rights authorities currently 
face. Stronger international scrutiny has been adopted within cases involving less mature 
constitutional democracies in the European system.663 As Judge Robert Spano has claimed, 
disrespect for the rule of law cannot be tolerated in the system, even within the age of 
subsidiarity.664 For him, inter-institutional deference within the system should be based on 
“good faith domestic engagement with Convention principles.”665 He has noted the salient 
differences among member states regarding the appropriate enforcement of the ECHR 
provisions. Given this discrepancy, he has argued that “states that do not respect the rule of law 
(…) and do not ensure the impartiality and independence of their judicial systems, oppress 
political opponents or mask prejudice and hostilities towards vulnerable groups or minorities, 
cannot expect to be afforded deference” within the system of human rights protection.666 This 
is a clear statement in favor of adopting strong international judicial review in cases involving 
member states with fragile democratic institutions. This statement could also apply to several 
Latin American countries, as we will see in the next chapter. 
 
Comparing international human rights jurisprudence in Europe and in Latin America 
does not just reveal the dynamic character of international human rights enforcement 
throughout history; it also reveals the most important task for lawyers trying to offer the most 
appropriate forms of international judicial review within human rights adjudication. The 
international and national authorities in both systems of human rights protection share the same 
task of interpreting human and constitutional rights. Due to the highly abstract character of most 
of these rights, granting national authorities a certain level of discretion can be an essential part 
of the legal interpretation process. Given this fact, the practice of the margin of appreciation 
should not be understood as a specific feature of the European system of human rights 
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protection and it should arguably play an important role in all systems of international human 
rights protection, which also includes the IAS.  
 
The most important question is whether, in a given case, a wider margin of appreciation 
is the right solution or whether a stricter international scrutiny is the most appropriate answer. 
We may call it the question of the right margin of appreciation. Although the answer to this 
question may change over time for specific case law or with regard to specific human rights 
provisions, the most important task for lawyers is to determine under which conditions national 
authorities should enjoy greater discretion and under which conditions they should abide by the 
international interpretations of the human rights documents.667 Based on this study’s analysis 
of ECtHR jurisprudence on the margin of appreciation and the scholarly descriptions of this 
concept, we can conclude that European judicial authorities and scholars have been trying to 
determine the most appropriate approach to international remedies based on the European 
human rights enforcement context. This is exactly what legal authorities and scholars should 
do with regard to the practice of inter-American judicial review in Latin America as this chapter 
concludes in the following. 
 
 
5.3. Conclusion: Moving toward a context-based theory of inter-American judicial 
review 
 
As a translation of the principle of subsidiarity as applied to European human rights law, 
the national margin of appreciation has been dynamically enforced within ECtHR 
jurisprudence. Based on concepts like the emergence of a regional consensus regarding a 
specific issue, it is clear that the practice of the margin of appreciation has evolved in line with 
the evolution of human rights legislation and jurisprudence in Europe. Although there is no 
substantive theory of the margin of appreciation that could be detached from this European 
context of human rights enforcement and exported to Latin America, the practice of the national 
margin of appreciation has the potential to guarantee the enforcement of the subsidiary principle 
as applied to human rights protection in Latin America.  
 
The differences between the specific forms of international judicial review are 
intimately related to the context in which they have emerged. ECtHR jurisprudence has not 
                                                 
667I thank Mattias Kumm for clarifying this point to me.  
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been the only decisive element in ensuring the legitimacy and effectiveness of the national 
margin of appreciation for international human rights enforcement in Europe. The different 
practices of the national margin of appreciation have been the product of several factors that 
are relevant in the European context. The case studies and the scholarly descriptions of ECtHR 
jurisprudence on the margin of appreciation have emphasized the flexibility of this concept over 
time. Issues that deserved a wide margin of appreciation in the past, may now be subjected to 
the strict international scrutiny. The increasing intrusiveness of remedies in Europe is also 
evidence of this dynamic character of the margin of appreciation within human rights 
jurisprudence. This dynamic character is due to the more extensive European experience with 
multilevel inter-institutional interaction. When addressing the possible application of the 
margin of appreciation to a case, we should not ignore these contextual features of a given legal 
culture of human rights enforcement. 
 
Latin American and European legal authorities and scholars have been seeking the most 
appropriate form of international judicial review to address the human rights violations in each 
context. The practices of conventionality control and the margin of appreciation prompted 
similar points of debate involving the legitimacy and effectiveness of international judicial 
review of domestic law based on regional human rights law, like the conditions under which 
national authorities should enjoy a wider or stricter margin of appreciation. Moreover, these 
similarities suggest how Latin American lawyers may gain another perspective on the more 
recent established forms of strong inter-American judicial review. Based on the more extensive 
European experience with multilevel inter-institutional interaction, it is arguably necessary to 
refine the practice of inter-American judicial review within the IAS in a way similar to what 
has been done in Europe.668 This should be made based on the particular challenges to human 
rights enforcement in Latin America. In a nutshell, the different interpretations of the national 
margin of appreciation that can be found in jurisprudence and in legal scholarship may give us 
good examples of how legal authorities could integrate contextual elements into jurisprudential 
approaches to international judicial review. This brings us to a final remark about the necessity 
of a context-based theory of inter-American judicial review. 
 
The final point refers to the implausibility of importing the margin of appreciation as an 
element in the practice of weak international judicial review without adapting it to the Latin 
                                                 
668This will eventually involve the adoption of mixed-form international judicial review, which represents a 
convergence with the approach adopted by the ECtHR. 
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American context. Addressing this issue, Laurence Burgorgue-Larsen has pointed out that it is 
wise to be cautious and to not adopt a “large-scale import operation” of the margin of 
appreciation to Latin America.669 For her, “an import without adjustments to the Latin 
American political context would surely be instrumentalized by states that are still 
democratically fragile.”670 Trying to change the practice of strong inter-American judicial 
review without paying attention to the historical evolution of human rights enforcement in Latin 
America is arguably a mistake. There is no easy way of weakening the practice of inter-
American judicial review. An uncritical import of weak international judicial review could put 
the normative force of the ACHR at risk, which is surely not what Latin American legal 
authorities and scholars intend. However, affording national authorities greater discretion when 
interpreting some ACHR provisions that still lack a stronger normative dimension within inter-
American human rights law can arguably increase the inter-institutional interaction within the 
IAS. This increasing interaction has the potential to improve the overall legitimacy and 
effectiveness of international human rights protection in Latin America. Reconciling strong and 
weak judicial review in order to improve the legitimacy and effectiveness of human rights law 
in Latin America is the task of the theory of mixed-form international judicial review, which 
will be proposed in the following chapter.  
                                                 
669Laurence Burgorgue-Larsen, “The Added Value of the Inter-American Human Rights System. Comparative 
Thoughts,” in Transformative Constitutionalism in Latin America. The Emergence of a New Ius Commune, eds. 
Armin von Bodgdandy et al., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 377-408.   
670Ibid, 407.  
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VI. The Theory of Mixed-Form Inter-American Judicial Review  
 
 
6.1. The Latin American human rights enforcement context 
 
The previous chapters have described the bottom-up and top-down elements of Latin 
American cosmopolitan constitutionalism. They have also addressed the normative questions 
relating to the practice of strong inter-American judicial review of domestic law and the 
alternatives that were proposed for appropriate inter-American human rights jurisprudence. 
This chapter will propose a mixed-form theory of inter-American judicial review as the most 
suitable normative model for the Latin American human rights enforcement context. This 
normative model is intended to strengthen the relationship between domestic and international 
law regarding the protection of human rights within the IAS. It is also intended to guarantee 
and strengthen democracy and the rule of law in the region under the thread of global 
constitutionalism scholarship.  
 
This chapter argues that the IACtHR should introduce weak judicial review into inter-
American jurisprudence in a way that is compatible with the evolution of inter-American human 
rights law. The inter-American adjudication of socioeconomic rights offers the best opportunity 
to do so. This appropriate introduction of weak review does not mean that the IACtHR should 
no longer practice strong judicial review. However, the IACtHR should only use strong review 
as a remedy for flagrant violations that mostly involve the civil and political rights protected 
under inter-American human rights law. Given that inter-American legislation has focused on 
the protection of civil and political rights, this chapter argues that the practice of strong review 
of domestic law by the IACtHR should be limited to the judicial enforcement of these rights. 
According to the theory of mixed-form inter-American judicial review, it is possible to 
reconcile the IACtHR practice of strong and weak review, which has consequences for the 
evolution of inter-American and domestic human rights law.  
 
As this study has already emphasized, mixed-form theory is a context-based theory of 
human rights adjudication. The first task is to explain what it is meant by the Latin American 
human rights enforcement context. The most prominent feature of this context has been the 
persistence of systematic state-perpetrated human rights underenforcement. Systematic human 
rights underenforcement is part of constitutionalism’s tragic cycle in Latin America, which 
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more than once has ended up in authoritarian rule at the domestic level. At least two major 
recent factors can illustrate this systematic practices of human rights underenforcement: i) the 
most recent wave of authoritarianism in the region and ii) the region’s increasing material 
inequality and institutional failure under democratic rule.  
 
 
6.1.1. The recent Latin American wave of authoritarianism  
 
Latin America is well-known for its history of authoritarian governments. As Roberto 
Gargarella has described in his studies of Latin American constitutional history,671 the region 
was initially open to the liberal North-American and French revolutionary ideas. Later, these 
ideas of constitutional liberalism were replaced by a very conservative type of government, 
which was characterized by centralized decision-making. Throughout the 20th century, Latin 
American constitutionalism saw development in the rights’ section of the constitutions like the 
introduction of social rights as a category of constitutional rights. This led to constitutions with 
a very progressive catalogue of rights, but a very old-fashioned and centralized structure of 
power. For Gargarella, it is not a coincidence that authoritarianism has time and again come 
back to the political stage, given that it is institutionalized in the conservative distribution of 
power that is evident in many Latin American constitutions. In fact, the survival of authoritarian 
rule in Latin America has a strong relation with the region’s sad history of colonialism, in the 
face of which legal and constitutional parlance has been, time and again, used to perpetuate 
oppression and inequality.672 This history had a catastrophic beginning with the genocide of the 
native peoples, the acute exploitation of natural resources at the expense of the environment 
and the introduction of African enslavement in the continent. All of these catastrophic elements 
still have consequences for most countries up to the present day.673  
 
Even if it is true that most of the challenges for constitutionalism have long been present 
in the region, Latin America has seen the emergence of a recent wave of authoritarianism in the 
past decades. This is especially evident when we consider the work of the regional commission 
                                                 
671Roberto Gargarella, Latin American Constitutionalism, 1810-2010. The Engine Room of the Constitution, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).  
672In a historical interpretation, see: Roberto Gargarella, The Legal Foundations of Inequality. Constitutionalism 
in the Americas, 1776-1860, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
673According to Boaventura de Sousa Santos, capitalism, colonialism and patriarchalism have always posed serious 
challenges for the government of free and equals in the Global South. See: Boaventura de Sousa Santos, 
Epistemologies of the South. Justice Against Epistemicide, (New York: Routledge, 2016). 
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for human rights protection (IACHR). The IACHR is supposed to act as the most immediate 
human rights watcher in Latin America and its country reports have illustrated the escalation of 
domestic authoritarian practices in recent years. One distinguishing feature of these domestic 
practices is that they are not restricted to a few episodes of serious human rights violations that, 
ultimately, could be acknowledged by the inter-American institutions in order to hold national 
authorities accountable. Addressing these illiberal practices, lawyers find out that some states 
have acted as recurrent and deliberate human rights violators, which have underenforced 
constitutional and conventional rights based on inexcusable interests, most of them related to 
power and money. Some governments have dealt with human rights enforcement in an 
unprincipled way and have regarded inter-American institutions as a threat to what they 
understand as sovereignty, i.e., their authoritarian governments. In a nutshell, they have brought 
back once again the well-known Latin American realpolitik on human rights enforcement.674 
There are currently two most salient examples of this phenomenon, namely Venezuela and 
Nicaragua.  
 
Venezuela has been one of the most prominent examples of Latin American 
authoritarian government in the past decades. Paradoxically, authoritarianism took power under 
the rule of the new 1999 constitution, which represents one of the most promising constitutional 
documents on human rights in the region. The main authoritarian actor in the country has been 
the ruling Venezuelan Unified Socialist Party, especially during the administrations of Hugo 
Chavez (2007-2013) and Nicolás Maduro (since 2013). According to the most recent IACHR 
report on Venezuela,675 although there has been a gradual deterioration of human rights 
enforcement since the beginning of closer regional surveillance in 2002, human rights 
violations escalated in 2017. The IACHR addressed several causes of the current crisis in the 
country, which has even become a humanitarian crisis responsible for many citizens emigrating 
to neighbor countries in the last years. For the IACHR, the key reasons for this crisis have been 
the substantial changes of the Venezuelan constitutional order, which were intensified in 
2017.676 
  
The executive and the Venezuelan Supreme Court have ignored the separation of 
powers throughout the last years. The alteration of the 1999 constitutional order has happened 
                                                 
674This realpolitik clarifies how the establishment of the IAS was possible during the rule of dictatorships in Latin 
America throughout the 20th century. 
675IACHR, Country Report: Situation of Human Rights in Venezuela, December 31, 2017, available at: 
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/reports/pdfs/Venezuela2018-en.pdf.   
676Ibid, §73. 
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mostly due to the “interference by the Executive in the Judiciary and, in turn, by the Judiciary 
in the Legislature.”677 The report mentioned several threats to democracy and to the rule of law 
in the country. These threats have included serious restrictions to the exercise of civil liberties 
and political rights in Venezuela such as: i) various types of harassment and persecution of the 
opposition, ii) postponements of regional and municipal elections; iii) repression, 
stigmatization and criminalization of social protests in the form of arbitrary detentions, torture 
and even sexual violence against civilians;678 iv) denial of access to justice and due process, 
with civilians reportedly being prosecuted and tried in military criminal courts; v) proliferation 
of legal provisions that restrict the right to freedom of thought and expression based on broad 
concepts such as national security and public order, and vi) the denial of access to public 
information through vague exceptions.  
 
Two judgements can illustrate important features of the changing Venezuelan 
constitutional order in 2017, which are specifically related to the disregard for the rule of law 
in the country: Judgements No. 155 and No. 156 by the Venezuelan Supreme Court.679 The first 
judgement established the unconstitutional character of the enforcement of the Inter-American 
Democratic Charter, which was proposed by an agreement passed by the National Assembly.680 
The Supreme Court invalidated the enforcement of this charter and called the passing of the 
agreement by the Assembly “treason,” because it allegedly brought foreign interference into 
the resolution of domestic affairs. Judgement No. 156 granted the executive broad powers in 
respect of oil and gas, which constitute important sources of money to finance the authoritarian 
politics of the ruling government. The current Venezuelan administration has also explicitly 
weakened its commitments with regard to human rights enforcement. Illustrative of this attitude 
was the withdrawal from the ACHR in 2013 and also the withdrawal of a member from the 
OAS Charter in 2017, which represented the first ever withdrawal from the membership of this 
international organization since its creation in 1948. These withdrawals represent a reaction 
against the work of inter-American institutions that have been reporting systematic human 
rights violations in the country for over a decade. They are ultimately a reaction against the 
                                                 
677Ibid, §75. 
678The escalation of violence and repression against the citizenry is illustrated by the adoption of the “Plan Zamora” 
in 2017. According to the IACHR, this civilian-military plan, which was established in 2012, was supposed to be 
enforced only in cases of environmental catastrophes, since it involves the use of military units for citizen security 
tasks; Ibid, §377. Through the declaration of this plan and of several other lengthy states of emergency, the 
Venezuelan government has tried to offer a legal basis for all its discretionary powers, no matter if they involve 
serious human rights violations like arbitrary detentions, torture and extrajudicial executions. Ibid, §§ 383, 386.  
679Ibid, §§103-105. 
680This inter-American document was adopted in order to guarantee the rule of democratic governments in the 
Americas. This chapter will address it with more attention below. 
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international community, which has condemned the serious human rights violations committed 
by the ruling government.  
 
Beyond Venezuela, Nicaragua represents another example of systematic state-
perpetrated authoritarianism. The authoritarian practices pose a substantial threat to the 
enforcement of constitutional rights, the rule of law, and democracy in this country. This rising 
authoritarianism was addressed by the IACHR in its 2018 report on the human rights situation 
in Nicaragua.681 In April 2018, public demonstrations and social protests spread around the 
country due to a fire that was not properly extinguished in a biological reserve and a reform of 
social security legislation that increased workers and employees’ contributions and established 
a 5% deduction to the pensions of retirees.682 The IACHR reported that the state response to 
the social protests was unreasonable. The commission concluded that state officials, based on 
the presumption that the civil protests could lead to a coup d’état,683 severely repressed the 
political demonstrations by, among other means, i) the excessive and arbitrary use of police 
force, ii) intimidation and threats against leaders of social movements, iii) by establishing 
obstacles to access emergency medical care for the wounded as a form of retaliation of their 
participation in demonstrations, and, finally, iv) by the dissemination of propaganda and 
stigmatization campaigns, followed by improper interference in the media.684  
 
The state representatives argued that the need to maintain public order and social peace 
justified the severe repression of the demonstrations. Several episodes of widespread violence 
happened after the repression of the first protests, which included, for instance, the attack on a 
peaceful march on Mothers’ Day (May 30, 2018) that caused 15 deaths and 199 people 
wounded.685 The IACHR reported that private groups were acting with the acquiescence of 
state officials and that there has been a widespread distrust among victims in filing complaints 
against human rights abuses due to the lack of appropriate investigation and judicial 
independence.686 For the IACHR, the situation was critical to the point that it affected the 
mental health and emotional well-being of the entire population.687 As a consequence of the 
                                                 
681IACHR, Country Report: Nicaragua. Gross Human Rights Violations in the Context of Social Protests in 
Nicaragua, June 21, 2018, available at: http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/reports/pdfs/Nicaragua2018-en.pdf.  
682Ibid, §§33-46.  
683Ibid, §53. 
684Ibid, §58. 
685Ibid, §48.  
686Ibid, §§18, 193, 232, 234. 
687Ibid, §159. 
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severe repressions of the citizenry, numerous people have been forced to leave their homes as 
well as emigrating to other countries to seek protection.688  
 
Venezuela and Nicaragua are examples of countries where civil rights and political 
liberties are still systematically endangered by state-perpetrated authoritarian practices in Latin 
America. These contemporary authoritarian governments exhibit very similar features to 
previous Latin American dictatorships. Despite having a different political ideology to some 
previous authoritarian regimes, there are few differences with regard to the severe repression 
of the citizenry. This is even more evident in the most recent report from the U.N. High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, Michelle Bachelet, on the contemporary human rights 
situation in Venezuela.689 In this report, Ms. Bachelet, a left-wing politician who ruled Chile 
for two terms (2006-2010, 2014-2018) and who once considered Hugo Chávez a political 
colleague in South America, denounced the arbitrary detentions, and the allegations of torture 
and extrajudicial executions that have been perpetrated by the Venezuelan government 
especially since Nicolás Maduro took office.690 In conclusion, regardless the political ideology, 
the persistence of authoritarian rule has been remarkable within some Latin American countries 




6.1.2. Material inequality and institutional failure under democratic rule 
 
Beyond the traditional violations of civil rights and political liberties, the Latin 
American context of state-perpetrated human rights underenforcement also involves questions 
of material inequality and institutional failure. This study will now address these issues as a 
different type of challenge for human rights enforcement in the region. Material inequality in 
Latin America refer to the fact that social gap between the poorest and the richest people in the 
                                                 
688Ibid, §§220-221. 
689United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Human Rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 
July 5, 2019, available at: https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/VE/A_HRC_41_18.docx. 
690The report also accused Chavez’s government of being responsible for serious human rights violations in the 
country: “For over a decade, Venezuela has adopted and implemented a series of laws, policies and practices, 
which have restricted the democratic space, weakened public institutions, and affected the independence of the 
judiciary. Although these measures have been adopted with the declared aim of preserving public order and 
national security against alleged internal and external threats, they have increased the militarization of State 
institutions and the use of the civilian population in intelligence gathering and defence tasks.” Ibid, §76. The report 
further concluded that “[t]his context has enabled the Government to commit numerous human rights violations.” 
Ibid, §77.    
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region has increased, despite the overall economic growth at the domestic level. The amount of 
national wealth has grown, but it has been more and more unequally shared within the countries. 
According to the World Inequality Database, the top 1% of Latin American earners share 27.9% 
of the total regional income.691 In some countries, the scenario is even more extreme: the richest 
1% of Brazilians share 28.3% of national income, which makes the country figure among the 
most socially unequal in the world.692 The regulatory framework has played a significant role 
for Latin America becoming one of the most unequal regions in the world. Socioeconomic 
rights underenforcement has been both the product of and the agent of increasing material 
inequality in Latin American countries.  
  
Historically, Latin American authorities have been responsible for the conceptualization 
of socioeconomic rights as both constitutional rights and a category of human rights. The 1917 
Mexican constitution was a pioneering constitutional document for including socioeconomic 
rights among rights protected by the constitution. Latin American lawyers were also influential 
advocates for the inclusion of socioeconomic rights into the text of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights.693 Despite this Latin American contribution to the concept of socioeconomic 
rights as enforceable rights, several historical factors have blocked their enforcement at the 
national and international levels. In the region’s recent history, these have largely related to 
controversial neoliberal macroeconomic agendas. There are several ways of approaching 
neoliberalism from a legal perspective.694 The most relevant approach for this study entails a 
focus on the relationship between neoliberal policies and the state-perpetrated systematic 
underenforcement of socioeconomic rights. Neoliberal policies prevent domestic enforcement 
of socioeconomic rights due to new regulatory frameworks, which, in turn, may result in 
increasing material inequality. There have been examples of this phenomenon in some Latin 
American countries.   
 
                                                 
691World Inequality Database, Region View: Latin America, available at:  
https://wid.world/world/#sptinc_p99p100_z/US;FR;DE;CN;ZA;GB;WO/last/eu/k/p/yearly/s/false/4.8255/30/cur
ve/false/region.   
692Brazil figures together with India and other Middle-East countries as one of the most unequal countries in the 
globe with regard to wealth concentration. See: World Inequality Database, Country Report: Brazil, available at: 
https://wid.world/country/brazil/. 
693On this issue, see: Johannes Morsink, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Origins, Drafting and Intent, 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999); Mary Ann Glendon, “The Forgotten Crucible: The Latin 
American Influence on the Universal Human Rights Ideal,” Harvard Human Rights Journal 16, (2003), 27-39. See 
also: Kathryn Sikkink, “Latin America’s Protagonist Role in Human Rights,” SUR 22, (2015), 207–219. 
694See, for instance, Alexander Somek’s analysis of the relationship between neoliberalism and anti-discrimination 
law within the European Union: Alexander Somek. Engineering Equality. An Essay on European Anti-
Discrimination Law, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 83-89. 
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After the 1980s, Latin American governments adopted a series of macroeconomic 
policies known as the “Washington consensus,” which usually involved the restriction of state 
interference in the economy and the establishment of free markets.695 These policy 
recommendations from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank were seen as 
essential for national macroeconomic development. They were supposed to reduce public debt, 
control inflation, stabilize the currency, and attract foreign investments. However, these 
neoliberal policies have resulted in the systemic underenforcement of socioeconomic rights due 
to social spending cuts. Governments were encouraged to underenforce these constitutional 
rights based on an agenda that privileged fiscal responsibility and economic growth. After years 
of their implementation, such policies have contributed to the escalation of material inequality 
in countries like Chile and Argentina.696 
 
Beyond the domestic level, neoliberalism has had consequences for the enforcement of 
socioeconomic rights as a category of human rights at the international level as well. A recent 
account of this fact comes from Samuel Moyn,697 who has affirmed that the age of human rights 
has paradoxically become “a golden age for the rich.”698 Moyn has referred to a triumph of 
market fundamentalism starting in the 1970s and has argued that “human rights conformed to 
the political economy of the age, not defining it but reflecting it.”699 For him, “a neoliberal 
campaign against welfare at every scale made human rights its hostages.”700 The result was that 
an accommodating relationship between neoliberalism and human rights has made “the globe 
more humane but enduringly unequal.”701 It is true that Moyn has stressed that human rights 
did not bring the neoliberal age about702 and that “human rights law and movements strove for 
a greater amount of valid social pluralism than ever defended.”703 However, the complacent 
attitude to neoliberalism on the part of human rights advocates has had severe consequences for 
the problem of material inequality around the globe.704  
                                                 
695On the Washington consensus, see: Nancy Birdsall, Augusto de la Torre, Felipe Valencia Caicedo, “The 
Washington Consensus: Assessing a ‘Damaged Brand’,” in The Oxford Handbook of Latin American Economics, 
eds. José Antonio Ocampo, Jaime Ros, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 79-107.   
696On this issue, see: Naomi Klein, The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism, (London: Penguin Books, 
2007).   
697Samuel Moyn, Not Enough. Human Rights in an Unequal World, (Cambridge, MA; London: Harvard 





702“Neoliberalism, not human rights, is to blame for neoliberalism;” Ibid, 192.  
703Ibid, 202. 
704He has emphasized this point in several passages of his book. For him, human rights “did nothing to interfere 
with distributive inequality;” Ibid, 176. Human rights “were companions to neoliberalism that did pressingly little 
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It is beyond the scope of this study to fully address questions relating to material 
inequality in Latin America. This study will restrict its analysis to the relation between 
increasing inequality and the state-perpetrated systematic underenforcement of socioeconomic 
rights. The focus here lies on how lawyers can respond to these systematic obstacles to 
socioeconomic rights enforcement. In this chapter, this study offers weak judicial review as a 
viable approach to the judicial enforcement of these rights at the domestic and inter-American 
levels. In the following, this section will briefly address institutional failure as another persistent 
element in state-perpetrated systematic human rights underenforcement in Latin America.  
 
Institutional failure under democratic rule relates to the misuse of democratic 
institutions and the disregard for the rule of law based on illegitimate interests. This can be 
illustrated by what some scholars have described as the lack of institucionalidad, i.e., the 
absence of institutional credibility, as Armin von Bogdandy has described.705 For him, 
institucionalidad translates into a high degree of trust in the rights, guarantees and institutions 
established in the constitution. He has noted that Latin American lawyers usually refer to clear 
institutional differences between the “Northern situation” and Latin America.706 In this sense, 
the lack of institucionalidad relates to structural problems in Latin American democracies that 
are well known, i.e., weak institutions that cannot cope with traditional problems like corruption 
and social exclusion. Legal scholars have time and again addressed the traditional disregard for 
institutions in Latin America. Before these more recent discussions of the lack of 
institucionalidad mentioned by Von Bogdandy, Guillermo O’Donnell was the most prominent 
thinker who addressed the institutional failures in Latin American countries.  
 
For O’Donnell, a common feature of these countries has been their “poorly functioning 
states”707 that, even under democratic rule, have been “deaf to the demands and interests of 
                                                 
to alter its course;” Ibid, 192. They “made the world more humane without challenging neoliberal globalization;” 
Ibid, 194. Despite the relevance of human rights within international legislation, “international law furnished no 
redistributive tools among countries” and “there was never any globalization of social justice;” Ibid, 196. In the 
end, “in a world-historic breakthrough of increasing recognition, everyone was treated more equally, except 
materially.” Ibid, 203. 
705Armin von Bogdandy, “Ius Constitutionale Commune en América Latina. Observations on Transformative 
Constitutionalism,” in Transformative Constitutionalism in Latin America, eds. Armin von Bogdandy et al.,  
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 27-48.  
706Von Bogdandy has claimed that “to be sure, there are deep problems even in Europe (…) However in Latin 
America, systemic deficits in the rule of law are much more frequently found and are a constant theme.” Ibid, 36.  
707Guillermo O’Donnell, “An Overview of Latin America”, in Democracy, Agency and the State: Theory with 
Comparative Intent, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 146. For O’Donnell, “big or small in the size of 
their bureaucracies, these states are weak. Some of them have been weak since their beginnings, and some have 
recently weakened, oddly enough, under democracy. Truly, in the past some of these states were efficacious 
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large parts of its population.”708 In this context, O’Donnell suggested “delegative democracy” 
as an adequate descriptive model of Latin American governments.709 He distinguished 
delegative democracies from representative democracies: Representative democracies are 
based on accountability of the government by several institutions, while delegative democracies 
share an anti-institutional bias. For O’Donnel, within delegative democracies, the institutions 
that are responsible for holding the authorities accountable are seen as obstacles by the rulers, 
especially by elected presidents: “Accountability to such institutions appears as a mere 
impediment to the full authority that the president has been delegated to exercise.”710 The anti-
institutional bias of delegative democracies is also illustrated by the ruler’s willingness to “try 
hard, and often succeed, to cancel, co-opt or otherwise neutralize”711 democratic institutions. 
 
O’Donnell claimed that Latin American governments have traditionally ignored the task 
of enforcing civil and socioeconomic rights, which has had consequences for how the state 
bureaucracy is perceived by parts of civil society. Many citizens perceive the state as an 
advocate for the interests of the rich and powerful.712 Indeed, according to the 2018 
Latinobarómetro report, Latin Americans share a deep distrust of democratic institutions.713 In 
2013, 79% of the interviewees agreed that democracy was the best system of government. In 
2018, this had fallen to 65%. In countries like Brazil, the decrease was even more extreme: 
from 81% in 2013 to 56% in 2018. Still according to this report, 79% agreed that politicians 
govern based on the interest of a few groups in society. In Brazil, this number reached 90% in 
2018. The most credible institutions in Latin America are religious institutions (63%), the 
armed forces (44%), and the police (35%). The government (22%), the congress (21%), and 
political parties (13%) are the least trusted institutions. In Brazil, trust in political parties was 
shared by just 6% of the interviewees in 2018. Although institutional failure has not necessarily 
led to support for authoritarianism in the region, it has led to the indifference towards politics. 
For instance, just 34% of the Brazilians interviewees declared themselves in favor of 
                                                 
repressive machines, but neither at those times nor after have they managed to achieve the minimum that a 
reasonably strong state does: to socially cohere and legally normalize their societies and nations;” Ibid, 148. 
708Ibid, 148.  
709Guillermo O’Donnel, “Delegative Democracy,” Journal of Democracy 5, no. 1, (1994), 55-69.    
710Ibid, 60. 
711O’Donnel, Overview of Latin America, 162.  
712O’Donnel, Overview of Latin America, 149; O’Donnell concluded that “the Latin American state is scarcely 
credible.” Ibid. 
713Latinobarómetro, 2018 Report, available at: http://www.latinobarometro.org/lat.jsp. 
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democracy, while 41% declared themselves indifferent to it. The report concluded that this 
indifference has become a revolutionary factor in Latin American politics in the last years.714  
 
Beyond the Latinobarómetro report, there is further evidence of the lack of institutional 
health in Latin America. It is worth mentioning two most illustrative factors of it: systemic 
corruption and the substantial obstacles to governability that have, time and again, resulted in 
presidential impeachments. Regarding the first factor, Marcelo Neves has argued that peripheral 
countries in world society suffer from systemic corruption.715 For him, systemic corruption 
blurs the lines between different social systems and does not allow them to further operate in 
an autonomous way.716 Systemic corruption has distorting effects on democracy, human rights 
enforcement, and the rule of law. In peripheral countries, the legal system is more likely to be 
subjected to direct influences from the economic and the political system.717 The institutional 
failure of Latin American countries has been at the same time the product of and one of the 
most prominent elements of systemic corruption in the region. Several institutions cannot 
function as they are supposed to due to the direct and constant influences of illegitimate 
interests.718 
 
                                                 
714With respect to Brazil, the Latinobarómetro report also referred to the results of the 2018 election based on the 
country’s collected data: “A country where satisfaction with democracy collapses in this way, where 73% of 
citizens do not vote by party, where only 34% support it and 41% are indifferent towards it, is a country ready to 
choose a candidate who is located outside the establishment and who wants to break with everything established;” 
Ibid, 37. 
715Marcelo Neves, “Systemkorruption von der Organisation zur Gesellschaft: Grenzen der Funktionalen 
Differenzierung von Recht und Politik in den Peripheren Ländern. Bemerkungen im Anschluss an Niklas 
Luhmann,” in Verfassung und Verfassungsgericht: Deutschland und Brasilien im Vergleich, eds. Rainer Schmidt, 
Virgílio Afonso da Silva, (Bade-Baden: Nomos, 2012), 59-72.   
716Marcelo Neves, “From the Autopoiesis to the Allopoiesis of Law,” Journal of Law and Society 28, no. 2, (2001), 
242-264; See also: Marcelo Neves, “Komplexitätssteigerung unter Mangelhafter Funktionaler Differenzierung: 
Das Paradox der Sozialen Entwicklung Lateinamerikas,” in Duch Luhmanns Brille. Herausfroderungen an Politik 
und Recht in Lateinamerica und in der Weltgesellschaft, eds. Peter Birle, Matias Dewey, Aldo Mascareño, 
(Wiesbaden: Springer Verlag, 2012), 17-27. 
717Corruption of the legal system can be illustrated, for instance, by the purchase of a judicial decision, which 
characterizes a non-legitimate interference by the economic system. 
718The Car Wash Operation is illustrative of the distorting effects of systemic corruption in Brazil. This 
investigative operation began in 2014 and ended up uncovering one of the biggest corruption scandals in Brazilian 
history. The investigations initially aimed at uncovering money laundering, but they soon found a web of 
corruption involving some of Brazil’s biggest companies and several political parties. Among other things, the 
investigation discovered a link between overpaid contracts and the funding of election campaigns to keep the 
governing coalition in power. After tracing the overall corruption within the political system, the operation led to 
what can be called the “judicialization of politics” in Brazil: Many influential politicians were sent to jail based 
on accusations derived from plea bargains. In some of these cases, the justification for the decisions was mostly 
based on the plea bargain and not on the established proof in the case. At the same time, the operation represented 
the “politicization of the Brazilian judiciary:” Some judges became influential in the media and acquired 
considerable political charisma. One of the leading judges of the Car Wash Operation, Mr. Sergio Moro, has even 
opted to join the 2018 elected government of Jair Bolsonaro as a Minister of Justice 
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The relation between systemic corruption and institutional failure has also had 
consequences for governability in Latin America. Presidential instability has been a constant 
element of the institutional failure in the region. The various cases of alleged corruption in Latin 
American countries were responsible for the impeachment of several heads of state in the past 
years. According to a recent study, Latin American presidents have been subject to 10 
impeachments or “declarations of incapacity” in the past 30 years.719 Brazil, Ecuador and 
Paraguay lead these statistics, each with 2 presidential impeachments in their most recent 
democratic history. As O’Donnell rightly put it, the process of institutionalization takes time 
and it is an even greater challenge than the transition to democracy in Latin America.720 One of 
the consequences of governance instability in the region is that it has become extremely difficult 
to strengthen democratic institutions within the highly unstable political environment in Latin 
America. For O’Donnell, crises demand strong institutions but, in Latin America, crises also 
hinder the further institutionalization of domestic democracies. Latin America seems to be cast 
into a vicious circle of institutional failure under democratic rule.  
 
 
6.2. The theory of mixed-form inter-American judicial review 
 
The issues relating to authoritarian governments, systematic underenforcement of 
socioeconomic rights, and institutional failure addressed above have formed the background of 
inter-American human rights enforcement in Latin America. The inter-American institutions 
have evolved in this context. They have tried to cope with systematic state-perpetrated human 
rights violations in an innovative way. The emergence of strong inter-American judicial review 
can be understood as a response to these traditional domestic issues. Conventionality control 
was a response to the systemic underenforcement of civil and political rights, while the direct 
enforcement of socioeconomic rights was a response to the systematic underenforcement of 
this second category of rights.  
 
This study will now propose a theory of mixed-form inter-American judicial review as 
the most suitable normative model for inter-American human rights jurisprudence. This theory 
asks whether strong-form review is always the most appropriate way of dealing with the 
                                                 
719See: Aníbal Pérez-Liñan, John Polga-Hecimovich, “Explaining Military Coups and Impeachments in Latin 
America,” Democratization 24, no. 5, (2016), 839-858. There is a very illustrative picture of the lack of 
governability in the region provided by Americas Quarterly. See: Brian O’Boyle, “President No Longer,”  
https://www.americasquarterly.org/content/president-no-longer.   
720O’Donnell, Delegative Democracy, 68. 
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different types of human rights violations in Latin America that were described above. This 
study argues that, while strong inter-American review is more suitable for reviewing domestic 
legislation on civil and political rights, weak review might be the best form of decision-making 
in cases involving socioeconomic rights. This mixed-form theory is in principle against the 
practice of strong-form review in cases involving socioeconomic rights, which is the approach 
that the IACtHR will likely adopt based on the evolution of inter-American case law on these 
rights. Yet, before addressing the theory of weak judicial review and its usefulness for domestic 
and inter-American human rights law, it is worth addressing a major counter-argument with 
regard to the distinction between civil and socioeconomic rights. 
 
When distinguishing between civil and socioeconomic rights, the concepts of positive 
and negative duties are usually taken as decisive elements. According to this interpretation, 
civil rights primarily demand that state authorities refrain from action (e.g., the right to freedom 
of speech), while socioeconomic rights demand a proactive attitude from the state (e.g., the 
right to education). For some legal scholars, this rights typology based on positive and negative 
duties might sound old-fashioned for several reasons. First, there is the fact that civil rights 
enforcement might also require a proactive attitude from state authorities. Beyond the fact that 
rights enforcement more often than not overlaps these different categories of rights, some 
scholars avoid the distinction between civil and socioeconomic rights for another good reason. 
When differentiating between civil and socioeconomic rights, some scholars have implied that 
only the former could be judicially enforceable, while the latter would have a programmatic 
character. When lawyers oppose the traditional rights typology, they usually do so because they 
resist the interpretation that socioeconomic rights should be taken only as intentions to promote 
collective welfare. In effect, they oppose any kind of hierarchy between those rights and aim at 
giving socioeconomic rights more authority. As some scholars have noted, this has been 
hindered by the traditional distinction to civil and political rights. According to the 1993 Vienna 
Declaration on Human Rights, “all human rights are universal, indivisible, interdependent and 
interrelated.”721 This provision is often cited as an argument that socioeconomic rights should 
enjoy equal authority with civil rights.722 
 
It is true that rights enforcement usually fails to draw strict lines between categories of 
rights and that the distinction between civil and socioeconomic rights has often led to the 
                                                 
7211993 Vienna Declaration on Human Rights, art. 5. 
722See, for instance: Sandra Fredman, Human Rights Transformed: Positive Rights and Positive Duties, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008). 
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interpretation that the latter should not be judicially enforceable. Nevertheless, the distinction 
is not useless if we consider the evolution of inter-American human rights legislation and 
jurisprudence. This is the main reason why this study insists on this distinction within the theory 
of mixed-form inter-American judicial review. This theory is based on the contemporary 
challenges associated with the judicial enforcement of different rights claims. It does not state 
that socioeconomic rights have a programmatic character, but it does claim that their 
enforcement is more difficult and might probably demand more from a multi-institutional 
approach. There are many factors responsible for that, but a prominent one is the lack of settled 
understandings about legislation and jurisprudence on socioeconomic rights within the inter-
American framework for human rights enforcement. 
 
Civil and political rights claims might be easier to settle based on the substantial existent 
material regarding their interpretation. By contrast, the judicial enforcement of socioeconomic 
rights is a new feature of constitutional democracies and even more recent in international 
contexts of adjudication. The judicial enforcement of socioeconomic rights is triggered by 
recent transformative constitutions at the domestic level. These new constitutions have a 
substantial catalogue of social rights and courts have started to directly enforce them by means 
of constitutional interpretation. At the inter-American level, the evolution of documents on 
socioeconomic rights is also a recent feature of inter-American human rights legislation. Due 
to this late evolution, courts might necessarily have to adopt weak-form judicial review in order 
to cope with the challenges associated with socioeconomic rights enforcement.  
 
 In the following sections, this chapter will first introduce the theory of weak judicial 
review in more general terms. Then, it will trace the approaches within legal scholarship that 
best fit what it is meant by weak judicial review as a system thought based on the challenges to 
judicially enforcing socioeconomic rights. After that, this chapter will discuss the legitimacy 
and effectiveness of weak judicial review in the domestic and international contexts of 
adjudication. Finally, this chapter will address inter-American judicial review allocation, i.e., 
when strong inter-American review is more appropriate and when weak review might be the 






6.2.1.  The theory of weak judicial review 
 
As Chapter IV has explained, the strong judicial review of legislation might not always 
seem a reliable option due to the problems with its legitimacy and effectiveness. Based on that, 
lawyers may be tempted to turn their attention to theories of weaker forms of judicial review. 
For some lawyers, weak judicial review has the potential to reconcile judicial lawmaking with 
democratic legitimacy, given that courts may adopt a dialogic form of decision-making and will 
not necessarily have a final say on the disputed issue. Moreover, weak judicial review could 
increase the effectiveness of judicial decisions, given that it relies on institutions beyond the 
judiciary to settle complex disputes.  
  
The theory of weak judicial review was first developed by Steven Gardbaum in his 
studies of constitutional law in some Commonwealth countries.723 For him, new development 
in constitutionalism in countries like Canada, New Zealand, and especially in the UK might 
offer a third way out of the “bipolar universe” of legislative against judicial supremacy. This 
third way is also an intermediate and hybrid way of inter-institutional communication. Within 
systems of weak review, political and judicial rights review are combined. According to his 
description of weak judicial review, a piece of legislation is first submitted to a pre-enactment 
political rights review; later, it can be judicially reviewed and, finally, it goes back to 
legislatures for a post-enactment political rights review.724 Gardbaum has emphasized that the 
third stage is central to weak review systems, since the last say on a piece of legislation is 
granted to legislatures. Based on that, weak review systems preserve judicial review as a 
controlling mechanism of legislative failures but also decouple constitutional review from 
judicial supremacy.725 
 
The UK has represented an important example of a weak review system since the 
enactment of the UK Human Rights Act (HRA) in 1998. According to Section 4 HRA, courts 
are able to issue a “declaration of incompatibility” between primary legislation and the HRA.726 
Nevertheless, according to subsection 6, this declaration of incompatibility “does not affect the 
                                                 
723Steven Gardbaum, The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism: Theory and Practice, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013).  
724“In essence, the new Commonwealth model of constitutionalism consists in the combination of two novel 
techniques for protecting rights. These are mandatory pre-enactment political rights review and weak-form judicial 
review.” Ibid, 25. 
725“The critical, and distinctive, hybrid feature of the new model is the legislative power to override the exercise 
of constitutional review of legislation by the courts.” Ibid, 45.  
7261998 UK HRA.  
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validity, continuing operation or enforcement of” primary legislation, nor is it “binding on the 
parties to the proceedings in which it is made.”727 The new system of judicial review established 
by the HRA is a conciliatory system between legislative and judicial lawmaking and, therefore, 
it is illustrative of weak judicial review in practice.  
 
There have been critical approaches to Gardbaum’s judicial review typology. Aileen 
Kavanagh, for instance, has called it an “unreliable and misleading way of categorizing 
systems.”728 For her, the strong-form/weak-form typology is “shallow” because it focuses on 
formal features of constitutional orders and ignores a “broader political and constitutional 
context;”729 it is also “narrow” because it measures the strength of judicial review in terms of 
the final word to strike down pieces of legislation.730 It is worth responding to Kavanagh’s 
critical points, since this response strengthens the arguments in favor of the usefulness of the 
distinction between strong and weak judicial review.  
 
Kavanagh is right when she takes a “hard look at the last word”731 as a defining feature 
of Gardbaum’s model. Nevertheless, her arguments have a problematic empirical focus. She 
has claimed that provisions like the declaration of incompatibility in the UK have “fallen into 
desuetude” due to their non-use: “If the aim of these provisions was to give the legislature ‘the 
last word’, it is hard not to conclude that they are not working.”732 She has also pointed out the 
confusion between the descriptive and normative approaches in Gardbaum’s work, given that 
the reader cannot distinguish between what has been the constitutional practice and what 
belongs to his normative ideal model of weak judicial review. However, her empirical 
arguments do not harm the relevance of the strong-form/weak-form typology as a way of 
describing and guiding inter-institutional communication within the practice of judicial review.  
 
The value of the distinction between strong and weak judicial review does not lie in the 
final say it grants to legislatures or to courts, but in the search for a more adequate interaction 
between these institutions. The strong-form/weak-form typology comes essentially from the 
                                                 
727Ibid, Section 4, Subsection 6. 
728Aileen Kavanagh, “What’s so Weak About ‘Weak-Form Review’? A Rejoinder to Steven Gardbaum,” 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 13, no. 4, (2015), 1049–1053, 1049. Kavanagh referred to a previous 
article on this issue; see also: Aileen Kavanagh, “What’s so Weak About ‘Weak-Form Review’? The Case of the 
UK Human Rights Act 1998,” International Journal of Constitutional Law 13, no. 4, (2015), 1008-1039. 
729Kavanagh, A Rejoinder to Steven Gardbaum, 1049.  
730Ibid.  
731Aileen Kavanagh, “A Hard Look at the Last Word,” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 35, no. 4, (2015), 825-
847.  
732Ibid, 834.  
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urge to find new theoretical approaches to judicial review and its complex character in 
contemporary legal systems. Kavanagh has also pointed out that “we need to move beyond a 
preoccupation with who has the last word” and “look more closely at the institutional roles of 
the branches of the government and the ways in which these institutions combine, interact and 
influence each other when making decisions about rights.”733 Nevertheless, she has not 
addressed the question of why constitutional lawyers cannot do exactly this by distinguishing 
between weak and strong judicial review. This distinction aims exactly at the “constitutional 
division of labor between all three branches of government, where each has a distinct though 
complementary role to play.”734 By distinguishing between strong and weak review, lawyers 
are better able to focus on inter-institutional interaction and they do not necessarily need to 
focus on its final results. Theories like weak judicial review try to place courts in a more 
adequate position within domestic constitutional orders. Lawyers should no longer ignore the 
necessity to develop new theories that aim to bring more legitimacy and effectiveness to the 
practice of judicial review and focus on inter-institutional interaction in order to fulfill this task. 
 
 
6.2.2.  The legitimacy and effectiveness of weak judicial review 
 
Weak judicial review offers many advantages for the interaction between institutions 
within contemporary constitutional democracies. Within constitutional democracies, courts 
inevitably have to discuss with other institutions about constitutional rights interpretation. 
Weak judicial review might be able to put courts in a better position in this dialogue. At the 
inter-American level, it might also be able to establish more frequent and meaningful 
communication between inter-American and national authorities. The practice of weak inter-
American judicial review could, in the long run, strengthen both the work of the inter-American 
institutions and the national authorities’ commitments to human rights, democracy and the rule 
of law. This effectiveness makes weak international judicial review appealing as a form of 
decision-making for the IACtHR.  
 
Weak review is much less problematic than strong-form review with regard to 
legitimacy issues. The most notable feature of weak judicial review is that it eliminates the most 
feared consequence of the practice of the strong-form variant, i.e., judicial activism. For Mark 




Tushnet: “Weak-form systems of judicial review hold out the promise of reducing the tension 
between judicial review and democratic self-governance.”735 This is based on the dialogic 
character of weak-judicial review. Weak-form review privileges neither judicial nor legislative 
supremacy. It treats “constitutional interpretations offered by legislatures as normatively equal 
in weight to those offered by courts.”736 Tushnet has emphasized that “weak-form review 
purports to promote a real-time dialogue between courts and legislatures.”737 Although he has 
illustrated this dialogic approach with reference to cases in countries like Canada and South 
Africa, it was up to Rosalind Dixon to theoretically address the dialogic character of weak 
review in more general terms.738  
 
Dixon has claimed that weak judicial review can help counter inherent blind spots and 
burdens of inertia in the ordinary legislative process. For her, “even well-functioning legislative 
processes are routinely subject to blockages.”739 Courts are, on the one hand, well-positioned 
to counter these blockages and, on the other hand, not necessarily dependent on strong judicial 
review for this task. She has claimed that the burdens of inertia and blind spots are not 
pathologies, but something ordinarily present in normally functioning democracies.740 
Legislative blind spots may happen due to the time-pressured nature of legislative deliberation 
and the burdens of inertia refer to the ordinary dynamic of legislative bodies that work based 
on priority- and coalition-driven agendas. Courts are well positioned to cope with these 
blockages, since they possess the necessary expertise and institutional framework to do so and 
given that they are entirely “free of direct partisan pressure” when considering particular 
issues.741 Furthermore, courts do not necessarily need to rely on strong judicial review to face 
legislative blind spots and the burdens of inertia. Dixon has argued that, in case of legislative 
blind spots, “courts will often need simply to draw the attention of legislators to instances of 
unintended or unnecessary rights infringement, and legislatures will then seek to pass corrective 
legislation for future cases.”742 In case of burdens of inertia, she has argued that “courts will 
need either to draw greater media and public attention to an issue, or change the legal default 
in a way that recasts the effects of burdens of inertia within the legislative process.”743  
                                                 
735Mark Tushnet, Weak Courts, Strong Rights, 23. 
736Ibid, 36. 
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Tushnet and Dixon’s approaches to domestic weak review might sharpen the conception 
of weak inter-American judicial review. Weak inter-American judicial review might promote 
more frequent and meaningful interaction between inter-American and national authorities 
regarding human rights protection by means of legislation. In fact, the introduction of weak 
review into inter-American jurisprudence seems essential for the progressive enforcement of 
inter-American human rights law, more specifically with regard to the direct enforcement of 
socioeconomic rights. This chapter will later address the usefulness of weak review for inter-
American socioeconomic rights adjudication. For now, it is worth addressing the type of inter-
institutional interaction that decision-making within weak review systems can provide. Weak-
form review might bring different institutions together for the task of rights enforcement. This 
means that the IACtHR can work together with national legislatures, the executive and domestic 
courts and regard them as allies for the proper enforcement of inter-American human rights 
law. Even if the judicial review of legislation might cause tension between institutions, weak 
judicial review does not necessarily lead to inter-institutional conflict within the IAS. There is 
only one way for the IACtHR to promote this type of inter-institutional interaction within the 
IAS. The IACtHR may limit the practice of judicial review to what Dixon has referred to as a 
type of decision-making that is “broad, but non-final in scope.”744 It is worth addressing with 
more attention this type of decision-making, which is central to the concept of weak judicial 
review.   
 
For Dixon, the practice of weak judicial review should be “both relatively broad in scope 
ex ante, and non-final in nature ex post.”745 Gardbaum has also referred to the “judicial non-
finality” as a defining feature of weak review systems.746 These definitions of judicial decision-
making relate to how these authors understand weak review as a different relationship between 
courts and legislatures. For Dixon, the broad scope means that courts are allowed to invalidate 
statutes if they find it appropriate. The non-final character of judicial review relates to the fact 
that legislatures may override this judicial decision. She has claimed that weak review depends 
on “whether legislatures have formal power ex post to override a decision of a court to 
                                                 
744Dixon has pointed out that: “Judicial review that is truly narrow in scope may at times be too weak to counter 
the most powerful legislative blockages; whereas judicial review that is broad but non-final in scope will almost 
always be sufficient for this purpose.” Ibid, 2202.  
745Ibid, 2203. 
746Gardbaum, The New Commonwealth Model, 29. 
 184 
invalidate a particular statute.”747 In these terms, weak judicial review is a “broad but revisable 
review” (my emphasis).748  
 
At the domestic level, judicial review necessarily leads to inter-institutional dialogue. 
Both in its the strong and weak variants, legislatures necessarily have to react to the judicial 
invalidation of pieces of legislation. This should also apply to the relationship between the 
IACtHR and national authorities. Weak review relies on a dialogic inter-institutional approach, 
in which courts refuse to have the final say when reviewing a statute and might accept the final 
solution adopted by the national legislature. The broad but revisable form of decision-making 
is particularly useful for the inter-American judicial enforcement of matters that have not been 
sufficiently addressed by inter-American human rights documents, e.g., socioeconomic rights. 
This form of decision-making might help inter-American judicial authorities to discuss more 
with domestic authorities about these matters. By practicing weak judicial review, the IACtHR 
may even invalidate a domestic statute pertaining to socioeconomic rights but it should later 
refer the issue to national legislatures so that they can practice the final phase of political rights 
review. This multi-institutional approach might improve the legitimacy and effectiveness of the 
direct enforcement of socioeconomic rights, at least under the contemporary form of inter-
American human rights law.  
 
Some scholars have argued that socioeconomic rights demand weak judicial review 
because they are more complex to enforce than civil and political rights. Mark Tushnet has 
explained that the judicial enforcement of socioeconomic rights must cope with “polycentric 
problems.”749 He has borrowed this term from Lon Fuller and Kenneth Winston, who claimed 
that polycentric situations involve many interrelated issues that could challenge the likelihood 
of judicial enforcement.750 Tushnet has claimed that socioeconomic rights pose polycentric 
problems to courts because “they are far less directive” than civil and political rights.751 For 
him, they usually “identify a general area of concern and require that the government do 
something in the area, without initially specifying in much detail what must be done.”752  
                                                 
747Dixon, The Core Case for Weak-Form Review, 2202. 
748Ibid, 2203.  
749See: Mark Tushnet, “The Inadequacy of Judicial Enforcement of Constitutional Rights Provisions to Rectify 
Economic Inequality, and the Inevitability of the Attempt,” Harvard Public Law Working Paper No. 18-25, (2018), 
available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3123085. 
750Lon Fuller, Kenneth I. Winston, “The Forms and Limits of Adjudication,” Harvard Law Review 92, no. 2, 
(1978), 353-409. On this type of polycentricity related to socioeconomic rights judicial enforcement, see also: Jeff 
King, “Polycentricity,” in Judging Social Rights, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 189-210. 




Tushnet has referred to socioeconomic rights as polycentric issues when arguing that 
weak review is the most appropriate way to enforce them judicially. One example is when a 
court settles a case that involves the claim that the state should cover the costs of expensive 
medicine based on the constitutional right to health. In order to settle the case, the court is 
supposed to deal with highly complex material like domestic fiscal policies and their sensitive 
effects on the enforcement of the right to health. This illustrates how courts do not possess the 
institutional capability to address many questions involved with the enforcement of 
socioeconomic rights in a definite way, at least not in the contemporary form of constitutional 
democracies. Besides being illegitimate, the practice of strong review with regard to 
socioeconomic rights legislation is barely effective. Courts are, therefore, forced to interact with 
legislatures, which are the institutions that rule over issues like public spending. Although 
courts might dare to address polycentric issues, they necessarily need to interact with other 
institutions when doing so. If they opt for strong judicial review, they might cause inter-
institutional conflicts or even risk crossing the limitations of judicial enforcement power. How 
could courts order public spending when they lack the knowledge of how much state authorities 
are even able to spend?  
 
Even if legal scholars might doubt this interpretation of the special nature of 
socioeconomic rights enforcement, it is hard to deny that these rights are far less directive than 
civil and political rights due to the lack of legislation and jurisprudence regarding them. This is 
especially true with respect to inter-American human rights law. It is based on this fact that 
socioeconomic rights might, at least in the contemporary form of inter-American human rights 
law, demand more inter-institutional interaction. The need for a multi-institutional approach 
intuitively makes weak judicial review the best option for the IACtHR. This study will return 
to this argument later under the analysis of the inter-American practice of weak judicial review. 
 
 
6.2.3. Comparing strong and weak international judicial review 
 
The concepts of strong and weak judicial review are easier to understand when they are 
compared to each other. The weak form is called dialogic, while the strong form is called 
authoritative or final. In this section, this study focuses on comparing their international 
variants. As Basak Çali and Anne Koch have pointed out, international human rights courts 
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“typically do not have the power to enforce their judgements or to strike out domestic legislation 
the way their domestic counterparts have.”753 Based on this fact, they have argued that we can 
make only an analogical use of the distinction between weak and strong review when referring 
to international human rights adjudication. In line with this, they have distinguished between 
weak, intermediate and strong international judicial review based on the level of intrusiveness 
and specialization of the ordered measures and whether the international court follows 
compliance with the judgement. However, based on the description of weak judicial review in 
this chapter, it is possible to distinguish between weak and strong international judicial review 
based on their different modes of inter-institutional interaction within the regional system for 
human rights protection.  
 
Within weak international judicial review, domestic legislatures may be able to override 
an international court’s decision on a particular statute. In contrast, strong international judicial 
review might establish final interpretations on the validity of statutes based on international 
documents. When an international court practices strong judicial review, it does not defer to 
national authorities’ interpretations of the matter. This lends this type of decision-making a final 
character. Due to this final character, strong international judicial review does not promote 
debate between the international human rights court and national authorities about the validity 
of a specific statute. When practicing weak international judicial review, the international court 
may afford national authorities greater discretion with regard to the general measures that are 
necessary to solve the human rights violations involved in a case. As we have seen with regard 
to ECtHR jurisprudence in the last chapter, these general measures can involve amending 
domestic legislation. However, even if the international court has ordered national authorities 
to amend domestic legislation to avoid future violations of the convention, the political review 
of legislation by the national legislature still remains the most important phase. 
 
Strong international judicial review has prompted much debate because it may involve 
the invalidation of domestic statutes by international courts. This is what the IACtHR has done 
with regard to amnesty laws within the IAS. The IACtHR has established conventionality 
control as a means to strike down amnesty laws that had been, according to the court, 
inappropriately adopted by national authorities within domestic law. This decision was 
resolutive and it was not supposed to be discussed by national authorities (i.e., courts and the 
                                                 
753Başak Çali, Anne Koch, “Explaining Compliance: Lessons from Civil and Political Rights,” in Social Rights 
Judgements and the Politics of Compliance. Making it Stick, eds. Malcolm Langford, César Rodríguez-Garavito, 
Julieta Rossi, (Cambridge et al.: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 43-74, 56. 
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national legislature). By contrast, weak international judicial review primarily involves the 
review of the (in-)compatibility of domestic law with international law. Weak international 
judicial review could be adopted by the IACtHR in order to establish that a given domestic 
statute is incompatible with inter-American human rights legislation. However, the IACtHR 
should limit its powers to declaring this incompatibility and refer the statute back to its national 
legislature. The legislature could then proceed to politically review the statute, taking this 
judicial decision as a meaningful reference point.  
 
Both forms of international judicial review also differ in their aims. International 
authorities may praise the consistency of existing international legislation and jurisprudence by 
practicing strong judicial review of domestic law. Weak judicial review, in contrast, might 
create more interaction between institutions when debating legislation. Authorities may opt for 
dialogue because they do not have a final solution for the disputed issue. This relates to what 
Tushnet has described as the experimentalist character of weak judicial review, i.e., that it “may 
be appropriate when genuine uncertainty exists in the relevant community about what some 
constitutional provision really means.”754 While strong review might emphasize the authority 
of existent legislation and jurisprudence as a way of reaffirming them as the right answer when 
discussing a specific statute, weak judicial review might seek new solutions with regard to a 
piece of legislation.  
 
Strong review should, at least in principle, have a limited scope, while the weak variant 
can adopt a broader scope. The limited scope of strong review is based on the fact that courts 
have to make narrow decisions. An authoritative judicial attitude usually demands that courts 
be specific in what exactly they want with regard to a statute. To do so, they necessarily have 
to limit the scope of judicial review, at least if they want authorities to comply with the decision. 
Within weak judicial review, in contrast, courts may address burdens of inertia and blind spots 
of legislation in a specific way, but they do not necessarily need to limit its scope to specific 
issues. International courts may declare statutes incompatible with an international convention 
and refer the issue to the domestic legislature for it to adopt further necessary measures. This 
does not mean that weak judicial review is vague, it just means that international authorities 
might dare to address more general issues and point to inconsistencies that can be more 
concretely addressed later by domestic legislatures.  
 
                                                 
754Tushnet, Weak Courts, Strong Rights, 66-67. 
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It is worth underscoring that broad-scope weak international judicial review enables the 
IACtHR to address the blind spots of domestic legislation and the burdens of inertia of national 
legislatures. Beyond declaring that a domestic statute is incompatible with the ACHR, the 
IACtHR can notify national legislators of these ordinary legislative pathologies and demand 
that they, in a reasonable time frame, amend legislation in order to comply with the inter-
American human rights regime on the disputed matters. In contrast to Çali and Koch’s typology 
of international judicial review, nothings stands in the way of the IACtHR closely monitoring 
compliance with a given judgement when practicing weak international judicial review. In fact, 
if weak international judicial review intends to promote more inter-institutional interaction 
within the IAS, monitoring compliance is the most effective way of maintaining dialogue 
between these institutions for a longer period until new legislation is adopted by national 
legislatures. 
 
A last comparative issue relates to the usefulness of judicial review. Strong international 
review might be more effective for the pieces of legislation relating to civil and political rights, 
while weak-form review seems to be more effective for reviewing legislation on socioeconomic 
rights. As this study has already explained, this is not related to the programmatic character of 
socioeconomic rights, but it is related to the challenge that these rights pose to legislatures and 
courts. This argument is mainly based on the late introduction of socioeconomic rights into 
legislation and jurisprudence at the national and international levels. Lawmakers and courts 
have much more experience with legislation on and enforcement of civil and political rights 
than they have with socioeconomic rights. Due to the greater difficulties of enforcing 
socioeconomic rights, international courts should limit their authority to the weak judicial 
review of domestic legislation pertaining to these rights. By doing so, judicial decision-making 
becomes more legitimate, since the lack of legislation and precedents on these rights inevitably 
leads to the practice of judicial activism. Moreover, weak international judicial review can make 
socioeconomic rights adjudication more effective because it engages other institutions like 
national legislatures on the interpretation and enforcement of these rights. This is particularly 







6.2.4. The unavoidable allocation problems of mixed-form judicial review  
 
The mixed-form theory of judicial review shares the concern of some constitutional 
lawyers regarding the issue that some legal systems might not offer the best form of the inter-
institutional interaction brought about by the practice of judicial review. Mattias Kumm, for 
instance, has pointed out that super-weak or super-strong systems are not appropriate forms of 
judicial review institutionalization.755 He has argued that some weak systems, like the UK’s, 
might not provide the best form of institutional relationship between courts and legislatures, 
given that courts cannot provide the minimal remedy of declaring legislation illegal or not 
applicable to the claimant.756 For him, judicial review systems like the system in the UK are 
too weak. On the other hand, the US system of judicial review also does not offer the best 
institutional alternative, given that the “decisions by the Supreme Court are extremely hard to 
overturn and judges have an inappropriately central role to play in the overall constitutional 
process.”757 This system is arguably too strong.  
 
Kumm has claimed that if the system is too weak, constitutional lawyers must address 
the problems involved in electoral authoritarianism; in a super-strong system, they must address 
the problems associated with juristocracy.758 In line with this, he has advocated for reforms of 
judicial review systems “towards appropriately institutionalizing contestatory rights against 
legislative majorities, while avoiding the pitfalls of juristocracy.”759 However, similar to Aileen 
Kavanagh, Kumm has described the conventional distinction between weak and strong review 
as irrelevant for addressing the most problematic issues regarding the institutionalization of 
judicial review in contemporary liberal democracies.760  
 
This study has already explained why these categories of weak and strong review might 
be useful for lawyers seeking the most appropriate form of inter-institutional relationship 
between courts and legislatures. When applied to inter-American human rights jurisprudence, 
                                                 
755Mattias Kumm, “Constitutional Courts and Legislatures. Institutional Terms of Engagement,” Católica Law 
Review 2, no. 1, (2017), 55-66. 
756Given this fact, Kumm has affirmed that the UK system “raises concerns that disqualifies it as an appropriate 
institutionalization of citizens contestatory rights.” Ibid, 64. 
757Ibid. This central role is due to factors like the burdensome regulation of constitutional amendments in the US 
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759Ibid, 66.  
760Ibid. 
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these categories offer another advantage: they can become a pedagogical instrument that is able 
to change the legal culture of international human rights judicial enforcement in Latin America. 
Distinguishing between strong and weak judicial review enables legal scholars to outline ways 
in which these systems can meet halfway. Moreover, this distinction can serve as a pedagogical 
tool to change a legal culture of human rights enforcement that has mostly been used to practice 
strong international judicial review in cases of conflicts between domestic and international 
human rights norms. In line with this argument, mixed-form judicial review embodies the 
normative ideal of inter-institutional interaction between the IACtHR and domestic authorities 
within the IAS.  
 
It is true that judicial review systems around the globe present much more complex 
elements than the categories of strong and weak systems are able to describe. It is also largely 
true that several important factors play an essential role in the appropriate institutionalization 
of judicial review. However, it is debatable whether these different categories cannot be used 
to change the legal culture of the institutional terms of engagement between domestic and 
international human rights authorities. In a nutshell, changing the legal culture of dependency 
on strong-form inter-American judicial review is the most salient reason for describing the most 
salient features of weak judicial review and for introducing it into inter-American 
jurisprudence. This gives rise to a major problem that mixed-form theory has to address, as this 
study explains in the following. 
 
Every theory of blended-form judicial review must deal with what Mark Tushnet has 
called problems with allocation, i.e., determining when strong review is most adequate or when 
weak review is the best option for courts.761 Due to this major obstacle, he has argued that the 
best option for legal scholars is to opt for a general theory of weak judicial review within 
domestic constitutional orders.762 Based on Tushnet’s analysis, a general theory of weak 
international judicial review could arguably be useful for the IACtHR as well. Addressing 
human rights systems in general, Richard Bellamy has also argued that the authority of 
                                                 
761Mark Tushnet has noted the difficulty of mixed-form theories: “Perhaps there could be strong-form review with 
respect to some constitutional issues, weak form review with respect to others. (…) The first problem with such a 
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criteria for allocating issues to weak- and strong-form review (…) is particularly difficult.” Tushnet, Weak Courts, 
Strong Rights, 36.  
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can be stably sustained – may indeed be the best institutional mechanism for enforcing all fundamental rights, 
first-, second-, and third-generation” (emphasis in the original); Ibid, 228.  
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international human rights courts should be restricted to weak review in order to ensure that 
regional systems gain more democratic legitimacy.763 For him, the democratic features of 
constitutional orders can be useful for holding adjudication accountable. Given that law may 
fall prey to arbitrary decisions and reflect only the views of particular groups with privileged 
access to the legal system, the legitimacy of the judicial decisions should rest on their 
concurrence with democratically established interpretations.   
 
International human rights courts would be compatible with Bellamy’s political 
constitutionalism if they only practice weak review,764 which allows the international system 
of human rights protection to be subjected to democratic political control within domestic 
legislative processes.765 The principles of Bellamy’s political constitutionalism lead to an 
institutional model for regional human rights systems based on a “two-level political 
constitution.”766 Within this model, “the voluntary and fair association among democratic 
states” translates into “a political constitution at the international level,” which renders 
decisions by the regional court and commission “subject to the democratic authorization and 
accountability of the representatives of the contracting democratic states, who are in their turn 
democratically authorized and accountable to those they represent through a political 
constitution at the domestic level.”767 For Bellamy, this two-level model could solve the 
legitimacy problem between the domestic and the international levels within a regional system 
of human rights protection.  
 
What Tushnet has proposed for domestic constitutional orders and Bellamy for regional 
systems, i.e., restricting rights adjudication to the practice of weak review, might not be the best 
option for the IACtHR for a number of reasons. First, the difficulties Tushnet has mentioned 
with regard to allocation issues might be addressed in a principled way based on the evolution 
of inter-American human rights law. Second, and more related to Bellamy’s argument, adopting 
weak review as the only form of inter-American judicial review could have severe 
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consequences for human rights enforcement in Latin America. As the initial parts of this chapter 
have explained, state-perpetrated authoritarian practices and the systematic underenforcement 
of socioeconomic rights are among the most prominent features of the Latin American human 
rights enforcement context. For this reason, the IACtHR should not become an accomplice to 
these systematic state-perpetrated human rights violations. Limiting international human rights 
jurisprudence to the practice of weak judicial review would certainly put the IACtHR in this 
position. 
 
  Tushnet is right when he affirms that problems with allocation are central to blended-
form theories of judicial review. Moreover, as this study has concluded in the last chapter, 
theories of judicial review should adopt a context-based approach. It is not possible to propose 
a theory of international human rights adjudication without considering the evolution of human 
rights legislation and practice in a particular context. In line with this, this study will now 
address the legitimacy and effectiveness of the strong and of the weak variants of judicial 
review based on the Latin American human rights enforcement context. Within this context, it 
is plausible to limit the practice of strong inter-American judicial review to flagrant violations 
of inter-American human rights law on civil and political rights. In contrast, the traditional 
absence of inter-American legislation and case law on socioeconomic rights leads us to the 
argument that the IACtHR should practice weak inter-American judicial review in cases 
involving these rights. 
 
 
6.3.  Inter-American judicial review allocation  
 
6.3.1. Strong inter-American judicial review 
 
One major problem with the practice of strong inter-American judicial review is the 
misconception that it will necessarily lead to backlash within the IAS. Backlash may range from 
domestic opposition to inter-American reports and decisions to even more drastic scenarios, 
such as the withdrawal from inter-American treaties or retreat from regional organizational 
membership. The threat of backlash has always been a sensitive topic for international courts, 
whose proper existence relies on state membership and compliance. Massive retreat from 
regional organizational membership would certainly not strengthen the legitimacy and 
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effectiveness of any regional system. Due to its relevance to the practice of inter-American 
strong judicial review, the fear of backlash will be briefly addressed in the following.   
 
The threat of backlash followed the evolution of human rights enforcement in Latin 
America since its beginnings. The Argentinian’s government threatened to leave the OAS due 
to a 1979 IACHR report on serious human rights violations in that country.768 More recently, 
the most substantial examples of resistance to the IAS were the retreat from regional 
membership by Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela.769 Despite these examples in the IAS’s 
history, the fear of backlash should not be used as a strong argument for the IACtHR to limit 
the enforcement of inter-American human rights law to the practice of weak international 
judicial review.  
 
According to Wayne Sandholtz, Yining Bei and Kayla Caldwell, backlash is more likely 
to occur when the perceived costs of membership are rising while the perceived benefits are 
declining.770 States usually balance these costs and benefits of membership and it is difficult to 
know which factors might figure as positive or negative. For authoritarian regimes, for instance, 
the appropriate enforcement of inter-American human rights law might have a negative impact 
and there is not so much that inter-American authorities can do to change this perception. In 
the two cases of retreat from the IAS, inter-American institutions would not have been able to 
keep those countries inside the system without compromising the integrity of inter-American 
human rights law. Trinidad and Tobago left the IAS due to the disagreement around the new 
regulation of the death penalty within the IAS. This new regulation of the death penalty was 
established based on an inter-American protocol on the matter, which was signed and ratified 
by the majority of the IAS member states. Venezuela, as this chapter has already mentioned, 
has regarded the inter-American institutions as enemies of its domestic authoritarian policies 
and even opted to leave the OAS based on this biased attitude.  
 
                                                 
768“The Commission’s report on Argentina precipitated a major crisis in the OAS. It was considered by the General 
Assembly of the OAS, meeting in Washington in November 1980. The report was highly critical of the Argentine 
Government and the United States proposed a resolution condemning the violations of human rights in that 
country. Argentina threatened to leave the Organization if this was adopted, and was supported by Bolivia, Chile, 
Paraguay and Uruguay,” A.H. Robertson, J. G. Merrils, Human Rights in the World. An Introduction to the Study 
of the International Protection of Human Rights, 4th ed., (Manchester, New York: Manchester University Press, 
1996), 208. 
769Trinidad and Tobago withdrew from the IAS in 1998, Venezuela in 2012.  
770Wayne Sandholtz, Yining Bei and Kayla Caldwell, “Backlash and International Human Rights Courts,” in 
Contracting Human Rights. Crisis, Accountability and Opportunity, eds. Alison Brysk, Michael Stohl, 
(Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2018), 159-178. 
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If backlash should not represent a meaningful counter-argument, the consequent 
question is what should guide the practice of strong inter-American judicial review. Strong 
judicial review greatly affects the multilevel inter-institutional interaction within the IAS. It 
represents the empowerment of the IACtHR at the expense of both national legislative 
authorities and the most authoritative domestic courts, which were previously the only 
institutions responsible for amending domestic legislation. When addressing the 
institutionalization of judicial review at the domestic level, Mattias Kumm has questioned 
which circumstances could justify the empowerment of a constitutional court to invalidate even 
constitutional norms, as it has been the case in Germany.771 Similarly to this domestic debate, 
there has also to be conditions and justifications for an international human rights court to 
practice strong judicial review.  
 
Chapter IV has explained how the justification for strengthening international 
institutions relate to the rise of global constitutionalism within constitutional law scholarship. 
Before addressing how global constitutionalism applies to the specific context of human rights 
practice in Latin America, it is worth remembering what has been said about constitutional 
lawyers’ turn to global constitutionalism in that chapter. The turn to global constitutionalism 
has arisen due to some constitutional lawyers’ skepticism about the idea that domestic 
constitutional norms could alone guarantee the legitimate exercise of public authority. 
International law is arguably necessary so that the protection of rights at the international level 
does not leave individuals to the mercy of constitutional norms drafters and interpreters.772 
Strengthening international institutions should be every national government’s duty in face of 
the “failures and risks of the sovereign-state system,”773 at least in the contemporary form of 
the international legal order. This duty is arguably “the most general structural principle and 
interpretative background of international law.”774      
 
How does this structural principle of international law according to global 
constitutionalism apply to the relationship between Latin American countries and the inter-
American institutions for human rights protection? Domestic governments have traditionally 
presented many challenges to the consistent evolution of democracy, the rule of law, and human 
                                                 
771Mattias Kumm, “Constitutional Courts and Legislatures. Institutional Terms of Engagement,” Católica Law 
Review 2, no. 1, (2017), 64-65. 
772Alon Harel, Why Law Matters (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 185-190. 
773Ronald Dworkin, “A New Philosophy for International Law,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 41, no. 1, (2013), 2-
30, 19.    
774Ibid. 
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rights protection in the region. The most recent Latin American wave of democratization in the 
late 1980s changed the relationship between the domestic and international institutions within 
the IAS. As we have seen in Chapter I, democratization was one of the factors responsible for 
the emergence of cosmopolitan constitutionalism in Latin American constitutional law. The last 
few decades have seen the empowerment of the inter-American human rights institutions from 
the bottom-up. National institutions have gradually afforded greater authority to the regional 
commission and the regional court within domestic law. This bottom-up empowerment of inter-
American institutions has, in fact, been in accordance with the structural principle of 
international law according to global constitutionalism. However, this last democratization 
process no longer seems capable of guaranteeing the appropriate evolution of human rights 
protection in some Latin American countries.  
 
As the present chapter has already explained, the region is now witnessing a new wave 
of authoritarianism, which has involved serious human rights violations in some countries, like 
Venezuela and Nicaragua.  One way out of this vicious cycle of authoritarianism is arguably to 
empower international institutions like the inter-American human rights institutions. Given that 
authoritarian countries will not keep on empowering these institutions through the bottom-up 
relationship,775 the IACtHR should be allowed to retain its strong powers against authoritarian 
legislation by practicing strong international judicial review. The inter-American institutions 
should not passively stand by as human rights protection is eroded in Latin American countries. 
They should not leave individuals to the mercy of authoritarian governments, which are 
currently among the drafters and interpreters of some Latin American constitutions.   
 
As Chapter IV has also generally explained, the IACtHR has the potential to serve as a 
control body against the adoption of authoritarian legislation in Latin American countries. 
Authoritarian governments typically change the constitutional order in order to subvert the rule 
of law to their political endeavors. Unsurprisingly, many of these political endeavors go against 
the established interpretations of the international conventions on human rights. In fact, how 
could authoritarian governments justify that the political intimidation of the opposition does 
not go against any reasonable interpretation of the ACHR provisions, most of them regarding 
the protection of civil and political rights? They simply cannot offer this justification; this is 
                                                 
775A good question is whether domestic courts could continue interacting with international human rights 
authorities despite the rule of an authoritarian government. Given that authoritarian rulers in Latin American 
countries have frequently interfered with the separation of powers, it seems implausible that courts could do it. 
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why Latin American authoritarian governments have commonly opposed the work of 
international human rights institutions. 
 
However, the defining question here is not what the IACtHR is supposed to do as a 
control body against domestic authoritarianism but how the court should fulfill this task without 
transforming human rights protection within the IAS into a type of international juristocracy. 
If the state-perpetrated authoritarian practices can justify the practice of strong inter-American 
judicial review, the political and legal outcomes of the multilevel inter-institutional interaction 
should guide this strong review within inter-American human rights jurisprudence. There are 
two basic principles that can guide the work of the different institutions involved in the practice 
of strong inter-American judicial review: the principle of the dignity of inter-American 
legislation and the principle of salience. The first relates primarily to the legitimacy of strong 
inter-American judicial review, while the second relates to guaranteeing its effectiveness within 
domestic law.   
 
The evolution of inter-American human rights legislation is arguably the first prominent 
outcome of the multilevel inter-institutional interaction within the IAS. Based on this, inter-
American legislation should guide the practice of strong inter-American judicial review. Due 
to the evolutive character of inter-American human rights legislation over time, the IACtHR 
might be able to limit the practice of strong judicial review to cases involving flagrant violations 
of civil and political rights. This greater attention to inter-American human rights legislation 
relates to what Jeremy Waldron has called “the dignity of legislation,”776 i.e., presenting 
legislation as a “dignified form of governance and a respectable source of law.”777 His argument 
helps us to understand how inter-American legislation is able to provide a legal basis for the 
practice strong inter-American judicial review.  
 
Waldron has called attention to the fact that jurisprudential approaches frequently ignore 
the value of legislation as a democratic source of law and tend to focus on what courts do.778 
He has intended to change how legal scholars perceive legislation because he opposes the 
practice of judicial review within domestic law. However, when applied to the relationship 
                                                 
776This argument can be found in: Jeremy Waldron, The Dignity of Legislation, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999). It can also be found in: Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999), 19-146.  
777Waldron, The Dignity of Legislation, 2 
778For him, jurisprudence usually “presents ordinary legislative activity as deal-making, horse-trading, log-rolling, 
interest-pandering, and pork-barreling – as anything, indeed, except principled political decision-making.” Ibid. 
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between domestic and inter-American human rights authorities, the principle of the dignity of 
legislation might have an opposite effect, i.e., it can justify the practice of strong inter-American 
judicial review. In this case, inter-American human rights legislation might serve as a legal 
basis for the practice of strong judicial review of inconsistent domestic legislation. 
  
Due to the legislative character of human rights treaties,779 the principle of the dignity 
of legislation should also apply to inter-American human rights law. When addressing the 
practice of judicial review within domestic law, Waldron himself has claimed that “it may still 
be the case that judicial review is necessary as a protective measure against legislative 
pathologies”780 and that there are cases “in which judicial review might be deemed appropriate 
as an anomalous provision to deal with special pathologies.”781 The pathology within the 
relationship between national and inter-American authorities consists in the fact that the 
national authorities, especially under the rule of authoritarian governments, systematically 
violate inter-American human rights law, despite having ratified it within the procedures 
established for IAS member states.  
 
Latin American countries have been opportunistic ratifiers of international human rights 
legislation.782 This opportunistic attitude justifies the practice of strong inter-American judicial 
review, especially with regard to those ACHR provisions that have been devoted greater 
attention in specific inter-American conventions, treaties, and protocols. It is the proper 
evolution of inter-American human rights legislation that can reveal when domestic authorities 
are flagrantly violating inter-American human rights law. The practice of strong review should 
therefore be directly based on inter-American legislation that was ratified by the national 
authorities. When practicing strong inter-American judicial review, the IACtHR should 
consistently refer to the inter-American documents that justify this greater intrusiveness of 
                                                 
779Samantha Besson has addressed the legislative dimensions of human rights treaties; see: Samantha Besson, 
“Sources of International Human Rights Law. How General is General International Law?,” in The Oxford 
Handbook on the Sources of International Law, eds. Samantha Besson, Jean D’Aspremont, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2017), 837-870, 846-847. 
780Jeremy Waldron, “The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review,” Yale Law Journal 115, (2006), 1346-1406, 
1356. Waldron referred especially to “pathologies relating to sex, race, or religion in particular countries.” Ibid. 
781Ibid, 1359.  
782Beth Simmons has distinguished between sincere, negative and opportunistic ratifiers of international treaties. 
See these different categories in: Beth Simmons, “Theories of Commitment,” in Mobilizing for Human Rights. 
International Law in Domestic Politics, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 57-111. The 
opportunistic ratifiers simply go with the crowd in order to avoid criticism from their peers within a specific 
international system: “They may ratify for relatively immediate diplomatic rewards, to avoid criticism, or to 
ingratiate themselves with domestic groups or international audiences.” Ibid, 58. 
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remedies within international human rights jurisprudence. By doing so, the IACtHR can 
strengthen the legitimacy of the practice of strong review of domestic law within the IAS.   
 
If inter-American human rights legislation is able to legitimize the practice of strong 
inter-American judicial review of domestic laws, then it probably merits more attention from 
us. The development in inter-American human rights legislation has focused on the protection 
of civil and political rights. These rights are the protagonists of the ACHR, which only 
indirectly relates to socioeconomic rights. Civil and political rights are also the subject of the 
majority of the inter-American conventions that have been adopted and ratified by the IAS 
member states. Inter-American documents focusing on the protection of civil and political 
rights include the inter-American conventions: i) on Extradition (1981), ii) to Prevent and 
Punish Torture (1985), iii) the Protocol to Abolish the Death Penalty (1990), iv) the convention 
on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence against Women (1994), v) on the 
Forced Disappearance of Persons (1994), vi) on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Persons with Disabilities (1999), vii) against Racism, Racial Discrimination and 
Related Forms of Intolerance (2013); and, finally, the convention viii) against All Forms of 
Discrimination and Intolerance (2013). 
 
Beyond these documents, in 2001 the OAS adopted the Inter-American Democratic 
Charter, which established that democracy is a right of the peoples of the Americas and that 
governments have an obligation to promote and defend it.783 Among essential elements of 
representative democracy the charter included “the holding of periodic, free and fair elections 
based on secret balloting and universal suffrage,” together with “the pluralistic system of 
political parties and organizations, and the separation of powers and independence of the 
branches of government.”784 The charter also established the possibility of a suspension from 
the participation in the OAS in case of “an unconstitutional interruption of the democratic order 
of a member state.”785 The inter-American focus on the protection of civil and political rights 
can also be observed in the creation of Special Rapporteurships by the regional commission 
(IACHR). Most of these special authorities are involved with the protection of civil and political 
rights. They include the IACHR Special Rapporteurships:  on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
(1990), on the Rights of Women (1994), on the Rights of Migrants (1996), for Freedom of 
Expression (1997), on Human Rights Defenders (2001), on the Rights of Persons Deprived of 
                                                 
783Inter-American Democratic Charter, art. 1. 
784Ibid, art. 3. 
785Ibid, art. 21. 
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Liberty (2004), on the Rights of Afro-Descendants and Against Racial Discrimination (2005); 
and, finally, on the Rights of Lesbian, Gay, Trans, Bisexual , and Intersex Persons (2011). 
  
This major concern with the protection of civil and political rights has also had 
consequences for the evolution of inter-American human rights jurisprudence. As Chapter III 
has explained, the IACtHR initially focused on the enforcement of civil and political rights after 
the establishment of new democracies in the region. This period of inter-American 
jurisprudence has been described as the transitional justice phase, which later was replaced by 
the contemporary phase of transformative justice. During the transitional justice phase, the 
IACtHR established conventionality control as a form of strong inter-American judicial review 
of domestic legislation, which, according to the court, involved violations of the civil and 
political rights within the ACHR.  
 
Yet, there is a remaining apparent contradiction with this argument for the strong 
authority of inter-American human rights legislation. When conventionality control was 
established by the IACtHR, it was not mentioned by any inter-American human rights 
document. In contrast to domestic judicial review, which is now established in different ways 
by domestic constitutions, conventionality control is still not mentioned by any inter-American 
treaty. This is the most salient reason why it has been called an example of the IACtHR’s 
judicial activism. How is it possible to reconcile the respect for the dignity of inter-American 
legislation with the emergence of strong-form inter-American judicial review? The answer to 
this question relates to the evolution of Latin American cosmopolitan constitutionalism 
according to what Dworkin called the principle of salience. 
 
Dworkin claimed that every state, as a coercive system, should seek to improve its 
political legitimacy within the international order.786 He also noted that there are several ways 
for states to do this. Given the range of alternatives available, how is it possible to find a 
normative guide for state action in the international system? His answer to this question was 
the principle of salience. According to it, “if a significant number of states, encompassing a 
significant population, has developed an agreed code of practice, either by treaty or by other 
form of coordination, then other states have at least a prima facie duty to subscribe to that 
practice as well.”787 He added that “this duty holds only if a more general practice to that effect, 
                                                 
786Dworkin, A New Philosophy for International Law. 
787Ibid, 19. 
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expanded in that way, would improve the legitimacy of the subscribing state and the 
international order as a whole.”788  
 
In international law scholarship, Dworkin’s principle of salience calls attention to legal 
sources relating to customary international law. For the present study, this type of relationship 
between customary law and international human rights law is of great relevance. Samantha 
Besson has explained that legal scholars have been proposing “softer understandings of 
custom” within international law scholarship due to more recent factors like the consolidation 
of international institutions.789 The principle of salience illustrates this softer understanding of 
customary international law, given that it loosens the two-element approach based on the 
elements of consuetudo and opinio juris.790 By doing so, the principle of salience gives 
customary international law a more dynamic character, which is arguably appropriate based on 
the increasing complexity of international law. In fact, customary inter-state and intrastate 
practices might represent increasingly important sources of international human rights law. This 
is especially true with regard to practices within regional systems of human rights protection.  
 
As Besson has also explained with regard to regional customary law: “[w]hile those 
regional customs may not yet present together the degree of universality one would expect of 
international human rights law,” many elements in the transnational consolidation of human 
rights law have “first occurred at intermediary regional levels before being universalized further 
through international human rights courts and bodies.”791 In line with this, scholars should not 
ignore elements of regional customary law. Based on this approach, it is worth explaining how 
strong inter-American judicial review abides by the principle of salience as applied to the 
regional level of human rights practices in Latin America. The two most decisive questions 
regarding this issue are: Could the practice of conventionality control of domestic norms that 
violate inter-American human rights law represent an appropriate means for state authorities to 
fulfill the general obligation of improving the legitimacy of Latin American governments in the 
international order? Is the adoption of conventionality control, in turn, consistent with the 
principle of salience? Both questions can be answered in the affirmative based on the evolution 
of Latin American cosmopolitan constitutionalism.  
                                                 
788Ibid. 
789Samantha Besson, “Sources of International Human Rights Law. How General is General International Law?,” 
in The Oxford Handbook on the Sources of International Law, eds. Samantha Besson, Jean D’Aspremont, (Oxford: 





The practice of strong inter-American judicial review might help Latin American state 
authorities to improve the political legitimacy of domestic governments, especially given that 
authoritarianism represents a recurrent threat to proper human rights enforcement within 
domestic law in the region. After democratization, these governments ratified international 
documents that mostly involve the protection of civil and political rights and, therefore, they 
should enforce these international rules. Conventionality control demands that national 
authorities pay close attention to these political commitments and guarantee the effectiveness 
of inter-American human rights law within domestic law. The establishment of conventionality 
control by the IACtHR represents a viable way to improve the legitimacy of Latin American 
states. The practice of conventionality control of inconsistent domestic laws sends the 
appropriate message that Latin American countries, most of which have had frequent episodes 
of authoritarian governments throughout their history, now care about enforcing civil and 
political rights in a consistent way.  
 
The innovative character of conventionality control should no longer be interpreted as 
an example of inter-American judicial activism. In fact, conventionality control has become the 
most salient example of how Latin American countries might improve the legitimacy of 
domestic governments and ensure the effectiveness of inter-American law within domestic law. 
Conventionality control was certainly an audacious step taken by the IACtHR. However, the 
establishment of judicial review at the domestic level was also the product of judicial audacity. 
Over time, this audacious attitude has found an appropriate place within domestic constitutional 
orders. Even legal scholars who oppose the practice of domestic judicial review admit that it 
became a defining feature of contemporary constitutional democracies. Dworkin claimed that 
judicial review might represent a viable means to improve the legitimacy of coercive authority 
at the domestic level. This study argues that the same applies to conventionality control with 
regard to the Latin American countries under the authority of the inter-American institutions.  
 
As Dworkin explained, the principle of salience is a mechanism that selects among the 
available alternatives to strengthen the legitimacy of coercive governments. According to this 
principle, conventionality control should be adopted by “a significant number of states, 
encompassing a significant population.”792 Has conventionality control become a salient form 
of Latin American states improving the legitimacy of the exercise of public authority? Some 
                                                 
792Dworkin, A New Philosophy for International Law, 19.  
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scholars have given a negative answer to this question. Laurence Burgorgue-Larsen, for 
instance, has claimed that the implementation of conventionality control by domestic 
authorities has been inconsistent.793 This could be an argument for the incompatibility of 
conventionality control and the principle of salience. However, the evolution of Latin American 
cosmopolitan constitutionalism attests to the successful adoption of conventionality control by 
Latin American states and demonstrates how it has been consistent with the principle of 
salience.  
 
Conventionality control has had important consequences for legal practice in Latin 
America. According to Pablo González-Domínguez, the IACtHR practiced conventionality 
control “in more than 25 contentious cases and in three Advisory Opinions since 2006.”794 
Beyond this, conventionality control has been present in several decisions made by the most 
authoritative national courts,795 and it is discussed in several books and academic articles about 
human rights enforcement in Latin America. This is evidence that conventionality control has 
become an important feature of legal practice and scholarship at both the inter-American and 
domestic levels of rights enforcement. Even Burgorgue-Larsen has admitted that “nowadays, 
all jurists (be they experts in constitutional, criminal or civil law) observe what appears to have 
been a genuine constitutional ‘big bang’;” (my emphasis).796 Even if it is true that many 
IACtHR’s decisions may not be enforced within domestic law, which reflects a sad reality for 
all international courts, the establishment and evolution of conventionality control can be 
described as a successful example of international human rights adjudication. Most importantly, 
the domestic and inter-American practices of conventionality control have given rise to a 
common intrastate practice of human rights enforcement in Latin America. This common 
practice within the IAS is, according to customary human rights law, the second source of 
legitimacy for practicing strong inter-American judicial review.  
 
                                                 
793Laurence Burgorgue-Larsen, “Chronicle of a Fashionable Theory in Latin America. Decoding the Doctrinal 
Discourse on Conventionality Control,” in The Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Theory and Practice, 
Present and Future, eds. Yves Haeck, Owaldo Ruiz-Chiriboga, Clara Burbano-Herrera, (Cambridge: Intersentia, 
2015), 661-663. 
794Pablo González-Dominguez, The Doctrine of Conventionality Control. Between Uniformity and Legal 
Pluralism in the inter-American Human Rights System, (Cambridge: Intersentia, 2018), 3.  
795It is worth remembering the recent decision of the Chilean Supreme Court that confirmed the IACtHR’s 
authority to practice conventionality control: Supreme Court of Chile, (Judgement) May 16, 2019, Case of AD 
1386-2014. On the importance of this judgement, see: Jorge Contesse, “The Supreme Court of Chile as an inter-
American Tribunal,” International Journal of Constitutional Law Blog, May 31, 2019, 
http://www.iconnectblog.com/2019/05/thesupreme-court-of-chile-as-an-inter-american-tribunal. 
796Laurence Burgorgue-Larsen, Chronicle of a Fashionable Theory in Latin America, 663. 
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Finally, it is worth addressing one last issue, namely the issue of which cases could 
concretely lead to the practice of strong inter-American judicial review of domestic law. To 
answer this question, it is useful to observe how conventionality control has been implemented 
within the IAS. Conventionality control was practiced by the IACtHR in different cases, all of 
them involving violations of civil and political rights. Since 2006, the IACtHR has consistently 
established the state authorities’ duty to practice conventionality control with regard to 
violations of civil and political rights. Beyond the amnesty law cases,797 conventionality control 
involved issues like the death penalty,798 enforced disappearances,799 extrajudicial 
executions,800 and torture.801 This evolution and implementation of inter-American 
jurisprudence should serve as an important reference point for the further practice of strong 
inter-American judicial review. Yet, it is still necessary to refine this argument for restricting 
the practice of strong review to pieces of legislation that violate civil and political rights. In line 
with this, the concrete form of strong inter-American judicial review should be the 
conventionality control of legislation that flagrantly violates inter-American legislation and 
jurisprudence on civil and political rights. Even though this formulation is still abstract, there 
is one immediately evident consequence: It excludes the practice of strong review of domestic 
legislation based on violations of Art. 26 ACHR. This is based on the fact that international 
strong review of domestic legislation on socioeconomic rights is not appropriate for the current 
stage of inter-American human rights law. Strong-form review should be used to bring more 
consistency to human rights enforcement in Latin America. Yet, this consistency is still far 
from being reached with regard to socioeconomic rights legislation and jurisprudence, as this 
study will explain in the following section.  
 
Beyond this first consequence, it is difficult to try to settle specific criteria for the 
practice of strong inter-American judicial review of domestic law given that this practice is 
intended to adopt a dynamic character within inter-American human rights jurisprudence. Even 
a general analysis cannot replace a case-by-case approach with specific references to inter-
American human rights legislation and precedents. Nevertheless, it is worth giving examples 
                                                 
797The cases of Barrios v. Peru, La Cantuta v. Peru, Almonacid Arellano et al v. Chile, Gelman v. Uruguay, Gomes 
Lund v. Brazil and Herzog v. Brazil will be addressed in greater detail in the following chapter.  
798IACtHR, (Judgement) November 20, 2007, Case of Boyce et al v. Barbados. 
799IACtHR, (Judgement) August 12, 2008, Case of Heliodoro Portugal v. Panama; IACtHR (Judgement) 
November 23, 2009, Case of Radilla Pacheco v. Mexico; IACtHR (Judgement) September 1, 2010, Case of Ibsen 
Cárdenas and Ibsen Peña v. Bolivia; IACtHR (Judgement) August 19, 2013, Case of Gudiel Alvarez et al. (‘Diario 
Militar’) v. Guatemala.  
800IACtHR, (Judgement) May 26, 2010, Case of Cepeda Vargas v. Colombia; IACtHR (Judgement) November 
30, 2012, Case of Santo Domingo Massacre v. Colombia. 
801IACtHR, (Judgement) November 26, 2010, Case of Cabrera Garcia and Montiel Flores v. Mexico. 
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of appropriate and inappropriate uses of strong-form inter-American judicial review before 
pointing out further important elements of its practice. One appropriate use of conventionality 
control can be found in Boyce et al v. Barbados.802 In this case, the IACtHR addressed 
violations of the ACHR due to the sentencing of four people to death based on a domestic 
statute that prescribes a mandatory sentence of death for persons convicted of the crime of 
murder. The IACtHR acknowledged that capital punishment was not prohibited by the ACHR, 
but it was subject to limits in the terms of Art. 4 ACHR. For the IACtHR, the application of 
mandatory capital punishment within domestic law as occurred in this case was against the 
ACHR since it was arbitrary and not restricted to the most serious crimes.803 The IACtHR found 
a violation of Art. 2 ACHR due to the existence of domestic legislation that restricts the human 
rights protected by the ACHR. Therefore, the IACtHR established state authorities’ duty to 
practice the conventionality control of the domestic statue due to its incompatibility with inter-
American human rights law.804 For the IACtHR, state authorities should amend domestic law 
and “ensure that the imposition of the death penalty does not contravene the rights and freedoms 
guaranteed under the Convention.”805 
 
In this case, the appropriate use of conventionality control can be determined based on 
the consistent references to inter-American legislation and jurisprudence. The IACtHR referred 
to the ACHR provisions on capital punishment and to precedent decisions of similar violations 
by Trinidad and Tobago. In a more recent case involving Barbados, namely Dacosta Cadogan 
v. Barbados,806 the IACtHR once again established a violation of Art. 2 ACHR due to the 
incompatibility between domestic law and inter-American human rights law and ordered 
national authorities to amend specific pieces of domestic legislation. By consistently referring 
to legislation and jurisprudence, the court has demonstrated that there are sufficient elements 
within inter-American human rights law that justify the strong review of domestic legislation 
in this specific case. 
 
Another case group in which the practice of conventionality control was appropriate 
relates to the duty of appropriately describing the crime of enforced disappearance within 
domestic law. In Heliodoro Portugal v. Panamá,807 the IACtHR found a violation of Art. 2 
                                                 
802IACtHR, (Judgement) November 20, 2007, Case of Boyce et al v. Barbados. 
803Ibid, §§62, 63. 
804Ibid, §78. 
805Ibid, §127 (b).  
806IACtHR, (Judgement) September 24, 2009, Case of Dacosta Cadogan v. Barbados. 
807IACtHR, (Judgement) August 12, 2008, Case of Heliodoro Portugal v. Panama.  
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ACHR due to the national authorities’ failure to define the crime of enforced disappearance of 
persons as an autonomous offense within domestic law.808 For the IACtHR, this omission 
prevented the establishment of effective criminal proceedings. The IACtHR ruled that this 
obligation arose for the state authorities in Panama on March 28, 1996, when the Inter-
American Convention on Forced Disappearances of Persons entered into force in the country.809 
In Radilla Pacheco v. Mexico,810 the IACtHR also ordered the amendment of domestic law due 
to the failure of the domestic authorities to appropriately define the crime of enforced 
disappearance within domestic law. The IACtHR established the state authorities’ duty to 
practice conventionality control of domestic legislation in both cases. Due to their consistent 
references to inter-American legislation and jurisprudence, these cases demonstrate the correct 
use of conventionality control as a means to bring domestic legislation into accordance with 
inter-American human rights law.  
 
Finally, it is worth mentioning at least one case in which the practice of conventionality 
control was not appropriate. As we have seen in Chapter V, in Artavia Murillo v. Costa Rica,811 
the IACtHR practiced the strong review of the regulation of in vitro fertilization within Costa 
Rican law. The IACtHR ruled that state authorities had to lift prohibitions on in vitro 
fertilization and regulate its implementation by public health care services. The measures 
ordered in this instance were completely detached from the evolution of inter-American human 
rights legislation and jurisprudence. Moreover, the IACtHR ignored the previous proposals 
within domestic law that intended to absolutely prohibit the practice of in vitro fertilization in 
the country. Hence, this case did not represent an appropriate example of strong inter-American 
judicial review of domestic law within the IAS.812 
 
There are some important conclusions from this brief case study of the practice of 
conventionality control. Strong inter-American judicial review should be a remedy for domestic 
legislation that flagrantly violates inter-American human rights law. These violations should be 
                                                 
808Ibid, §183.  
809Ibid, §185.  
810IACtHR (Judgement) November 23, 2009, Case of Radilla Pacheco v. Mexico.  
811IACtHR, (Judgement) November 28, 2012, Case of Artavia Murillo et al. (In Vitro Fertilization) v. Costa Rica. 
812As González-Dominguez has also pointed out: “asking domestic authorities to control the conventionality of 
domestic laws following the standards developed in the case law of forced disappearance, which is line of 
jurisprudence connected with serious and unquestionable violations to human dignity, is not the same thing as 
asking domestic authorities to control the conventionality of domestic laws following standards developed in the 
case law on the right to life of the unborn.” Pablo González-Dominguez, The Doctrine of Conventionality Control. 
Between Uniformity and Legal Pluralism in the Inter-American Human Rights System, (Cambridge et al: 
Intersentia, 2018), 250. 
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so flagrant that they do not allow domestic authorities to arrive at another interpretation on the 
validity of the reviewed statutes. If domestic legislation brings about flagrant violations of inter-
American human rights law, this legislation should be invalidated by the IACtHR based on Art. 
2 ACHR and the court should demand that national authorities enforce this decision within 
domestic law. To establish flagrant violations of inter-American human rights law, legal 
authorities should ask questions like: i) Are there sufficient legislative and jurisprudential 
elements that justify strong inter-American judicial review in a specific case? This first question 
refers to the political and legal outcomes of inter-institutional interaction within the IAS and 
leads to a cascade of questions like: ii) Has the respondent state frequently violated the same 
ACHR provisions by retaining inconsistent domestic legislation?;813 iii) Could a legislative 
amendment avoid future violations of the convention?; iv) Is there a converging approach 
among the member states with respect to the disputed domestic piece of legislation?; v) Have 
the most authoritative domestic courts already addressed the disputed issue and, most 
importantly, have they referred to the IACtHR interpretation of the matter?;814 vi) Have 
domestic authorities provided justification for not abiding by inter-American jurisprudence on 
the matter?;815 vii) Have domestic authorities previously adopted the interpretation that is now 
contested by new elected authorities?; viii) Is there member state compliance with the 
IACtHR’s interpretation of the disputed issue in similar cases? 
 
The practice of strong inter-American judicial review involves all these questions. 
Indeed, several other questions could be raised about the dynamic practice of strong review 
given that human rights law is constantly evolving at the different levels of legal enforcement 
in Latin America. The most important feature of mixed-form theory with regard to the practice 
of strong international review is that the IACtHR should consistently refer to inter-American 
legislation and jurisprudence as a means to establish the flagrant violations of inter-American 
human rights law. If the IACtHR could strengthen the arguments for practicing strong 
international judicial review based on the evolution of domestic and inter-American human 
rights law, it might avoid being criticized for practicing judicial activism.  
 
                                                 
813For González-Dominguez, conventionality control should be strongly enforced as an international obligation 
“when a state is flagrantly and systematically violating core aspects of the Inter-American Corpus Juris by 
maintaining or adopting domestic laws or practices manifestly anti-conventional.” Ibid, 184. 
814The IACtHR may establish the state authorities’ duty of conventionality control based on the fact that these 
domestic authorities have ignored inter-American human rights jurisprudence and therefore flagrantly 
underenforced the ACHR provisions.  
815This is based on the argument that inter-American human rights law increases national authorities’ burdens of 
justification.  
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It is worth underscoring that the majority of rights protected by inter-American human 
rights law are civil and political rights. Even if the practice of strong review in cases involving 
these rights is legitimate for the reasons provided above, the IACtHR should strive for 
consistency in the evolution of conventionality control case law. Successful experiences at the 
domestic level, like fundamental rights adjudication by the German constitutional court, show 
that courts may professionally, i.e., by means of appropriate legal argumentation, strengthen 
their authority within legal systems and that other institutions will not necessarily oppose 
strong-form judicial review.816  
 
In the case of Latin American constitutional law, adopting this professional approach to 
strong inter-American judicial review is necessary for the appropriate evolution of human rights 
protection in the region. The practice of judicial activism is arguably a signal of the IACtHR’s 
lack of methodology. Authoritarian governments might even opportunistically contest the 
IACtHR’s alleged international juristocracy in order to justify domestic human rights 
violations. The court should therefore adopt the most professional approach possible to the 
practice of strong review in order to avoid losing its legitimacy among all IAS member states.  
 
Despite being cautious with strong inter-American judicial review, the IACtHR should 
still be able to introduce innovative features into human rights jurisprudence. These innovative 
features should only be consistently linked to legislation and jurisprudence when they involve 
the review of domestic legislation. Even if some scholars argue that jurisprudence should be 
taken only as a subsidiary source of international law, it is the inter-institutional interaction 
between domestic and inter-American authorities that truly matters for the further evolution of 
human rights enforcement in Latin America. Weak inter-American judicial review should also 
attribute great weight to this inter-institutional interaction within the IAS as this study will 
explain in the following. 
 
 
6.3.2. Weak inter-American judicial review 
 
In this section, weak review is offered as an appropriate form of inter-American judicial 
review in cases involving socioeconomic rights. A major problem with the judicial enforcement 
of these rights is the misconception that they necessarily involve the practice of strong review. 
                                                 
816See: Michaela Hailbronner, Traditions and Transformations: The Rise of German Constitutionalism, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2015).  
 208 
This problem can be illustrated by the discussion of adjudication’s fiscal impacts at the 
domestic level. The judicial enforcement of socioeconomic rights is often regarded as expensive 
and involving measures that can affect government budgets in a non-democratic way. Mark 
Tushnet has addressed this general perception in legal scholarship: “The assumption that courts 
exercise strong-form review pervades the literature critical of judicial enforcement of social and 
economic rights.”817 In Brazil, for instance, courts have frequently established the 
government’s duty to provide expensive medication for the treatment of rare diseases. This 
domestic example of strong judicial enforcement of socioeconomic rights leads to the question 
of whether the IACtHR might necessarily follow the same path.  
 
However, it is important to avoid this misconception of a necessary relationship between 
socioeconomic rights and strong judicial review. How could we avoid this misconception and 
offer a viable approach to international socioeconomic rights adjudication? There are two 
different tasks associated with socioeconomic rights adjudication: a general and a concrete task. 
At the general level, the task is, following Jeremy Waldron on this point, to integrate 
socioeconomic rights into “a general theory of justice, which will address in a principled way 
whatever trade-offs and balancing are necessary for their institutionalization in a world 
characterized by scarcity and conflict.”818 In a more concrete sense, the task is to establish more 
frequent and meaningful interaction between domestic and inter-American authorities with 
regard to socioeconomic rights enforcement. This study argues that weak inter-American 
judicial review is the best way for both the general and the concrete tasks. 
 
Socioeconomic rights should not be taken as mere intentions to provide collective 
welfare. They are not just programmatic rules. The old-fashioned interpretation that these rights 
are mere declarations of social welfare has weakened their normative value. Likewise, their 
inclusion within constitutional texts as simple programmatic norms has frequently hindered 
their actual enforcement. The adoption of transformative constitutional texts might 
paradoxically represent a risk regarding the normative sense of socioeconomic rights. Legal 
authorities and scholars are right to worry about promises that the state authorities will not be 
able to fulfill in the future.819 These constitutionalized socioeconomic rights may indeed 
                                                 
817Mark Tushnet, Weak Courts, Strong Rights, 231.  
818Jeremy Waldron, Liberal Rights. Collected papers 1981-1991, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 
33.  
819This has turned many constitutions into what Karl Loewenstein once described as “nominalist constitutions.” 
On this issue, see: Karl Loewenstein, Verfassungslehre, trans. Rüdiger Boerner, 2nd ed. (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 
1969), 152-153. Marcelo Neves has called attention to the dangerous hypertrophy of the symbolic dimension of 
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become self-fulfilling prophecies in their political communities.820 Beyond including 
socioeconomic rights into constitutional texts, how is it possible to include them into the general 
framework of justice that Waldron has mentioned? There are two main ways for doing that: 
more specific legislation and legal interpretation. Here, it is worth focusing on these two ways 
of strengthening the normative force of socioeconomic rights within inter-American human 
rights legislation and jurisprudence.  
 
Regarding legislation, the IAS member states have gradually increased the inter-
American framework for socioeconomic rights adjudication. The Protocol of San Salvador 
(PSS) dates from 1988 and was the first effort to address socioeconomic rights in a more 
specific form.821 Before the PSS was adopted, mentions of socioeconomic rights were limited 
to the preamble of the ACHR and to the OAS Charter. As this study has already mentioned, the 
PSS lists a wide catalogue of socioeconomic rights. This protocol also established the 
progressive enforcement obligation, which leads to duties such as the non-adoption of 
retrogressive measures with regard to socioeconomic rights. In 2012 the OAS member states 
adopted the Social Charter of the Americas, which established the state’s obligation to promote 
development with the aim of eliminating poverty and achieving a decent standard of living for 
all.822 The charter also referred to the duty of progressive enforcement of socioeconomic rights 
“through policies and programs that they consider are the most effective and appropriate for 
their needs, in accordance with their democratic processes and available resources.”823 This 
duty also refers to the obligation “to make efforts, domestically and internationally (…) to 
eliminate obstacles to development with a view to achieving full enjoyment” of human 
rights.824 Progressive development also encompasses the implementation of public policies that 
aim to achieve economic development with social justice,825 and that give priority to persons 
living in conditions of poverty.826 
 
                                                 
constitutional texts, see: Marcelo Neves, Die Symbolische Konstitutionalisierung, (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 
1998). 
820This is one of the main reasons why Cass Sunstein has referred to the inclusion of a broad catalogue of 
socioeconomic rights into east-European constitutions as a catastrophe. Cass Sunstein, “Against Positive Rights,” 
East European Constitutional Review 2, (1993), 35-38. Sunstein has claimed that: “a constitution is in large part a 
legal document, with concrete tasks. If the Constitution tries to specify everything to which a decent society 
commits itself, it threatens to become a mere piece of paper, worth nothing in the real world.” Ibid, 36. 
821As mentioned, this protocol entered into force in 1999.  
822Social Charter of the Americas, art. 1.  
823Ibid, art. 2.  
824Ibid, art. 7.  
825Ibid, art. 9. 
826Ibid, art. 14. 
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The inter-American institutions also followed this evolution of inter-American 
legislation on socioeconomic rights. In 2012, the IACHR established the Special 
Rapporteurship on Economic, Social, Cultural and Environmental Rights. The IACtHR judges 
have also started to address socioeconomic rights with more attention, which brings us to the 
role legal interpretation has played for strengthening the normative force of socioeconomic 
rights. This role can be best illustrated by Latin American transformative constitutionalism, 
which led to the interpretation in favor of the judicially enforceable character of socioeconomic 
rights at the domestic level and, more recently, at the inter-American level. Gradually, by means 
of new inter-American documents on socioeconomic rights and innovative legal interpretation, 
inter-American authorities have tried to fulfil the general task of introducing socioeconomic 
rights to the regional framework of justice.  
 
However, the inclusion of socioeconomic rights into the inter-American framework for 
human rights adjudication is not enough. The concrete task of promoting more dialogue on 
these rights between inter-American and domestic authorities cannot be ignored. Regarding the 
task involving inter-institutional interaction, the IACtHR has failed in this concrete task within 
the IAS. Inter-American case law on socioeconomic rights shows evidence that the direct 
enforcement of these rights can involve the practice of strong inter-American judicial review. 
This chapter has argued that the IACtHR should limit its authority to the weak review of cases 
involving domestic legislation on socioeconomic rights. According to the type of decision-
making within weak judicial review, the IACtHR should review legislation on socioeconomic 
rights in a way that is “relatively broad in scope ex ante, and non-final in nature ex post.”827 
What does it mean that the IACtHR should adopt this form of decision-making in cases 
involving socioeconomic rights?  
 
The broad scope of weak judicial review refers to the IACtHR’s authority to rule on 
claims that allege violations of Art. 26 ACHR. These claims usually include references to other 
inter-American documents on socioeconomic rights, especially the PSS and the Social Charter 
of the Americas. It is worth remembering that the debate on the judicial enforceable character 
of Art. 26 ACHR has been settled within the IACtHR, as Chapter III of this study has already 
explained. The prevailing interpretation is that the IACtHR has competence to rule on violations 
of socioeconomic rights, even if they are only indirectly addressed by the ACHR. This stronger 
authority of the IACtHR is compatible with the concept of weak judicial review if it is linked 
                                                 
827Dixon, The Core Case for Weak-Form Judicial Review, 2203. 
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to the non-final character of decision-making. The non-final character of judicial review relates 
to the possibility of revision by national legislatures of the IACtHR’s decisions in cases 
involving legislation on socioeconomic rights. It is the non-authoritative decision-making that 
can promote more dialogue between inter-American and domestic authorities within the IAS.  
 
This non-resolutive character of decision-making has not been the approach adopted by 
the IACtHR when practicing the direct enforcement of socioeconomic rights. As this study has 
pointed out, some IACtHR judges have even claimed that weak review is not a viable approach 
within inter-American human rights jurisprudence. This is arguably a wrong interpretation of 
the practice of transformative constitutionalism at the inter-American level. The IACtHR 
should opt for weak review of legislation on socioeconomic rights due to the many advantages 
of this form of decision-making for the judicial enforcement of these rights. By adopting weak 
inter-American judicial review, the court can follow the evolution of inter-American human 
rights legislation and jurisprudence in a more consistent way. This more consistent way 
strengthens the legitimacy of the practice of inter-American judicial review as a whole.  
 
Weak judicial review decision-making may also improve the effectiveness of the direct 
enforcement of socioeconomic rights given that it involves a multi-institutional approach to this 
matter. Çali and Koch have underscored the advantages of a deliberative model of 
socioeconomic rights enforcement involving national and international authorities within 
regional systems for human rights protection.828 For them, one deliberative approach “allows 
states to realistically assess what measures need to be taken to remedy rights violations and 
provides non-governmental organizations with entry points to influence early stage decisions 
regarding suitable remedies.”829 Moreover, “by affording states more ownership of compliance 
decisions” the deliberative approach “increases the legitimacy of the process in the eyes of 
respondent states and has the potential to offset backlashes against enforcement.”830 
 
Finally, it is worth remembering that the multilevel inter-institutional interaction 
promoted by weak judicial review decision-making is essential to dealing with the ordinary 
                                                 
828Başak Çali, Anne Koch, “Explaining Compliance: Lessons from Civil and Political Rights,” in Social Rights 
Judgements and the Politics of Compliance. Making it Stick, eds. Malcolm Langford, César Rodríguez-Garavito, 
Julieta Rossi (Cambridge et al.: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 43-74, 66-69. The authors have referred to 
the deliberative compliance model adopted by the ECtHR, in which “the Court does not have to spell out the 




legislative pathologies (blind spots and burdens of inertia) regarding domestic legislation on 
socioeconomic rights. Weak review can promote more inter-institutional interaction on 
socioeconomic rights legislation and, over time, add new legislative and jurisprudential 
approaches into the inter-American framework for socioeconomic rights enforcement. This is 
a necessary step for the further evolution of inter-American human rights law, which makes 
weak inter-American judicial review an indispensable feature to be added to inter-American 
human rights jurisprudence. More specifically, when practicing the direct enforcement of 
socioeconomic rights, the IACtHR should give national authorities the final say on the validity 
of legislation on these rights. This means that the court should avoid practicing the 
conventionality control of domestic statutes on socioeconomic rights and opt for a deliberative 
approach to their judicial review. This deliberative approach should involve more conversation 
with national authorities about the ordinary legislative pathologies that affect the domestic 
enforcement of socioeconomic rights, which can arguably strengthen the normative dimension 
of these rights over time. 
 
 
6.4. Conclusion: The legitimacy and effectiveness of mixed-form inter-American 
judicial review 
 
State-perpetrated systematic violations have been the most defining feature of the Latin 
American human rights enforcement context. This becomes especially clear when we address 
the issues of authoritarianism and material inequality, which persist due to the state violations 
of civil, political, and socioeconomic rights. Within this context of systematic human rights 
violations, the IACtHR has developed specific forms of strong inter-American judicial review 
in order to align state practices with inter-American human rights law. As Chapter III has 
explained, the IACtHR started reviewing domestic laws pertaining to civil and political rights 
during the first major phase of inter-American jurisprudence, i.e., the transitional justice phase. 
More recently, the court has extended its authority to socioeconomic rights by directly 
enforcing these rights, which has led to the transformative justice phase. Inter-American case 
law on socioeconomic rights demonstrates that the IACtHR will probably adopt strong inter-
American judicial review on domestic laws pertaining to these rights in the near future. Despite 
the fact that the IACtHR has consistently opposed the systematic human rights 
underenforcement in Latin America by practicing strong inter-American judicial review, the 
court is ignoring the advantages that alternative approaches may have for the legitimacy and 
effectiveness of inter-American human jurisprudence.  
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This chapter has introduced the concept of weak judicial review as a valuable approach 
to inter-American judicial review. Within weak review decision-making, courts may adopt a 
non-final approach to reviewing legislation, i.e., they may give legislatures the final say on this 
matter. Steven Gardbaum has described weak judicial review as a form of decision-making in 
which a final stage of political rights review of legislation by legislatures is the most important 
stage. Weak review decision-making is best described by Rosalind Dixon as “broad in scope 
ex ante, non-final in nature ex post”831 or as a “broad but revisable review.”832 Within this form 
of decision-making, courts may invalidate laws, but they do not necessarily need to strongly 
review them, i.e., strike them down or order legislatures to amend them within domestic law. 
This chapter has also tried to demonstrate the advantages of introducing weak review into inter-
American human rights jurisprudence for the greater legitimacy and effectiveness of the direct 
enforcement of socioeconomic rights. This leads us to the theory of mixed-form inter-American 
judicial review.  
 
Mixed-form inter-American judicial review is intended to be a context-specific theory 
of human rights adjudication for the IACtHR. This mixed-form theory does not ignore the 
complex context in which inter-American judicial review has emerged and evolved. However, 
it tries to offer a better approach to international judicial review in light of the contemporary 
phase of inter-American human rights jurisprudence. Within this contemporary phase, strong 
review should be limited to cases involving legislation that is flagrantly offensive to the civil 
and political rights protected by inter-American human rights law. This involves the fact that 
the normative dimension of civil and political rights has been most effectively developed by 
means of inter-American human rights legislation and jurisprudence. Several inter-American 
documents on the protection of civil and political rights have lent these rights a stronger 
normative dimension. The IAS member states that ratified the inter-American conventions and 
protocols on the protection of civil and political rights should, in turn, not be allowed to violate 
these same documents by adopting inconsistent legislation within domestic law. The dignity of 
inter-American human rights legislation is the first element to bring legitimacy to the practice 
of strong inter-American judicial review of domestic law in cases that involve flagrant 
violations of civil and political rights.  
 
                                                 
831Rosalind Dixon, The Core Case for Weak-Form Judicial Review, 2203. 
832Ibid. 
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Within inter-American human rights jurisprudence, conventionality control has 
emerged as the first specific form of strong inter-American judicial review. However, 
conventionality control has not been mentioned by any inter-American convention or treaty to 
date. This chapter has argued that this is not a violation of the dignity of inter-American human 
rights legislation. This argument is based on the circumstances in which conventionality control 
emerged and its further evolution within inter-American and domestic human rights law. Latin 
American states share a fundamental obligation of strengthening the legitimacy of their 
governments within the contemporary international order. There are several ways of fulfilling 
this fundamental obligation. For all of these alternatives, the principle of salience should act as 
the criterium of selection. Conventionality control has become the most salient way of 
strengthening the legitimacy of Latin American states within the IAS. Most of these states were 
recently ruled by authoritarian governments and now have the opportunity to demonstrate to 
the international community that they are committed to human rights enforcement in a 
consistent way.  
 
The implementation of conventionality control within the IAS demonstrates that it 
abides by the principle of salience when it comes to amending domestic laws that flagrantly 
violates inter-American human rights documents on civil and political rights. The IACtHR 
should therefore limit the practice of strong judicial review to cases involving these rights. In 
these cases, the IACtHR can avoid the practice of international judicial activism, given that the 
court is able to consistently refer to inter-American documents and jurisprudence when 
reviewing domestic law. This is the most legitimate and effective way of practicing strong inter-
American judicial review. By doing so, the IACtHR can serve as a legitimate control body in 
case inconsistent domestic legislation is adopted by an IAS member state.  
 
 Still, according to the theory of mixed-form inter-American judicial review, the 
IACtHR should limit its authority to practicing the weak review of domestic laws on 
socioeconomic rights. This chapter has argued that weak review is the most legitimate approach 
due to the late evolution of inter-American legislation and case law on these rights. Due to this 
weak normative dimension of socioeconomic rights within inter-American human rights law, 
the IACtHR would inevitably be practicing international judicial activism if it extended strong 
review to the cases involving socioeconomic rights. It is worth emphasizing that weak review 
decision-making is the most legitimate alternative in light of the contemporary inter-American 
framework for human rights adjudication. Over time, national and inter-American authorities 
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will strengthen the normative dimension of socioeconomic rights by means of legislation and 
jurisprudence. This may eventually lead to the practice of strong inter-American judicial review 
in the future. However, taking the contemporary phase of inter-American human rights law as 
a meaningful reference point, strong review for cases involving socioeconomic rights would 
represent the practice of judicial activism. 
 
This chapter has also claimed that weak review is also the most effective type of 
decision-making for cases involving socioeconomic rights. Despite being present in several 
constitutions, these rights still present substantial challenges to courts when they seek to enforce 
them. Due to the fact that weak review engages non-judicial institutions in enforcing 
socioeconomic rights, it can also strengthen the effectiveness of judicial enforcement. Weak 
review is a dialogic form of judicial decision-making that intends to promote more discussion 
about legislation within legal systems. This relates to what Tushnet has described as the 
experimentalist character of weak judicial review,833 which involves an inter-institutional 
approach to reviewing legislation. Weak review can become a way of bringing the IACtHR and 
the highest national authorities together in order to strengthen the normative dimension of 
socioeconomic rights. The inter-institutional interaction between the IACtHR and national 
courts and legislatures has the potential to become a valuable source of law with regard to these 
rights within the IAS.  
 
Although mixed-form theory intends to be the most legitimate and effective approach 
to inter-American judicial review, it is difficult to address its practical value for the Latin 
American context in the general terms described above. One way of doing this is providing 
concrete examples of how this normative model can be useful for the IACtHR and also for 
national authorities that are supposed to abide by inter-American human rights jurisprudence. 
The following chapter will try to prove the practical value of this theory by applying it to the 
review of Brazilian laws.  
                                                 
833Tushnet, Weak Court, Strong Rights, 66.   
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PART IV. THEORY IN ACTION  
 
 
VII. Mixed-Form inter-American Judicial Review and Brazilian Constitutionalism 
 
This chapter will submit the theory of mixed-form inter-American judicial review to a 
test. Given that the Brazilian constitution represents a particularly important Latin American 
cosmopolitan constitution for this study, mixed-form inter-American judicial review will be 
applied to Brazilian laws and the possible consequences that this may have for Brazilian 
constitutionalism will be addressed. Mixed-form review can be useful to reviewing two 
particularly problematic pieces of legislation within Brazilian law: the Brazilian amnesty law 
(Law No. 6683/1979) and Constitutional Amendment No. 95/2016 (hereinafter CA 95). These 
two laws are illustrative of the traditional challenges for Brazilian constitutionalism within the 
Latin American context, i.e., authoritarianism and material inequality. This chapter claims that 
the mixed-form theory can address these challenges and keep Brazilian constitutional practices 
on the path to global constitutionalism.  
 
In the following, this chapter will advocate for the practice of strong-form judicial 
review of the Brazilian amnesty law and weak-form review of CA 95. The following sections 
will offer the legal basis and also explain the effectiveness of each form of judicial review for 
each case. Here, the aim is to offer a response to the persistent threats to Brazilian 
constitutionalism represented by authoritarianism and material inequality. This can be seen as 
an effort to bring the never-ending cycle of illiberalism in Brazil to an end. If mixed-form inter-
American judicial review succeeds at this Brazilian test, it may also serve as a guide for other 
Latin American democracies that suffer from the same pathologies. Mixed-form inter-
American judicial review is certainly not a definitive solution for state-perpetrated systematic 
human rights underenforcement in Latin America. Nevertheless, it might represent the first step 
that inter-American and national authorities may take in order to align domestic constitutional 
practices with global constitutionalism. In a nutshell, mixed-form judicial review can strengthen 
commitments to human rights enforcement in Brazil, which also has consequences for 
democracy and the rule of law within domestic law.  
 
These two pieces of legislation have been chosen because they fit the normative model 
of mixed-form theory and also due to their relevance in the most recent history of Brazilian 
constitutionalism. This most recent history is in fact illustrative of the never-ending cycle of 
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illiberalism in Brazil. The non-review of the Brazilian amnesty law, despite two IACtHR’s 
decisions ordering it,834 illustrates the failure on the part of national authorities to come to terms 
with the country’s authoritarian past. Authoritarianism has recently escalated, which can be 
represented not exclusively, but prominently, by the election of Brazilian far-right strongman 
Jair Bolsonaro to the presidency. Mr. Bolsonaro’s election reminds Brazilians that 
authoritarianism is still a significant threat, despite the country having overcome the past 
dictatorship. CA 95 relates to the disputed austerity measures that have been adopted by the 
Brazilian government in order to cope with a severe economic crisis since 2015. As a response 
to this severe crisis, CA 95 has led to rising material inequality in a country that is already well-
known for its significant social gap between the poorest and the better-offs. Both pieces of 
legislation should be reviewed according to inter-American human rights law. In the following, 
it is worth focusing on how inter-American legislation and jurisprudence offer a legal basis for 
the review of these Brazilian laws. In line with this, their judicial review might open new 
prospects for Brazilian constitutionalism because it solves the inconsistent relationship of 
national authorities with inter-American human rights law. Mixed-form inter-American judicial 
review can therefore help to take the 1988 constitution out of the vicious cycle of illiberalism 
brought about by authoritarianism and material inequality in Brazil.  
 
 
7.1. The Brazilian amnesty law: the case for strong inter-American judicial review 
 
The enforcement of the Brazilian amnesty law by national authorities has already been 
described as an example of resistance to inter-American human rights jurisprudence. As an 
introduction to the legal basis for its review, it is worth addressing the contemporary value of 
this debate. There is no scope for a historical review of the amnesty law in this study, although 
this statute is related to the difficult evolution of Brazilian constitutionalism in history.835 The 
Brazilian amnesty law is an example of how Brazilian authorities have been unable to find a 
way out of the vicious cycle of authoritarianism in the country. For several reasons relevant in 
the past and today, Brazilian constitutionalism has been punctuated by a never-ending series of 
                                                 
834As Chapter II has already mentioned, they are: IACtHR, (Judgement) November 24, 2010, Case of Gomes Lund 
et al. (“Guerrilha do Araguaia”) v. Brazil; IACtHR, (Judgement) March 15, 2018, Case of Herzog et al. v. Brazil. 
835On the historical context of the adoption of the amnesty statute, see: Lilia M. Schwarcz, Heloisa M. Starling, 
“On the Path to Democracy: The Transition to Civilian power and the Ambiguities and Legacy of the Military 
Dictatorship,” in Brazil: A Biography, trans. Allen Lane, (New York: Farrar Straus and Giroux, 2018), 537-576. 
The literature on how the Brazilian state has dealt with transitional justice issues is also very relevant. See, for 
instance: Transitional Justice. Handbook for Latin America, ed. Félix Reátegui, (New York: International Center 
for Transitional Justice, 2011). 
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authoritarian flashbacks. Several prominent Brazilian legal scholars have referred to the 
persistence of authoritarian rule in the country. For José Afonso da Silva, explicit or hidden 
authoritarianism has been the prevailing element in Brazilian constitutional history.836 Ingo 
Wolfgang Sarlet has also described the “turbulences and long authoritarian periods” during 
Brazilian constitutionalism.837 Finally, Paulo Bonavides has lamented that, in Brazil, new 
constitutions were never truly new systems of power based on a catalog of principles and 
rules.838 Hence, he has described the vicious cycle of authoritarianism as an eternal constituent 
crisis that “has existed since the origins of the Brazilian state and it has still not been solved.”839  
 
The continuing validity of the amnesty statute (Law No. 6683/79) relates to this eternal 
constituent crisis in Brazil. It seems that the 1987-1988 constituent assembly has failed to build 
a new constitutional order that breaks out of this authoritarian cycle. The main piece of evidence 
that the validity of the amnesty law was not the best way to deal with the country’s authoritarian 
past is that authoritarianism is once again back to the Brazilian political debate.  The election 
of Jair Bolsonaro to the presidency has brought back the fear of authoritarian rule to Brazil.840 
At the time of writing this chapter, Mr. Bolsonaro’s authoritarianism has been restricted to his 
political speeches. This should be enough for him to be considered a significant threat to the 
rule of law, democracy and human rights enforcement in Brazil. Mr. Bolsonaro has long praised 
the rule of the 1964-1985 military dictatorship. He has described the rise of the military to 
power in 1964 as a civil society movement, not a coup d’état. During his campaign he has also 
time and again showed troubling conceptions of human rights. He has frequently been offensive 
to women, black people and LGTB people, which reveals his disregard for minority rights. 
Moreover, he has advocated very controversial stricter policies against crime and corruption 
throughout his “law and order” political campaign. He has claimed, for instance, that police 
force should not be held accountable during raids in the Brazilian favelas. For him, this would 
intimidate criminals and provide a safer environment for the good Brazilians.841   
 
                                                 
836José Afonso da Silva, O Constitucionalismo Brasileiro: Evolução institucional, (São Paulo: Malheiros Editores, 
2011), 89.  
837Ingo Wolfang Sarlet, “Breves Notas sobre a Evolução Constitucional Brasileira de 1824 a 1988,” in História do 
Direito Brasileiro. Leituras da Ordem Jurídica Nacional, ed. Eduardo Bittar, 4th ed., (São Paulo: Atlas, 2017), 
263-290, 287. 
838Paulo Bonavides, Curso de Direito Constitucional, 24th ed., (São Paulo: Malheiros Editores, 2009), 381.  
839Ibid, 384.  
840On the circumstances of his election, see: Juliano Zaiden Benvindo, “Brazil’s ‘False Consciousness of Time’: 
The Rise of Jair Bolsonaro,” Int’l J. Const. L. Blog, November 10, 2018, available at: 
http://www.iconnectblog.com/2018/11/brazils-false-consciousness-of-time-the-rise-of-jair-bolsonaro. 
841It is needless to point out that this might result in the massacre of Brazil’s poorest people, since it legitimates 
the arbitrary use of police force more specifically in peripheral urban areas.   
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Mr. Bolsonaro’s election is part of the long cycle of authoritarianism in Brazilian 
politics that has threatened the exercise of civil rights and political liberties in the country.842 
In fact, Brazilian authorities have showed an enduring willingness for authoritarian rule. For 
most of the 20th century, the country was ruled by strongmen, usually leaders with great political 
charisma, who were unable to bring the promised global relevance to the country.843 This seems 
to be the case of Mr. Bolsonaro. The most accurate descriptions of Mr. Bolsonaro’s political 
profile, at least based on his political speeches and activities during more than 16 years as a 
deputy, fairly relate to Jan-Werner Müller’s analysis of populism844 or even Jason Stanley’s 
analysis of how fascism works in contemporary times.845 For Stanley, fascism in current times 
stands for “ultranationalism of some variety (…) with the nation represented in the person of 
an authoritarian leader who speaks on its behalf.”846 Contemporary fascism, he has argued, 
relies on different strategies to seize and exercise power, like i) praising a mythic past, ii) 
propaganda (or even unreality with the sharing of fake news), iii) anti-intellectualism and iv) 
victimhood, which places the leader as a national hero.847 All these political strategies apply to 
the attitude that Mr. Bolsonaro adopted during his 2018 political campaign.848 
 
Despite the fact that Mr. Bolsonaro’s election keeps the debate about authoritarianism 
in Brazil alive, it is important to stress that this study does not want to advance a militant 
discourse against his government based on what he promised in his campaign, although many 
issues are indeed incompatible with the Brazilian constitution. The first reason for this non-
                                                 
842It is worth distinguishing authoritarianism and totalitarianism based on Karl Loewenstein’s interpretation of 
these categories. See: Karl Loewenstein, Verfassungslehre, trans. Rüdiger Boerner, (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 
1969), 52-58. Loewenstein applied this distinction to the Brazilian context in his book about the Getúlio Vargas’s 
government. See: Karl Loewenstein, Brazil Under Vargas, (New York: McMillan, 1942). For him, 
authoritarianism “refers to the form of government, to the type and technique of the policy-forming power.” 
Loewenstein, Brazil Under Vargas, 370. By contrast, totalitarianism “refers to a way of life, to social factors. It 
implies that the sphere of private life of the individual citizen or subject is subordinated to the public policies of 
the state to the point of obliteration.” Ibid. As Loewenstein very accurately noted: “If there is anything which is 
commonly shared by Brazilian people it is their ingrained aversion to all forms of totalitarian intrusion upon their 
privacy.”  Ibid. These observations remain true in contemporary times. 
843Throughout the 20th century Brazil experienced long times under authoritarian rule. Getúlio Vargas, for instance, 
took power with the help of a military junta in 1930 and stayed in the presidency of Brazil until 1945. 
844For Müller, populists try to delegitimize others based on the argument that they are the only legitimate 
representatives of the people. See: Jan-Werner Müller, What is Populism?, (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2016). 
845Jason Stanley, How Fascism Works. The Politics of Us and Them, (New York: Random House, 2018). 
846Ibid, Introduction, xiv. 
847Ibid, 3-108.  
848Mr. Bolsonaro can be compared to similar contemporary heads of government in countries like Russia, Hungary, 
Poland, India, Turkey, and in the United States. This kind of politicians represent a significant threat to democracy, 
the rule of law, and human rights enforcement in their respective countries and in the international community as 
a whole. As Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt have claimed, they can lead to a gradual deterioration of 
democracy. See: Steven Levitsky, Daniel Ziblatt, How Democracies Die, (New York: Crown Publishing, 2018). 
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militant approach is that it would be simply speculation about the future. Mr. Bolsonaro may 
likely change his political rhetoric throughout his administration, which would be no novelty 
among politicians.849 A second reason is that this militant discourse against him does not play 
an important role in the normative model of mixed-form international judicial review that this 
study proposes. It just turns this normative model more necessary in light of the current 
Brazilian political situation. This study does not aim to take a far-right populist out of the 
government. It aims to turn the constitutional landscape into an unwelcoming environment for 
the rise of populism and authoritarianism. This can be achieved by means of the enforcement 
of national and inter-American human rights law. This obviously leaves little scope for a 
populist in the government of Brazil, but that is only a necessary consequence.850 That been 
said, this study will now offer reasons for the review of the Brazilian amnesty statute within 
domestic law. The review of this statute by the IACtHR was a case of strong-form inter-
American judicial review, i.e., the IACtHR ordered national authorities to invalidate the 
domestic amnesty statute. The legitimacy of strong-form review in this case is largely based on 
the evolution of inter-American human rights jurisprudence on amnesty laws and its 
enforcement by national authorities of different IAS member states. This evolution and 
enforcement of inter-American jurisprudence on amnesty laws will be addressed in the 
following section.   
  
 
7.1.1. The evolution and enforcement of inter-American human rights jurisprudence 
on amnesty laws  
 
As it is well-known, many Latin American countries have endured dictatorships in their 
recent past. Most of these authoritarian regimes adopted amnesty statutes as a condition for 
domestic democratization. The human rights violations practiced by some of these authoritarian 
regimes were later addressed by the IACtHR based on the ACHR, when the court had the 
                                                 
849This does not seem likely to happen after months of his administration. It is true that the president is facing 
opposition from Congress and from courts. However, it is still uncertain whether Brazilian democratic institutions 
will be able to limit his presidential powers in order to combat his authoritarianism. Juliano Benvindo’s studies 
illustrate well this contemporary challenge for Brazilian democratic institutions. See: Juliano Zaiden 
Benvindo, “The Party Fragmentation Paradox in Brazil: A Shield Against Authoritarianism?,” Int’l J. Const. L. 
Blog, October 24, 2019, available at: http://www.iconnectblog.com/2019/10/the-party-fragmentation-paradox-in-
brazil-a-shield-against-authoritarianism/; See also: Juliano Zaiden Benvindo, “Populism Meets Congressional 
Backlash in Brazil: Recasting Executive-Legislative Relations?,” Constitutionnet, July 4, 2019, available at: 
http://constitutionnet.org/news/populism-meets-congressional-backlash-brazil-recasting-executive-legislative-
relations.  
850This represents an institutional way of dealing with Brazilian sui generis populism. 
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opportunity to invalidate domestic amnesty laws. As Louise Mallinder has claimed, inter-
American jurisprudence and domestic compliance with it have represented a regional trend of 
“an outright rejection of amnesties for international crimes and gross human rights violations 
enacted during dictatorships.”851 Laurence Burgorgue-Larsen has also pointed out that the 
“anti-impunity” approach to amnesty laws is the key to understanding the “jurisprudential 
politics” of the IACtHR in Latin America.852 This jurisprudential politics led to an overall 
rejection of amnesty laws in the region and it can be illustrated, for instance, by Judge Cançado 
Trindade’s concurring opinion on Barrios Altos v. Peru, whereby he described amnesty laws 
as “nothing but an aberration, an inadmissible affront to the juridical conscience of humanity.”853 
 
According to inter-American jurisprudence on amnesty laws, there is neither legitimacy 
nor a legal basis for the validity of the Brazilian amnesty law. One of the core arguments for its 
review is that other Latin American countries, despite the many political and economic costs 
involved with compliance, have enforced the IACtHR decisions that invalidated amnesty 
laws.854 This common practice has arguably become regional customary human rights law. This 
study has already addressed the resistance on the part of the Brazilian authorities towards inter-
American jurisprudence on amnesty laws in Chapter II. Most prominently, the Brazilian 
constitutional court refused to adopt the IACtHR’s interpretation of the invalidity of the 
Brazilian amnesty statute. This section will argue why especially these Brazilian judicial 
authorities should review this severe violation of inter-American human rights law. As 
mentioned, this relates to the evolution of inter-American jurisprudence on amnesty laws. A 
close analysis of the IACtHR’s decisions and compliance with them by the corresponding 
national authorities of Peru, Chile, Uruguay and El Salvador can illustrate this evolution. The 
IACtHR was in fact successful in all cases within this specific inter-American case law. 
However, national authorities defied the authority of the court on several occasions. This 
                                                 
851Louise Mallinder, “The End of Amnesty or Regional Overreach? Interpreting the Erosion of South America’s 
Amnesty Laws,” International and Comparative Law Quarterly 65, (2016), 645-680, 649. She has also pointed out 
that “limited amnesties that exclude gross human rights violations can be permissible provided that the limitations 
are applied in practice.” Ibid. This section will later address this possible use of amnesty laws within the IAS. 
852Laurence Burgorgue-Larsen, “La Erradicación de la Impunidad: Claves para Decifrar la Política Jurisprudencial 
de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos,” in El Control Difuso de Convencionalidad. Dialogo de la 
Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos y los Jueces Nacionales, ed. Eduardo Ferrer Mac-Gregor, (México: 
Fundación Universitaria de Derecho, Administración y Política, 2012), 33-62. 
853IACtHR, (Concurring Opinion of Judge Antonio Augusto Cançado Trindade) March 14, 2001, Case of Barrios 
Altos v. Peru, § 26. 
854As the IACtHR noted:  “… all of the international organs for the protection of human rights and several high 
courts of the region that have had the opportunity to rule on the scope of amnesty laws regarding serious human 
rights violations and their compatibility with international obligations of States that issue them, have noted that 
these amnesty laws impact the international obligation of the State to investigate and punish said violations.” 
IACtHR, Gomes Lund v. Brazil, §170. 
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happened before and after the emergence of conventionality control.855 The following analysis 
does not focus on full compliance with inter-American decisions, given that this would involve 
analyzing several ordered measures.856 Hence, compliance analysis relies on domestic adoption 
of the IACtHR’s core positions as a means to ensure the effectiveness of strong inter-American 
judicial review within domestic law.  
 
The first case of inter-American judicial review of an amnesty law was Barrios Altos v. 
Peru,857 which concerned the international state responsibility of Peru in the non-investigation, 
prosecution and punishment of human rights violations carried out especially during the 
authoritarian regime of Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000). Barrios Altos needs to be analyzed in 
connection with the case of La Cantuta v. Peru,858 given that both related to Peruvian amnesty 
laws enacted during Fujimori’s dictatorship.859 In Barrios Altos, the Court established that Peru 
was responsible for violations of the right to life of 15 persons and the right to personal integrity 
of 4 persons who, in November 1991, were seriously injured in a facility situated in the 
neighborhood of Lima. In La Cantuta, the IACtHR found Peru responsible for violations of the 
right to life, personal integrity and personal liberty of one teacher and nine students of the 
University of La Cantuta, who were illegally and arbitrarily detained in July 1992. The teacher 
and one of the students were proved to be executed, while the remaining eight people have been 
missing since then. In both cases, the human rights violations were carried out by the Grupo 
Colina, a death squad linked to the Peruvian National Intelligence Service that operated with 
the knowledge of the Presidency of the Republic and the army command. The death squad 
promoted several repression campaigns, many of them against the oppositional armed group 
known as the Sendero Luminoso (The Shining Path).  
 
                                                 
855Generally, the IACtHR invalidation of amnesty laws has been based on an extensive interpretation of Art. 2 
ACHR. Invoking this article, the IACtHR has ordered states to amend their corresponding domestic legal orders 
as a means to avoid conflicts with the ACHR. It is worth mentioning that Art. 2 ACHR has gained more importance 
throughout the evolution of inter-American jurisprudence after the IACHR started to refer cases to the IACtHR 
alleging violations of this ACHR provision. On this issue, see: Laurence Burgorgue-Larsen, “The Right to ad intra 
Enforcement of the Convention,” in The Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Case Law and Commentary, eds.  
Laurence Burgorgue-Larsen, Amaya Úbeda de Torres, (New York, Oxford University Press, 2011), 243-268. 
856The ordered reparations in the cases ranged from simply symbolic measures, like publishing the judgement in 
state press outlets, to even more lengthy and complex remedies, like the review or amendment of domestic 
legislation. 
857IACtHR, (Judgement) March 14, 2001, Case of Barrios Altos v. Peru. 
858IACtHR, (Judgement) November 29, 2006, Case of La Cantuta v. Peru. 
859These two cases involved the “systematic practice of illegal and arbitrary detentions, torture, extra-legal 
executions and forced disappearances” with the knowledge or “even ordered by the highest command of the armed 
forces, the intelligence services and the then governing Executive” and whose main victims were people “labelled 
as subversive or somehow contrary or in opposition to the Government.” IACtHR, La Cantuta v. Peru, §81.  
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An investigation of the facts of the cases was not possible due to the general climate of 
impunity that prevailed in Peru during the military government that took power after a coup 
d’état on April 5, 1992. The non-prosecution of human rights violations was a common practice 
that was ensured through several means, but especially by the delegation of investigations to 
military courts. In several cases, the authority has been taken from ordinary courts and referred 
to military courts in order to hinder the investigations for years and ensure the impunity of the 
military commando. Other common practices to secure impunity were the removal of judges 
and prosecutors from their activities and, most importantly for the analysis here, the enactment 
of amnesty laws.860 
 
The IACtHR first declared the Peruvian amnesty laws invalid on the grounds that they 
hindered the investigation, prosecution and punishment of serious human rights violations 
carried out by the Peruvian military state.861 In a later interpretation of Barrios Altos, the 
IACtHR established the general effects of the decision due to the nature of the violation 
represented by the amnesty laws.862 Peruvian authorities complied with these IACtHR 
decisions.863 These decisions represented one of the main reasons for dismissing the amnesty 
laws as a defense argument and reopening criminal investigations within Peruvian law. 
Moreover, domestic judicial authorities referred to the decisions of Barrios Altos and La 
Cantuta within the criminal judgement of Alberto Fujimori. This fact strengthened the authority 
of inter-American jurisprudence, given that the decisions were adopted as a reference point for 
the punishment of a prominent political figure based on the human rights violations committed 
during his administration and with his clear consent.864   
                                                 
860On these authoritarian practices that were adopted during Latin American dictatorships, see: Anthony W. 
Pereira, Political (In)Justice. Authoritarianism and The Rule of Law in Brazil, Chile and Argentina, (Pittsburg: 
University of Pittsburg Press, 2005).  
861IACtHR, Barrios Altos v. Peru, §§41-44 and 4th operative paragraph.  
862“Enactment of a law that is manifestly incompatible with the obligations undertaken by a State Party to the 
Convention is per se a violation of the Convention for which the State incurs international responsibility. The 
Court therefore considers that given the nature of the violation that amnesty laws No. 26479 and No. 26492 
constitute, the effects of the decision in the judgment on the merits of the Barrios Altos case are general in nature, 
and the question put to the Court in the Commission’s request for interpretation must be so answered,” (my 
emphasis). IACtHR, (Interpretation of the Judgment) September 3, 2001, Case of Barrios Altos v. Peru, §18. The 
IACtHR ruled that “given the nature of the violation that amnesty laws No. 26479 and No. 26492 constitute, the 
decision in the judgment on the merits in the Barrios Altos Case has generic effects.” Ibid, 2nd operative paragraph. 
863According to the order of monitory compliance issued on September 22, 2005, the IACtHR found that Peru 
complied with the duty to enforce the interpretation of the invalidity of Laws No. 26.479 and No. 26.492. See: 
IACtHR, (Monitoring Compliance with Judgement) September 22, 2005, Case of Barrios Altos and La Cantuta 
v. Peru.  
864Fujimori was granted a humanitarian pardon in 2017 by president Pedro Pablo Kuczynski, whose administration 
ended in 2018 after he resigned due to accusations of corruption and alleged vote buying. On the history of 
compliance with Barrios Altos and La Cantuta, see: Jorge Contesse, “Case of Barrios Altos and La Cantuta v. 




In Almonacid v. Chile,865 the IACtHR was asked to rule on the non-investigation of the 
execution of Mr. Almonacid-Arellano, as well as the non-reparation in favor of his kin, based 
on the interpretation held by national authorities of the Decree Law No. 2191/1978, equivalent 
in its effects to an amnesty law in Chile. Mr. Almonacid-Arellano was a 42 years old teacher 
who, after being arrested at home and arbitrarily shot by the police of his city, died due to the 
shooting.866 As in the Peruvian cases, the investigation and prosecution of the case were 
hindered by the enforcement of the Chilean amnesty law by state authorities even after the 
country’s democratization. On December 5, 1996, the Chilean Supreme Court decided to 
dismiss the case within the ordinary justice system and alleged that it should be referred to a 
military court. Not surprisingly, the military justice system was inactive for years and, 
eventually, the Second Military Court of Santiago dismissed the case based on the Decree Law 
No. 2191. With this factual basis, the IACtHR ruled that the Chilean decree law was invalid 
and, for the first time in its jurisprudence, established conventionality control as a specific form 
of strong inter-American judicial review of domestic laws.867 Since then, conventionality 
control was practiced with regard to all others domestic amnesty laws that were judicially 
reviewed by the IACtHR.  
 
The IACtHR found that Chile complied with the duty to ensure that the Decree Law No. 
2191 did not continue to hinder the investigation of Mr. Almonacid-Arellano’s case.868 The 
IACtHR’s decision was, according to a report presented by the Chilean state, the main reason 
why domestic authorities nullified resolutions and judgements that had previously dismissed 
the case based on the enforcement of the Chilean amnesty law. The case was referred to 
ordinary criminal courts and, when faced with a peremptory challenge to the ordinary 
jurisdiction by the Second Military Court of Santiago, the Chilean Supreme Court dismissed it 
and maintained the ordinary jurisdiction of the case based on the IACtHR’s judgment.869  
                                                 
865IACtHR, (Judgement) September 26, 2006, Case of Almonacid Arellano et al. v. Chile. 
866His murder took place in the context of the military dictatorship that took over the government in Chile on 
September 11, 1973 by means of a coup d’etat. Like other Latin American dictatorships, the Chilean authoritarian 
government (1973-1990) practiced several human rights violations, which included arbitrary executions, torture, 
detention and forced disappearance of alleged “state enemies.” In fact, civilians could represent a threat simply by 
their political ideology as in Mr. Arellano’s case.  
867IACtHR, Almonacid Arellano v. Chile, §124. 
868See: IACtHR (Monitoring Compliance with Judgement) November 28, 2010, Case of Almonacid Arellano v. 
Chile.  
869No later monitory compliance order has been issued to date, but domestic authorities fully complied with the 
operative paragraphs concerning the investigation of Almonacid Arellano’s murder. After domestic criminal 
investigations, on July 31, 2013 the Chilean Supreme Court dismissed an appeal in favor of Raúl Neveu Cortesi 
for the execution of Mr. Almonacid Arellano. This decision confirmed his sentence to 5 years in prison. 
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The conventionality control of the Uruguayan amnesty law was practiced in Gelman v. 
Uruguay.870 The facts of the case occurred during the civil-military dictatorship in Uruguay 
(1973-1985), which also represented a period of systematic human rights violations by the 
Uruguayan armed forces in collaboration with Argentine authorities. In this context, María 
Claudia Casinelli and her husband Marcelo Ariel Gelman, both Argentines, were arrested and 
separated in Buenos Aires by Uruguayan and Argentine officials. María Claudia was 19 years 
old and about seven months pregnant. She was later taken to Montevideo by the Uruguayan 
authorities on a clandestine flight and held at the headquarters of the Uruguayan Defense 
Information Service, where she gave birth to a girl. Her baby was taken from her and handed 
over to a Uruguayan policeman and to his wife, who registered her as her own daughter. Since 
then, María Claudia has been missing and the criminal investigation of the authorities involved 
in the case has not been possible based on the enforcement of the Ley de Caducidad (Expiry 
Law or Law No. 15.848). 
 
The most notable feature of Gelman is that the Expiry Law in Uruguay was twice 
confirmed by referenda that happened in 1989 and in 2009. The IACtHR had to address the 
arguably democratic legitimacy of the Uruguayan amnesty law based on the majoritarian 
decision of the Uruguayan people. Despite its confirmation by the majority of the Uruguayan 
people, the IACtHR invalidated the Expiry Law. For the IACtHR, “the democratic legitimacy 
of specific facts in a society is limited by the norms of protection of human rights recognized 
in international treaties, such as the American Convention” and “particularly in cases of serious 
violations of nonrevocable norms of International Law, the protection of human rights 
constitutes an impassable limit to the rule of the majority.”871  
 
Within domestic law, the Uruguayan national legislature adopted a new statute (Law 
No. 18.831), which invalidated the previous amnesty law. The executive power also issued 
Decree 323/2011, which invalidated the administrative acts referring to the Law 15.848. 
Finally, domestic legal authorities reopened investigations of the case of María Claudia García 
de Gelman. However, the Uruguayan Supreme Court of Justice did not invalidate the amnesty 
statute (Law 15.848) within domestic law and, in turn, invalidated some provisions of the new 
Law 18.831. This domestic court decided against inter-American jurisprudence when it 
                                                 
870IACtHR, (Judgement) February 24, 2011, Case of Gelman v. Uruguay. 
871Ibid, §239. 
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established the end of the expiry period for the prosecution of serious human rights violations 
in a case whose investigations were hindered by the domestic enforcement of the amnesty 
statute. However, the state representatives emphasized that the domestic court did not invalidate 
Art. 1 Law No. 18.831, according to which the state has authority to prosecute the human rights 
violations committed by public officials during the authoritarian period.872 
 
The case of El Mozote v. El Salvador873 involved human rights violations perpetrated 
by the Salvadoran armed forces during an internal armed conflict, which resulted in the murder 
of more than 1000 people, the majority of whom were children. El Mozote involved the inter-
American judicial review of two different types of amnesty laws. The exception of El Mozote 
was due to the fact that the IACtHR established the admissibility of amnesty laws in case of 
internal armed conflicts. The IACtHR ruled that “amnesty laws are sometimes justified to pave 
the way to a return to peace.”874 The court established that, due to the internal armed conflict 
in El Salvador, an amnesty law could be used in order to bring the hostilities to an end. The 
problematic aspect of the case was that after the National Reconciliation Law, which complied 
with the requirements of an appropriate use of an amnesty law, the El Salvadorian Congress 
enacted a general and absolute amnesty statute, which hindered the criminal investigations of 
all serious human rights abuses committed in the country during the armed conflict. For the 
IACtHR, the “ratio legis of this general amnesty was to render ineffective the Peace Accord,” 
leaving unpunished the crimes committed during the armed conflict.875  
 
The IACtHR pointed out that, 20 years after the massacre of El Mozote, investigations 
have always been dismissed based on the enforcement of the general amnesty law, which has 
constituted a serious violation of the state’s international obligation to investigate and punish 
human rights offences.876 Due to these facts, the IACtHR established the invalidity of the 
second general amnesty statute.877 Taking this IACtHR decision as a meaningful reference 
point, state authorities filed the judicial review of the general amnesty law, whose decision by 
the El Salvadoran Supreme Court took longer than 3 years. Finally, in 2016, this court reviewed 
the general amnesty law enacted in 1993. This decision abided by the interpretation of the 
                                                 
872IACtHR, (Monitoring Compliance with Judgement) March 20, 2013, Case of Gelman v. Uruguay, § 32. 




876Ibid, § 295.  
877Ibid, §318. 
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IACtHR and the El Salvadoran Supreme Court also established its erga omnes effects within 
domestic law.878 In the most recent monitory compliance, the IACtHR concluded that the state 
authorities fully complied with the order to ensure that the general amnesty law no longer 
represents an obstacle to the investigation of serious human rights violations committed during 
the internal armed conflict in El Salvador.879 
 
 
7.1.2. The strong judicial review of the Brazilian amnesty law   
 
Based on the above description of the evolution and enforcement of inter-American 
jurisprudence on amnesty laws, the further enforcement of the Brazilian amnesty law represents 
a flagrant violation of inter-American human rights law by Brazilian authorities. The 
contemporary validity of the amnesty law represents a flagrant violation of regional customary 
human rights law. The Brazilian authorities should follow their Latin American peers and strike 
down the Brazilian amnesty law. They should no longer enforce this statute because its 
enforcement has been based on a very controversial interpretation of the 1988 constitution that 
privileges an illegitimate transitional justice mindset to the detriment of the normative force of 
the 1988 cosmopolitan constitution and of inter-American human rights law. This chapter has 
focused on how resistance on the part of the Brazilian authorities to enforce inter-American 
jurisprudence brings about flagrant violations of the regional practices of judicial review of 
amnesty statutes. 
 
No other body of case law has become as relevant for the IACtHR authority as the cases 
involving amnesty laws within the IAS. The Peruvian cases were the first ones in which the 
IACtHR established the erga omnes effects of the invalidation of amnesty laws within the IAS. 
The Chilean case was responsible for the emergence of conventionality control as a specific 
form of strong inter-American judicial review. In the Uruguayan case, the IACtHR decided to 
enforce its own precedent decisions and ruled that even democratic procedures should abide by 
the principles of international human rights law. In the case involving El Salvador, despite the 
fact that the IACtHR recognized the possibility that the amnesty law could be appropriately 
used to bring peace to an internal armed conflict in the country, the court did not hesitate to 
                                                 
878Constitutional Chamber of El Salvador, (Judgement) July 13, 2016. 




strike down a subsequently issued general amnesty law. The IACtHR acknowledged that this 
second statute was issued as a means of leaving serious human rights violations unpunished, as 
has traditionally been the case with amnesty laws in Latin America. 
 
Even if other domestic authorities have on several occasions resisted the enforcement 
of inter-American jurisprudence on amnesty laws, like the judges of the Uruguayan Supreme 
Court of Justice have done, the Brazilian constitutional court posed the most substantial 
challenge to the effectiveness of inter-American judicial review of amnesty laws. As Chapter 
II has explained, the Brazilian STF established the constitutionality of the Brazilian amnesty 
statute within the domestic system of constitutional review.880 This decision strengthened the 
provincial and insular development of Brazilian constitutionalism because it ignored the 
evolution of inter-American human rights jurisprudence on the matter.881 The Brazilian 
constitutional court also ignored the IAS member states’ converging approach to amnesty 
statutes within domestic law. The case involving the Brazilian amnesty law illustrates best how 
national authorities have been responsible for the insular evolution of Brazilian 
constitutionalism. This leads to the compelling case for Brazilian authorities enforcing the 
IACtHR decisions in Gomes Lund and Herzog: By doing so, they could align domestic 
constitutional practices with the evolution of inter-American human rights law.  
 
Cosmopolitan convergence in this case has consequences for both the inter-American 
and the domestic levels. By enforcing the IACtHR decisions, the Brazilian constitutional court 
can guarantee their effectiveness within domestic law. This means that one of the most 
substantial IAS members would finally abide by the most relevant body of inter-American case 
law. In this sense, Brazilian authorities can strengthen even more the normative force of 
regional customary human rights law. However, not only the inter-American authorities would 
gain from domestic compliance. From another perspective, the Brazilian constitutional court 
could strengthen the legitimacy of the Brazilian state if they practice the strong review of the 
amnesty statute. This argument is based on what Dworkin has described as the fundamental 
                                                 
880Brazilian STF, (Judgement) April 29, 2010, Claim of Non-Compliance with a Fundamental Precept (ADPF) 
No. 153. 
881This has been common practice within Brazilian constitutional court’s jurisprudence: “Brazil’s 1998 acceptance 
of the jurisdiction of the IACtHR did not immediately alter the almost irrelevant role that the case law of this Court 
has played in the decision-making process of the Brazilian Supreme Court. References to decisions of the IACtHR 
were virtually non-existent. Even before 1998, that is, even before Brazil had accepted the IACtHR’s jurisdiction, 
the case law of the IACtHR could have played an important argumentative role, especially in decisions related to 
human rights. The STF frequently refers to foreign precedents as an argumentative toll, but almost never to those 
of the [IACtHR].” Virgílio Afonso da Silva, The Constitution of Brazil. A Contextual Analysis, (Oxford et al: Hart 
Publishing, 2019), 167-168.  
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obligation of international law and the associated principle of salience.882 According to this 
fundamental obligation, states should always try to improve the legitimacy of their own 
authority as coercive governments. This obligation is especially applicable to the Brazilian state 
in light of the long periods under authoritarian rule. The principle of salience is the mechanism 
that selects among the wide range of alternatives available for domestic governments to abide 
by the fundamental obligation.  
 
As the previous chapter has explained, conventionality control abides by the principle 
of salience in Latin America. This means that the strong review of the Brazilian amnesty law 
has become the most salient opportunity for national judicial authorities to improve the 
legitimacy of the Brazilian state. In this sense, the Brazilian STF has substantial normative 
reasons to invalidate the Brazilian amnesty statute. These normative reasons relate to the fact 
that the Brazilian constitutional court cannot simply ignore the consistent evolution of inter-
American human rights law, especially with regard to the protection of civil and political rights. 
The previous chapter has explained how the practice of strong inter-American judicial review, 
if it is limited to cases involving legislation that flagrantly violates the civil and political rights 
protected under inter-American human rights law, is the most legitimate approach that the 
IACtHR could adopt to the practice of international judicial review. The conventionality control 
of amnesty laws within the IAS abides by all criteria established by the theory of mixed-form 
inter-American judicial review regarding the practice of strong review of domestic legislation. 
Given this fact, there is no scope for national authorities to contest the legitimacy of the 
conventionality control of amnesty laws. There is also no reason why Brazilian authorities 
should not guarantee the effectiveness of conventionality control of the amnesty statute within 
domestic law.  
 
Finally, it is worth mentioning that, following the IACtHR decision in Gomes Lund, the 
Brazilian Bar Association (OAB) issued a review of the Brazilian STF’s judgement in ADPF 
153. The decision of this review is still pending. This seems to be the best opportunity for the 
highest domestic judicial authorities to take a step towards more consistency in human rights 
enforcement within domestic law. These Brazilian judicial authorities owe it to the international 
community to invalidate the domestic amnesty statute. They should comply with this duty as 
soon as possible.  
                                                 
882Dworkin’s argument has been addressed in Chapter IV and in the previous chapter under “strong inter-American 




7.2. Constitutional Amendment 95/2016 (CA 95): the case for weak inter-American 
judicial review 
 
Recent decades have seen a very promising Brazilian economy. Especially after 1994, 
when the Brazilian currency and inflation stabilized, the country started to benefit from foreign 
investment and good commodity prices on the international market.883 These favorable 
circumstances helped Brazil to once again figure among the most influential global actors, 
together with the emerging economies of Russia, India, China and South Africa (also known as 
the BRICS). Within domestic politics, these favorable circumstances enabled significant 
increases in public spending, which led to the establishment of important social welfare 
programs and, ultimately, to the rise of 40 million Brazilians out of poverty.884  
 
This ended at some point around 2015. Some see the turning point for the Brazilian 
economic miracle already in June 2013, when millions of Brazilians took the streets to protest 
against the inefficiency and expense of public service. The protests were first motivated by a 
rise in public bus fares in metropoles like São Paulo and Rio, but they quickly spread around 
the country and started to address broader issues like corruption and public security. This 
widespread public dissatisfaction came as a surprise to the Brazilian government at the time, 
since they believed that the country was consistently heading towards the end of Brazilian 
underdevelopment. Brazilian former president, Dilma Rousseff, even called the population 
ungrateful for not recognizing the accomplishments of the administrations headed by her 
Workers Party (PT). The widespread dissatisfaction would escalate in the years to come. 
 
The decrease in commodity prices and bad domestic macroeconomic decisions 
contributed to the most severe economic crisis that Brazilians had experienced in a very long 
time.885 In 2015, Brazil’s GDP decreased 3.8%, which was followed by another significant drop 
                                                 
883This enthusiasm with the Brazilian economy can be illustrated by this 2009 issue of The Economist: The 
Economist, Brazil Takes Off, November 12, 2009, available at: 
https://www.economist.com/leaders/2009/11/12/brazil-takes-off. 
884See: “Almost 40 million Brazilians Climbed to Middle Class in the Last Eight Years,” Mercopress, June 28, 
2011, available at: http://en.mercopress.com/2011/06/28/almost-40-million-brazilians-climbed-to-middle-class-
in-the-last-eight-years. 
885Paul Krugman recently addressed the macroeconomic causes of the depression; see: Paul Krugman, “What the 
Hell Happened to Brazil (Wonkish),” New York Times, November 9, 2018, available at: 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/09/opinion/what-the-hell-happened-to-brazil-wonkish.html 
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of 3.6% in 2016. This turbulent atmosphere led to the impeachment of Ms. Rousseff and to the 
rise to power of Michel Temer who, in just two years, adopted a series of very disputed austerity 
measures in order to respond to the economic crisis. Mr. Temer drastically cut public spending 
and adopted impressive legislative reforms in his short period in the government. He benefited 
from his party’s majority in the two congressional chambers, which enabled him to pass 
legislative reforms in a record time. One example is the reform of the Brazilian Labor Code as 
a way for introducing more flexibility to employment contracts under Brazilian law. Many 
Brazilian politicians had aimed to pass such reforms, but only Mr. Temer’s administration was 
finally able to so. Mr. Temer promised the reform would significantly increase employment in 
the country. However, he was proved wrong by the end of his administration. This reform led 
to the abolition of important workers’ rights and to the deregulation of labor contracts. Some 
points of the reform even drastically violated human rights.886  
 
Another example of Mr. Temer’s radical reforms was the adoption of Constitutional 
Amendment 95/2016 (CA 95), also known as the Expenditure Ceiling Act or the new fiscal 
regime,887 which represents, according to a very accurate headline, “the mother of all austerity 
plans.”888 This constitutional amendment came into force in 2017 and established a 20-year 
social spending freeze. It might represent the most socially regressive austerity package 
currently in force in the world and it is causing a severe domestic underenforcement of 
socioeconomic rights. This 20-year freeze in social spending has severe consequences for the 
public budgets for education, health and the promotion of important social programs in Brazil. 
The Brazilian legislature has adopted this radical measure as a way to deal with fiscal deficits 
that, according to most of the representatives, were reaching problematic levels due to the 
Brazilian economic crisis. The following sections argue that Brazilian authorities should review 
the adoption of CA 95 due to the incompatibility between the domestic austerity measures and 
national and international human rights law. The necessity to review this specific constitutional 
amendment derives from the lack of a legal basis and its disproportionate effects in light of 
other alternatives available to bring Brazil back to fiscal health. These reasons will be addressed 
in the following section. Then, this chapter will argue how weak inter-American judicial review 
                                                 
886For instance, it allowed that pregnant women could be exposed to unhealthy conditions at work.  
887See the text of the amendment (available only in Portuguese) at: 
https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/constituicao/Emendas/Emc/emc95.htm. 
888See: Shannon Sims, “Brazil Passes the Mother of All Austerity Plans,” The Washington Post, December 16, 
2016, available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/12/16/brazil-passes-the-mother-
of-all-austerity-plans/?utm_term=.8d2b0771678a. 
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might be useful as a remedy for the substantial violations of socioeconomic rights brought about 
by CA 95 within domestic law.  
  
 
7.2.1. The lack of a legal basis according to national and international human rights 
law 
 
Within national law, the adoption of CA 95 represents a severe underenforcement of the 
1988 constitution. Due to its consequences, Yaniv Roznai and Letícia Kreuz have referred to 
CA 95 as an example of an “unconstitutional constitutional amendment.”889 For them, CA 95 
should be reviewed for violating Art. 60 (4) of the Brazilian constitution, which establishes the 
unamendable character of some constitutional features. They have argued that CA 95 violates 
the state’s federalist form of government and several fundamental rights.890 The violation of 
federalism is due to the derogation of the states’ capacity for self-organization, self-government 
and self-administration. The violation of fundamental rights is related to the prohibition, 
according to Art. 60 (4), of the abolishment of individual rights and guarantees. This involves 
the interpretation that socioeconomic rights are included under the catalogue of fundamental 
rights and, therefore, unamendable within Brazilian law.  
 
Richard Albert has referred to CA 95 as an example of “constitutional 
dismemberment.”891 For him, constitutional dismemberment occurs when constitutional 
amendments represent “self-conscious efforts to repudiate the essential characteristics of the 
constitution and to destroy its foundations.”892 Albert has claimed that, based on the impact on 
the next generation’s enjoyment of socioeconomic rights and on the incompatibility with core 
constitutional norms, CA 95 represents “more than a simple amendment. Its purpose and effect 
suggest that it should instead be called a constitutional dismemberment.”893 CA 95 has, in fact, 
introduced a disruptive fiscal policy that has severe consequences for the normative force of 
the 1988 constitution as a social welfare document.  
 
                                                 
889Yaniv Roznai, Letícia Regina Camargo Kreuz, “Conventionality Control and Amendment 95/2016: a Brazilian 
Case of Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendment,” Revista de Investigações Constitucionais 5, no. 2, (2018), 
35-56. 
890Ibid, 42. 
891Richard Albert, “Constitutional Amendment and Dismemberment,” Yale Journal of International Law 43, no. 
1, (2018), 1-84.  
892Ibid, 2-3.  
893Ibid, 42. 
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Socioeconomic rights are mentioned in several parts of the Brazilian constitution. Its 
preamble establishes that the state commits itself to ensuring the exercise of social rights.894 
Art. 3 (III) establishes the following core aims of the current constitutional order: the 
eradication of poverty and substandard living conditions, and the reduction of social and 
regional inequalities.895 Furthermore, the constitution lists several socioeconomic rights 
especially under Chapter II of its Tittle II, including, for instance, the rights to work, food and 
housing.896 The constitution also ensures the right to public healthcare,897 social security,898 
education,899 and culture.900 Due to the violation of all these fundamental rights protected by 
the Brazilian constitution, national authorities should regard CA 95 as an unconstitutional 
constitutional amendment and, therefore, review its adoption within domestic law.  
 
CA 95 should also arguably be reviewed for being incompatible with international 
human rights law. This incompatibility was first described by international human rights 
organizations that followed the debate around the project of this constitutional amendment. The 
UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), for instance, expressed 
concern with and questioned the legitimacy of the severe Brazilian austerity measures. For 
Philip Alston, the Special Rapporteur for Extreme Poverty and Human Rights, CA 95 “has all 
the characteristics of a deliberately retrogressive measure”, since the “federal spending cap will 
undoubtedly result in retrogression with regard to the realization of economic and social 
rights.”901 It is worth addressing how the adoption of CA 95 represents a violation of the duty 
of progressive development with regard to socioeconomic rights. 
 
The progressive development obligation is part of several international human rights 
documents. According to Art. 26 ACHR, state parties undertake to adopt measures to achieve 
                                                 
894Brazilian Constitution, preamble.  
895Brazilian Constitution, art. 3 (III). 
896“Education, health, nutrition, labor, housing, leisure, security, social security, protection of motherhood and 
childhood and assistance to the destitute, are social rights, in accordance with this Constitution.” Brazilian 
Constitution, art. 6.  
897Ibid, arts. 196-200. 
898Ibid, arts. 203-204. 
899Ibid, arts. 205-214. 
900Ibid, arts. 215-216 (A). 
901See: Philip Alston, “Brazil. Some Reflections on Brazil’s Approach to Promoting Austerity Through a 
Constitutional Amendment. Remarks Prepared for Presentation at a Colloquium on Constitutional Austerity, São 
Paulo, October 3, 2017, available at: 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Poverty/Austeritystatement_Alston3Oct2017.pdf. See also: OHCHR, 
“20-Year Public Expenditure Cap Will Breach Human Rights, UN Expert Warns,” available at: 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=21006. 
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the progressive full realization of the socioeconomic rights established by the OAS Charter.902 
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (hereinafter ICESCR) 
establishes in its Art. 2 (1) that state parties undertake “to take steps, individually and through 
international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum 
of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of” 
socioeconomic rights.903 Moreover, the progressive development obligation is part of the 
Protocol of San Salvador, which establishes a similar provision to the one in the ICESCR.904 
 
For Tara J. Melish, the duty of progressive enforcement implies at least three immediate 
obligations: i) the obligation to plan the progressive realization of socioeconomic rights, ii) the 
duty to execute this plan with due diligence and in good faith, and iii) the duty of not taking 
retrogressive measures that bring about the underenforcement of these rights.905 She has 
claimed that “[j]ust as a State Party has the obligation to take progressive measures, it has an 
obligation not to take regressive measures. Thus, at the most basic level, the duty of 
progressivity is a prohibition of regressivity.”906 International organizations have also shared 
this interpretation and considered the duty of refraining from the adoption of retrogressive 
measures as one of the consequent obligations that derives from the progressive enforcement 
of socioeconomic rights.  
 
Although the CESCR has claimed that “the full realization of all economic, social and 
cultural rights will generally not be able to be achieved in a short period of time,”907 it also 
claimed that this does not mean that the progressive development obligation is irrelevant.908 
With regard to the relationship between progressive development and the prohibition on 
adopting retrogressive measures, the CESCR established that “any deliberately retrogressive 
                                                 
902ACHR, art. 26. 
903ICESCR, art. 2 (1).  
904“The States Parties to this Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights undertake to adopt 
the necessary measures, both domestically and through international cooperation, especially economic and 
technical, to the extent allowed by their available resources, and taking into account their degree of development, 
for the purpose of achieving progressively and pursuant to their internal legislations, the full observance of the 
rights recognized in this Protocol.” PSS, art. 1. 
905Tara J. Melish, Protecting Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the Inter-American System: A Manual on 
Presenting Claims, (Quito: Centro de Derechos Económicos y Sociales, 2002), 175. 
906Ibid, 191.  
907CESCR, “The Nature of States Parties Obligations, General Comment No. 3”, December 14, 1990, U.N. doc 
E/1991/23, available at: https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4538838e10.pdf. 
908The CESCR established that the progressive development obligation “must be read in the light of the overall 
objective, indeed the raison d’être, of the Covenant, which is to establish clear obligations for States parties in 
respect of the full realization of the rights in question. It thus imposes an obligation to move as expeditiously and 
effectively as possible towards that goal.” Ibid, §9. 
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measures in that regard would require the most careful consideration and would need to be fully 
justified by reference to the totality of the rights of the Covenant and in the context of the full 
use of the maximum available resources.”909 
 
According to Art. 4 ICESCR, limitations to the enjoyment of socioeconomic rights 
should be determined by law “only insofar as this may be compatible with the nature of these 
rights and solely for the purpose of promoting the general welfare in a democratic society.”910 
There is a similar provision in Art. 5 of the Protocol of San Salvador (“Scope of Restrictions 
and Limitations”).911 Still, according to the Limburg principles of implementation of the 
ICESCR, the progressive development obligation is independent of increasing economic 
resources, since it is still possible to fulfil it by using resources more effectively.912 As applied 
to the case of CA 95, limitations on socioeconomic rights based on the argument that state 
authorities must cope with fiscal deficits caused by a macroeconomic crisis are not in 
accordance with the international human rights regime on these rights, as Philip Alston has also 
noted.913 State authorities have a duty to justify the adoption of restrictions and limitations on 
socioeconomic rights. The argument that an economic crisis demands a new fiscal regime that 
is against enforcing these rights does not suffice. Consequently, we may ask how fiscal policies 
relate to human rights enforcement within domestic law.  
 
For the IACHR, fiscal policies should be established based on the fundamental 
principles of participation, accountability, transparency and access to information.914 The 
IACHR also listed particularly relevant principles for fiscal policy from a human rights 
perspective: the guarantee of essential minimum levels, mobilization of the maximum amount 
of resources available for the progressive realization of socioeconomic rights, the non-
regressive nature of these rights and the principles of equality, and non-discrimination.915  As 
some critics have noted, the Brazilian legislature did not invest much time in the discussion 
                                                 
909Ibid. 
910ICESCR, art. 4. 
911“The State Parties may establish restrictions and limitations on the enjoyment and exercise of the rights 
established herein by means of laws promulgated for the purpose of preserving the general welfare in a democratic 
society only to the extent that they are not incompatible with the purpose and reason underlying those rights;” PSS, 
art. 5.  
912See the principle mentioned at §§ 21-28 in “The Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,” Human Rights Quarterly 9, (1987), 122–135.  
913“The mere invocation of an economic or fiscal crisis does not set aside the international human rights regime.” 
Alston, Some Reflections on Brazil’s Approach, 2. 




about the adoption of CA 95 and about the severe consequences this amendment could bring 
about within domestic law.916 In fact, CA 95’s adoption by the Brazilian legislature occurred 
in a very hasty and anti-democratic way. There was no effort from the part of the government 
or the legislature to inform civil society about the possible effects of CA 95. Debates on its 
adoption took place in Congress and they did not enable the active participation of civil 
society.917 Moreover, Mr. Temer had only come to power as a result of the impeachment of the 
former Brazilian president, Ms. Rousseff. This means that there was practically no ordinary 
democratic mandate by the people in support of the austerity measures introduced by his 
government.918 Due to the context of adoption of this amendment, the Brazilian authorities have 
violated several principles relating to the necessary transparency with regard to fiscal policies 
from the perspective of international human rights law.  
 
It is also worth mentioning that the United Nations Human Rights Council (OHCHR) 
has recently established guiding principles on how states should address the human rights 
impact of economic reforms.919 According to it, human rights “should guide all efforts to design 
and implement economic policies,” based on the principle that “the economy should serve the 
people, not vice versa.”920 Most importantly, the OHCHR established that countries should 
promote impact assessments in order “to prevent adverse human rights impacts of economic 
reforms.”921 EC 95 violates several of the OHCHR’s guiding principles, which this study 
explains in the following.  
 
Principle 2 establishes the obligation to abide by international human rights law when 
adopting economic policies. The OHCHR has pointed out that “in times of economic and 
financial crisis, States’ efforts are often directed at trying to stabilize the economy,” which often 
“comes with risk of disregarding their human rights obligations with regard to those who suffer 
                                                 
916This point of CA 95’s procedural illegitimacy has been first raised by Philip Alston. See: Alston, Some 
Reflections on Brazil’s Approach, 7-8.  
917For Philip Alston, “engagement with civil society was rather limited and did not include a wide range of different 
civil society organizations and groups. According to my information, debates on EC-95 mostly took place in 
Congress and there was limited scope for civil society to be involved in discussions or debates on the matter.” 
Ibid, 8.  
918Alston has pointed to the “the fact that the present Government came into office after the impeachment of the 
previous President and has not been able to obtain a specific mandate from the electorate for its program of fiscal 
consolidation, which runs contrary to the platform on which the Government had been elected.” Ibid, 7. He was 
referring in this passage to the previous government of Ms. Rousseff, who was elected due to her affiliation to the 
Workers’ Party (a traditional defender of socioeconomic rights enforcement).  
919OCHRH, Guiding Principles on Human Rights Impact Assessments of Economic Reforms, December 19, 2018, 
available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/1663025?ln=en#record-files-collapse-header. 
920Ibid, preamble, §2. 
921Ibid, preamble, §7. 
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most from the economic crisis.”922 Given this usual practice, the OCHRH established that fiscal 
policies “must not lead to sacrificing international human rights obligations,” and that states 
“should undertake full assessments of the potential impacts of fiscal discipline policies in 
different national and subnational contexts before committing to such policies.”923Moreover, 
states should guarantee the participation of all affected individuals and groups in the adoption 
of economic reforms.924  
 
Under Principle 9, the OHCHR addressed the progressive realization of socioeconomic 
rights and established that “states are obliged to establish fiscal policies that aim at the 
realization of human rights.”925 Moreover, states should prove that “every effort has been made 
to mobilize all available resources, even in times of economic crisis,”926 to progressively 
enforcing socioeconomic rights. Still according to the OHCHR, the progressive enforcement 
obligation involves the states’ obligations to tackle tax evasion and avoidance, ensure a 
progressive tax system, and reprioritize expenditures to ensure the adequate funding of public 
services.927 Finally, the OHCHR established that states should in principle abide by the 
minimum core obligations regarding the protection of socioeconomic rights. Exceptions to this 
rule are allowed only if states demonstrate that every effort has been made to use all resources 
that are at their disposal to the progressive enforcement of these rights.928 
 
Based on the international documents mentioned above, there is a strong presumption 
of the inadmissibility of retrogressive measures with regard to socioeconomic rights as a 
consequence of the progressive development obligation. According to the OCHRH’s guiding 
principles, retrogressive measures are considered prima facie violations of socioeconomic 
rights.929 In line with this, state must prove that these retrogressive measures are i) temporary, 
ii) legitimate, iii) reasonable, iv) necessary, v) proportionate, vi) non-discriminatory, vii) 
protective of the minimum core content of socioeconomic rights, vii) based on transparency 
and genuine participation of affected groups, and viii) subject to meaningful review and 




925Ibid, §9 (a).  
926Ibid, §9 (b).  
927Ibid, §9.3. 
928Ibid, §9.5. 
929Ibid, §10.   
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accountability procedures.930 The adoption of EC 95 by the Brazilian national legislature did 
not abide by the majority of the principles above mentioned.  
 
 Given the fact that international law imposes a high burden of proof in the adoption of 
retrogressive measures, there is a remaining question with regard to the judicial review of CA 
95: does this amendment concretely represent a retrogressive measure? This relates to the 
concrete effects of CA 95 within domestic law, which this study will now describe. 
 
Few reports have been written on the effects of CA 95 and most of them are focused on 
its impacts on the most socially vulnerable groups in Brazil. According to a factsheet issued by 
three different organizations (COI factsheet hereinafter),931 on its first anniversary, CA 95 “has 
already begun to disproportionately affect disadvantaged groups, such as Afro-Brazilian 
women and people living in poverty.”932 This report mentioned that, since its adoption, 
“significant resources have been diverted from the most important social programs towards 
debt service payment, threatening to exacerbate the extreme levels of economic inequality” in 
the country.933 Based on CA 95, the Brazilian government has established “pro-cyclical budget 
cuts principally targeting investments in human rights, social protection, climate change, and 
racial and gender equality.”934 Moreover, the enforcement of CA 95 might significantly reduce 
key investments in health, education and public programs in the future. The budgetary impacts 
of CA 95 during the 2017 fiscal year illustrate this more clearly.  
 
The share of health and education spending within the federal budget dropped 17% and 
19% respectively. The government has also reduced funding for food security programs. One 
of the consequences has been the budget cuts of the Food Acquisition Program, which links 
small-scale farmers to food-insecure households and children (32% cut in 2017 if compared to 
the 2014 budget). The COI factsheet mentioned that especially small-scale farmers from the 
poorest northern regions of Brazil have been deprived of this social benefit. The drastic cuts to 
food programs and tax transfer programs may lead to hunger and malnutrition among the 
poorest Brazilians. Moreover, austerity measures have dismantled institutions that ensure 
                                                 
930Ibid, §10 (a-i). 
931They are: The Center for Economic and Social Rights (CESR), Oxfam Brazil and the Institute for 
Socioeconomic Studies (INESC). 
932See: CESR, Oxfam, INESC “Brazil. Human Rights in Times of Austerity,” 1, available at: 
http://www.cesr.org/factsheet-brazils-human-rights-advances-imperiled-austerity-measures. 
933Ibid, 4.  
934Ibid. 
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gender equality in Brazil. Social programs that were created to strengthen women’s autonomy, 
and provide services for women in violent situations, suffered major cuts in 2017 (only R$ 32,2 
million released out of R$ 96,5 million initially set in the federal budget). As a consequence, 
several women’s rights programs have been undercut. The number of specialized services 
offered to women suffering from violence has already been reduced by 15% as a result of budget 
cuts.  
 
CA 95 widens social inequality in Brazil and it does not promote any good to the poorest 
Brazilians. In contrast, its enforcement causes a considerable change in the distribution of 
wealth in the country at the expense of the worst-off Brazilians, which can also be illustrated 
by the impact of the new fiscal regime on another vulnerable social group: black women. Black 
women represent a traditionally underprivileged group in Brazil that is disproportionately 
affected by Brazil’s regressive tax system, given that the richer the tax payer is in Brazil, the 
lower the real tax rates are.935 Despite the fact that the Brazilian fiscal regime is traditionally 
deeply unfair to the poorest, CA 95 exacerbates the impact of this unfair fiscal policy on the 
poor black female population. Based on the consequences of CA 95 for poor black women in 
Brazil, the adoption of this new fiscal regime could even be considered a type of discrimination 
against this historically underprivileged social group.  
 
The COI factsheet rightly concluded that “austerity, and CA 95 in particular, is not a 
plan for fiscal stabilization, but an assault on the human rights of Brazilians, particularly 
women, blacks and others at greatest risk of poverty,” which has increased social and economic 
inequality in Brazil.936 The adoption of CA 95 has represented a clear underenforcement of 
socioeconomic rights under national and international law. Its enforcement has been 
implemented within a very controversial macroeconomic agenda at the expense of the 
normative force of the Brazilian constitution and of many international documents on 
socioeconomic rights. Brazilian authorities have especially ignored the international obligation 
to refrain from the adoption of retrogressive measures with regard to socioeconomic rights or 
to provide justifications for said measures. 
 
When adopting CA 95, national authorities also ignored other alternatives available to 
ensure fiscal health without necessarily cutting social spending in such a drastic way. Some of 




the alternatives involve maintaining the level of public spending and supporting it by other 
means. According to an IMF public policy paper, the impact of fiscal consolidations on public 
spending can be reduced by the greater reliance on wealth and property taxes, more progressive 
income taxations and combatting abuses like tax avoidance and evasion.937 These alternatives 
are legitimate ways to cope with the fiscal crisis and they also seem to be much more effective 
in countries like Brazil. Still according to the IMF, one recent report makes it clear that austerity 
measures per se will not bring the country back to fiscal health.938 
 
National authorities have traditionally ignored these efficient measures of improving 
fiscal health. Besides the provision of a wealth tax in the Brazilian constitution,939 for instance, 
the Brazilian legislature has still not turned it into reality by means of more concrete legislation, 
which brings about a significant loss of resources that could be used for social spending. 
Moreover, as the COI factsheet has also pointed out: “Brazil is one of the few countries 
worldwide that does not tax the dividends paid by corporations to their shareholders.”940 This 
reduces the taxes paid by the (super-)rich Brazilians, while it places a heavy burden on the poor 
and the middle class. The fight against tax abuses could also provide significant resources for 
public spending and be used as a measure to avoid cuts in the budgets for education, health and 
other important social programs.  
 
Due to several alternatives available, the Brazilian authorities should seek other tax 
sources in order to cope with fiscal deficits. The Brazilian legislature has not demonstrated the 
necessary and proportional character of CA 95 in light of these other alternatives available. 
Fiscal deficits must not necessarily lead to the abolishment of policies that promote the 
enforcement of socioeconomic rights. These policies represent ultimately the enforcement of 
the 1988 constitution as a social welfare document. They also ensure the effectiveness of 
international human rights law with regard to the protection of socioeconomic rights within 
domestic law. CA 95 brings about far reaching consequences for the normative force of 
                                                 
937IMF, Policy Paper: Fiscal Policy and Income Inequality, January 23, 2014, available at: 
https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Policy-Papers/Issues/2016/12/31/Fiscal-Policy-and-Income-Inequality-
PP4849. 
938IMF, “Country Report: Brazil,” 2018, available at:  
https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2018/08/03/Brazil-2018-Article-IV-Consultation-Press-Release-
Staff-Report-and-Statement-by-the-46154. 
939“The Union has the power to levy taxes on: large fortunes, as provided in a complementary law.” Brazilian 
Constitution, art. 153 (VII). 
940CESR, Oxfam, INESC, “Brazil. Human Rights in Times of Austerity,” 3. 
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domestic and international human rights law on socioeconomic rights and therefore it should 
be judicially reviewed by the IACtHR.  
  
 
7.2.2. The weak inter-American judicial review of CA 95  
 
Inter-American judicial review is a possible way of ameliorating the violations of 
national and international human rights law that CA 95 has brought about. Before addressing 
the reasons why weak international judicial review is the best approach that the IACtHR can 
adopt in this case, it is worth mentioning that this constitutional amendment has first to be 
reviewed by the Brazilian constitutional court. The validity of the amendment was already 
contested within the domestic system of constitutional review.941 The Brazilian STF already 
addressed a writ that intended to suspend the discussion of the project of this amendment by 
the national legislature. The Justice Rapporteur did not suspend the discussion of the 
amendment in the National Congress. According to Judge Luis Roberto Barroso, the judiciary 
should only suspend the discussion of any matter of public interest due to extreme 
circumstances.942  
 
He did not find any violation of Art. 60 (4) of the Brazilian constitution, which refers to 
the unamendable constitutional features, and, more specifically, rejected a violation of 
fundamental rights. For him, “the open and vague nature of the principles protected by the 
unamendable clauses gives courts an enormous power, which includes defining the very content 
of the ‘essential core,’ ‘basic structure’ or ‘identity’ of the constitution.”943 He claimed that 
democracy demands that courts adopt self-restraint by practicing the judicial review of 
constitutional amendments based on the unamendable clauses due to the fact that “amendments 
to the constitution are adopted through a more difficult process, which normally requires the 
formation of large majorities, so that they enjoy a high degree of democratic legitimacy and 
presumption of constitutionality.”944  
                                                 
941Brazilian STF, (Provisional Measure within a Writ by Judge Luis Roberto Barroso), Case of MS 34.448 DF. 
942Ibid, §16. This approach has been common practice within Brazilian constitutional court’s jurisprudence. 
Virgílio Afonso da Silva has claimed that “there seems to be no decision that has ever blocked deliberations in 
Congress” based on the argument that a constitutional amendment goes against an eternal clause of the Brazilian 
constitution; Virgílio Afonso da Silva, The Constitutional of Brazil. A Contextual Analysis, (Oxford et al, Hart 
Publishing, 2019), 93-94. 





According to Art. 46 ACHR (“Subsidiarity Principle”), the existence of domestic writs 
against the validity of the new fiscal regime is a factor that limits the authority of the IACHR 
and of the IACtHR to order the review of CA 95. However, this should not prevent us from 
analyzing the most appropriate form of international judicial review that the IACtHR could 
adopt if the Brazilian authorities do not invalidate CA 95. As this chapter has demonstrated in 
the previous section, the incompatibility between CA 95 and inter-American human rights 
legislation and jurisprudence is clear. It is now worth addressing how the IACtHR could review 
CA 95 in a different way than by practicing the strong judicial review of this amendment. This 
practical test can prove the arguments in favor of the advantages of weak review for inter-
American human rights jurisprudence. In the following, it is worth addressing how the inter-
American institutions should proceed with the weak inter-American review of CA 95. 
 
The weak international review of CA 95 involves, first, the analysis of the case by the 
IACHR. This first step is more related to the political stage of review within the IAS. The 
IACHR authorities should encourage the Brazilian authorities, more specifically the Brazilian 
legislature, to review CA 95 according to national and international human rights legislation 
and jurisprudence on socioeconomic rights. The IACHR has quasi-judicial authority within the 
IAS and it can reach a friendly settlement with the Brazilian authorities before referring CA 95 
to the IACtHR for review. In fact, the IACHR has already addressed the disproportionate effects 
of CA 95 as a measure to ensure fiscal responsibility in Brazil.  
 
After its most recent visit to the country in 2018,945 the IACHR claimed that the 
government’s harsh austerity measures violate the country’s legal obligations under inter-
American human rights law. In its preliminary report on this visit,946 the IACHR pointed to the 
historical roots of poverty and inequality in Brazil, as well as to their multidimensional nature 
and their effects on particular groups in society (Afro-descendant and indigenous persons for 
instance). According to the commission, the “current fiscal policy measures do not seem to be 
aimed at changing such conditions.”947 The IACHR also pointed to the contradiction between 
CA 95 and the Brazilian constitution, which has as its goals the eradication of poverty and 
marginalization and the reduction of social and regional inequalities. For the IACHR, CA 95 
                                                 
945IACHR, Press Release, “IACHR Concludes Visit to Brazil,” November 12, 2018, available at: 
https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/media_center/preleases/2018/238.asp. 




could lead to the adoption of measures with a “negative impact on the effective enjoyment of 
the rights to housing, healthcare and education.”948 This could provide “a setting that does not 
seek to reduce social inequalities but rather to deepen and perpetuate them.”949 
 
The IACHR also reported that it had obtained information about the enforcement of CA 
95 and its serious impact on vulnerable groups and on groups that have suffered historical 
discrimination in Brazil. With regard to indigenous people, the IACHR reported that FUNAI, 
which is the national institution for indigenous rights in Brazil, had suffered budget cuts and 
that its staff were experiencing inadequate working conditions.950 The IACHR also mentioned 
the risk of Brazil returning to FAO’s “hunger map.”951 With regard to the human rights situation 
of poor and homeless people in Brazil, the IACHR concluded that, with the adoption of CA 95, 
“Brazil’s constitution no longer applies substantial differentiation to ensure public policies 
aimed at reducing extreme poverty and improving the living conditions of homeless people and 
favela dwellers.”952 Based on all these consequences that CA 95 has for the enforcement of 
socioeconomic rights at the domestic level, the IACHR recommended that Brazil refrain from 
adopting measures that are regressive with regard to these rights.953   
 
If this first political phase of inter-American human rights protection does not lead to 
the political review of CA 95 by the national legislature, the IACtHR should initiate the judicial 
phase of inter-American review. Yaniv Roznai and Letícia Kreuz have mentioned 
conventionality control as the most appropriate remedy for CA 95 and seem to advocate for the 
practice of strong international judicial review of this constitutional amendment.954 By contrast, 
this study argues that the IACtHR should limit its judicial authority to the practice of weak 
review of CA 95, given that this piece of legislation primarily affects socioeconomic rights 
within domestic law. There are good reasons for practicing weak inter-American judicial review 
in this case. They include the general advantages of weak judicial review for cases relating to 




951Ibid, 20.  
952Ibid, 23. 
953Ibid, 52.  
954For them, “the Brazilian New Tax Regime violates compromises ratified by the country not only on a global 
level, but also on a regional one. The judicial control of conventionality advocated by the Inter-American Court 
appears as a legal mechanism by which judges invalidate rules of hierarchy inferior to the convention, which have 
not been dictated in conformity with it, taking into account not only the Convention itself, but interpretation made 




socioeconomic rights that have been mentioned in the last chapter. There are also specific 
advantages of the weak inter-American judicial review of CA 95, which we will now discuss. 
 
Although the adoption of CA 95 was inappropriate, it is important to remember that 
Brazil has been under a macroeconomic crisis in the last years. This has had severe 
consequences for the public budget, which relies on different tax sources that have suffered due 
to the economic recession. According to domestic law, the body with power to establish fiscal 
policies is the Brazilian legislature. Given this fact, the Brazilian legislature is also the most 
competent authority to review the adoption of CA 95. This situation makes the argument in 
favor of weak inter-American judicial review even more compelling. How could the IACtHR 
practice the strong review of an amendment regarding public spending when the court lacks the 
appropriate knowledge of all the different issues relating to domestic fiscal policies? How could 
the IACtHR, with its current institutional capacity, replace the much more substantial domestic 
institutional apparatus when it comes to the discussion of fiscal policies? Based on these 
inherent restrictions of the institutional character of the IACtHR as a regional human rights 
court, the most legitimate and effective way of reviewing CA 95 is by means of weak inter-
American judicial review.  
 
According to weak review decision-making, the IACtHR should establish the 
incompatibility between CA 95 and inter-American human rights law and refer the final say on 
the new fiscal regime back to the Brazilian legislature. However, weak judicial review is not 
intended to have just a symbolic dimension in this case. In this declaration of incompatibility, 
the IACtHR can make the Brazilian legislature aware of the blind spots and burdens of inertia 
relating to the adoption of CA 95. The blind spots in the case of CA 95 refer to the far-reaching 
consequences that the enforcement of this amendment has for the enjoyment of socioeconomic 
rights in Brazil. The burdens of inertia refer to the fact that the national legislature has long 
ignored essential means for establishing fiscal policies like the adoption of wealth and property 
taxes, and of more progressive income taxations. The IACtHR can address all these appropriate 
measures that prove that the adoption of CA 95 was not necessary and therefore does not 
represent a legitimate restriction of the enjoyment of socioeconomic rights within domestic law.  
 
Given that weak judicial review is intended to promote more inter-institutional 
interaction with regard to legislation on socioeconomic rights, the IACtHR should closely 
monitor compliance with the amendment of the Brazilian new fiscal regime. Monitoring 
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compliance with the judgement is an effective means to keep the interaction between national 
and inter-American authorities. National authorities are supposed to respond to the declaration 
of incompatibility between CA 95 and the ACHR in a reasonable time. They should not 
postpone the review of CA 95 and tolerate the consequences of this amendment for the 
enjoyment of socioeconomic rights. In line with this, the national legislature should have the 
final say on a new fiscal regime that is not offensive to socioeconomic rights and deliberate 
over it as soon as possible, given the far-reaching consequences of the current fiscal regime. 
 
 In conclusion, the IACtHR should, based on all arguments presented above, avoid 
establishing the state authorities’ duty to practice conventionality control of CA 95. The court 
should limit the practice of strong review of domestic pieces of legislation that are flagrantly 
offensive to the civil and political rights protected by the ACHR. This could ensure that the 
practice of strong inter-American judicial review becomes more consistent. Moreover, CA 95 
could be the best opportunity to introduce weak judicial review into inter-American human 
rights jurisprudence. Weak judicial review could transform inter-American jurisprudence and 
make it fit to face the current challenges of human rights enforcement in Latin America, which 
are increasingly related to the protection of socioeconomic rights. 
 
 
7.3. Conclusion: The legitimacy and effectiveness of mixed-form inter-American 
judicial review for Brazilian constitutionalism  
 
The 1988 Brazilian constitution emerged within the Latin American human rights 
enforcement context, the most remarkable feature of which is systematic state-perpetrated 
human rights violations. Not surprisingly, Brazilian constitutionalism shares with other Latin 
American countries the same problems with regard to authoritarianism and material inequality. 
This is most evident when we look at domestic legislation. The validity of the Brazilian amnesty 
law and the adoption of CA 95 are evidence of how Brazilian authorities have been unable to 
change this context of systematic human rights underenforcement. In fact, these laws show how 
domestic law can be instrumentalized by national authorities and help perpetuate the 
persistently illiberal practices. This final chapter has argued that mixed-form theory could be 
an alternative for the IACtHR when dealing with cases like these Brazilian laws. This theory 
intends to offer the most legitimate and effective approach to reviewing domestic legislation 
that is inconsistent with inter-American human rights law. In this chapter, the main task was to 
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demonstrate the practical value of mixed-form inter-American judicial review for Brazilian and 
Latin American constitutionalism. 
 
The enforcement of the Brazilian amnesty law attests to the Brazilian authorities’ 
enduring tolerance of authoritarianism. Given that Brazil has experienced several periods of 
authoritarianism, we may even claim that these authorities have a particular willingness to rule 
in an authoritarian way. As Chapter II has explained, the amnesty law was contested within the 
domestic system of constitutional review established by the 1988 constitution. Despite the fact 
that the amnesty law violates national and inter-American human rights law, the highest 
Brazilian judicial authorities established its constitutionality within domestic law. These same 
judicial authorities adopted a controversial interpretation of issues relating to transitional justice 
and did not offer justifications for not adopting inter-American jurisprudence on this matter. In 
fact, they practically ignored the evolution of inter-American legislation and jurisprudence with 
regard to the protection of civil and political rights within the IAS. 
 
According to mixed-form inter-American judicial review, the conventionality control of 
the Brazilian amnesty law was legitimate, given that this domestic statute flagrantly violates 
the civil and political rights established by the ACHR and other inter-American human rights 
documents. Most importantly, the enforcement of the Brazilian amnesty law violates inter-
American human rights jurisprudence, because the IACtHR has consistently invalidated the 
adoption of domestic amnesty statutes that were adopted by authoritarian governments as a 
means to avoid punishment. After the establishment of new democracies, the national 
authorities of several Latin American countries enforced inter-American human rights 
jurisprudence on amnesty laws and guaranteed its effectiveness within domestic law. This 
converging approach has arguably become customary regional human rights law within the 
IAS. 
 
The adoption of inter-American jurisprudence had consequences for the further 
evolution of constitutionalism in some Latin American countries. Several human rights 
violations committed during the dictatorships were later prosecuted by national authorities. This 
illustrates the consistent enforcement of inter-American human rights law within domestic law. 
This consistent enforcement has also led to a different interpretation of the authoritarian eras in 
these countries. While in Argentina, for instance, civil society now sees the military dictatorship 
in a very critical way, many Brazilians do not share this critical perspective on past military 
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government.955 In this context, it is no surprise that Brazil is again facing the same problems 
with authoritarian rule. As some may say, those who ignore their past are doomed to repeat it. 
It is true that blaming the amnesty law for the election of Mr. Bolsonaro would be an 
overstatement. However, it is not wrong to affirm that this law is part of an inconsistent 
approach to human rights enforcement within Brazilian law. A different approach could help 
in the battle against the traditional illiberal practices within domestic law that have historically 
ended up in authoritarian rule.   
 
In view of this, national authorities should adopt a different approach. The Brazilian 
authorities, more specifically the judges in the Brazilian constitutional court, should practice 
the strong judicial review of the Brazilian amnesty law. This is, in fact, a normative argument 
based on the legitimacy of conventionality control of amnesty laws within the IAS. Due to the 
consistent implementation of the strong inter-American judicial review of amnesty laws by 
Latin American authorities, the Brazilian judicial authorities are also obliged to invalidate the 
domestic amnesty law. If they maintain their current and inconsistent interpretation that the 
amnesty statue is valid within domestic law, they are clearly underenforcing the ACHR and 
also the 1988 cosmopolitan constitution. Underenforcing the constitution is not what the 
constitutional court is meant to do. The Brazilian STF judges should therefore adopt inter-
American jurisprudence on the amnesty statute and consistently enforce inter-American human 
rights law within domestic law. By doing so, they can send the appropriate message to the 
international community that the Brazilian state is committed to human rights enforcement in a 
consistent way. 
 
The adoption of CA 95, in turn, illustrates the traditional systematic underenforcement 
of socioeconomic rights within Brazilian law. This constitutional amendment was adopted in 
response to the macroeconomic crisis that Brazil has been experiencing since 2015. CA 95 
introduced a 20-year public spending freeze, which is currently deeply affecting areas like 
education, health, and social programs. In past decades, public policies in these areas helped 
millions of Brazilians to rise out of poverty. By freezing public spending in these areas, the 
national authorities, more specifically the national legislature, find themselves on the wrong 
side of the battle for consistent human rights enforcement within domestic law.  
 
                                                 
955This is not only related to the fact that the Argentinian dictatorship was much more violent than the Brazilian 
one. On this issue, see: Kathryn Sikkink, The Justice Cascade. How Human Rights are Changing World Politics, 
(New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2011). 
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CA 95 has introduced a disruptive fiscal regime into the 1988 constitutional order. This 
amendment has correctly been described by legal scholars as an unconstitutional constitutional 
amendment, or even as a serious constitutional dismemberment. CA 95 endangers the normative 
force of the 1988 constitution, which was intended to be a social welfare document according 
to its preamble and extensive catalogue of socioeconomic rights. Beyond being incompatible 
with the 1988 constitution, CA 95 violates the progressive enforcement obligation, which is 
established by several international documents on socioeconomic rights. The duty of refraining 
from the adoption of retrogressive measures is a consequence of this progressive development 
obligation. This leads to a strong presumption against the adoption of measures that bring about 
the retrogressive enforcement of socioeconomic rights. According to this strong presumption, 
national authorities should prove why the retrogressive measures were the only means 
available. As this chapter has demonstrated, this did not occur in the case of CA 95, given that 
the Brazilian legislature ignored alternative measures that could be even more effective than 
the adoption of this constitutional amendment to cope with the fiscal crisis. 
 
Despite the severe violations of inter-American human rights law that CA 95 brings 
about, this chapter has argued that the IACtHR should practice weak inter-American judicial 
review of this amendment if it has the opportunity to adjudicate on this matter in the future. 
This argument is based on the notion that weak judicial review offers a better form of decision-
making for the judicial enforcement of socioeconomic rights. This form of decision-making 
also promotes greater dialogue between inter-American and national authorities with regard to 
the immediate highly complex issues inherent in the Brazilian fiscal crisis. The adoption of CA 
95 was arguably not the most appropriate form of dealing with this crisis. However, the 
Brazilian national legislature is the most legitimate and capable institution to establish domestic 
fiscal policies that are coherent with national and international human rights law. By practicing 
weak review in this case, the IACtHR can make national authorities aware of the severe 
violations of inter-American human rights law that CA 95 has brought about and remind them 
of their duties to address the blind spots and burdens of inertia within domestic law. These 
problematic issues are also responsible for the current fiscal deficit. Together, national and 
inter-American institutions may find a better way to resolve the systematic underenforcement 
of socioeconomic rights represented by the adoption of CA 95. 
 
The Brazilian laws analyzed above strengthen the argument that mixed-form theory is 
the most appropriate form of inter-American judicial review. This attests to the usefulness of 
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mixed-form review for inter-American human rights jurisprudence. Similar to Brazil, other 
Latin American countries may face fiscal crises and national authorities may adopt legislation 
that violates inter-American law on socioeconomic rights. The court should avoid practicing 
strong inter-American judicial review in these cases. However, in cases where authoritarian 
laws that flagrantly violate inter-American documents are passed, like the cases involving 
amnesty laws, the IACtHR can legitimately practice conventionality control and order their 






Against the Insular Evolution of Constitutionalism: The Latin American Path to Global 
Constitutionalism 
 
Cosmopolitan constitutionalism refers to the emergence of a new context for human 
rights enforcement in Latin America. Elements of positive human rights law established by 
domestic and inter-American authorities have strengthened the relationship between national 
and international law within the IAS. These top-down and bottom up elements of cosmopolitan 
constitutionalism were described in Chapter I. From the top-down perspective, it was worth 
mentioning that the organizational evolution of the IAS has strengthened the authority of human 
rights law within Latin American constitutionalism. The bottom-up elements include mostly 
new constitutional texts adopted by national legislatures and innovative constitutional 
interpretations held by the most authoritative domestic courts. These bottom-up and top-down 
elements have granted a cosmopolitan character to human rights enforcement in Latin America. 
 
In this new context, the normative questions associated with the inter-institutional 
interaction between domestic and international authorities have become more difficult to 
address. The practice of inter-American judicial review of domestic legislation illustrates this 
fact. This study has started addressing the specific questions related to international judicial 
review by analyzing the invalidation of the Brazilian amnesty law by the IACtHR in Chapter 
II. This chapter has served to illustrate the cosmopolitan relationship between national 
authorities and the IACtHR. Most importantly, it has illustrated the resistance of a domestic 
constitutional court to the practice of strong inter-American judicial review. After examining 
the resistance of the Brazilian constitutional court to abiding by the inter-American judicial 
review of the amnesty statute, in Chapter III, this study has described the specific forms of 
strong international judicial review developed by the IACtHR throughout inter-American 
human rights jurisprudence: conventionality control and the direct enforcement of 
socioeconomic rights.  
 
In this study, it was my task to try to find the most appropriate approach to how inter-
American judicial review can become an ally of global constitutionalism in Latin America. 
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Based on this task, Chapter IV has assessed the normative grounds for the practice of strong 
international judicial review. This chapter first addressed theories that have tried to offer 
reasons for the practice of strong judicial review within domestic law. These approaches are 
also useful for the discussion of international judicial review due to the common feature of 
inter-institutional interaction, which is present within both domestic and international variants 
of judicial review. When focusing on inter-institutional interaction, legal scholars can better 
analyze the legitimacy and effectiveness issues that are associated with the practice of judicial 
review. Due to these legitimacy and effectiveness issues, a common feature of theories that 
have intended to weaken the judicial authority of the IACtHR has been their mention to the 
principle of subsidiarity. Legal authorities and scholars have usually invoked the principle of 
subsidiarity in order to weaken the practice of inter-American judicial review.  
 
 The European margin of appreciation has been the most frequently mentioned concept 
within this debate. Some scholars have argued that the IACtHR should adopt a similar form of 
international judicial review to the ECtHR practices of the national margin of appreciation. Due 
to the arguable value of the margin of appreciation for inter-American jurisprudence, Chapter 
V has compared some specific case groups within European and inter-American case law and 
analyzed the legal scholarly debate around the concept of the national margin of appreciation. 
Based on this approach, this chapter has pointed out the advantages of affording national 
authorities the right margin of appreciation based on a specific human rights enforcement 
context. The analysis of European human rights jurisprudence has illustrated how it is possible 
to incorporate contextual elements into jurisprudential approaches to the practice of 
international judicial review. This chapter has also addressed the problems related to weaker 
forms of international judicial review in Latin America. Due to the risks associated with fragile 
Latin American democracies, this chapter has underscored the argument that the IACtHR 
should adopt a context-based theory of international judicial review of domestic legislation.  
 
The theory of mixed-form inter-American judicial review that this study has proposed 
in Chapter VI is intended to be a context-based theory of human rights adjudication for the 
IACtHR. This theory draws on the evolution of domestic and inter-American human rights law 
within the Latin American human rights enforcement context. This context has been 
characterized by the persistence of illiberal practices within the domestic realm. These illiberal 
practices can include the problems associated with authoritarianism, which relates to violations 
of civil and political rights, and of material inequality, which relates to the underenforcement 
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of socioeconomic rights. Within this context, Chapter VI has tried to reconcile the inter-
American practice of strong-form international judicial review with the practice of weak-form 
judicial review. According to the theory of mixed-form judicial review, the IACtHR should 
reconcile the practice of strong review of domestic law that flagrantly violates inter-American 
human rights law on civil and political rights with the practice of weak review of domestic 
legislation that goes against the inter-American framework for socioeconomic rights 
enforcement.  
 
This study has argued that mixed-form inter-American judicial review is the most 
legitimate and effective form of international judicial review that the IACtHR could adopt. This 
theory argues against the overall strong-review approach adopted by the court throughout inter-
American jurisprudence, which has become a defining feature of the legal culture of 
international human rights enforcement in Latin America. The IACtHR has frequently relied 
on the practice of strong review of domestic legislation, especially since it started to decide 
cases involving domestic amnesty statues within the IAS. This transitional justice phase of 
inter-American jurisprudence was a reaction against the systematic gross human rights 
violations practiced by domestic authoritarian regimes. This phase was responsible for the 
emergence of conventionality control of domestic laws, which has become the overall approach 
to reviewing domestic legislation. With the establishment of new democratic governments in 
Latin America, issues like poverty and institutional failure started to occupy the attention of 
legal authorities and scholars. These issues have given rise to the transformative justice phase 
of inter-American jurisprudence. Chapter VI has argued that the practice of strong judicial 
review might not be the most appropriate form of judicial review for this more recent phase of 
transformative justice.   
 
The introduction of weak judicial review of domestic laws into inter-American 
jurisprudence has the potential to strengthen the legitimacy and effectiveness of the direct 
enforcement of socioeconomic rights. This argument is based on the late evolution of inter-
American legislation on socioeconomic rights and also on the even more recent emergence of 
inter-American case law on these rights. It is a fact that there is no substantial body of inter-
American legislation and jurisprudence on socioeconomic rights. In order to avoid the 
illegitimate practice of international judicial activism, Chapter VI has argued that the IACtHR 
should limit its authority to the practice of weak review in cases involving socioeconomic 
rights. This chapter has also explained the reasons for weak review being the most effective 
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approach to the enforcement of these rights. This effectiveness is due to the fact that weak 
review decision-making enables more inter-institutional interaction for the review of 
legislation. Although courts may have a say on legislation pertaining to socioeconomic rights, 
within weak judicial review, legislatures should have the most authoritative say on issues 
relating to these rights. When practicing weak international judicial review, the IACtHR should 
therefore defer the final decision on the validity of legislation on socioeconomic rights to 
domestic legislatures.  
 
It is worth underscoring once again the importance of increasing inter-institutional 
interaction within the IAS by introducing the practice of weak international judicial review. 
Although it is true that the IACtHR should not invalidate domestic laws on socioeconomic 
rights, the court can still address the blind spots and burdens of inertia associated with domestic 
legislative procedures. The broad scope of weak judicial review enables the IACtHR to notify 
national legislatures about the inconsistencies of domestic laws on socioeconomic rights. The 
IACtHR should not refrain from its duty to point out which specific legislative provisions are 
not in accordance with inter-American human rights regime. Nevertheless, the IACtHR should 
give national authorities the final say on the validity of legislation on socioeconomic rights at 
least based on the contemporary weak normative dimension of these rights within inter-
American human rights law. The court should, however, still monitor compliance with the 
judgement and check whether national authorities amend inconsistent domestic laws in a 
reasonable time frame. In a nutshell, all these features of weak inter-American judicial review 
prove that this form of decision-making does not necessarily harm the normative force of 
socioeconomic rights as human rights but arguably tries to strengthen it over time. In the future, 
the practice of strong inter-American judicial review may become the most legitimate and 
effective approach to the direct enforcement of socioeconomic rights. However, this time has 
not yet come. 
 
The last chapter of this study has tried to prove the practical value of the theory of 
mixed-form inter-American judicial review by applying it to the review of two Brazilian laws: 
the Brazilian amnesty law and CA 95. These two laws best fit the practical test of mixed-form 
review because the first is a piece of legislation that brings about violations of civil and political 
rights, while the second offers a legal basis for violations of socioeconomic rights within 
domestic law. Chapter VII has offered the reasons for reviewing each piece of legislation and 
also explained the suitability of each form of judicial review for each case. In line with this, this 
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chapter has argued that the amnesty law should be subject to strong judicial review, and that 
national authorities should guarantee its effectiveness within domestic law. Regarding CA 95, 
the IACtHR should practice the weak review of this constitutional amendment and refer the 
matter back to the national legislature to be politically reviewed. After this brief summary of 
the study, in this conclusion, I would like to highlight the reasons why legal scholars and 
authorities should pay greater attention to the emergence of Latin American cosmopolitan 
constitutionalism and how new jurisprudential approaches to this new context for human rights 
enforcement have the potential to keep Latin American constitutionalism on the path to global 
constitutionalism.    
 
Global constitutionalism represents a recent thread of jurisprudential approaches to 
issues of constitutional law based on at least three main indispensable fields of research, i.e., 
human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. However, these three pillars of global 
constitutionalism do not point to a single direction that constitutional theory and practices 
should go in. They are broad concepts that accept diverse interpretations. In light of this wide 
variety of approaches to democracy, human rights and the rule of law, an appropriate question 
is what could represent a common concern among all these scholars and different theories of 
global constitutionalism with regard to the evolution of Latin American constitutionalism. We 
may call this question a search for the meaning of global constitutionalism in Latin America, 
which tries to assess what is particularly useful in this new form of constitutional law and 
scholarship around the globe for the evolution of Latin American constitutionalism.  
 
Here, again, different answers may come to mind. Based on my experience with this 
concept during this study, it seems to me that what could unify all these global constitutional 
scholars and theories is their opposition to forms of insular evolution of constitutionalism in 
Latin America. We can regard global constitutionalism and its transformative potential for 
constitutional lawmaking and scholarship as a consistent effort to combat the insular evolution 
of domestic constitutional law in Latin America.956 In line with this, this study has focused on 
how cosmopolitan constitutionalism forms a new context that has enabled different perspectives 
on prominent issues of constitutional law, like the practice of judicial review. Although 
                                                 
956This does not mean that legal authorities and scholars should not be aware of the surrounding context for rights 
enforcement. Constitutional theory should always be context-based, but constitutional exceptionalism can become 
a dangerous form of constitutionalism in Latin America. Exceptionalism may end up in insular or hermetic 
constitutionalism and hinder the practice of authentic constitutionalism, i.e., constitutionalism that is able to 
dismantle the illiberal structures of power in society. In fact, constitutional façades have been a common element 
in Latin American constitutional history.    
 255 
constitutional law has been a research field primarily focused on elements of domestic positive 
law, I hope this study has at least demonstrated how elements of international human rights law 
have played a transformative role toward domestic constitutional practices in Latin America. 
Due to the emergence of a new context for human rights enforcement in the region, national 
constitutional orders no longer involve only elements of domestic law. Legal authorities and 
scholars should therefore give greater attention to the evolution of inter-American human rights 
law and adopt it as a meaningful reference point for domestic constitutional theory and 
adjudication. By doing so, they can oppose the traditional insular evolution of constitutionalism 
that has always ended up poorly in Latin America.  
 
Latin American countries have traditionally alternated between very promising and very 
depressing times for the proper evolution of constitutionalism. However, even progressive 
constitutional texts have not been able to break out of the region’s never-ending cycle of 
illiberalism.957 This never-ending cycle has been brought about by the insular development of 
domestic constitutionalism in Latin America. It is possible to illustrate this inevitable fate of 
Latin American constitutions by analyzing the recent evolution of Brazilian constitutionalism 
with regard to the issues of authoritarianism and material inequality. The fact that the Brazilian 
amnesty law remains in force and the adoption of CA 95 reveal that Brazilian constitutionalism 
is in a never-ending constituent crisis. This crisis has been a traditional feature of Brazilian 
constitutionalism, and the most common response to it has been to adopt a new constitutional 
text. Since the first 1824 constitution, Brazilians have adopted 8 different constitutions in less 
than two centuries. This is evidence of a very problematic evolution of domestic 
constitutionalism. 
 
When faced with the challenges that illiberal practices have offered, Brazilian 
constitutional politics has opted to take the easy path of rhetorically adopting new constitutional 
texts.958 These new constitutional texts often represented self-fulfilling prophecies in which the 
constituent authorities opted to postpone necessary structural reforms simply by stating them 
                                                 
957This is true if we compare constitutional texts that were issued in different periods like the 1917 Mexican 
constitution and the 1999 Venezuelan constitution, for instance. The first failed to provide a meaningful reference 
point for the enforcement of socioeconomic rights in Mexico, while the later was no match for the most recent 
authoritarian practices in Venezuela. 
958Raymundo Faoro wrote a classic study of the persistent non-democratic structures of power in Brazil despite 
the adoption of new constitutions, see: Raymundo Faoro, Os Donos do Poder. Formação do Patronato Politico 
Brasileiro. 5th ed., (São Paulo: Globo, 2012). Fábio Konder Comparato has also addressed the oligarchical 
structures of power throughout Brazilian constitutional history, see: Fábio Konder Comparato, A Oligarquia 
Brasileira: Visão Histórica, (São Paulo: Contracorrente, 2017).  
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within the constitutional text. With the passage of time, Brazilians can hardly note the 
normative force of the constitution, given that the constitutional text is no match for the 
unending illiberal practices within domestic law. The constitution gradually loses its 
significance in society and the solution always seems to be the adoption of a new constitutional 
text, completing the superficially revolutionary cycle. The Brazilian sociologist and politician 
Florestan Fernandes has referred to this complicated evolution of constitutionalism in Latin 
America as “interrupted revolutions.”959 He described them as a “repetitive political 
phenomenon” in the region since the end of colonialism.960 For him, one important feature of 
this traditional phenomenon was that the revolutions are interrupted only with regard to the 
interests of the underprivileged in society but not with regard to the most privileged social 
groups.961 In Brazil, and in Latin America more generally, the constitution has been misused to 
the detriment of the emancipatory power of constitutionalism. The adoption of constitutional 
façades has been evidence of this phenomenon.962 
 
However, is the 1988 constitution just another element of this constant interruption of 
the emancipatory power of constitutionalism in Brazil? Is this constitution, like all the other 
Brazilian constitutions in history, destined to fail? The answer to these questions is arguably: 
not necessarily. The cosmopolitan form of the Brazilian constitution may become a powerful 
instrument against the insular evolution of Brazilian constitutionalism. Cosmopolitan 
constitutionalism may keep Latin American constitutions on the path to global 
constitutionalism. In this study, the adoption of the 1988 constitution has been described as a 
way for Brazilian constitutionalism to break out of the never-ending history of illiberalism. It 
is true that this constitution emerged and is still immersed in the same context of human rights 
underenforcement that has characterized Latin America for a very long time. Nevertheless, the 
current constitution has become the most important trigger for the bottom-up emergence of 
cosmopolitan constitutionalism within Brazilian law. The current constitutional order has 
gradually opened up Brazilian constitutional practices to the enforcement of international 
                                                 
959Florestan Fernandes, “Reflexão sobre as ‘Revoluções Interrompidas’ (Uma Rotação de Perspectivas),” in Poder 
e Contrapoder na América Latina, 2nd ed., (São Paulo: Expressão Popular, 2015). 
960Ibid, 94. 
961Ibid, 95.  
962A constitutional façade stands on the opposite pole of the type of constitution that enables structural changes in 
society by means of law. Germans call their constitution Grundgesetz and, in fact, this constitution has so far 
represented a solid normative ground for the reproduction of legality in the country, despite the surrounding 
disturbing atmosphere of constitutionalism in Europe. On this issue, see: Kriszta Kovács, Mattias Kumm, 
Maximilian Steinbeis, Gábor Attila Tóth, “Introduction: Constitutional Resilience and the German Grundgesetz,” 
Verfassungsblog, December 6, 2018, available at: https://verfassungsblog.de/introduction-constitutional-
resilience-and-the-german-grundgesetz/. 
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human rights law. It is based on this more intimate relationship with international human rights 
law that the 1988 constitution can gradually find a way out of hermetic constitutionalism and 
keep Brazilian constitutionalism on the path to global constitutionalism. 
 
Ultimately, the Brazilian cosmopolitan constitution offers all the elements necessary to 
oppose the traditional insular evolution of constitutionalism in Brazil. Chapter II has described 
the cosmopolitan interaction between the domestic and inter-American institutions by 
analyzing some Brazilian cases before the IACtHR and how they have played a transformative 
role toward domestic practices of state authority. These cases involved different issues like the 
treatment of mental illnesses within psychiatric institutions under the public health system, the 
use of police violence in the Brazilian favelas and the fight against contemporary forms of 
slavery. Insofar as the cosmopolitan constitution represents a form of constitutionalism that 
exposes traditional domestic human rights violations to inter-American review, it offers a new 
horizon for the evolution of Brazilian constitutionalism. As this study has tried to demonstrate, 
national authorities are now able to make use of the inter-American framework for human rights 
enforcement. This regional integration through human rights law in Latin America may 
gradually lead to a way out of insular constitutionalism and rescue constitutions from becoming 
simple façades that hide domestic illiberal practices. 
 
Yet, how can we be so sure that the Brazilian cosmopolitan constitution represents an 
authentic means of countering the insular evolution of domestic constitutionalism? How can 
we affirm that this constitution can help Brazilian constitutionalism to break out of the vicious 
cycle of illiberalism? Finally, how can we know with certainty that the cosmopolitan 
constitution can escape the indelible fate of all the past constitutions in the country? The 
answers to these questions arguably relate to how this constitution, despite all the challenges 
that it has been through, has showed resilience and, most importantly, how it has become an 
ally of the underprivileged Brazilians when they contest the illiberal structures of power within 
Brazilian society. Even if the 1988 constitution did not succeed in bringing an end to many 
traditional illiberal practices in the country, we can see its resilience and increasing importance 
throughout the last 30 years if we focus on how socially oppressed groups in Brazil started to 
adopt constitutional parlance in order to fight against their illegitimate oppression. In a 
historical perspective, this is, in fact, a new feature that the 1988 constitution has brought to 
Brazilian constitutionalism. The 1988 constitution has, for the first time in history, empowered 
socially excluded groups with the rhetoric of human rights, democracy and the rule of law. They 
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have, since then, used this rhetoric to fight against their oppression in Brazilian society. This is 
arguably the most compelling argument for the usefulness of global constitutionalism within 
Brazilian law. This empowerment of the underprivileged Brazilians can be historically 
illustrated by the evolution of Brazilian law and its analysis by one notable legal scholar. 
 
During the 1970s, the Portuguese legal sociologist Boaventura de Sousa Santos lived 
for some months in a Brazilian favela, which he called Pasargada.963 He used this experience 
to describe the existence and structure of legal pluralism within Brazilian law.964 For Santos, 
Pasagarda law existed parallel to official state law during the 1964-1985 Brazilian 
dictatorship.965 Santos described how Pasargada law worked by describing dispute prevention 
and settlement carried out by a Resident’s Association (RA) in the favela.966 He noted that, 
within the authoritarian and extremely unfair class structure of Brazilian society, Pasargada 
law was simultaneously ignored and tolerated by the state authorities. In this context of extreme 
social oppression and exclusion, the internal unofficial legality of the favela became one of the 
only ways for the Pasargadians to have access to justice.967  
 
For Santos, faced with extreme marginalization, favela dwellers found their way 
through Brazilian society and came up with a new type of social order mediated by an unofficial 
legality. He believed that this spontaneous emergence of a parallel legal system was to the 
benefit of the favela dwellers and could serve as an example to official state authorities to be 
more considerate of the different forms of living in the Brazilian peripheries. For him, although 
Pasargada was not “an idyllic community,” this did not “prevent its internal legality from 
hinting at some of the characteristics of an emancipatory legal process” 968 (my emphasis). 
                                                 
963Pasargada actually refers to the favela of Jacarezinho in Rio de Janeiro. 
964Boaventura de Sousa Santos, “The Law of the Oppressed: The Construction and Reproduction of Legality in 
Pasargada,” in Toward a New Common Sense. Law, Science and Politics in the Paradigmatic Transition, (New 
York: Routledge, 1995), 124-248. 
965“Because of the structural inaccessibility of the state legal system, and especially because of the illegal character 
of the favelas as urban settlements, the popular classes living in them devise adaptive strategies aimed at securing 
the minimal social ordering of community relations. One such strategy involves the creation of an internal legality, 
parallel to (and sometimes conflicting with) state official legality;” Ibid, 124.  
966This RA was composed of a president, a secretary and a treasurer, who were financed by local residents and had 
the most immediate authority over different types of legal relationships between Pasargadians; for instance, the 
parallel legal relationship of selling and buying property in Pasargada. Santos has pointed out that the RA did not 
claim authority to settle issues pertaining to criminal law. 
967At that time, Santos affirmed that: “Unofficial legality is one of the few instruments that can be used by the 
urban oppressed classes to organize community life, enhance the stability of the settlement, and thus maximize the 
possibility of resistance against intervention by the dominant classes, thereby increasing the political cost of any 
such action.” Ibid, 237-238. For Santos, Pasargada law followed an ideal of creating a justice system that was 
“accessible, cheap, quick, intelligible and reasonable.” Ibid, 240. 
968Ibid, 248. 
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Looking at Santos’ study and the evolution of Brazilian constitutionalism since then, it seems 
that, beyond attesting to the existence of legal pluralism, Pasargada law also attested to the 
insular evolution of different legal orders in Brazil. One particular feature of legal pluralism 
that Santos could not observe at that time is that different legal orders, if they continue to 
reproduce in a hermetic way, become imperialistic and, ultimately, self-destructive.969  
 
Several decades after Santos’s stay in Pasargada, many things have changed in the 
Brazilian favelas. In many of them, the strategies for securing the minimal social ordering of 
community relations have been corrupted. The Brazilian favelas have seen the emergence of 
paramilitary organizations, most of them financed by drug dealers, which started to threaten the 
residents. The milícias, as they are called in Brazil, perform similar functions to the ones the 
RA used to have in Pasargada. Beyond that, they have become a parallel power to the Brazilian 
state, using force to make the interests of organized crime prevail in their territories. Most 
importantly, the milícias have started to spread their influence into the Brazilian state, 
controlling the votes of favela residents and electing politicians that support their illegal 
businesses in the favelas. In this new context, Pasargada law has surprisingly lost its appeal in 
comparison to state law under the rule of the 1988 constitution.970 In fact, some favela dwellers 
have started to regard the new context for the reproduction of legality offered by the 1988 
constitution as a powerful instrument against the innumerable violations of their human rights. 
Throughout its last 30 years, the 1988 constitution has not only showed resistance to Brazilian 
illiberalism but it has also attracted an unexpected audience for constitutional law: the 
Pasargadians themselves. Most importantly, it has turned this unexpected audience into agents 
of authentic constitutionalism within Brazilian law. Two recent examples of this fact are worth 
mentioning; they are: Marielle Franco and Jean Wyllys. 
 
Marielle Franco was born in Maré, another favela in Rio de Janeiro. Besides being poor, 
she was also black, a single mother and had a same-sex partner. Marielle assumed all these 
historically oppressed positions in Brazilian society with pride and, beyond that, ran for office 
as a city councilor in Rio de Janeiro, where she was elected in 2017. As a politician, she 
                                                 
969See this argument within studies of societal constitutionalism. See: Andreas Fischer-Lescano, Gunther Teubner, 
Regime-Kollisionen. Zur Fragmentierung des Globalen Rechts, (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2006); Gunther 
Teubner, Verfassungsfragmente. Gesellschaftlicher Konstitutionalismus in der Globalisierung, (Frankfurt am 
Main: Suhrkamp, 2012). 
970In an interview, Santos admitted that, during the Brazilian dictatorship, the favelas were among the most 
democratic places in Brazil but, with the increasing authority of the drug traders, the civil organization between 
favela dwellers has suffered severe backlashes. See: André Costa, “Boaventura Revisita Pasárgada,” Vozerio. 
Mais Vozes, Mais Rio, November 11, 2015, available at: http://vozerio.org.br/Boaventura-revisita-Pasargada. 
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advocated for the rights of poor women in the Brazilian peripheries, many of whom shared the 
same historically discriminated positions that she had. Sadly, she was murdered in 2018 by the 
paramilitary groups that are active in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro.971 Jean Wyllys is another 
example of how law became surprisingly appealing for the oppressed Brazilians. Wyllys was 
born poor in the periphery of Alagoinhas, a city in the northeast of Brazil, which is one of the 
poorest parts of the country. He struggled to get an education and, eventually, became a 
journalist. Later, he joined a TV show and, due to his national fame, ran for office as a federal 
deputy, becoming one of the first openly homosexual congressmen in Brazil. Jean was forced 
to leave Brazil, despite being elected for his third period in congress. He constantly received 
threats for advocating for LGBT people’s rights and, after his friend Marielle’s murder, decided 
it was best to leave Brazil and make opposition to the new elected Bolsonaro’s government 
from abroad.972  
 
Jean and Marielle were both well-known politicians in Brazil and their histories 
demonstrate that there is something in the new legal context offered by the 1988 constitution 
that is very appealing to individuals engaged in the fight against the eternal cycle of illiberalism 
in Brazil. This is arguably related to the emergence of global constitutionalism within Brazilian 
law. Since then, the underprivileged Brazilians have started looking at the new constitutional 
order as a powerful means of opposing their historical oppression in the country. Why did they 
stop regarding their own Pasargada laws as the best way through Brazilian society? What is 
now so appealing in constitutional law that has attracted the attention and energy of these 
disadvantaged Brazilians? I argue that the global constitutionalism framework of the 1988 
Brazilian constitution has been responsible for a new context for the reproduction of legality 
that, despite all problems offered by the persistent illiberal practices within domestic law, has 
turned democracy, human rights and the rule of law into powerful allies of the underprivileged 
in Brazil. Marielle and Jean are proof that the 1988 constitution can act as a powerful instrument 
against the never-ending cycle of illiberalism in Brazil, given that it has, for the first time, 
empowered those most affected by the illiberal practices of state authority. Most importantly, 
Marielle and Jean teach us legal scholars that constitutionalism is by itself legally 
                                                 
971Marielle was investigating the milícias when she was shot in her car in the city center of Rio de Janeiro. She 
and her driver passed out due to the shooting. After more than one year, state authorities have still not clarified all 
the circumstances of Marielle’s murder, which is arguably the most important political crime in Brazil’s 
contemporary history. 
972After spending some months in Berlin, Jean Wyllys is currently doing research at Harvard University. 
 261 
transformative and that we all should be aware of this and take responsibility for enacting 
change within our different roles in society.973  
  
Social change by means of the constitution is not only a matter of keeping faith with the 
emancipatory potential of constitutionalism. It also involves a responsibility, more specifically 
a responsibility on the part of legal authorities and, not surprisingly, of legal scholars, who have 
exercised a major influence over lawmaking and legal interpretation in Latin America. Building 
a bridge out of insular constitutionalism towards global constitutionalism is a task that lawyers 
share with other institutions and professionals within Latin American societies. This task also 
helps us understand the fact that when authorities insist on ignoring developments in 
constitutionalism around the globe, they fail at facilitating the proper evolution of 
constitutionalism. The Brazilian constitutional court has certainly failed at facilitating the 
consistent evolution of Brazilian constitutionalism when it decided that the amnesty statute was 
valid within Brazilian law. It is high time for legal authorities and scholars to work on better 
normative approaches to combat the insular evolution of domestic constitutionalism. This task 
underscores the importance of jurisprudential approaches like mixed-form theory of inter-
American judicial review. Concepts like cosmopolitan and global constitutionalism can 
arguably be useful for these necessary new jurisprudential approaches to Latin American 
constitutionalism.  
 
Legal authorities and scholars still have much work to do with regard to the evolution 
of global constitutionalism in Latin America due to several context-relevant issues like, for 
instance, the historical skepticism of Latin American people towards international 
institutions.974 Widespread populism and even obscurantism in politics are other current 
obstacles to the evolution of global constitutionalism in the region. However, the adoption and 
refinement of serious commitments to human rights, democracy and the rule of law are certainly 
not impossible tasks in Latin America. In fact, if the Pasargadians made it there, we all should 
also be able to make it. Global constitutionalism, as an innovative way of constitutional 
lawmaking and constitutional theory, is able to address more effectively the historical 
                                                 
973Authentic constitutionalism is legal transformative by itself. “Transformative constitutionalism” is, in fact, a 
redundant expression used by many public lawyers in Latin America. 
974This comes before the most recent trend against globalism. In Latin America, this skepticism against 
international institutions was already present during the 1980s and 1990s: “The underlying bias of many 
international treaties and institutions toward the ‘North’ is obviously much more present in Latin American than 
in European legal consciousness.” Armin Von Bogdandy, “Ius Constitutionale Commune en América Latina. 
Observations on Transformative Constitutionalism,” in Transformative Constitutionalism in Latin America, eds. 
Von Bogdandy et al, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 27-48, 39. 
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oppression of people in the Global South, given that it transforms them from audience members 
into agents. Legal authorities and scholars have a special responsibility in this process of 
empowering oppressed people by means of lawmaking and legal theory, skeptics 
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